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Abstract
The Logic of Escalation and the Benefits of Conventional Power Preponderance in the Nuclear
Age
Tyler John Bowen
2021
What is the value of conventional military preponderance in a nuclear world? The
possession of nuclear weapons by the world’s major power renders great power war obsolete,
and fundamental theories of how nuclear weapons affect international politics claim that
conventional capabilities matter less in a nuclear world. Yet, major powers are competing for
conventional superiority and have done so throughout the nuclear age. In particular, the United
States spends hundreds of billions of dollars to maintain aggregate conventional preponderance
over its nearest great power rivals.
Rather than label this behavior as irrational, I develop conventional options theory
examine the security benefits of conventional superiority under the shadow of nuclear weapons.
Due to the high costs of using nuclear weapons, which include the risks of retaliation as well as
their larger moral and strategic downsides, there are instances where nuclear threats may not be
credible. This may make nuclear deterrent threats ineffective, causing states to need conventional
capabilities to defend their interests. The way in which conventional capabilities bolster
bargaining power in nuclear disputes is by providing options for escalation. In each dispute, each
state has their own ladder of escalation with different rungs on that ladder that represent military
options to which it can escalate and credibly communicate to the adversary that it could win.
More rungs on the ladder of escalation equals more conventional options. The number of options
is shaped by the number of troops and equipment a state has in the area where a dispute takes
place.

i

States also have a point of resolve, or a level past which the costs of conflict outweigh the
benefits of winning the dispute. If a state has few conventional options, it is more likely to be
caught in a resolve-capability gap, or an area in which it has to decide between escalating past its
point of resolve or backing down. States face heavy pressure to back down in this situation,
especially over peripheral interests. Conventional options prevent a state from being in a resolvecapability gap and make it more likely that it will coerce its adversaries into one. Because the
costs of backing down are higher in a dispute over a core interest, conventional options should
have more of an effect in disputes over peripheral interests.
This security benefit of conventional options in a nuclear dispute incentivizes states to
possess a variety of capabilities at the global level. States know that having more conventional
options in a dispute carries a benefit. However, they are uncertain of where the next dispute will
take place. To increase their chances of having a greater number of conventional options in the
next dispute, states maintain a military force that is large, contains a diverse array of platforms, is
rapidly deployable, and is forward-deployed into multiple regions. Thus, conventional options
theory provides a rationale for the type of military force and posture adopted by the United States
since WWII.
I test this argument with a quantitative overview of all crises between nuclear states from
1961-2018 along with four case studies of nuclear crises: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin
Crisis of 1958-61, the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954-55 and 1958, and the Gulf War. Taken
together, these tests provide empirical support for the idea that conventional options bolster a
state’s bargaining power in a nuclear dispute, that this benefit is larger in peripheral disputes, and
that this means there is an incentive for states to have a wide variety of conventional capabilities
in the aggregate. I end with a grand strategy recommendation derived from conventional options
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theory. The United States should focus on deploying forces into the Western Pacific, but it can
retreat from areas where the costs of providing superior conventional options may outweigh their
benefits, such as continental Europe.
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Introduction: The Puzzle and a Preliminary Answer
What is the value of conventional military preponderance in the nuclear age? Nuclear
weapons are the most powerful tools of war ever created. Yet, countries with nuclear weapons
have worried about the conventional balance and still compete with each other for conventional
military superiority. One seminal theory in International Relations scholarship known as the
Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) would say that this competition is misguided. Nuclear
weapons are so destructive that their use hangs over any confrontation between nuclear weapons
states. The shared nuclear danger makes any large war between two nuclear weapons states too
risky to contemplate, which is why large-scale conventional war is now impossible between
major powers.1 Conventional superiority cannot be used to win wars, and it is not useful in a
crisis situation either. Due to the impossibility of war, crises in between nuclear powers become
competitions in risk-taking where the side with the greater resolve and the best brinkmanship
tactics emerges victorious.2 States can thwart the conventional superiority of their adversary by
taking steps that raise the risk of nuclear escalation, thereby negating any conventional
advantage. As Robert Jervis wrote, “being able to win a conventional war is not synonymous
with the ability to keep the war conventional.”3 Conventional forces play a role in increasing the
nuclear risk by acting as “tripwire” forces, and they could be useful in confrontations with nonnuclear adversaries. However, conventional superiority over another nuclear power does not

Waltz, Kenneth. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” Adelphi Papers, Number 171
(International Institute of Strategic Studies: 1981); Waltz, Kenneth. “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.”
American Political Science Review, 84, No. 3 (Sep. 1990): pp. 730-745; Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival:
Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988.
1

2

Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960; Arms and
Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008 (1966).
3

Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1989, 45.

1

translate into a political advantage because it cannot be used to win wars or enhance bargaining
power.
Yet, this received wisdom has not stopped the United States from spending over $700
billion on its military in order to maintain its hold on the conventional preponderance it has
enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. It has not stopped China from increasing its defense
budget by more than tenfold since 2000, with the vast majority of this spending going towards
conventional capabilities.4 Russia has also devoted tens of billions of dollars to modernizing its
conventional forces with NATO as the primary target.5 US leaders still worried about what the
Soviets could do with their conventional superiority in Europe during the Cold War. The United
States and its NATO still built up their military forces in order to close the conventional gap with
the Soviets in Europe. Despite the prediction of TNR that conventional superiority does not
translate into a political advantage, nuclear powers still compete with each other to gain
conventional superiority.
Previous nuclear scholars have challenged TNR’s hypotheses about the benefits of
conventional weapons. For instance, the advocates of the strategy of Flexible Response argued
that conventional options were necessary for defending against aggression at lower levels of
violence and for enhancing nuclear deterrence.6 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said in
1961 that “the ability to respond promptly to limited aggressions, possibly in more than one
place at the same time, can serve both to deter them and to prevent them from spreading into

4

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The SIPRI Yearbook. Stockholm: SIPRI, 2020.
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/yb20_summary_en_v2.pdf
5

IISS. Russia’s Military Modernisation: An Assessment. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020.

6

Taylor, Maxwell. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1960; Kaufmann, William. The McNamara
Strategy. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
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larger conflicts.” Furthermore, this ability to fight limited aggression would be develop via “an
increase in our non-nuclear capabilities.”7 Herman Kahn stressed that reliance on threats to
escalate to the highest rungs of the escalation ladder were ultimately too risky of a basis on
which to base defense policy.8 These critiques show that it is possible to simultaneously
recognize the deterrent power of nuclear weapons and the security benefits of conventional
military power.
Figuring out which part of the debate over the benefits of conventional military
superiority is correct matters for today’s policy debates. One major issue in US foreign policy
today is whether and to what extent the United States should deploy forces abroad and how much
it should invest in its military. Advocates of Restraint argue that the United States does not need
to deploy military forces abroad to deter major challengers such as Russia and China from
making aggressive moves to revise the regional status quo.9 Their case would be strengthened if
extended nuclear deterrence can be used to deter limited conflicts and conventional military
superiority did not carry much of a security benefit. Conversely, supporters of Deep Engagement
argue that the United States receives many benefits from deploying military forces abroad.10 This
argument would be strengthened if nuclear weapons played a small role in deterring aggression
against allies and conventional military forces played a large role in doing so. Part of the current

7

Kaufmann, 1964, 59-60.

8

Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, Revised Pelican Edition. Baltimore, MD: Penguin
Books, 1968 (1965), 14-15. Later, I adapt Kahn’s metaphor of the escalation ladder to develop conventional options
theory.
9

Posen, Barry. Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
Gholz, Eugene, Press, Daryl, and Sapolsky, Harvey. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face
of Temptation.” International Security, 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997): pp. 5-48.
10

Brooks, Stephen and Wohlforth, William. America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from
the World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016.
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grand strategy therefore hinges on the question of whether conventional military superiority
offers a security benefit under the nuclear umbrella.
To answer this question, I propose a new theory called conventional options theory. This
theory refines the theory of escalation posed by TNR. It starts with the proposition that there is a
risk of nuclear escalation in all confrontations between great powers, but it is not shared equally
across all disputes. It is hard for a nuclear state to make another state believe that it would
actually make good on its deterrent threats and use nuclear weapons due to the risk of retaliation
and wanton destruction that comes with nuclear use. This credibility problem is most acute over
peripheral interests. Where nuclear threats are less credible, they may also be ineffective.
Therefore, there are instances in which conventional capabilities will be needed to defend a
nuclear state’s interests.
The mechanism through which these conventional capabilities bolster a state’s bargaining
power is by providing its decision-makers with more credible options for the use of force.
Leaders want to avoid having to make the nuclear decision, especially over peripheral interests.
This is why they tend to eschew the brinkmanship tactics in TNR’s theory of escalation. Having
conventional options for escalation gives decision-makers military capabilities they are more
likely to use in a dispute. Conventional options therefore allow a state to stay in a dispute and in
so doing put the onus for escalation back on the adversary. If the adversary does not have
correspondingly strong conventional options, it faces pressure to back down or escalate. In a
nuclear context where escalation comes with higher risks of nuclear use, there are heavy
incentives to back down. Having greater conventional options for escalation make it more likely
that a state will be able to stay in a dispute and put pressure on its adversary to back out of it. The
side with more conventional options for escalation therefore has a bargaining advantage in a

4

nuclear dispute. This constitutes a security benefit to having more conventional options for
escalation in crises between nuclear adversaries.
The size of this security benefit, however, is conditional on the resolve states have in a
dispute. A state could choose to escalate rather than back down when faced with the choice
between the two. If a state has core interests at stake, such as survival, territorial integrity, or
control over an area with vital resources, the costs of backing down may be higher than the costs
of escalating the crisis and the risks of nuclear use such escalation entails. On the other hand, if a
state has peripheral interests at stake, its resolve is likely to be lower, and as a result the costs of
backing down will be lower than the expected costs of escalation. The benefit of conventional
options is therefore greater in disputes over peripheral interests than in ones over core interests.
A state’s local military power in the area where a dispute takes place along with its ability
to rapidly deploy forces to the area determines its available conventional options. States that
have quantitative and qualitative superiority across a relevant portfolio of military capabilities in
a dispute, or portfolio superiority, tend to have more conventional options for escalation. States
recognize this, and they are uncertain about where the next crisis will erupt. To maximize their
chances of having superior conventional options in the next crisis, states are incentivized to
develop a variety of conventional capabilities, or forces that are large, contain a diverse range of
platforms, rapidly transportable, and forward deployed. A state increases the probability that it
will have more conventional options in any given dispute by having much greater conventional
variety than any other state. Identifying the benefit of conventional capabilities in a nuclear
dispute highlights an incentive for building the type of military force that the United States
possesses today and gives a rationale for why the US would value conventional power
preponderance in the nuclear age.

5

Yet, there is also a paradox to the benefits of conventional military superiority in a
nuclear world. As noted earlier, these benefits are context-bound by the effectiveness of nuclear
deterrence. Over core interests, the costs of backing down are higher, making threats of rapid
nuclear escalation more credible. This increases the chance that an adversary will be deterred by
nuclear threats alone, allowing nuclear deterrence to substitute for conventional defenses. Over
peripheral interests, the costs of backing down are lower, which makes nuclear threats more
difficult to make credible. Because of this, the bargaining advantage from possessing superior
conventional options grows as the interests at stake in a dispute become less tied to core security
interests. This leads to a paradox wherein countries build large conventional military forces to
capture less of a security benefit than these forces could obtain in a pre-nuclear era.
An identification of the benefit of conventional military superiority in a nuclear world
gives credit to both sides of the grand strategy debate. On the one hand, there is a benefit to
forward-deployed military force. On the other hand, it applies most to disputes over peripheral
interests, which brings into question whether the benefit is worth the costs of building the
conventional forces necessary to obtain it. Which side should the United States take? The one
that emphasizes benefits or the one that emphasizes cost? There should be two considerations
that guide this answer. First, “peripheral” interests are still important; they are peripheral in
relation to the core interests of survival, territorial integrity, and the defense of strategically vital
areas. For instance, the defense of the global commons is a peripheral interest, but it is
nevertheless an important US foreign policy objective. Second, US policymakers should pay
attention to the opportunity costs of defense spending. If the requirements for building superior
conventional options in a particular peripheral area require large increases in defense spending,
then it may be better to forgo the acquisition of bargaining advantages in that area. I use these
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two points to estimate that US forward-deployed forces provide a net benefit in the South China
Sea, East China Sea, and the global commons, but not so in Eastern Europe or in the area
immediately around Taiwan.
The rest of the dissertation is devoted to laying out and testing this argument about the
benefits of conventional military superiority in the nuclear age in greater detail. In Chapter 1, I
develop conventional options theory by introducing the metaphor of the escalation ladder to
show how conventional options can ameliorate the problem of credibility associated with nuclear
deterrence while also putting pressure on an adversary to back down. I also develop and define
the necessary terms that I use in making my theory and that I will use throughout my empirical
tests.
In Chapter 2, I conduct a quantitative overview of all disputes between nuclear states
between 1961 and 2018. I measure conventional options in a dispute by gauging the
conventional balance in the area where a dispute takes place across a portfolio of relevant
conventional capabilities. This portfolio includes capabilities for war at sea, on land, and in the
air. States with portfolio superiority tend to have more conventional options in a dispute. I then
correlate this measure of local conventional superiority with dispute outcomes. I also interact this
measure of conventional superiority with the stakes involved in a dispute. I find support for both
aspects of conventional options theory. More conventional options in a dispute gives a state a
greater chance of coming out ahead in a nuclear dispute and this effect is greater in disputes over
peripheral interests.
Chapters 3-6 cover case studies of specific nuclear crises to show how conventional
options and the stakes involved interacted to affect the crisis outcome. Chapter 3 highlights the
key role of America’s superior conventional options in bringing about a successful outcome in

7

the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapter 4 details how limited US conventional capabilities coupled
with the core interest of protecting West Berlin allowed the US to successfully defend the status
quo in the Berlin Crisis. Chapter 5 covers the Taiwan Strait Crises and how the United States’
improved conventional capabilities in the Taiwan Strait allowed it to do better in the second
crisis. Chapter 6 shows how the theory applies to crises without a nuclear shadow, and it shows
that the benefit of conventional preponderance for the United States lay in the ability to put
superior conventional options in a peripheral theater in a short amount of time.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the theory and key findings, highlighting
the degree to which the quantitative overview and individual case studies supported conventional
options theory. It then goes into the implications of conventional options theory for US grand
strategy. It shows that the fact that the largest benefit of conventional superiority occurs in
peripheral disputes means that US policymakers need to be attuned to the opportunity costs of
defense spending. Using this framework, I assess that conventional capabilities provide a net
benefit in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the global commons, but they may not in
Eastern Europe.

8

Chapter 1: A Theory of Escalation and the Benefits of Conventional Preponderance in the
Nuclear Age

What is the value of conventional power preponderance in the nuclear age? The United
States allocated $730 billion to the Department of Defense in fiscal year 2020.11 This is nearly
three times more than its closest military rival, China, which spent $261 billion in 2019, and
more than ten times the amount of another large adversary, Russia, which spent $65 billion in
2019.12 The United States is using its large defense budget to procure new tactical air platforms
such as the F-35 joint-strike fighter and the F-15EX, the Arleigh Burke class of destroyers with
the Aegis Weapons System, and strengthened C4ISR (command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), which indicates an emphasis on the
ability to fight and win conventional conflicts against peer competitors.13 The 2018 National
Defense Strategy (NDS) stresses that the primary focus of the United States should be to build a
military force that can take control of the battlespace in conflicts against great power rivals.14 For
their part, China and Russia are also building up their conventional military strength to contest
the United States. China increased its defense budget by 3 percent annually between 2008 and
2017 with the intent to build capabilities that would directly challenge US conventional military

Gould, Joe. “Pentagon Finally Gets its 2020 Budget from Congress.” Defense News, December 19, 2019.
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/12/19/pentagon-finally-gets-its-2020-budget-from-congress/
11

SIPRI. “Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2018) US$ (millions).” SIPRI, 2020.
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%20i
n%20constant%20%282018%29%20USD.pdf
12

13

There is, however, some mismatch between the budget items and the priorities of the NDS. For this, see CSIS.
“What to Look for in the FY 2020 Defense Budget Request.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. January
31, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-look-fy-2020-defense-budget-request
Department of Defense. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge.” US Department of Defense,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
14

9

power in the Western Pacific through an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.15 Russia has
modernized its tactical combat aircraft and armor while investing in precision-strike capabilities
and integrated air defense systems that could force NATO to fight a long, costly war.16
All of this conventional competition is taking place in a context in which all three
countries have the potential to inflict catastrophic damage on the other with their nuclear
arsenals.17 The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that this condition of Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD) makes large-scale conventional war among great powers
unthinkable.18 The likelihood of escalation to general nuclear war, and therefore sure destruction,
is too high for nuclear states to get involved in major conventional wars with each other. Indeed,
since 1945, there has been no large conventional wars between nuclear powers. This fact has
been used by Kenneth Waltz to assert that the “the probability of major war among states having
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nuclear weapons approaches zero”19 and by John Lewis Gaddis to argue that nuclear weapons
were responsible for “the long peace” between the United States and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War.20 The nuclear danger that hovers over relations among nuclear states should therefore
reduce the salience of the conventional military balance. As Robert Jervis argues,
“[conventional] military capability is not a good predictor of national behavior or international
outcomes…”21 What matters to states in the nuclear age is the risk of nuclear escalation, and one
does not need to have conventional superiority to make this risk salient.
If TNR is right, then why are China, Russia, and the United States engaging in a
conventional arms race? Questions of high-level grand strategy and middle-range theories of
nuclear crisis bargaining are tied together. Understanding the role of conventional capabilities in
nuclear crises can give scholars insight on the incentives the United States has for maintaining its
conventional military preponderance.22 To date, no study has explicitly connected these two
strands of scholarship. To address this gap, I show how conventional capabilities can help states
fare better in disputes with nuclear adversaries and how this incentivizes states to build large and
diversified conventional military forces.
The logic of conventional superiority in the nuclear age lies in having options for
escalation in instances where nuclear threats may not be effective. Nuclear use comes with the
prospect of retaliation, and even when it does not, it generates significant normative and strategic
costs. The costs of using nuclear weapons are so high that it is hard to justify their use. This
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brings up a problem of credibility, especially when it comes to extended deterrence. Would, for
example, the United States be willing to risk the fate of New York City to extend its nuclear
protection over Tallinn in the case of a Russian attack? This is unlikely, and it shows that over
certain objectives, a state may need to rely on its conventional capabilities. To show how
conventional capabilities create a bargaining advantage in a nuclear dispute, I develop a theory
of the utility of conventional options for escalation. This theory starts from the observation that if
a nuclear state has no conventional capabilities with which to protect a given security interest, it
could be faced with a choice between escalating past its level of resolve or backing down.
Conventional options for escalation close this “resolve-capability gap,” allowing a state to stay in
a dispute over a given objective and forcing the onus for escalation back on its adversary. I
define a conventional option for escalation as a military mission that you can credibly
communicate to your adversary that you are likely to successfully execute. The number of
conventional options available to a state in a dispute is shaped by the local conventional balance
in the area where a dispute takes place. The state in a dispute with “portfolio superiority,” or an
advantage in numbers and quality across a range of platforms, in the region tends to be able to
perform more military missions. The side with more conventional options for escalation, or the
ability to perform more military missions than its opponent, is more likely to be able to press its
claims in a dispute through the use of force and convince its adversary to back down. The
balance in the number of conventional options available to each side therefore shapes the balance
of bargaining power in a nuclear dispute.
This benefit applies most to disputes over peripheral issues. Over core interests, a state is
more likely to be able to credibly communicate that the costs and risks of escalating past its level
of resolve, or “over-escalation,” are lower than the costs of backing down. This makes nuclear

12

deterrent threats more credible and therefore more effective. Over peripheral issues, nuclear
threats will be more difficult to make credible and therefore may not be effective. It is here that
conventional options for escalation will provide their greatest benefit to a state’s bargaining
position. At the global level, the benefit of having conventional options for escalation and the
requirements for building them in a particular dispute incentivizes states to build a variety of
conventional capabilities. I define the variety of conventional capabilities as the number and
quality of different types of conventional platforms a state possesses across all theaters. States
are uncertain about where and when the next dispute will take place, and in order to meet the
variety of contingencies they could face, they develop a large, diversified, technologically
sophisticated, rapidly transportable, and forward-deployed conventional military in order to have
conventional options in those contingencies. This creates a paradox of conventional superiority
in the nuclear age. In order to capture the security benefits of having conventional options in a
particular dispute, states need to spend large sums on defense in peacetime in order to be able to
project power into several areas around the globe. These high levels of defense spending go to
capturing bargaining advantages over peripheral security interests.
This paper proceeds in five parts. First, I review the literature over the question of the
utility of conventional military power in relations among nuclear powers. Second, I use the
metaphor of the ladder of escalation to demonstrate the logic of how conventional options for
escalation can ameliorate the problem of credibility and provide a bargaining advantage to a state
in a nuclear dispute. Third, I apply my theoretical framework to the Kargil War by way of
illustration. Fourth, I discuss how the logic of the theory leads states to build a variety of
conventional capabilities and how it creates a paradox of conventional military superiority in the
nuclear age. I end with a brief conclusion summarizing my argument and its predictions.
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Theories of Escalation and the Benefits of Conventional Superiority
Seminal works on the effect of nuclear weapons on international politics stress that
conventional military superiority does not add to a state’s bargaining power in the nuclear age.
Thomas Schelling, in his work on nuclear deterrence, argues that having conventional superiority
plays little role in enhancing the credibility of a state’s security commitments.23 Schelling states
that because nuclear weapons are so destructive, a small probability that they may be used is
enough to deter conflict. States threaten to escalate a conflict to a point at which nuclear weapons
might be used; they make “threats that leave something to chance.” An effective way to make
these threats is to position conventional troops such that they have to be engaged by an adversary
at the outset of a conflict. The mission of these troops is not to win but to act as a “plate-glass
window” or “tripwire” that triggers a greater conflict. Once these troops are killed, the odds of an
intense conflict where nuclear weapons could be used increase.24 Indeed, the deaths of a
country’s soldiers could trigger a desire for revenge that goes beyond rational calculations,
further increasing the odds that a “threat that leaves something to chance” could escalate to
nuclear war.25
If conventional forces are mostly good for their “tripwire” effect, then states can
manipulate the nuclear danger inherent in the use of force without conventional superiority.
Scholars of the Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) use this insight to argue that
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conventional superiority is not of much value in the nuclear age.26 “If the arguments about the
nuclear revolution are correct,” Jervis writes, “there should be only tenuous links between the
details of the military balance and political outcomes…What matters is not nuclear superiority or
the exact nuclear balance, but the nuclear danger.”27 The United States thus does not need
conventional superiority to deter the Soviet Union from attacking NATO allies despite the
USSR’s “increased ability to fight a conventional war in Europe.”28 Kenneth Waltz provides an
even more forceful take on the irrelevance of conventional capabilities in conflicts between
nuclear powers: “Conventional forces have only a narrow role in any confrontation between
nuclear states over vital interests, since fighting beyond the trip wire level serves no useful
purpose. Enlarging conventional capabilities does nothing to strengthen deterrence.”29 By
employing threats of brinkmanship, nuclear states can remind their adversaries of the damage
they can inflict with their secure second-strike capabilities. Nuclear threats are thus useful for
deterring conventional attacks, and there is little need for conventional military superiority.
TNR scholars base their argument about the irrelevance of conventional superiority on a
particular theory of escalation. Escalation refers to the process through which states intensify
conflicts such that they “cross thresholds considered significant by one or more of the
participants.”30 Because states regard the nuclear threshold as salient, analysis of escalation
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dynamics explores how the prospect of going from conventional to nuclear war affects state
behavior. TNR’s theory of escalation is that the threat of nuclear catastrophe looms so large that
it deters great powers from engaging in low-level conventional conflicts. Jervis writes that “the
United States risks destruction in any war with the USSR, even if the United States is successful
in immediate military terms.”31 The possibility of escalating to nuclear rungs on the escalation
ladder serves as a disincentive for states to engage in conventional conflicts. In the nuclear age,
the “ability to win a conventional war is not synonymous with the ability to keep the war
conventional.”32 In a similar vein, Waltz argues that “everyone knows that anyone can quickly
move to the top rung of the ladder.”33 The fear of rapid escalation to the nuclear level prevents
great powers from initiating conventional conflicts. This strips away the utility of conventional
military superiority among nuclear powers.
One could have an alternative theory of escalation in which superiority at conventional
levels of escalation allow a state to better manipulate its adversary’s fear of nuclear war. Herman
Kahn, in his seminal study of how states could go from pre-crisis bargaining all the way up to
all-out nuclear war, provided such a theory of escalation.34 Kahn devised the metaphor of the
“escalation ladder” in which each rung represented a more intense form of conflict than the
previous one. Kahn’s ladder had 44 rungs, and over half of them included some form of nuclear
use. Kahn also quoined the term “escalation dominance” to describe the ability to escalate to any
level of conflict and win. While I disagree with Kahn’s argument that “escalation dominance” is
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necessary for deterrence (a point on which I expand later), he did usefully employ the concept to
show that states can use superiority in one area of the escalation ladder to prevent escalation to
areas in which they are deficient. For example, a state could “make sufficiently credible threats
of going higher” on the escalation ladder in order to prevent a challenge at the lower-level
rungs.35 Kahn warned that the United States should not “rely on this tactic too heavily” due to the
risk of nuclear escalation, and if one takes this risk, “one may be unlucky and lose the gamble.”36
Instead of consistently threatening to cross the nuclear threshold, the United States should
put it as high as possible, threatening and using lower-level conventional force in an attempt to
win conflicts without risking nuclear conflict. Because the United States and its allies had greater
aggregate economic and military strength than the Warsaw Pact, such a strategy would be to
their advantage: “With only modest capabilities in being and adequate mobilization bases, we
could in the long run deliver more tons of ammunition and other supplies to any spot on the earth
than any possible enemy could do. If we made sufficient but reasonable preparations, we could
possibly do so in the short run as well.”37 As evidence for this argument, Kahn pointed to
President Kennedy’s use of naval power during the Cuban Missile Crisis: “The willingness to go
to Rung 12 (large conventional war) may have sharply decreased the probability of a future
escalation to much higher rungs.”38 Kahn thus supported a theory of escalation in which
dominance at lower conventional levels could forestall nuclear escalation and be a source of
strength to a nuclear-armed state.
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These contending theories of escalation have implications for the benefits of conventional
military superiority at the global level. Charles Glaser applies the theory of escalation inherent in
TNR to the question to examining the benefit of unipolarity. As he points out, calculating the
security benefits of unipolarity depends on assessing the value of conventional superiority in
disputes between nuclear adversaries.39 Due to its favorable geography of two ocean borders and
a strong nuclear arsenal, the United States can defend its territory without having conventional
superiority. Conventional troops in or near the territory of major allies can play the role of
“communicating the extent of the US commitment” to that ally, thus strengthening the credibility
of nuclear deterrence.40 Moreover, these conventional forces need not be superior in order to
signify American commitment to an ally’s defense. This leads Glaser to conclude that
conventional military preponderance has little to no added value in securing a state’s interests in
the nuclear age. Daniel Deudney makes a similar argument, saying “the nuclear shadow makes
improbable the exercise of conventional military force to achieve potential outcomes.”41
The benefits of conventional preponderance in the nuclear age hinges on whether Kahn’s
theory of escalation or that of TNR’s is correct. Robert Powell’s recent work on brinkmanship
and limited war argues that these theories of escalation are context-bound.42 Powell examines in
what contexts conventional capabilities are likely to have an impact in crises among nuclear
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states. Powell uses a brinkmanship model similar to Schelling’s, but he adds as a variable the
trade-off between power and risk. In Powell’s model, the more power one brings to bear in a
nuclear crisis, the greater risk of escalation to the nuclear level. The deterring state chooses how
sharp this trade-off will be.43 If it is stark, then the challenger cannot bring more power to bear
without running great risks of nuclear escalation. If it is light, then the challenger can bring a lot
of power while not risking nuclear escalation. Important to Powell’s model is that while the
deterring state can choose how sharply to make the trade-off, the ability for it to do so is shaped
by outside factors. Variables exogenous to the model such as force posture and the interests at
stake determine the range of potential risk that the deterring state can exploit.
To illustrate the concept of potential risk, Powell uses the metaphor of calm, rough, and
heavy seas.44 In calm seas, there is little a deterring state can do to raise the risk of nuclear
escalation, meaning that both states can “stand up” in the canoe and fight with little worry of
capsizing. In rough seas, the deterring state can manipulate the risk of capsizing such that the
challenging state cannot stand up but must “sit down” to fight. In heavy seas, the risk of
capsizing is very high, and that is when confrontations come down to the balance of resolve
rather than power. The utility of conventional military power is contingent on the degree of
escalation inherent in the use of force. If it is low, then the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation
is low, and there is a lot of room for nuclear states to engage in conventional conflict. They can
“stand up” in the canoe. Powell shows that Kahn’s approach and TNR’s approach to escalation
both have merit, and the central question is in what context do each of the theories apply. The
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fact that conventional capabilities could be useful in some nuclear disputes means that
conventional superiority at the global level could also be beneficial.
Moreover, Powell’s analysis further points to the possibility that conventional military
superiority provides a benefit by allowing a state to use its conventional capabilities across
multiple contexts. In contexts where many major crises between nuclear states happen in “rough
seas,” the ability to win at lower levels of conventional conflict may be more important than
winning at the highest levels. However, current analyses of nuclear crises do not measure a
conventional force’s ability to perform missions at different levels of conflict. For example, in
his analysis of nuclear crises, Matthew Kroenig finds no benefit for having greater conventional
capabilities.45 Using a dataset of crises involving nuclear-weapons states that includes only
compellent threats, Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann find that conventional military power
does not contribute to making successful coercive threats.46 The studies by Kroening and Sechser
and Fuhrmann use CINC scores as measures of conventional capability, but this aggregate
measure of economic potential and productivity obscures local variations in the balance of power
that may be more important in a short-term crisis. Using a more fine-grained conception of
conventional military power could lead to a different conclusion about the utility of conventional
capabilities in a nuclear crisis. To explore this possibility, I turn to my theory of conventional
options.
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A Theory of the Benefits of Conventional Superiority in Nuclear Crises
I start my theory by first noting that nuclear deterrence comes with a problem of
credibility.47 The first use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear adversary risks heavy damage if
not annihilation to the state. Aside from this, the use of nuclear weapons also carries with it the
possibility of international condemnation and the erosion of a “tradition” of non-use that has
served to keep relations among nuclear states stable for the past seven decades.48 The high costs
of using nuclear weapons mean that it can be hard to justify the costs of nuclear use and thus
make the threat to use nuclear weapons believable. The effectiveness of threats to use nuclear
weapons is correlated with their credibility. In places where the problem of credibility is most
acute, nuclear deterrence is least likely to be effective. Where credibility is easier to establish,
nuclear deterrence is more effective.
I posit that the level of credibility of nuclear deterrence is shaped by the type of threat a
state could use nuclear deterrence to thwart. To describe the range of threats states could face, I
first assume that a state’s ultimate security goal is survival. Above all else, it wants to survive as
an independent, sovereign entity. The core of realist IR theory assumes that states have an
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“irreducible minimum” goal of survival.49 There are other goals that states aim for other than
survival. States want to secure their economic well-being, the spread of their style of domestic
government, and the survival of their allies, among other priorities. However, all other goals are
subordinate to survival, and the achievement of those goals contribute to ensuring it. A state’s
national security policy thus attempts to secure a state from threats to its survival. The national
interest is the set of priorities that, if fulfilled, would achieve such security.
Survival as the ultimate goal is an as-if assumption used to highlight the nature of threats
states face in the international system.50 All threats can be described in their relation to a state’s
survival. Threats can either directly or indirectly impinge on survival. Those that directly affect
survival are any threats that could destroy a state or a regime entirely. These include a nuclear
attack by a large nuclear power or a conventional attack by a much more powerful adversary. It
could also include the rise of an aggressive regional hegemon, which does not immediately
threaten survival but could in the near future. The most prominent example of an indirect threat
is the danger posed by the growth of Nazi Germany to the United States’ national security. In
1940-41, the fall of the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union to Nazi Germany would not have
directly led to an invasion and conquest of the United States. However, such events would have
created an unchecked hegemon in Europe that could have used its enormous power against the
United States in the future. This fear of a currently indirect threat but future direct threat partially
explains why the United States provided assistance to the UK and then was part of the reason it
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later joined the war in Europe.51 Indirect threats are those that harm important foreign policy
goals but do not immediately jeopardize a state’s survival. These threats could include the
expansion of your adversary’s economic and political system, the de-legitimation of your style of
governance around the world, or your main adversary acquiring a new weapons system. Direct
and indirect threats to survival are not two strict types, but two ends of a continuum. I label
threats in the half of the continuum that is closer to a direct relationship with survival “core”
security threats, and threats in the other half closer to the most indirect relationship possible I
label “peripheral.”
The illustration of the types of threats helps to identify where nuclear deterrence is most
credible, and hence most effective. Against core threats that directly affect a state’s survival,
threats to use nuclear weapons are quite believable. For peripheral threats that have only a
tenuous relationship with survival, threats to use nuclear weapons are not credible and may be
ineffective. This shapes the space in which conventional military capabilities are relevant.
Nuclear deterrence achieves a security objective through the threat of punishment. Instead of
defending a given interest by threatening to deny the adversary the ability to achieve her
objective, a state defends its interest by threatening to punish the adversary with the use of
nuclear weapons.52 If a threat to use nuclear weapons is sufficiently credible, then a state can
achieve a security objective without the need for conventional forces. Nuclear deterrence can
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substitute for conventional defense.53 Over core threats, the risk of rapid escalation during a
conventional conflict is high, making nuclear deterrence highly credible and conventional forces
unnecessary. States are fighting in the “heavy” seas described by Powell. Against threats in the
periphery, escalation can be more calculated, meaning nuclear deterrence may not be credible
and states may need to use conventional forces to achieve their objectives. This is where states
may be fighting in “calm” seas.
This insight is not new. The limits of nuclear deterrence and the subsequent need for
conventional capabilities in “peripheral” or “limited” conflicts was the basis for the strategy of
Flexible Response. What older works did not specify, however, was how conventional military
forces would provide a security benefit in disputes with nuclear adversaries. Showing the
mechanisms through which conventional military power affects dispute outcomes between
nuclear powers helps identify exactly what the benefit of conventional military superiority is. It
also shows the best way to measure the conventional balance between nuclear rivals. I will show
the process of how conventional military superiority provides a security benefit by analyzing the
dynamics of escalation from conventional to nuclear conflict. To do this, I will use the metaphor
of the escalation ladder.54
Figure 1.1 shows my version of the escalation ladder in the abstract. As one moves higher
up the escalation ladder, the more intense conflict becomes. For the sake of simplicity, I focus
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only on the conventional areas of the ladder, and the very top of it represents the nuclear
threshold.55 Each rung on the escalation ladder represents a conventional military mission that a
state can credibly communicate to its adversary that it can execute.56 An escalation ladder is
unique to a particular state. Some states have several rungs on the escalation ladder and others
have few. States can have a different number of conventional options for escalation. The number
of conventional options is represented by the number of rungs a state possesses on the escalation
ladder. The number of conventional options is relative to a particular adversary in a particular
area, making it a local-level measure of the different capabilities a state has on-hand in a dispute.
Having one escalation ladder represent a crisis participant rather than the crisis as a whole allows
me to introduce the variable of the “number of conventional options.”57 The state that has
“portfolio superiority,” or superiority across a range of weapons platforms and domains, in the
dispute area will have more conventional options in the dispute. This means that the balance in
conventional options can be estimated by measuring the local conventional military balance
across several weapons platforms on land, in the air, and at sea. A state can bring forces from

An analysis of whether there can be any meaningful degrees of intensity of nuclear war – whether it can be kept
limited – is beyond the scope of this paper. There may be several rungs beyond the nuclear threshold or few, and
conventional conflict can continue once nuclear weapons have been used.
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abroad into the local theater during a dispute. Below, I show how this affects the logic of the
theory and the research design.
These different military missions correspond to the different objectives for which a state
could fight and the different intensities of conflict at which they could fight over those
objectives. To achieve a certain policy goal, a country may find it useful to be able to fight a
limited air war where you establish a “no-fly zone” or a strategic air war where you need to
suppress enemy air defenses and destroy political targets.58 For other goals, a country may find it
Figure 1.1: The Ladders of Escalation59
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threat of a ground invasion was helpful in that operation, too.
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useful to fight a large ground war.60 In some conflicts, a state may need to open up fighting in a
new domain or a new geographic area. Such “horizontal escalation” represents an increased cost
of fighting and may increase the risk of nuclear use. The increased cost could come from greater
destruction inflicted by forces in the new domain, more investment of resources by the state, or
the psychological signal of crossing a certain geographic or domain-specific boundary that
served as a “focal point” to limit conflict.61 Going into another domain therefore represents a step
up on the escalation ladder in my theoretical framework. For example, if North Korea responded
to US air strikes on its missile testing sites with a cyberattack against the American energy grid,
this would constitute a step up the escalation ladder. This theory of escalation can therefore apply
to questions of cross-domain deterrence that are gaining increasing attention.62
I first show the abstract version of the escalation ladder to illustrate how possessing more
conventional options for escalation in a dispute can confer a bargaining advantage in a nuclear
dispute. States that can perform several military missions against an adversary in the area where
a dispute is taking place have more rungs on their escalation ladder and less average distance
between them. States that can perform fewer military missions against their adversary in a
dispute have fewer rungs on their escalation ladder and greater average distance between them.
In Figure 1.1, the ladder on the left represents a state with fewer conventional options, and the
ladder on the right represents a state with more conventional options. Possessing more
conventional options in a dispute confers a bargaining advantage because it allows a state to use
force that is congruent with its level of resolve. In Figure 1.1, the red dotted line represents
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“resolve” and brackets pointing out a state’s “resolve-capability gap.” I define “resolve” as the
costs a state is willing to pay to win a particular conflict. 63 The “point of resolve” is the point
after which the benefits of winning the dispute outweigh the costs of fighting. In my framework,
costs need not be material or immediate. It can include any domestic punishment for
hawkishness, increased strain with allies, or greater risk of nuclear use. Resolve does not operate
intersubjectively. The state does not need to know the adversary’s level of resolve to gauge what
uses of force would lie below its own point of resolve and vice versa.
The “resolve-capability gap” is the space between the point of resolve and the first level
of conventional conflict that lies below it. If an adversary escalates to a level of conventional
conflict in this space, a state will have to choose between escalating to a point at which the
dispute becomes too expensive or backing down. In the nuclear age, one potential disutility from
“over-escalation” is the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction that entails. Thus, states
caught in a resolve-capability gap have to choose between two disutilities and face heavy
pressure to back down.
This is why states with more conventional options for escalation should be more
successful in disputes with their nuclear adversaries. By success, I mean the ability to accomplish
your primary objectives in a nuclear dispute. In each crisis, a state has primary and secondary
goals. A primary goal is what the crisis actors themselves identify as the main issue they want
resolved in their favor during the crisis. A secondary goal is any goal that is related to the main
goal or that is brought up in the course of the dispute. A successful dispute outcome is any
outcome in which the state achieves its primary goal(s). A defeat in a crisis constitutes failure to
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achieve the primary goal. Achieving a secondary goal while not achieving a primary goal is akin
to a “face-saving” failure. Compromising on secondary goals while achieving a primary one
would be a “qualified success” as opposed a “total success” involving no compromise at all.
Finally, a draw is an outcome in which both sides partially achieve their primary goal or the
issues go unresolved. That the outcome of a crisis is not binary and that there are degrees of
success and failure within the two ends of an outcome is recognized by the International Crisis
Behavior dataset. This dataset codes states as achieving most, part, or none of its basic goals, or
having the dispute go unresolved.64
To see why a state with more conventional options is likely to be more successful in a
nuclear dispute, imagine a scenario in which the two states with the escalation ladders
represented in Figure 1.1 entered into a dispute. A state with a greater variety of conventional
capabilities, represented by the right-hand ladder in Figure 1.1, has a smaller resolve-capability
gap and thus faces less pressure to back down in a conflict. By contrast, a state with a low variety
of conventional capabilities, represented by the ladder on the left-hand side of Figure 1.1, is more
likely to find itself in a resolve-capability gap. There are more types of conventional conflict
between its maximum level of escalation and its point of resolve. It will be more likely to need to
choose between over-escalating and backing down. It will therefore be more likely to face
pressure to back down in a crisis. In order to credibly commit to stay in a dispute with a nuclear
adversary, a nuclear-armed state needs to make its capabilities congruent with its resolve. In
disputes where the interest at stake may not justify nuclear use, this means having conventional
options that can defeat the adversary’s forces in a limited conflict.
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These conventional options can contribute to general nuclear deterrence over an
objective. Against a state with several conventional options, the adversary knows that it cannot
win in less intense forms of conventional conflict. The adversary therefore realizes that it in
order to win the dispute, it cannot rely on a quick fait accompli or salami tactics. It will have to
escalate to a point that may be past its resolve or to a level of conflict where nuclear use may be
more credible.65 Thus, by forcing the adversary to consider higher rungs of escalation,
conventional options lower on the escalation ladder bolster the credibility of nuclear threats. This
happens because the need to escalate to higher areas of the escalation ladder make the adversary
think that nuclear escalation is a more likely prospect than it would be if the use of force could
stay at lower areas of the escalation ladder. I call this the “negative effect” of conventional
escalation options. In some situations, successful conventional options for defense can substitute
for nuclear deterrence; in others, they enhance it.
A larger number of conventional options also allows a state to exert pressure on its
adversary during a crisis, contributing to immediate deterrence. When faced with a challenge
from an adversary, the state with conventional options can choose to escalate to a given
conventional level. Such a move may put the adversary into a resolve-capability gap, especially
if the adversary has a lesser number of conventional options. In response to a provocation,
greater conventional capabilities allow a state to put the onus for nuclear escalation back on the
adversary. Putting the pressure to escalate on the adversary is exactly the strategy articulated by

The fait accompli is a common way for territory to change hands in international politics, see Altman, Dan. “By
Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries.” International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 61 (2017): pp. 881-891. Previous work identifies one source of a fait accompli as an information problem
where the challenger is unsure of the defender’s resolve or capabilities to resist the fait accompli and make it costly.
See Tarar, Ahmer. “A Strategic Logic of the Military Fait Accompli.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60
(2016): pp. 742-752. I am saying here that the ability to fight a low-intensity conventional conflict is important in
resisting and therefore preventing a fait accompli.
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Schelling’s brinkmanship theory, and my theory points out that this strategy is more effective
with conventional capabilities that could plausibly defeat an adversary in limited conflict rather
than merely signal commitment.66 I call this the “positive effect” of greater conventional options.
Table 1.1 below summarizes the main logic of conventional options theory.

Table 1.1: Overview of Conventional Options Theory
Independent Variable

Mechanisms

Dependent Variable

Mediating Effect

Conventional options
– measured by the
number of military
missions a state’s
military forces can
credibly
communicate that it
could successfully
execute in a crisis

Negative Effect –
greater conventional
variety makes threats
to fight more credible
by closing state’s
resolve-capability
gap
Coercive Effect –
allows a state to put
adversary in a
resolve-capability
gap

Dispute outcome
against nuclear
adversaries – states
with more
conventional options
are more likely to
find success

Impact of
conventional options
are greater in disputes
over peripheral
interests

In the final cell of Table 1.1, I point out a logical consequence of conventional options
theory: an advantage in conventional options should confer its greatest benefits on the periphery
of the threat space. The threat space is defined as the set of potential disturbances that could
impact interests more indirectly tied to a state’s survival. This correlates with geography, as
interests in the near abroad tend to be more tied to survival than those far overseas, but this
correlation is not perfect. The deterrent benefit of conventional options is the ability to not have
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to choose between over-escalation and backing down, and the coercive benefit lies in forcing the
adversary to consider this. The costs of backing down over threats indirect to survival are not as
high as conceding an issue more direct to survival. For peripheral threats, it is harder to justify
running the risks of over-escalation to avoid the costs of backing down. By contrast, for threats
to a core interest, or those closer to survival, the downsides of risking nuclear escalation may be
less detrimental than the costs of backing down. It is therefore easier to make threats of rapid
nuclear escalation more credible for threats closer to survival.
This is not a controversial point. It certainly applies to the distinction between symmetric
and asymmetric escalation in nuclear deterrence. There is little doubt that a nuclear state would
respond to the use of nuclear weapons by its adversary with nuclear retaliation.67 The problem of
credibility of nuclear deterrence comes into play when an adversary makes a challenge at the
conventional level over an issue a state declared that it would use nuclear weapons to defend.
Herman Kahn contended that in conventional conflicts that one is losing, it may be better to take
the loss now rather than use nuclear weapons in an attempt to win in the short-term.68 This is
another way of saying that the dangers of backing down may not be worth the risks associated
with escalation to nuclear conflict.
Among instances of asymmetric escalation, there is variation in the costs of backing
down versus the costs of escalation. If an adversary challenges a core interest at the conventional
level, then asymmetric escalation is much more credible. This is why conventionally superior

In fact, any doubt comes from scenarios that include accidental, one-time use or “demonstration” strikes that are
meant only to showcase the power of nuclear weapons. For more on these less likely scenarios, see Quester, George.
Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
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states find it hard to threaten invasion against a weaker state armed with nuclear weapons. If
India launched a large-scale conventional attack against Pakistan, it is almost certain that the
latter would use nuclear weapons against Indian troops.69 But if a peripheral interest is
challenged at the conventional level, nuclear use is not likely to be a credible response. This is
why the use of nuclear weapons is not currently a factor in the US response to China’s
provocations in the South China Sea.70 Any threat to use nuclear weapons first to defend a
peripheral interest may not be believed, and the adversary is likely to challenge it. As I describe
in more detail later, this is what arguably happened in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
For threats to a state’s core interests, the costs of backing down are high, and thus the
threat to run the risks of rapid nuclear escalation is more credible. The state does not need to
solve the problem of credibility by possessing options for conventional escalation. For threats to
peripheral interests, or those that are more indirect to survival, the problem of credibility looms
larger. The state will need to bolster its defense by building conventional options for escalation.
These options can help the state avoid the difficult choice between over-escalation and backing
down and force the adversary to consider escalation to intolerably high levels. This leads to the
second major hypothesis of the theory: the benefit of conventional options will be greatest for the
achievement of peripheral interests.
The interaction between the stakes involved in the crisis and the utility of conventional
options brings up an endogeneity problem with testing the effect of conventional superiority. As
stated previously, states can deploy capabilities from elsewhere in the world to an area where a
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dispute is taking place to increase the number of conventional options available. However, this is
costly to do, since it requires taking forces from an area in which the state wants to accomplish
other interests. Therefore, states are more likely to deploy outside capabilities to the area of a
dispute when they have higher resolve. The level of conventional options will therefore correlate
positively with the level of resolve in a dispute. If high resolve states will also tend to have a
high level of conventional variety, could it be possible that the balance of resolve is doing all the
work in variety of capabilities theory? To illustrate the endogeneity problem, I make the causal
graph below in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Effect of Resolve within a Dispute
Deployability

Resolve

Local Military Balance

Conventional Variety

Outcome

This graph shows that, to account for resolve, I can examine cases in which each side in
the dispute has similar stakes involved. I cannot control for resolve itself since it is unobservable,
but it is possible to label the stakes involved in a dispute for a state. Is it fighting over core or
peripheral interests? States are likely to have lower resolve in disputes over peripheral interests
than they do in disputes over core ones. There is a direct pathway from resolve to outcome and
minimizing the difference in the importance of the stakes involved in a dispute should minimize
the effect of this pathway. In addition, if states have similar stakes involved in a dispute, they
should be willing to deploy a similar level of forces from outside the area of the dispute to the
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local theater. Therefore, examining disputes in which each side has similar stakes involved is a
way to address the endogeneity problem presented by the correlation of resolve and conventional
options. The observed difference in capabilities deployed in these disputes should come from the
difference in the deployability of their forces.71 An implication of this research strategy is that it
makes the ability to transport forces from outside the local theater into a determinant of
conventional options.
Figure 1.2 also highlights another way in which the variety of conventional capabilities
influences dispute outcomes according to a state’s resolve. When a state has high levels of
resolve, it is willing to deploy forces from other areas to win, but its ability to do so is shaped by
its ability to project power abroad and the forces it has in the local area. If a state has high
resolve, weak local forces, and little ability to augment those forces, it can have a hard time
communicating its resolve and thus using high resolve as a bargaining advantage. In this
scenario, conventional options act as the key mechanism through which resolve leads to better
dispute outcomes. Without access to that mechanism, states with high resolve may not be able to
attain bargaining leverage, even against adversaries with lower resolve if those adversaries have
superior conventional options.72 The implication of this is that among states with more at stake in
a dispute, those with greater conventional options should see more success.
When states have low resolve, then they are not willing to deploy a lot of forces to the
area, taking the deployability of their forces out of the equation. Their resolve is also unlikely to
play a direct role in producing the outcome of the dispute. This means that the local balance of

The “deployability” of a force is a function of its airlift and sealift capabilities, and states can have varying
qualities of these transport capabilities. For more, see Lesser, Ian. “The Mobility Triad: Airlift, Sealift, and PrePositioning in American Strategy.” The RUSI Journal, 136, No. 1 (1986): pp. 31-35.
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military power and the options for conventional escalation these locally deployed capabilities
generate operate as the main cause of the dispute outcome. Of course, it is necessary to examine
cases where both sides have low resolve relative to other issues. In these cases, neither side is
likely to have a lot of local capabilities deployed in the area of the dispute, which is likely to be
of peripheral interest. However, in this area, the marginal superiority in conventional options for
escalation could have quite a large effect on determining who wins the dispute. This is another
reason for why I claim that the effect of conventional variety is more pronounced for issues on
the periphery.
Given the different pathways through which conventional variety can affect a dispute
outcome, am I setting up a situation where I can make every case a “just-so” story? No, because
there are ways to test if the above casual graph is an accurate representation of how conventional
variety affects dispute outcomes. When resolve is held constant, conventional variety should still
have a positive effect on dispute outcome. States with little conventional options and high
resolve should experience worse outcomes, on average, than states with lots of conventional
options and high resolve. States should deploy more capabilities when they have more at stake in
the crisis. When resolve is equal, states with more options should win crises because they are
putting states with lesser variety into a resolve-capability gap. Finally, among the universe of
states with more at stake in a crisis, those with more conventional options should be more
successful in their disputes.
The Kargil War: A Concrete Application of Conventional Options Theory
To illustrate the ladder of escalation in action and how the effect of greater conventional
options works, I apply my theory to the Kargil War. Figure 1.3 shows the ladder of escalation for
India and Pakistan in the conflict. The first level of conflict was a limited ground incursion in
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March and April of 1999 across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir by Pakistan with Northern
Light Infantry troops.73 These troops occupied posts in the Kargil-Dras sector overlooking a
major highway, NH-1A. This constitutes the first rung on Pakistan’s ladder of escalation. The
Indian military attempted to take back the posts through an assault with ground troops and
supporting artillery.74 This proved ineffective, prompting Indian policymakers to decide to use
the Indian Air Force for close air support of the ground troops.75 The Indian military also brought
in additional artillery to support the assaults.76 This counteroffensive was conducted without
forces crossing the LoC, restricting the geographic scope of combat. This represents the first
rung on India’s ladder of escalation. That the use of air power was recognized as a form of
increasing the intensity of the conflict illustrates that going into a new domain represents a move
up the escalation ladder.
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Figure 1.3: Applying the Ladder of Escalation to the Kargil War
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The next rung on India’s ladder of escalation shows that horizontal escalation into a new
geographic area also constitutes an escalatory move. India could have chosen to conduct the
same counteroffensive with air support and increased artillery but to extend the scope of combat
across the LoC. India had sent reserve forces to Kashmir in the form of the 6 and 27 Mountain
divisions in case the initial fighting did not go well, giving them the capability to cross the
LoC.77 Early in the conflict Indian troops were informed that they should be prepared to cross the
LoC if ordered to do so.78 General V.P. Malik, the head of the Indian Army during the Kargil
War, affirms that “if the tactical situation had not gone well, India would have crossed the
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LoC.”79 Extending the fight past the LoC constitutes the second rung on India’s ladder. The point
of resolve lies somewhere above this level of conflict for both sides. Indian policymakers did not
view crossing the LoC as a nuclear “red line” for Pakistan and only did not cross it in order to
gain international favor for their position in the conflict.80 General Malik writes that there is
some space for limited conventional fighting to occur between nuclear powers, and the actions of
Indian leaders during the Kargil indicates that they believed combat beyond the LoC in Kashmir
fell within this space.81
Nevertheless, General Malik states that with nuclear weapons, “the probability of an allout, high-intensity regular war will remain fairly low.”82 This means that the next rung on India’s
escalation ladder, limited conventional attacks into Pakistan across the internationally recognized
border, was above its point of resolve in the Kargil War. India deployed its armed forces “along
the entire Indo-Pak front in a deterrent posture,” but Indian leaders saw that crossing the
internationally recognized border would be too costly and carry too high a risk of a big war.83
Against this limited cross-border attack, Pakistan could have responded with an even larger
counter-attack to rebuff the Indian incursion. This represents Pakistan’s second rung on its ladder
of escalation. In response, India could have launched a major invasion of Pakistan, instigating a
full-scale conventional war which held high risk of going nuclear. This is the final conventional
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rung on India’s escalation ladder. Above this, the highest rung (not shown in Figure 1.3) would
be nuclear war.
What this short application of the concept of the ladder of escalation to the Kargil War
shows is that India was successful in the conflict because of its ability to win a limited
counteroffensive. The ability to rebuff the intruders via a ground assault and close air support
without crossing the LoC put Pakistan into a decision-making bind: either it backs down from
the war or escalates to a wider conflict. The cost of going to the next rung on its escalation ladder
encouraged it to seek a withdrawal. As John Gill writes:
“Their capture [Tololing Ridge and point 5203 in the Batalik sector] demonstrated that the Indian army’s
combination of careful planning, determination, firepower, and tactical maneuver would slowly but surely
overcome the defenders, barring significant reinforcement from north of the LoC…Moreover, the capture
of Tololing and point 5203 set the context for the visit of American envoy General Anthony Zinni to
Islamabad on June 25, doubtlessly increasing the pressure on the Pakistani government to find a way to
arrange a withdrawal.”84

Pakistan could have responded with an escalation of the conflict, but Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif was afraid of the nuclear risks of such an action. He believed that the Kargil War
“could have taken the shape of an open, full-scale war,”85 and by time he called President Bill
Clinton on July 3 he was “desperate” and “ready to come immediately to Washington to seek
[US] help.”86 The Indian military’s ability to conduct a limited counteroffensive to expel the NLI
intruders put Pakistan’s leadership into a resolve-capability gap, and this led to Pakistan agreeing
to withdraw back behind the LoC. The Kargil War illustrates how my theory of escalation can be
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applied to particular case and how conventional options for escalation can provide a bargaining
advantage.
Incentives for Force Posture: The Variety of Conventional Capabilities
My theory of escalation applies at the level of a dispute in a local geographic area, but it
has ramifications for how states build their global faorce posture. States are uncertain about
where the next crisis will arise, and they need to be prepared for it. Furthermore, conventional
options are not only helpful in crises with nuclear adversaries. The normative costs of using
nuclear weapons mean that nuclear states want to avoid nuclear use in crises with non-nuclear
adversaries as well. In order to meet the variety of contingencies and threats facing them from
both nuclear and non-nuclear rivals, states attempt to build a corresponding variety of
conventional capabilities.87 A state with a high variety of conventional capabilities possesses a
military force that: 1) has a diverse array of weapons platforms, 2) maintains qualitative and
quantitative competitiveness in a wide range of weapons types, 3) can rapidly send troops into a
dispute area, and 4) stations forces around the world. These four measuring sticks are diversity,
strength, deployability, and dispersion, respectively.
How does a variegated force structure that scores well along these criteria help a country
build a greater number of conventional options in a dispute? First, to be able to perform several
missions, a country needs to have the ability to use several different weapons platforms at
baseline. For instance, a state may want to win a battle for air superiority over a certain area, but
it could not do that if it had no fighter aircraft. This is the easiest requirement for a state to fulfill,
as all it requires is that a state devote resources to building multiple weapons platforms. Second,
for a state to be able to credibly communicate that it could successfully a given missions, it needs
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to have a certain level of strength relative to the adversary in the relevant platforms. For
example, for a state to be able to make its adversary think that it could execute an armored
offensive, it should have sufficient quantity of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery tubes,
and troops in order to make that happen. These units should also be well-trained with up-to-date
technology. It is not necessary to have unquestioned qualitative and quantitative superiority in
the relevant platform, merely that the state be willing and able to compete with its adversary in
quality and quantity. In order to meet a variety of threats and perform the corresponding variety
of missions, a state is pressured to be competitive across a range of weapon types, as any one of
them could become relevant in any given contingency.
Third, a state with rapid deployability can send troops and equipment into a dispute area
in a short amount of time. Such speed is crucial to keeping the conflict limited and then going on
to win it. Indeed, capabilities for strategic mobility such as airlift and sealift became more
important within US military strategy as the idea of being able to execute a limited conflict, or
the “half-war,” gained prominence.88 Finally, forward-deployed forces can respond immediately
to any conflict, providing resistance in the opening hours and days of a conflict. Plus, it is easier
to build conventional options in an area where your forces are already operating and you have
access to ports and bases. To capture the benefits of conventional military superiority in the
nuclear age, states build a variety of conventional capabilities. To do that, they build a range of
weapons platforms, attempt to be competitive in quantity and quality in many of these platforms,
invest n strategic mobility assets, and station forces around the world.
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States that have competitive capabilities across more platforms are the ones that are the
strongest militarily. To illustrate this concept of the variety of conventional capabilities, consider
two worlds, one in which there are nuclear weapons and only one conventional weapon, rifles.
The other world contains nuclear weapons and one hundred different conventional platforms. In
each world, a state and its adversary spend an equal sum on defense. In the first world, the
conventional balance is measured by which state can make the best rifles at the lowest price. In
the second world, if one state put all of its investment into rifles while its adversary spread it
equally across the one hundred platforms, it will be far superior in its sniper capability but be
deficient in everything else, making it weaker overall despite the same level of defense
expenditure.
This presents a paradox of conventional military power in the nuclear age. States compete
across several domains, try to gain military superiority in several areas, and invest in power
projection capabilities in order to gain a smaller benefit for conventional superiority than what
existed in the pre-nuclear era. States engage in conventional competition to capture a bargaining
advantage in disputes over peripheral interests. If that is the case, then why do states do this? Are
they being irrational?
No, because these peripheral interests are still important. They are only peripheral in
relation to the assurance of survival and territorial integrity. The defense of the global commons
falls into the category of a peripheral interest, but many scholars would agree that it is important
for the United States to maintain its command of the commons.89 Similarly, it would be
important to achieve the US goal in the South China Sea of keeping it free and open to
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navigation, outside of Chinese dominance. This would also count as a peripheral interest. There
are still important objectives that conventional superiority can achieve, which can explain why a
state could value having conventional power preponderance in the nuclear age. It allows a state
to put superior conventional options for escalation in almost any spot around the globe, giving it
a bargaining advantage in a dispute with a nuclear-armed state in areas where that is potentially
helpful. The United States enjoyed such an advantage immediately following the Cold War, and
it has been eroding recently. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy put it: “For
decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating
domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we
wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space,
and cyberspace.”90 A state would attempt to maintain that advantage if it was within its means,
and therefore my theoretical framework can provide a rational explanation for why the United
States strove to maintain conventional preponderance after the Cold War.
My theory can also explain the nature of the conventional arms buildup by China and
Russia. It is not currently possible for either country to build the type of highly variegated and
globally dispersed military force the United States possesses.91 However, they can build their
conventional power to be competitive in certain geographic spaces and at lower levels of
escalation. China’s A2/AD capabilities at sea can make it difficult for the United States to win a
conflict within a few weeks, causing the US to fight a more intense and longer conflict than it
may want to over issues such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, or the Spratly Islands.92 Similarly,

90

Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018.
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
91

In China’s case, it is not yet possible. As their economy grows and investment in defense continues it will be.

92

Heginbotham, et. al., 2015.

44

Russia’s capabilities for “hybrid warfare,” geographic advantages, and air defense capabilities
could cause the United States and NATO to fight a long, costly conflict to defend their Baltic
State allies or Ukraine.93 Such conventional armament constitutes “targeted balancing” aimed at
putting the United States into a resolve-capability gap in a potential conflict over issues in
China’s and Russia’s near abroad.94 Eventually and if it became within their means, I predict that
these states will want to challenge the United States at all levels of the escalation ladder in
several areas, which would entail building power projection capabilities to rival the United
States. I therefore claim that conventional arms racing between the United States and regional
challengers will continue even though the latter have nuclear weapons. This is in contradiction to
the predictions of previous scholars about the dynamics of the United States’ conventional
military preponderance.95
Conclusion
This chapter laid out a theory of how conventional capabilities provide a security benefit
in relations among nuclear powers. Conventional military options allow a state to use a level of
military force congruent with its resolve in a dispute, preventing it from having to choose to back
down or escalate past its level of resolve. The use of a conventional option may force an
adversary with less conventional means to confront this decision, which incentivizes backing
down. Because the costs of backing down are higher over core interests, the benefit of
conventional options should apply more to disputes over peripheral issues that do not directly
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affect survival, territorial integrity, or the defense of strategically vital areas. Table 1.2 below
summarizes the hypotheses of the theory that will be tested in subsequent chapters. H1 and H2
represent the hypotheses about the main effect of conventional options and its interaction with
the stakes involved in a dispute. These are meant to be “hoop” tests that establish the plausibility
of the theory.96 H3 and H4 can help show that conventional options have an effect on dispute
outcomes independent of the role of resolve. H5 establishes that the causal process proposed by
my theory operates in producing crisis outcomes in the real world.
Table 1.2: The Predictions of Conventional Options Theory
Hypothesis 1 (H1) An increase in conventional options will lead to better dispute
outcomes
Hypothesis 2 (H2) If a state is in a dispute over a peripheral interest, it will derive a
greater benefit from its conventional options
Hypothesis 3 (H3) If two states have similar stakes in the dispute, increasing the
number of conventional options will increase the probability of a
successful dispute outcome
Hypothesis 4 (H4) Among states with more at stake in, increasing the number of
conventional options will increase the probability of a successful
dispute outcome
Hypothesis 5 (H5) If a state with greater conventional options is successful in a dispute,
it will due to the coercive effect of putting the adversary in a resolvecapability gap

Conventional options theory can address current questions about why the United States
attempts to maintain conventional superiority over its major rivals. If one starts from the logic of
escalation inherent in the argument of the nuclear revolution, then it follows that “under current
conditions, unipolarity does little to enable the United States to increase its security.”97 What is
the value of an attempt to gain conventional superiority when nuclear weapons already deter
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major forms of conventional great power conflict? My argument is not that the nuclear
revolution is wrong but that its theory of escalation overlooks instances where conventional
capabilities could prove useful. In disputes over peripheral interests where the problem of
credibility is most acute, it is beneficial to have conventional options for escalation below your
level of resolve. Because it is difficult to know ex ante where the next dispute will arise and what
types of military missions will be most relevant in it, this benefit of conventional options
encourages states to build a variety of conventional capabilities. A state with a large, diversified,
rapidly deployable, and dispersed force structure is able to bring to bear more conventional
options for escalation in a dispute. States with conventional preponderance have the ability to put
superior forces in almost any place in the world. This is the type of military force that the United
States has sought to maintain in the post-Cold War era. Major challengers such as Russia and
China try to develop conventional options of their own in particular geographic areas to thwart
the United States. A refined theory of escalation can provide a rationale for the benefits of
conventional power preponderance and current conventional arms racing in the nuclear age.
The major question is whether the United States should continue to aim for conventional
power preponderance. Answering this question presents a tradeoff that gives talking points both
to advocates of a grand strategy of restraint and advocates of a grand strategy of deep
engagement. The security benefits of conventional power come in disputes over peripheral
interests, and the growing military power of China and Russia will make it increasingly
expensive for the United States to maintain conventional superiority in the areas where
conventional power could be useful, such as Eastern Europe or the South China Sea. This points
to a recommendation that the United States should drop its quest for conventional superiority and
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spend less on its military. This would allow the United States to spend money to improve the
domestic economy, through both increased public and private investment.98
On the other hand, peripheral interests are still important; they are only peripheral in
relation to the objectives of survival and territorial integrity or goals directly related to them. The
defense of the command of the commons is a peripheral goal over which conventional
capabilities could be useful. The security benefits of a large and forward-deployed force could
therefore be substantial.99 Reducing the size of the US military and pulling back from the world
would come with a cost. Future research should attempt to gauge whether the costs of forgoing
bargaining advantages in peripheral disputes with China and Russia are greater than the costs of
defense spending required to gain those bargaining advantages.100 By identifying a security
benefit for conventional superiority in the nuclear age, my theory may not settle the grand
strategy debate but points toward a path that could address an important question at its heart.
My theory also has implications for various issues within the nuclear crisis bargaining
literature. One of these issues is the discussion around the stability-instability paradox. First
proposed by Glenn Snyder, it argues that mutually assured destruction creates stability at the
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nuclear level. However, because both sides know that nuclear war is a disaster, they know
neither of them will escalate to it, and the reduced fear of escalation emboldens both sides to
fight limited conventional wars.101 While not endorsing the idea, my theory highlights two
under-explored aspects of the paradox. First, the “stability” half of the paradox need not be at the
nuclear level. The mutual fear of a large-scale conventional war could increase a state’s
confidence that it can engage in low-level conventional conflict. This could happen if a large
conventional war lay above both sides’ point of resolve, as is often the case. Indeed, this can
partly explain the Kargil War. Pakistan’s knowledge of the mutual fear of a conventional conflict
was one reason it felt emboldened to act in Kashmir.102 Second, the theory highlights the
conditionality of the paradox; it should be more operative in certain contexts. If neither state has
many capabilities for fighting lower-level conventional wars, then nuclear stability will not
increase conflict at all. This could also be true if both sides’ lower-level capabilities offset each
other. If one state has superiority at the lower parts of the escalation ladder, then nuclear stability
could embolden that state to initiate limited conflict. That is the condition under which I predict
the stability-instability paradox would be most likely to operate.
Conventional options theory also adds to our understanding of brinkmanship tactics. One
of Schelling’s tactics for making threats that leave something to chance is tying one’s hands. It is
better to let the adversary know that you have no other option except for nuclear use should it
initiate an armed challenge. Yet, my theory of conventional variety with its emphasis on the
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benefits of options for escalation seems to fly in the face of that theory. In some sense it does. I
argue that tying one’s hands is an unsound strategy since leaders do not like being in an all-ornothing decision-making space and will seek to avoid being in one if they can. However, the
point of tying one’s hands is to put the onus for escalation on the adversary. You make them
choose to use nuclear weapons or not, since the decision is out of your hands. I hypothesize that
having conventional options is a better tactic for forcing the adversary to choose between nuclear
escalation and backing down. The utility of conventional variety therefore rests on producing the
same end for which Schelling hypothesized tying one’s hands to be useful. In that sense, my
theory builds on brinkmanship theory.
Finally, while my theory does say that there is a security benefit to “escalation
dominance,” I do not maintain that it is necessary for deterrence. My theory says that escalation
dominance could guarantee deterrence of an adversary in that the adversary could not hope to
prevail at any level of conflict. From that perspective, escalation dominance is sufficient for
deterrence.103 However, escalation dominance, with the exception of a very large state
confronting a very small one, is an “ideal type.” The requirement of having superiority at every
possible level of escalation is rarely met, and it is certainly not met in the context of major power
competition between China and Russia.104 My theory that “more conventional options are
useful” is not an argument for the necessity of escalation dominance, nor does it suggest that the
United States should strive for it given its infeasibility. My theory also does not comment on the
debate over whether the United States needs several “nuclear options.” In my theory, I assume
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that it is difficult to keep a nuclear war limited, but there may be instances where limited nuclear
options provide a bargaining advantage.105 More research could identify whether the bargaining
incentives I identify for building a large, variegated conventional force also encourage the
construction of a large, diversified nuclear force.
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Chapter 2: Empirical Patterns in Nuclear Crises and the Balance in Conventional Options

What is the empirical relationship between the outcome of nuclear crises and the
distribution of conventional options? The first look at this relationship that I present is an
overview of all nuclear crises and how their outcomes were impacted by the balance in local
conventional military power. My hypothesis is that states with superior military strength across
the most categories of weapons platforms in a given area will have more options for
conventional escalation in a crisis. A quantitative measure of local military power, while only a
proxy for conventional options, should be able to test my theory. I take a statistical approach to
examining the overall pattern between conventional military power and dispute outcome. I
identify all disputes between states with nuclear weapons that either did escalate or could have
escalated to major conflict. I code the outcomes of nuclear crises according to how successful a
state was at achieving its primary and secondary goals. I pair these outcomes with my own
construction of a measure for local conventional military power. My dataset also includes control
variables about the actors in the crisis and characteristics of the crisis itself.
The regressions I conduct and the results I display are not intended to illustrate a
definitive causal link. Rather, these quantitative analyses are meant to be an initial gauge at how
well conventional options theory performs at describing reality. In broad terms, does the
relationship between crisis outcomes and the local conventional balance conform to the
predictions of my theory? What does this say about the utility of a variety of capabilities as a
whole? If the data bear out the predictions, that would lend credence to the argument that the
causal processes described in the case studies map onto a broader phenomenon. In my mixed
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methods approach, this quantitative portion is intended as a preliminary and illustrative look that
tests the plausibility of my theory.
I test two main hypotheses in my quantitative analysis. First, I predict that states that can
bring to bear more military power at the local level will be more successful in nuclear disputes.
States with local superiority should be able to make more credible threats of escalation, and their
escalatory actions could coerce states with inferior capabilities into backing down. This is not an
absolute prediction such that every state with superior capabilities wins a dispute, but across
several crises, states with more conventional military power should have higher average
outcomes. Second, I predict that the benefit of conventional options should be higher in disputes
over peripheral interests. Over core issues, threats to use nuclear weapons should be more
credible, and thus the need to have conventional options for escalation is attenuated.
The empirical patterns I identify lend support to both hypotheses. Across several different
statistical models, better outcomes in disputes between nuclear states is associated with having a
greater conventional military power at the local level. This is true even when controlling for
variables such as regime type, distance of the state from the dispute, and the nuclear balance.
There is also some evidence benefit of conventional military power is concentrated in disputes
over peripheral interests, though these tests are underpowered. This gives support to the main
logic of conventional options theory: conventional options for escalation bolster a state’s
bargaining power in a nuclear dispute, and this benefit is larger in disputes over peripheral
interests.
This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I explain my methodology and the purpose of
quantitative evidence in my dissertation. Second, I explain how I measure the variables in my
dataset, with a focus on arguing that measuring local conventional military power is an effective
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proxy for measuring conventional options. Third, I present the results of my regressions. Fourth,
I discuss how these results relate to my initial predictions and lay out the questions left
unanswered by the quantitative results and the role of the case studies in addressing those
questions.
Observational Data of Nuclear Crises
Before describing the measurement of independent and dependent variables and the
statistical models I will be using, I want to start by justifying the use of observational data paired
with case studies. The dominant turn in social science methods is to use research designs that
overcome the fundamental problem of causal inference.106 Any independent variable of interest
can be thought of as a “treatment,” and subjects could be in a treatment or control group. The
problem is that it is impossible to observe a subject’s potential outcome under both treatment and
control.107 A researcher can overcome this problem through random assignment of the treatment,
X, such that it is independent of the potential outcome, Y.108 There are ways to get around the
fundamental problem of causal inference without random assignment. In principle, you can
model the causal pathways that produce Y, and control for the variables that could confound the
measurement of the effect of X on Y. This is the “back-door criterion” developed by Judea
Pearl.109 Controlling for a “back-door” path satisfies the “conditional ignorability” assumption,
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which states that bias can be accounted for if, conditional on a certain value of confounding
variable, Z, assignment to treatment X is “as-if” random of the potential outcome.110
Researchers attempt to exploit social processes that generate values of the independent
variable that are “as-if” randomly assigned.111 One such process is a “natural experiment” in
which political leaders implementing some policy decide to assign some value randomly. This
could be conscription into military service,112 assignment to farmland,113 or election quotas for
women.114 In some instances, there is a cutoff to determine who is eligible for a given
“treatment,” such as social safety net assistance or political office. This gives rise to
“discontinuities” in which values of Z may be independent of treatment, X.115 There could be
some variable exogenous to the potential outcome that causes variation in X, and a researcher
could isolate the variation in X explained by the “instrumental variable” to recover values of X
independent of Y.116 Of course, an instrument is only valid if it has a significant effect on X and

110

Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models. Reasoning, and Inference, Second Edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2009.
111

Dunning, Thad. Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Angrist, Joshua. “Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social Security
Administrative Records.” American Economic Review, 80, No. 3 (Jun. 1990): pp. 313-336.
112

Di Tella, Rafael, Galiani, Sebastian, and Schargrodsky, Ernesto. “The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the
Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 122, No. 1 (Feb., 2007): pp. 209-241.
113

Bhavnani, Rikhil. “Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
in India.” American Political Science Review, 103, No. 1 (Feb. 2009): pp. 23-35.
114

Angrist, Joshua and Pischke, David. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2009.
115

116

Wooldridge. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. 5th Edition. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage
Learning, 2013, pp. 517-521.

55

it has no effect on Y other than through its effect on X.117 In sum, social scientists have devised a
number of strategies for tackling the problem of causal inference.
The problem for IR scholars, especially those that study issues related to nuclear
deterrence, the military balance, and grand strategy, is that most or all of these methods are
infeasible. For my purposes, the variety of conventional capabilities is certainly not something
that is randomly assigned, nor can it be. States invest in their military capabilities to develop a
greater variety of conventional options that they can use in a crisis. Decision-makers do not
randomly decide where to place more of their troops, and there is not “cutoff” point to determine
which states would have more variety or not. The back-door path method is almost impossible to
implement. Outcomes in international politics are produced via a complex interaction of myriad
variables, and it is folly to assume that you know the exact relationship among all of them and
that you can measure them all. Even variables that appear to be as-if randomly assigned by
policymakers, such as land borders, are, at second glance, decidedly not.118
These limitations do not mean, however, that questions about the effects of nuclear
weapons and the conventional military balance on international politics cannot be subjected to
scientific inquiry. Despite the claims that causal inference is the only legitimate way to conduct
science, there is no set definition or standard of what “science” is.119 Debates over the nature of
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science continue within philosophy departments to this day.120 Plus, if IR scholars only studied
issues that could be subjected to a causal inference design, that would prevent them from
studying many of the most interesting questions in the field. IR scholars therefore must keep an
open mind about what constitutes scientific study and take a question-drive rather than methoddriven approach to their research.121 Interesting questions should then be subjected to the most
rigorous research design that can feasibly be executed.
My research design seeks to leverage strong aspects of observational quantitative
research and case studies in order to overcome their respective weaknesses. Observational
studies can show broad patterns in data, but they are less adept at illustrating the causal process
observations (CPO’s) underlying the relationship among variables.122 Case studies offer rich
descriptions of a theory in action within what would be one “data point” in a quantitative data
set, but one case study cannot determine whether the theory might apply to other cases.123 I will
use a quantitative analysis of crises between nuclear states to provide an overview of how
conventional options relate to crisis outcomes. I will use case studies to provide evidence that my
theory plays a role in producing the relationship between conventional options and dispute
outcome illustrated by the quantitative data. It can also offer fine details on how policymakers

120

Okasha, Samir. Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016.

121

Shapiro, Ian. The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.

122

Brady, Henry and Collier, David, eds. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, Second
Edition. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010.
123

Bennett, Andrew and Checkel, Jeffrey, eds.. Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2014. And Debs, Alexandre. “The Empirical Promise of Game Theory.” In The Oxford
Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations, ed. William Thompson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.515.

57

react to the conventional military balance in terms of the options for the use of conventional
force.
My quantitative analysis will build on the International Crisis Behavior Dataset.124 This
data and similar datasets on international disputes among states have been used by numerous
scholars to test theories on the dynamics of nuclear deterrence.125 Huth, for example, uses a
quantitative study to find that nuclear weapons enhance the value of extended deterrent threats as
does the possession of superiority in the local balance of conventional military power.126
Beardsley and Asal use the ICB dataset to confirm the idea that nuclear weapons deter reckless
escalatory behavior by showing that crises between nuclear states are less violent than ones
between non-nuclear states.127 Kroenig uses the ICB dataset to address the question of whether
“nuclear superiority” is a meaningful concept, and he finds that states with more nuclear
weapons are more successful in interstate disputes.128 Sechser and Fuhrmann use their own
dataset on military compellent threats to test the “nuclear blackmail” theory, and they illustrate
that nuclear weapons do not enhance a state’s ability to make coercive threats.129 Narang shows
that force posture matters in crisis bargaining, with a more ready posture of “asymmetric
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escalation” leading to more success.130 Bell and Miller test the stability-instability paradox,
finding that asymmetric nuclear dyads – dyads in which one state has nuclear weapons and the
other does not – experience more low-intensity disputes.131
I point out these studies to emphasize that even with the problems of endogeneity and
measurement, quantitative overviews of patterns in nuclear crisis outcomes have advanced our
understanding of nuclear deterrence. However, one area that needs improvement is how the
conventional balance interacts with the nuclear balance to enhance or diminish the credibility of
nuclear deterrence. Huth includes a measure of the local balance of military power, but this is
only a “bean count” of ground and air troops in a particular area.132 Kroenig and Sechser and
Fuhrmann, while in vehement disagreement on many issues, both use CINC score as a measure
of conventional military power. Yet there are good reasons to think that overall industrial
production is not a good determinant of how much conventional power a state possesses in the
area of a dispute at the time it occurs.133 I solve this issue by enriching the concept of the
conventional balance of military power, including counts of weapons platforms in my
measurement of the conventional balance, and accounting for any qualitative superiority of one
state’s weapons over another’s identified by previous analysts. This measure allows me to
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explore what aspects of conventional military power matter most in a nuclear dispute. While still
prone to measurement error and the fundamental problem of casual inference, my collection of
data on conventional options constitutes the most rigorous test yet on how the conventional
balance affects nuclear crisis outcomes.
Methods and Measurement
The quantitative analysis will measure conventional balance in the region where a dispute
takes place and measure its impact on interstate dispute outcomes among nuclear states. I
hypothesize that if my theory is true, there will be a positive relationship between the local
conventional balance and dispute outcome. This can test the effect of conventional options
because states with superior conventional military power in the area where a dispute takes place
should have more options for conventional escalation. I use local military superiority as a proxy
for conventional variety. Why do I take this approach to measuring the variety of conventional
capabilities?
I start by adopting a framework for devising valid measures developed by Adcock and
Collier.134 The framework provides a guide for taking a measure from a broad concept into
scores for cases. For the variety of conventional capabilities, this means first describing the broad
concept it captures and then operationalizing that concept into a formulation that can be used to
assess individual cases. As stated in the theory chapter, the motivation for distinguishing
between aggregate military capabilities and local forces-in-being comes from the simple
observation that military forces are tasked with numerous missions, not just winning a largescale conventional war. For instance, a recent RAND study comparing Chinese and US forces

Adcock, Robert and Collier, David. “Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Quantitative and Qualitative
Researchers.” American Political Science Review, 95, No. 3 (Sep. 2001): pp. 549-566.
134

60

that could be deployed to a fight in the Western Pacific analyzed their relative strengths in ten
different categories of conflict.135 Analyses of Russian conventional forces in Eastern Europe
distinguish between their ability to conduct low- to medium-intensity operations in the opening
stages of a conflict and their ability to execute a high-intensity war of longer duration with the
United States.136 During the Cold War, defense analysts divided their estimates between US
ability to wage nuclear war against the Soviet Union, conventional war in Europe against the
Soviets, and so-called “brushfire wars” against third parties.137
These analyses point to the fact that there are several facets of military power and types
of missions a force is asked to execute. The concept of conventional options is meant to measure
how many types of conventional conflict in which a state’s military force is proficient. Therefore,
the definition I adopt for conventional options is the number of missions a military force can
execute against a given adversary in a particular time and place. At the global level, the desire
to build conventional options for particular contingencies leads states to develop a variety of
conventional weapons platforms and train its forces for a wide range of missions. At the local
level of a dispute, the concept of greater conventional options is captured by who can do more
with their conventional forces in the area. This definition and its focus on missions combines
both horizontal and vertical aspects of escalation. The concept accounts for the ability to add
more tanks or troops to a low-intensity armored land war and the capacity to open up a conflict
for air superiority in a low-level land war.
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How do I turn this definition into a measure? For my purposes, I want to evaluate which
country in a dispute has more conventional options. The side that can execute more missions
successfully relative to their adversary has a greater number of conventional options. This is
difficult to measure in a precise manner. For example, an entire RAND book, The US-China
Military Scorecard is devoted to measuring the relative advantage for the US and China across
10 different missions at 4 points in time.138 This 300-page study covers one dyad. Given that the
scope of this study covers almost two dozen nuclear crises, I do not have enough space to
conduct this type of analysis for every crisis. Instead, I develop a proxy measure for conventional
options in the form of the local conventional balance across a portfolio of weapons platforms.
States that have more conventional capabilities in the area where a dispute takes place
should be able to perform more military missions relative to their adversary in the dispute. For
example, in the Kargil War, I calculate that India had twice as much conventional military power
as Pakistan in the area close to Kashmir. This translated into an ability for the Indian military to
perform more missions in the Kargil War than the Pakistani military could. The Indian military
could conduct limited ground operations to retake military posts on their side of the Line of
Control, and it could conduct close air support and air strikes in high altitudes against Pakistani
targets.139 The positive relationship between local superiority and greater conventional options
allows me to predict that states with greater local conventional military power should perform
better in nuclear disputes. Measuring the effect of the local conventional balance on dispute
outcomes should provide a test of conventional options theory.
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I consider the local balance of military power to encompass the region in which a dispute
takes place. For example, in the Berlin Crisis, I counted all forces available in continental Europe
for the United States and the Soviet Union together with naval forces in the Mediterranean,
Baltic, and Eastern Atlantic. For the Cuban Missile Crisis, I counted all forces in North America,
the Caribbean, and the Western Atlantic. While this is a large area, it is local relative to the
global balance of power. In any case, I use the terms local and regional interchangeably.
I will measure local conventional superiority in both discrete and continuous terms. I
intend to determine which side has more variety and how superior they are in terms of local
military power. The exercise of evaluating the relative proficiency of one side’s military forces
against another’s is known as “net assessment.”140 A crude way to conduct this sort of
comparison would be to take the number of troops and weapons on one side and compare them
to the number of troops and weapons on the other. These “bean counts” can be misleading
measures of a state’s military power. One reason why bean counts can be poor indicators is that
“warfare is a dynamic process” in which communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and
willingness to take casualties play a role in determining the outcome.141 Another reason, and one
that I am able to take into account in this study, is that bean counts make no correction for the
quality of training that troops receive, the relative technological advancement of the weapons, or
a military’s method of force employment.142
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For example, if you compared the total number of troops (including reserves) and tanks
in the North Korean and American militaries, you would find that North Korea has 1.88 million
troops and over 3500 main battle tanks against the United States’ 2.2 million troops and 2386
main battle tanks.143 Looking only at these static counts, you would conclude that North Korea
has roughly similar land power to the United States, but that would be a preposterous conclusion.
Its troops are not nearly as well trained as American troops, and most of its tanks were produced
in the first half of the Cold War.144 This example illustrates the need to utilize a sophisticated
framework for measuring a state’s relative military power.
Nevertheless, given the scope of my analysis to include all nuclear crises between 19612018, I do not have enough space to incorporate all of the “best practices” in net assessment. A
detailed evaluation of the military balance at any one time requires measuring superiority across
a range of military capabilities.145 It also requires specifying a model of how forces will be
employed along the battlefield and the rate at which they will suffer attrition.146 To do this sort of
analysis for each dispute in my dataset would be a monumental undertaking, one that is not
feasible to do in the space constraints of one dissertation. Yet, it is possible to apply insights
from defense analysts that have devised complex methods of measuring military power to a
simpler measure of military power.
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I measure the regional conventional military power a state has relative to its adversary by
measuring the relative strength it has across six categories of conventional military strength:
troops, main battle tanks, tactical aircraft, transport aircraft, principal surface combatants, and
submarines. In five of these measures, I assess the capabilities a state possesses in the area where
the dispute is taking place. For transport aircraft, I use an aggregate count as a way to inject
deployability of forces into the variety measure. This is because a state can bring to bear military
power from elsewhere to the area where a dispute is taking place within the timeframe of a crisis.
This causes my measure of military power to be correlated with resolve, but below, I address this
by examining disputes where the stakes involved for both states are similar. For each of these
categories, I take the amount a state possesses and then express it as a ratio of the total number of
persons or weapons that the two states have in that category combined. Any measure above 0.5
indicates superiority in the quantitative count for that category. Expressing superiority this way
gives each category comparison a value between 0 and 1. This should mute the effect of a state
being dominant in one category but deficient in everything else.
With the exception of troops, I introduce a qualitative superiority variable into the
measure. If a particular weapons platform that is commonly used is much newer than an
adversary’s most commonly used weapons platform in the same category, then I code
“qualitative superiority” as a 1 due to a technological advantage. In addition, if one state has a
capability that the other side does not have in that domain, I code qualitative superiority as a 1.
For example, in the balance of surface combatants, if state A possessed an aircraft carrier but
state B did not, I code this as qualitative superiority for state B. Otherwise, the value for both
states is 0.5. While this puts subjective judgment into the measure of the regional balance,
accounting for the relative quality of a weapon is necessary for devising a valid measure of
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military power. Coding decisions on qualitative superiority are provided in the Appendix. All
estimates for these categories come from The Military Balance, an annual publication by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies that estimates the military power of every major
country. In the earlier years of its publication, it has some missing data on deployment and
counts of weapons. I supplement the estimates in these years with data from the CIA and
Department of Defense, because all of them involved disputes between the Soviet Union and the
United States.147
To get the measure of local conventional military power, I then average the ratio across
all six categories and the five technological superiority scores. This yields a measure for the
share of local conventional military power between 0 and 1. States that have a measure above 0.5
have superior conventional power in the area where the crisis is occurring and those with less
than 0.5 have inferior military power. This produces a discrete measure of who has more
conventional options for escalation in a nuclear dispute. The gap between the two sides’ value
for conventional superiority provides a continuous measure for conventional power. It estimates
how much more local conventional power a superior side has in a dispute. This continuous
operationalization of the local conventional balance is better than the discrete measure. In my
theory, the number of gaps in a state’s ladder of escalation matters, and the more options you
have over your adversary, the less gaps in the ladder of escalation you have and the more your
adversary does. States with far more regional conventional power should have smaller gaps in
their conventional escalation options than states with only modest superiority.
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The universe of cases that I apply this measure to is any dispute between two nucleararmed states from 1961 to 2018. I start in 1961 because that is the first year for which I have data
from The Military Balance. I confine the analysis to disputes among nuclear states, or nuclear
disputes, due to the scope conditions of my theory. This is because I only make explicit
predictions about the value of conventional power in the shadow of nuclear deterrence.
Nevertheless, I pointed out in my theory chapter that the dynamics of escalation and the utility of
conventional variety could apply to asymmetric and non-nuclear dyads as well. My dataset
includes 21 disputes between nuclear states. It is organized at the country level, yielding an N of
42. All the crises are listed below in the appendix in the Summary of Cases section. It includes
information on the year, the actors, the military balance, the interests at stake, how the crisis
unfolded, and the outcome.
The other main independent variable in my theory is the stakes involved in the crisis. I
hypothesize that for a crisis on the periphery of a country’s threat space, nuclear threats will be
less credible and therefore conventional military power will be more useful. This begs the
question: what puts a particular area in a state’s “periphery” or “core?” I adapt Timothy
Crawford’s definition of a core interest, which he defines as ensuring survival, territorial
integrity, or the defense of “strategically vital areas” through which a threat to the first two
objectives might arise.148 I use that requirement to define a dispute over a core interest as any
dispute in which a country’s existence or territorial integrity is in jeopardy. I also include
disputes where the control of a strategically vital area is at stake. For example, a dispute with the
United States where control of Western Europe is at stake would constitute a core dispute, even
though it is far from the US homeland. The definition of a “strategically vital area” is subjective,
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but for each case, I considered whether a complete loss over the issue in dispute could lead to a
threat to survival or territorial integrity. I then used this assessment to label a dispute as being
related to a core interest or not. The rationale for these coding decisions is presented in my Crisis
Summaries in the Appendix, and each case study has a detailed analysis of whether the issue at
stake is core or peripheral.
To define territorial integrity, I distinguish between the “main” part of a state’s territory
and its fringe territories. Of course, this distinction is a matter of judgment, but policymakers
often treat certain territories as peripheral and others as more significant.149 Not all threats to
territory are equal. A threat to Hawaii, though severe, is qualitatively less dire than a threat to
California or Washington, D.C. This is where the political process by which threats become core
or peripheral enters into the quantified measure of the stakes involved in a dispute. There are
geographic constraints to this process. However, in terms of choosing which home territories lie
in the core, policymakers have discretion in labelling core and periphery.150 This leads to some
judgment on the part of researchers as to which pieces of land belonging to the state lie in the
core and which in the periphery. I provide a summary of cases where I explain how I judged
whether a certain threat to territory was a threat to a “peripheral” or “core” piece of territory.
I use these metrics to make a core-periphery distinction. Any dispute where the issue at
stake involves a state’s survival, a major piece of a state’s territory, or the defense of a key
geographic area outside its territory, I count as “core.” Disputes where the issue at stake does not
fall in any of these categories is labeled as “periphery.” This is a restrictive definition of what
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counts as a core interest, but I think this is necessary to give meaning to the concept. Including
too much in the measure of what counts a core interest would dilute the term and lump together
disputes where survival is at stake with disputes where a small piece of territory is at stake. This
restrictive definition is important to note because it means that, in the nuclear age, disputes over
core interests should be less common than peripheral disputes. Adversaries have a good idea
what issues are most important to a state, and they will be unlikely to challenge those interests if
a state possesses nuclear weapons. A potential adversary will need high resolve to challenge a
nuclear state’s core interest. I test this hypothesis in the summary statistics below.
The dependent variable in my theory is the outcome of a dispute between nuclear states.
To measure dispute success, I use the same approach as the OUTCOM variable in the ICB
dataset. I assess how well a state achieved its goals in the crisis. In this assessment, I distinguish
between primary and secondary goals. A primary goal is what leaders in the state themselves
declare to be the main issue in dispute or what historians analyze as the main objective during
the crisis. There can be multiple primary goals. For example, during the Berlin Crisis,
Khrushchev held as main issues during the crisis the removal of Western troops from West
Berlin and the halting of the refugee flow from East to West Germany through Berlin. Secondary
goals are any objectives that are brought up during the dispute or related to the main goal but still
would not settle the main issue at hand. Secondary goals are therefore defined in relation to the
primary goal. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the main issue at hand for the Soviet
Union was keeping its missiles in Cuba. The presences of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were a
secondary matter. Or in the Berlin Crisis, the question of setting the boundary of East Germany
at the Oder-Neisse Line was a secondary issue to the more important ones of whether the US
would recognize East Germany and remove its troops from West Berlin. Finally, in any given
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crisis there may be no secondary goals because the crisis actors did not link minor issues to the
main items in dispute. I code primary and secondary goals for each actor in each crisis in my
Crisis Summaries in the Appendix.
I judge the outcomes of each dispute based on the achievement of primary goals. If a
state achieved most or all of its primary goals, then this is a successful dispute outcome, which I
code as a 2 in my dataset. If it had to compromise on secondary goals to do this, that would be a
“qualified success” but a 2 in my dataset, nonetheless. In my case study of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, I use the example of the non-invasion pledge and the removal of the Jupiter missiles as an
example of this type of outcome. The United States achieved its main objective of removing the
Soviet missiles from Cuba while compromising on secondary issues. If a state failed to achieve
its primary goals, then this coded as a failed dispute outcome, or a 0 in my datatset. If the state
accomplished some secondary goals along the way, then it “saved face” but it still counts a 0 in
my dataset. For example, in the Scarborough Shoal Incident in 2012, the United States was able
to accomplish its secondary goal of keeping the South China Sea an open waterway. This
salvaged a failure to achieve the primary goal of preventing China from extending its authority
deeper into the South China Sea. I code this a dispute failure for the United States. Finally, if
both sides failed to achieve their primary goals, partially achieved them, or left the issue
unresolved, I code this as a draw, or a 1 in my dataset. For example, in India and Pakistan’s
dispute over Kashmir in 1990, they both achieved their main goal of keeping the current Line of
Control in place. However, they left the issue of Pakistani support for insurgents in Indiancontrolled Kashmir unresolved.
I choose my control variables to focus on the most relevant and serious confounders to a
correlation between conventional variety and dispute outcome. The most important control
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variable is the balance of nuclear military power. Kroenig shows that states with superiority in
the number of nuclear weapons are more successful in nuclear crises.151 States that are able to
build and deploy variegated conventional forces are also likely to have more nuclear weapons
than their adversaries. Thus, my results could be due entirely to correlation to the more important
nuclear balance. Kroenig’s theory relies on policymakers differentiating between disastrous
outcomes. The state with nuclear superiority thinks that a nuclear war would be catastrophic, but
it would not suffer as much as its adversary and therefore gains a bargaining advantage. The
empirical support for policymakers having this logic is tenuous, but other theories of how to
measure nuclear military power could also confound my results. If second-strike capability is the
ultimate level of nuclear power, then countries with second-strike capabilities are more likely to
win crises than countries without it. Just like nuclear superiority, the countries that can build
strong conventional forces are also more likely to have a second-strike nuclear capability. I
therefore control for both nuclear superiority and second-strike capacity to test the robustness of
the relationship between conventional variety and dispute outcome.
I also control for three other variables that are believed to be relevant to crisis outcomes.
The audience cost literature has shown that more politically open regimes are better able to
signal their resolve during a crisis.152 Making public threats in a democratic society is a way for
policymakers to constrain their ability to back down for fear of facing costs for looking
irresolute.153 Democracies could therefore gain better dispute outcomes than autocracies. In my
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dataset, the United States appears frequently, and it often has greater conventional options than
its adversary. If the United States achieves more favorable outcomes than its adversaries, it could
be due to regime type mechanisms, and thus political openness confounds my finding. I therefore
include the polity score from the Polity IV dataset as a measure for political openness in my
analysis.
I include two further variables from the ICB dataset. One is the level of violence reached
in the dispute. Unlike other control variables, the way this variable affects the outcome happens
at the dispute level rather than the actor level. The successful outcomes for states with superior
variety could be concentrated in the disputes where the most force was used. While this would
not be detrimental to my theory, it would raise doubts that possessing capabilities along the
entire escalation ladder carries a security benefit. It may point to the possibility that traditional
aggregate measures of conventional power are adequate. As a result, I control for the level of
violence reached in a dispute by including the Intensity of Violence (SEVVIO) variable from the
ICB dataset. I also condition on distance from the dispute in models where I do not include the
stakes variable. There are many reasons to believe that states care more about disputes that
happen closer to their borders and thus gain better outcomes in those disputes. Many states are
also likely to station most of their military strength within their borders. The distance of the
dispute is probably correlated with conventional options, and the differences in dispute outcome
could be due to that relationship. I therefore use the Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of
Crisis (CRACTLOC) variable to control for distance from the dispute in my analysis.
I will estimate the effects of the variety of conventional capabilities, the stakes involved
in a dispute, and the control variables on dispute outcome via a multinomial logistic regression.
The fully specified model will be:
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Y_i = B1(Power_i) + B2(Stakes_i) + B3(Stakes_i*Power_i) + B4(X_i) + e_i
X represents the vector of control variables that I may or may not include depending on the
particular test. This type of regression model is appropriate for my three-tiered outcome variable
of win, draw, or loss. Logistic regressions measure the change in the log-odds of an outcome due
to the change in one unit of a variable.154 The log-odds is a difficult quantity to visualize. For this
reason, I will not focus on the size of the coefficients and instead point to their direction and
statistical significance. I will formulate my hypotheses in terms of effect direction rather than
effect sizes to reflect this emphasis.
Another thing to consider when estimating the relationship between conventional options
and dispute outcome is that results within dyads over time are correlated with each other due to
unobserved factors. I address this issue by using a “within-dyads” estimator. To account for
correlation in the error term for the dispute outcomes of a dyad, I use clustered robust standard
errors at the dyad level.
Hypotheses
My main hypothesis is that nuclear states that possess more conventional options will be
more successful in disputes with their nuclear adversaries. The reason is that the side with more
conventional options is more likely to put its adversary into a resolve-capability gap in which the
adversary faces heavy incentives to back down. To test this hypothesis, I will measure the
regional balance of conventional military power as a proxy measure for conventional options.
My first look will be whether an indicator of local conventional superiority correlates with
nuclear dispute outcomes. To get the military superiority indicator, I use the index I compiled
and label every state with a value below 0.5 as “inferior” and all those above 0.5 as “superior.”
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This turns the ratio variable into an indicator of greater or lesser options available. While this is a
proxy for conventional options, it corresponds to my theory’s prediction that having more rungs
on your escalation ladder than your adversary confers greater bargaining power. This main
hypothesis would be strengthened if I found that superiority in the local military balance is
correlated with more successful outcomes in disputes on average. This hypothesis and the
method of testing it is summarized below:
H1: States with greater conventional options will have better outcomes in nuclear crises.
Test: Indicator variable of local conventional military superiority on nuclear crisis outcome.

The indicator variable of superiority makes it easier to interpret the interaction effect with
the stakes involved in a dispute. My hypothesis here is that the effect of superiority in the
conventional variety balance will be higher in peripheral disputes than in core disputes.
Conventional options should confer benefits in both spaces, but their effect on strengthening the
credibility of threats to fight over a certain interest is larger when that interest is peripheral. I will
measure the stakes variable as a strict indicator of peripheral or core. I will use core disputes as
the baseline, so they will be coded as 0. Being in the periphery is the “treatment” in this case, and
it is coded as a 1. This hypothesis will be true if the interaction effect is positive and significant.
The hypothesis and test are summarized below:
H2: The effect of superiority in conventional options will be larger in nuclear disputes over
peripheral interests.
Test: Interaction between the balance in local conventional power and the stakes involved in a
dispute.
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Results
Summary Statistics
Before delving into the main results, I will show the summary statistics for local
conventional superiority and the stakes involved in a crisis. Which countries tend to have greater
military power in the area where a dispute takes place? What are their characteristics? How
many disputes are over core interests and how many involve peripheral ones? Table 2.1 answers
the first two questions. It shows that a country’s average value for the regional conventional
balance is influenced by its most common adversary. For example, India is at the top of the list
because it only faces Pakistan, a rival over whom it has conventional superiority. Russia/Soviet
Union has the second-highest average defense expenditure, but its average in the regional
balance is below 0.5 because it consistently faces the United States in areas outside Europe.
China has a large economy, but it only appears in the dataset three times, once against the Soviet
Union and once against the United States in areas where both stationed a lot of military power.
Nevertheless, there are a couple patterns to discern here. First, states that spend more on
their military forces overall tend to have more conventional power on-hand in the area of a
dispute. This makes sense. It takes a lot of money to build power projection capability and
deploy troops overseas. If a dispute takes place on the two disputants’ border, the regional
balance will mirror the overall balance. Second, states with bigger economies tend to have more
conventional power in the region where a dispute takes place. Again, this is because it takes a lot
of resources to station troops overseas and build large military forces.
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Table 2.1: Summary Stats of Local Military Power
Country

Power Average Military Expenditure GDP
(thousands of US $)

(billions of US $)

12939000

2205.250

United States 0.5822737

328711495

10243.400

Israel

0.4681107

890909

35.000

Russia

0.4296624

90749175

3069.543

Pakistan

0.3399006

3226500

467.250

China

0.3155704

51957307

6403.000

North Korea

0.2356328

824400

43.000

India

0.6601056

The next set of summary statistics break down the stakes involved in disputes. Figure 2.1
shows the number of core disputes and peripheral disputes. As expected for nuclear crises,
disputes over peripheral interests are more common than disputes over core one. There are 29
times where a state was defending a peripheral interest in a dispute and 13 times when it was
trying to achieve a core interest. These are odd numbers due to the breakdown of disputes with
dissimilar and similar stakes involved. There are 5 disputes where both sides have core interests
at stake, 13 disputes where both sides have peripheral interests at stake, and 3 where they have
dissimilar stakes involved. This corresponds to 10 observations in the “double core,” 26 in the
“double periphery,” and 6 in asymmetric disputes. In any case, the greater number of peripheral
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disputes lends credence to the idea that states are reluctant to challenge the core objectives of a
state with nuclear weapons.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of State Interests in Nuclear Disputes

Main Tests
Do these hypotheses correctly predict the relationship between conventional options and
dispute success? To answer this, I first conduct a simple regression of the local conventional
balance on dispute outcomes. This regression favors the first hypothesis that superiority in
conventional variety leads to better crisis outcomes among nuclear states. To illustrate this
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finding, I plot the outcome of dispute success by conventional balance in Figure 2.2. Clearly,
superior states gain better dispute outcomes on average, and this difference is statistically
significant. The results of the regression, including effect size, standard error, and p-value are
shown in the caption.
Figure 2.2: Local Conventional Superiority and Dispute Outcomes

DIM: 0.761905 (s.e. = 0.100420, p-value < 0.01)155
This result establishes some baseline plausibility for the first hypothesis. To do the same
for the second hypothesis, I analyze how the indicator of regional conventional superiority
interacts with the stakes involved. The results shown in Figure 2.3 indicate that in core disputes
there is very little positive effect for having greater local conventional capabilities. However, in
disputes over peripheral interests, there is a large positive effect for local conventional
superiority. The difference-in-differences (DID) estimator is positive and statistically significant.

This is the “pooled” estimate. In Table A1, I present the “within-dyad” estimator for the bivariate regression,
hence the difference between the two estimates.
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This gives support to the idea that states with less conventional capabilities can substitute
conventional options with threats of nuclear escalation to achieve core objectives. Over
peripheral disputes, the benefit of having more conventional capabilities in the region where a
dispute takes place is quite large. This lends support to the idea that nuclear deterrence may not
be effective in peripheral disputes and a state will need to rely on its ability to credibly
communicate that it can win a limited conventional conflict.
These analyses show that local conventional military superiority has a positive
relationship with nuclear dispute outcomes and that this positive relationship is conditional on
the dispute occurring over a peripheral interest. This raises a question: does the overall positive
effect of local superiority run through higher resolve for states with more capabilities? While the
finding of the effects of the regional conventional balance being concentrated in peripheral
disputes implies that this is not the case, it does not directly answer this question. To do so, I
break down how states with lesser and greater local conventional power fared in disputes
according to their level of resolve relative to the adversary.
As mentioned in the theory chapter, resolve is private information and therefore
unobservable. However, it should correlate with the stakes involved in a dispute. A state that is
fighting over a core interest is likely to have more resolve in that conflict than if it were
defending a peripheral interest. I can therefore gauge whether the positive effect of local
superiority is purely driven by the effect of superior resolve by examining disputes in which both
states have similar stakes involved in the crisis. If a state was contesting a core interest but its
adversary a peripheral one, I labeled this as a state having “more at stake” the crisis. For the
those disputing a peripheral interest while its adversary was fighting over a core one, I labeled
the state as having “less at stake.” If both sides were disputing a core or peripheral interest, I
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labeled the states has having “equivalent stakes” in the crisis. The results of this analysis are
shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.3: Core, Periphery, and the Effect of Local Superiority

DID: 0.91346 (s.e. = 0.33510, p-value = 0.0096447)
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Figure 2.4: Stakes Differentials and the Effect of Dispute Outcome

DIM for Similar Stakes Crisis: 0.77778 (s.e. = 0.18371, p = 0.0001649)
The first notable takeaway from this figure is that states tend to get into disputes where
they think the stakes involved are close to even. This makes sense, as the importance of the
objectives at stake in the crisis is a variable that should be factored in before a state initiates a
dispute.156 Second, in those disputes where similar interests are at stake, states with greater local
military power tend to obtain better dispute outcomes. This lends support to the hypothesis that
For more on selection effects in the study of international crises, see Fearon, James. “Selection Effects and
Deterrence.” International Interactions, Vol. 28 (2002): pp. 5-29.
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more conventional options for escalation in a crisis increases a state’s bargaining power and
therefore leads to a better crisis outcome. Finally, the result that states with greater military
power but peripheral interests at stake perform better than a draw should be taken with caution.
There are only three disputes with an imbalance in interests, and that result is driven by US
success in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96 where the US had less resolve over Taiwan
than China.
The results of better performance for states with greater local military power when the
stakes involved in a dispute are held equal should be concentrated in disputes where both sides
are disputing peripheral interests. Meanwhile, when both states are pursuing core objectives,
conventional military power should not have an effect on dispute outcome. To test for this, I split
up the disputes with similar stakes involved into the “double core” and “double periphery” and
examine the effect of the local balance in each. The results are shown in Figure 2.5. When both
sides are disputing a peripheral interest, local conventional superiority has a large, positive
relationship with nuclear dispute outcomes. This effect does not happen when two nuclear states
are disputing a core interest. For the 5 disputes in the “double core,” there is no difference in the
average outcome for states with greater conventional options compared to states with fewer
options.
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Figure 2.5: Results in the Double Periphery vs. the Double Core

DIM in Double Periphery: 1.07692 (s.e. = 0.24451, p = 0.0001889)
For a further test of both hypotheses, I use regressions with the continuous measure for
local conventional superiority. This takes the gap between the two values of regional
conventional military power for each state in a dispute. The larger this gap, the more local
conventional power the superior side possessed in the crisis. This is a better estimate of the
regional balance than the indicator variable because it does not treat states with only a small
degree of superiority the same as those with far more options for escalation than its adversary.
Because it is a better estimate than the indicator variable, using the gap variable should also
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reduce measurement error. Measurement error in the independent variable tends to bias the
estimated effect of that variable towards zero, effectively lowering the power of my analysis.157
As such, if there is a relationship between conventional military power and dispute outcome, it
should appear more robust when measured as the equipment ratio compared to the indicator. I
only used the indicator variable to be able to make a simple illustration as a first cut analysis. I
report results with the ratio gap measure in Table 2.2. The results show that, on average, the
more superior a state is in the local conventional balance, the better dispute outcome it achieves.
This provides further support for the first hypothesis that more conventional options lead to
better crisis outcomes. The main result is similar when the indicator variable is used in the
regression model, as I show in Appendix Table A1.
To test the second hypothesis, I examine the interaction effect between the gap in
regional military power and the stakes involved in a dispute. The results are displayed under
Model 2 in Table 2.2. I find a small negative, yet null, effect for the interaction between the
stakes involved in a crisis and the balance in conventional capabilities. In further models with
control variables, I find a small, positive effect for the interaction between the stakes in dispute
and conventional military power. This may constitute evidence that dispute outcomes get better
for states with local conventional superiority when disputing a peripheral interest. This effect is
not statistically significant, however, limiting the inferences one can draw from it. The null
finding could be due to the fact that I do not have enough power to pick up an interaction effect.
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Interaction effects are difficult to detect, as the sample size needed to detect an interaction effect
is four times that of the sample size needed to detect a main effect of the same magnitude.158
Table 2.2: Regression Results with Continuous Balance Variable

21 disputes and 42 states are likely not enough observations to detect an interaction
between local superiority and the stakes involved in a regression model. In Appendix Table A1, I
use the indicator variable of local superiority in the regression models. I find that the interaction
effect is significant at the 10 percent level when no controls are added, but when I include
control variables, I find the same relationship as the gap in superiority measure. There is a small,
positive interaction effect between peripheral disputes and the effect of conventional superiority,

Leon, Andrew and Heo, Moonseong. “Sample Sizes Required to Detect Interactions between Two Binary FixedEffects in a Mixed-Effects Linear Regression Model.” Computational Statistics and Data Analytics, 53, No. 3
(2009): pp. 603-608.
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but it is statistically insignificant, possibly due to a low N. Nonetheless, the coefficients for the
main variables indicate that conventional superiority helps, and it may help even more for
peripheral disputes.
I first examine the robustness of these findings to the inclusion of relevant control
variables by adding the nuclear balance into the regression model. Model 3 shows the regression
with the regional conventional balance and the quantitative nuclear balance as the only variables
in the regression. The nuclear balance is measured as an indicator of which side has more nuclear
weapons. That result provides further support to Hypothesis 1. Superiority in local conventional
capabilities leads to better dispute outcomes even when controlling for the effect of the nuclear
balance. This is evidence that conventional options confer their own benefit apart from that
provided by a state’s nuclear arsenal. Model 4 adds the interaction effect. This result shows a
positive but statistically insignificant main effect with a positive and also insignificant interaction
effect. This lends weak support to Hypotheses 1 and 2. More local conventional military leads to
better dispute outcome, and there is a small but statistically insignificant interaction effect with
the stakes involved in the dispute. Again, this insignificance in the interaction effects models
could be due to low statistical power.
I then include the three other relevant control variables that each could have a strong,
independent effect on dispute outcome and be confounded with the balance of conventional
variety. Model 5 shows these control variables without the interaction effect. It also supports the
first hypothesis with the effect of local conventional superiority being positive and significant.
Model 6 includes the interaction effect. This model provides weak support to Hypotheses 1 and
2. There is some positive effect for conventional superiority in core disputes, and the effect
increases to some degree in peripheral disputes. However, this interaction is again not
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statistically significant. I run these same models using the indicator measure of the conventional
variety balance and post the results in Table A1 in the appendix, finding similar results.
Other tests and robustness checks
Conventional variety influences dispute outcomes, but are there any particular kinds of
conventional military power that matter more than others? To answer this, I divide the measures
of the conventional military power index by domain, providing a measure of the local balance in
land components, air components, and naval components. I use the balance in troops and main
battle tanks for the balance on land, the balance in tactical aircraft and transport aircraft for the
balance in the air, and the balance in surface combatants and submarines for the balance at sea. I
then run the same regression that I used to produce Table 1 with the local balance in each domain
as the measure for the degree of superiority in conventional variety. For instance, in Table A2,
the balance in power on land substitutes for the overall variety balance. The balance in the air is
used in Table A3, and the naval balance is used in Table A4. The balance in land power is
positively correlated when not including an interaction effect. However, the interaction effect is
much stronger than in the overall local balance measure, so much so that the effect of land power
in core disputes is slightly negative. The balance in air power provides similar results as the
overall local balance. The balance in sea power is positive in the bivariate model and in Model 2
where the interaction effect as the only other variable. It has a weak effect in every other model.
Overall, the results when only measuring one aspect of conventional military power are not as
strong as the correlation between the overall local balance and dispute outcomes. This is good for
the theory, as each component of conventional power, and hence, each domain where
conventional options are available, seems to matter. However, its effect is magnified by a
country being strong in other domains of warfare alongside it. The F-test for joint significance
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indicates that they all jointly predict dispute outcome, providing further support for the
hypothesis that all components of conventional military power work together to influence crisis
behavior.
Another question is whether my results could be reproduced using standard measures of
aggregate power. Perhaps I am showing the mechanism through which countries with more
overall power get their way in nuclear disputes. This possibility is only strengthened by the fact
that larger states tend to have more conventional options for escalation in any given dispute. To
test this, I run the regressions used in Table 1 using GDP, GDP per capita, and superiority in
CINC score as measures for conventional variety. The results are reported in the appendix in
Tables A5-A7. In Tables A5 and A6, I show that GDP and GDP per capita have no relationship
to dispute outcome, respectively. In Table A7, I use the superiority in CINC score to indicate
who has more conventional military power. I refrain from using the “gap” variable in this
analysis because CINC score is not a dyadic measure. It is referenced to the degree of material
power relative to all other countries in the world. Using the indicator, I find that superiority in
overall material power does not correlate positively with outcomes in the bivariate model. In the
models with control variables and an interaction effect, a higher CINC score appears to have a
negative effect in core disputes and positive one in peripheral disputes. This is a stronger
interaction effect than the one found with the models featuring the local conventional balance as
the independent variable of interest. Taken together, these results are more inconsistent and less
robust than the one produced by the regional conventional balance. This indicates that the
conventional options available in a dispute can be separated from aggregate material power and
has a stronger correlation with dispute outcomes.
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I test the robustness of my results with reference to three decisions I made in the main
analysis. First, I test whether the results are robust to providing a smaller correction for
technological superiority. Second, I examine whether the coding the outcome of the Berlin Crisis
as the ICB codes the outcome significantly changes the results. Third, I use clustered standard
errors at the country level to see if that significantly changes the results. If the results hold up to
these tests, then that suggests the findings of my main analysis are not due to my specific
decisions on how to handle the data.
The first robustness check changes the technological superiority coding from 1 for the
side employing newer or qualitatively superior weapons platforms to 0.75. It changes the side
with inferior or older weapons platforms from a coding of 0 to a coding of 0.25. I then
recalculate the variety balance with these new technological superiority corrections. The results
with this new measure of conventional military power are reported in Table A8. The relationship
remains positive and statistically significant in models without the interaction effect. Models
with the interaction effect point in the right direction, with little effect for local military power in
core disputes and a greater effect in peripheral ones. This is similar to the results with the larger
correction for technological superiority, suggesting that my results are robust to an alternative
coding of the correction for qualitative superiority.
The second set of robustness checks is done by changing the outcome of the Berlin Crisis
to a Soviet victory. This is how the crisis is coded in the ICB dataset, but I code this as an
American victory in my dataset. I find that this re-coding makes the results even better for the
first hypothesis. The relationship between conventional military power and dispute outcome is
stronger. However, the interaction effect fails to show much substantive or statistical
significance. These results are in Table A9.

89

The final set of robustness checks involves another way of specifying standard errors and
fixed effects. In Table A10, I cluster standard errors at the country level rather than the dyad
level. I also use a “within-country” estimator rather than a “within-dyads” estimator. The results
show a weaker interaction effect and stronger main effect.
Discussion
The results of the quantitative analysis support the predictions of the first hypothesis.
Having greater conventional military power in the region where a dispute is taking place is
correlated with better dispute outcomes. This supports the idea that having more conventional
options for escalation aids a state in a nuclear dispute. The analysis also showed that nuclear
superiority and possessing a more open political regime could also affect outcomes in nuclear
disputes. As noted earlier, these two variables may be correlated with the number of
conventional options available to a state. In addition, there is a “selection problem” when it
comes to measuring nuclear crises. The processes that produce the disputes we observe may be
related to the balance in conventional power. Those two factors combined with the fundamental
problem of causal inference mean that no causal claim can be made from the positive results of
this analysis for the first hypothesis. Even if that were the case, you could not argue that
superiority in the number of conventional options was the sole cause of better dispute outcomes
in the data. Nevertheless, the overall empirical pattern sketched in the quantitative analysis
suggests that having more conventional options bolsters a state’s bargaining power in a nuclear
dispute.
The second hypothesis that the effect of conventional options is greater for disputes over
peripheral issues is somewhat supported. There is an interaction effect between the stakes
involved in the dispute and the effect size of conventional superiority. When only including
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those variables, there is no effect for local conventional superiority in core disputes and a large
effect in peripheral disputes. This follows the logic of conventional options theory. In the
regression models with control variables, a weak positive interaction effect is found. This
weakness could be due to the sample size of 42 states being too small. The overall results lend
support to the idea that in disputes over peripheral interests, which represent the majority of
nuclear disputes, conventional options have a large effect on dispute outcome.
Looking beyond the testing of hypotheses, the empirical patterns found by the
quantitative analysis leave some questions unanswered. One unresolved issue is that there are no
causal process observations in the analysis. This is another source of doubt as to whether the
correlation between greater conventional options and better dispute success is due to a causal
relationship. In nuclear crises, do states with greater options force their adversaries into
disadvantageous bargaining positions because of the use of conventional force? And do their
adversaries back down because of this? I will seek to answer this question through my case
studies.
Another unanswered question is whether a state can have enough conventional options or
if it is always the case that more is better. We think of nuclear military strength in terms of
whether a state has enough of it to impose the danger of nuclear catastrophe upon its adversaries.
Anything beyond this capability is unnecessary or does not translate into tangible benefits.
Conventional military power could work in the same way. After a certain point, it may be the
case that the extra costs of adding another rung to the escalation ladder is not worth the benefits
that doing so would confer. This issue comes up in debates over military spending when defense
analysts and lawmakers ask whether a weapons program is “necessary.” It is thus worth
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examining whether there is a level of conventional power after which further adding further
options is not useful and it would be productive to speculate on where that level is.
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Chapter 3: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Conventional Options Theory
On October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy learned of Soviet missile installations
of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBM’s and IRBM’s) in Cuba. This
kicked off the most intense 13 days of the Cold War. After close to a week of deliberation,
President Kennedy announced in an address to the American public on October 22 that the US
would blockade Cuba, preventing any further offensive weapons from reaching the island. He
also demanded that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev withdraw the missiles from Cuba.
Khrushchev was at first resolved to keep Soviet missiles on the island, but as fears of a war
between the two sides grew, he decided to seek ways to end the crisis. He sent a “soft” letter to
Kennedy on October 26 proposing that the United States pledge not to invade Cuba in exchange
for the Soviets withdrawing their missiles. One day letter, Khrushchev sent a second, “hard”
letter demanding a non-invasion pledge plus the removal of US nuclear missiles in Turkey in
return for a Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. The Kennedy administration decided to publicly
respond to the first letter while telling Soviet officials in private that the missiles in Turkey
would be removed. The Soviets accepted this deal and the crisis ended on October 28, 1962.
The Cuban Missile Crisis is the first case in which I will test conventional options theory.
To review, conventional options theory argues that states with more options for escalation at the
conventional level are more likely to achieve success in nuclear crises. This is because the ability
to carry out a conflict at a particular conventional level puts the onus for further escalation back
on the adversary. The next level to which the adversary would have to raise the conflict may be
too costly and/or run too high a risk of general nuclear war. Successful conventional escalation
by a state puts pressure on an adversary to deescalate. Because the United States had
conventional preponderance in the Caribbean during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it had multiple
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conventional options. My theory would predict that these conventional options were the principal
source of bargaining leverage for the United States. The Soviet Union backed down because it
could not respond to US moves at the conventional level, making the maintenance of missiles in
Cuba too costly for them.
However, conventional options theory also predicts that nuclear threats would be credible
in this instance because Cuba lies close to the core of the American threat spectrum. In addition,
Cuba was in the Soviets’ geographic periphery, perhaps giving the Soviet Union less resolve in
the crisis. This gave the United States room to use conventional force in a major crisis but also
opens up the possibility that US nuclear threats alone could have persuaded the Soviet Union to
compromise in the absence of conventional escalation by the United States. As a result, the
Cuban Missile Crisis should be regarded as an illustrative case. Because the US possessed many
conventional options, it should grant the opportunity to analyze how conventional options for
escalation can build leverage over an adversary. This case study on its own cannot, however, rule
out a purely resolve-based theory of nuclear crisis outcomes.159
Summary of Argument
What role did the conventional balance of power play in the Cuban Missile Crisis? I
argue that the United States’ local preponderance in conventional military power allowed it to
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build coercive leverage over the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US did this
by escalating, or threatening to escalate, to conventional options against which the USS.R. had
no response except to use tactical nuclear weapons. The lack of a proportionate response to the
US blockade or a potential US invasion of Cuba motivated Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to
back down. US President John Kennedy offered Khrushchev concessions on secondary issues – a
non-invasion pledge towards Cuba and the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey – that
would allow Khrushchev to save face while doing so. The Cuban Missile Crisis shows the
benefits of having a multiple conventional options for enhancing a state’s bargaining power in a
nuclear crisis. Without options for conventional escalation, the Soviet Union faced a choice
between withdrawing its missiles or accepting an invasion that would cause it to initiate the use
of tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, not wanting to risk nuclear war over Cuba, chose
the former. The United States, on the other hand, was able to draw on several conventional
options, and this permitted it to escalate to a point at which the Soviets had to choose between
nuclear use and surrender. The United States successfully coerced the Soviet Union through a
strategy of conventional compellence during the crisis.
This case study, by itself, however, cannot establish the general validity of the benefits of
conventional options. While there are several causal process observations that accord with the
theory, the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis could also have been shaped by US resolve and
nuclear threats. American policymakers intensified the alert posture of the country’s strategic
nuclear forces during the crisis, and the United States had high resolve over Cuba, a country
which had carried strategic significance for over a century. Cuba was on the Soviets’ geographic
periphery. In his letters to President John F. Kennedy, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev cited
the mutual fear of nuclear escalation several times as a reason to seek compromise. Thus, in the
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absence of a counterfactual Cuban crisis in which the US did not possess conventional
preponderance, it is hard to know whether the United States could have had a successful coercion
strategy through nuclear threats alone. This case study is illustrative of the use of conventional
power, but it cannot be used to dismiss theories of nuclear crisis outcomes primarily based on the
nuclear balance and resolve.
My interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis provides clarity to debates about the crisis
in international security studies. In particular, it illuminates how debates on the relative merits of
US nuclear threats persist. A recent debate in IR scholarship centers around the role of American
nuclear superiority in shaping either a win or a draw for the United States in the Cuban Missile
Crisis.160 On one side, Matthew Kroenig argues that the US was victorious in the crisis, and this
was due to its strategic nuclear superiority. Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann disagree on
both fronts, arguing that the US and the Soviet Union came to an even compromise and that the
Soviet Union was not cowed by US nuclear superiority.161 This debate mirrors the one among
policymakers during the crisis over the meaning of US nuclear superiority.162 Missing from this
debate on nuclear superiority is attention on the role that the much larger US superiority in
conventional military capabilities in the Caribbean played in the crisis. Marc Trachtenberg
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explicitly compares the role of conventional and nuclear weapons in the crisis, and he concludes
that Soviets were more afraid of strategic inferiority than conventional inferiority.163 However,
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, two historians with access to Soviet archives,
highlight the pressures the fear of an American invasion of Cuba put on Khrushchev.164 These
pressures ultimately caused him to deescalate, and the decision to retreat from Cuba was a major
setback to Khrushchev’s foreign policy. The most recent sources released and scholarship on the
crisis points to how the lack of conventional military options put the Soviets in a
disadvantageous bargaining position in the crisis.165
The chapter will proceed in five parts. First, I will outline the nuclear and conventional
military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, with special attention paid to
the local balance in the Caribbean and North Atlantic. Second, I will describe the context and
background of the crisis and use it to explain the objectives each side pursued during the crisis.
Thirdly, I will describe the outcome of the crisis and argue why it is a victory for the United
States. The fourth part will trace the development of the Cuban Missile Crisis, showing how the
military balance shaped the actions of decision-makers. This part will also assess the relative
importance of the conventional and nuclear balance in motivating these actions. Fifth, I will
conclude the case study by reflecting on its ramifications for conventional options theory.
Structural Bipolarity, Regional Unipolarity: The Military Balance
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What was the military balance in October 1962 on the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
At the global level, the balance was bipolar, with both countries possessing extensive
conventional capabilities and nuclear arsenals that could destroy the other side. In the Caribbean
and Western Atlantic, however, the United States maintained unquestioned conventional
preponderance. American conventional power made it difficult for the Soviet Union to project
military power into the Atlantic Ocean. The mismatch between the global and regional balances
of power in the Cuban Missile Crisis makes the case an opportunity to analyze the importance of
local forces and power projection capabilities to the possession of conventional options during a
crisis.
The Nuclear Balance
In the period from 1958 to 1961, the United States maintained a far larger and more
diversified nuclear arsenal than the Soviet Union. While US policymakers felt that this gave
them nuclear superiority, they did not think that this gave them a first-strike advantage capable of
escaping unacceptable damage in a nuclear war. The result of the nuclear balance in this time
frame is that neither side wanted a general war, even though the Soviet Union would likely
experience greater destruction than the United States should one occur.
The Soviet Union made strides in improving its nuclear arsenal from 1958 to 1961, but it
remained limited in its long-range strike capability. The Soviet Union deployed its firstgeneration ICBM, the R-7, in July 1959.166 This worried US intelligence analysts, whose
analyses projected the Soviet Union to have 500 operational ICBM’s by 1962.167 This sparked
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fear that the United States would not keep pace and thus suffer from a missile gap with the
Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union deemphasized production of its first-generation ICBM,
and by 1961 the Soviet Union only had 50 operational ICBM’s.168 In addition, General Maxwell
Taylor, first a senior military aide and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President
John Kennedy, explained in a military briefing to West German leaders that the Soviet ICBM’s
in 1961 were deployed on “soft and easily destroyed launching complexes with cumbersome
liquid-fueled missiles, and an inadequate defense against bomber attack.”169 The Soviets lacked
long-range bomber capacity as well. They possessed around 150 long-range heavy bombers in
both 1958 and 1961 of the jet Bison and turboprop Bear class.170 The downside of these bombers
was that many of them were vulnerable to being shot down by American air defenses should the
United States receive sufficient advance warning of a Soviet nuclear strike.171 During the crisis,
the Soviet Union had a limited long-range strike capability that was vulnerable to an American
first strike or air defenses.
Some analysts look at the vulnerability of the Soviet arsenal during 1958-1961 and claim
that it lacked a second-strike capability during this time. This assessment rests on undue
optimism about the outcome of a US first strike during a crisis, however.172 There was little
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guarantee that the United States would knock out a sufficient number of Soviet targets in a first
strike to keep damage to the homeland below 10 million casualties. Plus, the Soviet Union could
supplement its long-range arsenal with attacks from its medium-range and short-range platforms.
For instance, the Soviet Union had around 1,000 medium bombers of the Badger class with a
range of 3500 miles. These medium bombers constituted the bulk of Soviet nuclear forces during
the Berlin Crises.173 If the Soviets stationed these bombers in the Arctic and sent their pilots on
one-way missions, then the medium bomber force could also strike targets in the United
States.174 Such use was considered unlikely – not least because the crews of medium bombers
were not trained for Arctic operations – but possible.175 In addition, the Soviet Union placed
short-range ballistic missiles on submarines in the Atlantic. The US military knew that the
Soviets had around 30 of these submarines armed with a total of around 100 missiles in the range
of 150-350 nautical miles.176 It is not clear if American ASW capability was good enough in the
early 1960’s to locate and destroy every Soviet submarine in the Atlantic before they could fire
their nuclear weapons. While not as large as the American arsenal, US military and civilian
leaders alike believed that the Soviet Union possessed enough nuclear weapons on a sufficient
number of platforms such that “some portion of the Soviet forces would survive to strike
back.”177 Plus, even if a retrospective look could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Soviet
Union lacked the ability to inflict unacceptable damage to the United States, American
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policymakers at the time believed that they were vulnerable to Soviet retaliation.178 Thus, the
Soviets’ ability to use one-way missions for their medium-range bombers and short-range
missiles fired from submarines in the Atlantic in addition to their limited intercontinental
capability gave them the capacity to inflict grave damage on the United States.
Whatever damage the United States experienced, it was clear that the Soviet nuclear
hammer stroke would fall hardest on Western Europe. A National Intelligence Estimate
estimated that the Soviet Union had several different types of medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBM’s) that could fly between 700 and 1100 nautical missiles (about 800-1250 miles).179
Western military analysts between 1958 and 1961 counted around 200 MRBM’s stationed near
the USSR’s western border, putting much of Western Europe at risk of a nuclear strike.180 The
medium bomber force could also strike targets in Western Europe. US military strategists
assessed that in a nuclear war, Western Europe would experience a level of catastrophe “perhaps
so great as to threaten the fabrics of the nations.”181 Given the potential level of destruction the
Soviets could cause, US policymakers could not have been optimistic about the outcome of a
nuclear first strike.
Both American and Soviet policymakers were certain that the United States would inflict
a catastrophic level of damage on the Soviet Union. In long-range bomber capability, the United
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States had a huge advantage with 1000 B-47’s and close to 600 B-52’s that could hit targets in
the Soviet Union (the former with in-flight refueling).182 By late 1961, the United States also had
missile superiority, with 54 Atlas and 9 Titan intercontinental missiles that could strike the
Soviet Union. The US also had 96 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM’s) placed on
Polaris submarines that could be deployed within range of the Soviet Union.183 This level of
nuclear superiority is what led Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to proclaim that
“we [the United States] have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the
Soviets can deliver by striking first.”184 The United States had nuclear superiority, but this
superiority was not enough to make them invulnerable to Soviet retaliation.185
Global Conventional Balance
The global conventional balance was one of rough parity with the Soviet Union and its
allies possessing an advantage in Europe. The Soviet Union had a total of 3 million troops under
arms; the United States had over 2.8 million.186 The US deployed 229,000 troops to Western
Europe and the Soviets deployed over 231,000 troops to Eastern Europe. The Soviets also had
over 500,000 troops in the European portion of their country at this point.187 Those troop
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numbers represent only the forces in ground combat units. The Soviets’ Warsaw Pact allies have
a total of 865,000 ground forces, with 460,000 coming from East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia, the closest countries to West Germany.188 There were over a million ground
forces among US NATO allies in Europe, with over 300,000 deployed in Germany.189 In terms
of overall manpower, the United States and the Soviet Union were roughly equal, and this
assessment changes to a slight Soviet advantage when including allies and looking only at the
European theater.
The Soviet Union and its allies possessed a greater quantity of military equipment than
the United States and its allies. For instance, the Soviet Union had over 28,000 tanks in 1962
compared to around 7,000 for the United States.190 In Europe, this discrepancy is more muted,
with the Soviets deploying 5,500 tanks and the Americans 2,500.191 The Soviet Union had
around 11,750 combat aircraft, and the United States had over 3,500.192 The balance in Europe is
slightly better, with 1475 tactical aircraft for the Soviets and 960 for the Americans.193 In terms
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of transport aircraft, the US had over 700 aircraft and the USSR over 1700.194 The Soviet Union
also possessed more submarines, 359 to 114.195 The United States, however, did possess a much
larger surface fleet, with 817 surface combatants to 193 for the Soviet Union.196
What the United States and its allies lacked in quantity of weapons they made up for in
quality. With the exception of battle tanks, the US and its allies tended to have higher quality
weapons with better technology. Tanks were the main focus of the Soviet land forces, and its
T54/55 tank was on par with the M48 tank deployed among US forces in Europe at the time.197
The most common planes in the US tactical air fleet (F-100 Sabre, F-104 Starfighter, and F-105
Thunderchief) were faster, had greater range, and had a higher payload than the most common
planes in the Soviet tactical air fleet (MiG-17, -19, and -21).198 Most of the Soviet Union’s
transport aircraft were “light” cargo aircraft (I1-12 and Il-14) and the United States’ aircraft were
mostly of the “medium” (C-118) or “heavy” (C-124) variety.199 The Soviet Union’s submarine
fleet featured a lower percentage of long-range subs than did the United States, and it had less
nuclear-powered subs than the US at the time (7 vs. 16).200 Overall, the Soviet Union and its
allies possessed more troops and equipment, most importantly in Europe, than did the United
States and its allies. The latter side compensated for their quantitative deficiency by producing
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weapons of better quality. This contributed to a state of rough structural parity in the
conventional military balance in the early 1960’s.
Local Conventional Balance in the Caribbean
Underneath the global structure of military power lies several regional balances of power.
The balance of power in a particular region may not reflect the structural balance. This was the
case in the Caribbean during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1961, the US military combined the
Tactical Air Command and the Army divisions stationed in the continental United States into a
single Strike Command, or STRAC.201 By 1962, STRAC was composed of 2 airborne, 2
armored, and 4 infantry divisions, with one armored and one infantry division being composed of
National Guard troops.202 If you use the approximation of 40,000 troops per Army division, then
there were about 240,000 non-National Guard Army troops within STRAC alone. STRAC also
had 10 tactical fighter squadrons, 1 reconnaissance squadron, and 3 troop carrier squadrons for a
total of 756 combat aircraft.203 In the Atlantic Ocean, the US Second Fleet featured 4 attack
carriers, 5 ASW carriers, 5 cruisers, 116 destroyers, and 69 submarines for a total of close to 200
surface and subsurface combatants.204
Arrayed against this concentration of US conventional military power was the Soviet
deployment of troops, weapons, and equipment to Cuba. The Soviets transportation of its men
and materiel to Cuba was known as Operation Anadyr. In addition to the 60 MRBM’s and
IRBM’s deployed to the island, the operation also sent four motorized rifle regiments with a total
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of 14,000 troops. The Soviets sent 42 Il-28 light bombers, 40 MiG-21 fighter planes (at the time
the best fighter in the Soviet air forces), and 72 V-75 launchers for air defense. It deployed 80
FKR-1 cruise missiles, 32 S-2 “Sopka” cruise missiles, and 12 Komar patrol boats for coastal
defense.205 It planned to send in a naval force that included 11 submarines, two cruisers, and four
destroyers (two missile-firing and two regular), but they were ultimately not deployed.206 This
meant that at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union had around 42,000 troops
deployed to Cuba.
It is likely that Khrushchev viewed the nuclear missiles as the principal component of the
Soviet Union’s deployment. Before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev and his military
advisers did not think that conventional military strength – and naval strength in particular –
would play a role in deciding superpower contests. Khrushchev cut funds to conventional
military programs in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s in order to put more money into the Soviet
ICBM program. One area that was targeted for cuts was the surface naval fleet, and this was
done in the belief of the obsolescence of surface strength. As one Soviet defense official put it,
“Ships! They’ll be food for the fishes!”207 If Khrushchev had not held this view and invested in
greater naval and power projection capabilities, he may have deployed greater conventional
capabilities to Cuba, which then could have helped the Soviets keep their nuclear missiles on the
island.
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That the Soviet Union was able to transfer this many troops and equipment to Cuba
should be considered an operational achievement of the highest order. To do it, the Soviet Union
had to traverse thousands of miles of ocean in which they had almost no military presence, and if
caught, a ship transporting nuclear missiles would likely have been forced to stop. This is why
the Soviets conducted the operation in strict secrecy. The missiles and nuclear warheads were
transported in a commercial cargo ship, Indigirka, unaccompanied by any other ship.208 The Il28’s and MiG-21’s were disassembled and shipped in wooden crates. Military personnel made
the journey across the Atlantic in closed holds. Soviet troops and equipment were dropped off at
11 different ports around Cuba.209 Sergo Mikoyan, son of former Soviet official Anastas
Mikoyan, points to the secrecy of the operation outside of the Soviet top brass while the
transportation was ongoing and assesses that it “was organized brilliantly from the very
beginning.”210
The Soviet Union used secrecy to establish some military strength in the Caribbean, but
this deployment was no match for the amount of forces the US controlled in the region. As will
become clear later in the case study, this meant that the Soviet Union had little to no
conventional options for escalation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet leadership knew
this ahead of time, which is why they also transported 36 Luna short-range rockets with 12 2kiloton nuclear warheads in September 1962 to augment the rest of the forces in Operation
Anadyr.211 In contrast, regional conventional power preponderance gave the United States a wide
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range of conventional options for escalation during the crisis. The goal of the rest of the case
study is to judge to what extent those increased options for escalation played a role in decisionmaking and benefitted the United States. To do that, I will first explain the background to the
crisis and the objectives each side was trying to accomplish during it.
US and Soviet Policy towards Castro’s Cuba
The United States’ main objective with regards to Cuba was to prevent it from becoming
a base from which Communist powers could project military and political influence in the
Western Hemisphere. This translated into an immediate objective of convincing the Soviets to
withdraw their nuclear missiles and military forces from Cuba. The Soviet Union wanted to use
an alliance with Cuba as a way to project power in the Americas and to protect Cuban leader
Fidel Castro from a US-imposed regime change. During the crisis, this meant that the Soviet
Union wanted above all to keep its missiles and forces in Cuba and only after that to ensure the
survival of Cuba’s communist government.
Since the 19th century, control over Cuba was eyed as an important objective for US
foreign and domestic policy. Then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams declared that Cuba has
“an importance in the sum of our national interests with which no foreign Territory can be
compared.”212 Southerners in the United States viewed the island as a potential slave state. John
C. Calhoun said of Cuba that “as the pear, when ripe, falls by the law of gravity into the lap of
the husbandman, so will Cuba eventually drop into the lap of the Union.”213 With this aim in
mind, President James K. Polk attempted to buy Cuba from Spain, but his agent was rebuffed by
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the Spanish government. In 1898, newspaper editors such as William Randolph Hearst and
Joseph Pulitzer were able to use sensationalist press to stir a war for the “liberation” of Cuba
from Spanish rule. Afterwards, the US occupied Cuba for three years and inserted the Platt
Amendment into the Cuban constitution. This amendment allowed the United States to intervene
at any time to “protect Cuban independence.”214 In 1903, the United States also leased the
strategically important Guantanamo Bay from Cuba in order to establish a naval base.215
The United States would use the Platt Amendment as a pretext to send troops to Cuba on
and off again until 1934, when both sides abrogated the agreement.216 After the Platt
Amendment, the United States still continued to wield influence over Cuba’s economy and
society. US investors poured billions of dollars into the Cuban economy in the first half of the
20th century, and US companies controlled most of Cuba’s main industries: sugar, mining, and
transportation.217 While many in Cuba chafed at US influence, by the middle of the 20th century
the Cuban professional classes had developed a taste for American goods and culture.218 Before
Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba was “an American-dominated state.”219
The United States thus held deep economic and strategic interests in Cuba, and when the
Cold War began, it was determined to not let the country fall to Communism. One part of this
can be seen in America’s larger policy towards Latin America in the late 1940’s and 1950’s. In
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1954, the United States convinced the Organization of American States (OAS) – an organization
founded on the basis of non-intervention into the domestic affairs of other American countries –
to adopt the Caracas Resolution. This resolution stated that countries within OAS can intervene
in other countries in order to prevent the development of a “communist beachhead” in the
Western Hemisphere.220 This resolution legitimated the CIA-backed coup of Jacobo Arbenz in
Guatemala in 1954. Consistent with a larger foreign policy of containment, the United States
resisted any attempts to establish Communist rule over any Latin American country.
With regards to Cuba in particular, the United States’ anti-communist foreign policy can
be seen in its support for the Fulgencio Batista regime and its initial ambivalence about Fidel
Castro. Similar to all previous Cuban leaders, Batista received generous American patronage,
and in return the Batista regime was a reliable partner in America’s anti-communist agenda in
Latin America.221 When Fidel Castro overthrew Batista, the Eisenhower administration took a
“wait-and-see” approach with the new Cuban leader. During Castro’s trip to the United States in
April 1959, he portrayed himself and the July 26 movement which he led as supporters of
noncommunist economic and social reform.222 This led Castro to have some sympathy among
the American left, and he initially had great popularity in the United States. In 1959, US officials
thought Castro was an enigma, and Eisenhower was unsure of the correct policy to take towards
him.223
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Nevertheless, by the spring of 1960, it was clear that Castro was moving himself farther
to the left in order to co-opt the communist elements of the July 26 movement and gain more
political power. Over the course of 1960, the Soviet Union deepened its ties to Cuba, giving
Castro strength he needed to institute a full socialist reform of the Cuban economy.224 In
November 1960, Castro declared himself to be a Marxist-Leninist from his earliest days.225 On
May 1, 1961, Castro officially declared that his revolution was a communist revolution, and in
April 1962, the Soviet newspaper Pravda began referring to Castro as “comrade.”226 Cuba,
located 90 miles from US shores, was a communist state entrenched in the Soviet orbit.
This turned Cuba into another node of confrontation in the Cold War. The Eisenhower
administration developed a policy of economic strangulation, diplomatic isolation, and covert
action to pressure Castro into either reversing his move to communism or undermining his rule
altogether. By the time of John Kennedy’s inauguration, it was clear that the only way to prevent
communist rule in Cuba was to overthrow Castro. The way to remove him was through covert
operations aimed at fomenting unrest inside Cuba. As Eisenhower explained to the incoming
president, “We cannot let the present government there go on.’ Then Kennedy asked: ‘Should we
support guerilla operations in Cuba?’ Eisenhower’s response was unequivocal: ‘To the
utmost.”227 The limitations of this policy were revealed by the Bay of Pigs fiasco, but that
debacle never changed the basic US policy towards Cuba. The use of covert means to remove
Castro would be continued by the “Special Group – Augmented,” headed by the president’s
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brother Robert Kennedy, rather than the CIA. It planned activities under the guise of Operation
Mongoose.228 This operation was still ongoing when the Cuban Missile Crisis began. The failure
of the Bay of Pigs also highlighted the need for overt military means to overthrow Cuba, and this
the Pentagon provided with OPLAN 312 and OPLAN 314.229 Even though these airstrike and
invasion plans were developed, it is not clear if the use of military force against Cuba by US
forces was ever an official policy or simply contingency plans in case a situation arose in which
the US could overthrow Castro.
Due to Cuba’s size and proximity to its shores, the United States regarded Cuba as
strategically and economically important. It thus became crucial, as was the case with other Latin
American countries, to not see it fall to communist rule. When Castro overthrew Batista, the
United States attempted at first to persuade Castro to continue friendly relations with the US As
Castro moved further into the Soviet orbit, the United States adjusted its policy to one of
economic strangulation and the use covert means to foment unrest. US policymakers wanted to
see Castro removed from power. At a minimum, they did not want Cuba to be a base from which
the Soviet Union could project military power and political influence in the Western
Hemisphere.
That last minimum objective is exactly what the Soviet Union wished to do when it
decided to send nuclear missiles to Cuba. The Soviets were just as wary as the Americans of
Fidel Castro in the early days of his regime. In February 1960, Alexei Adzubei, Khrushchev’s
son-in-law and editor-in-chief of the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya, warned a delegation to Cuba
headed by Anastas Mikoyan on the eve of its visit: “Most likely you will see a typical Latin
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American dictator…He’s already been to the United States and is under its influence. Don’t get
any illusions about Castro.”230 Mikoyan’s ten-day visit, however, changed Soviet perceptions of
Cuba, and it started a program of Soviet military and economic assistance to Cuba. After
Mikoyan’s visit, the Soviet Union agreed to give Cuba $100 million in economic aid and buy
Cuban sugar.231 The visit also alerted the Soviet Union to the possibility of having a “dependable
ally right under the Americans’ nose…90 miles from the southern tip of Florida.”232 Nikita
Khrushchev decided to supply Cubans with whatever arms they wished. In a note to Castro on
March 15, 1960, Khrushchev wrote that “with regard to supplies of weapons, the Soviet
government is prepared to render any assistance in the supply and delivery of them from the
Czechs…and, if necessary, then directly from the Soviet Union.”233 Khrushchev cemented the
Soviet Union’s ties to Cuba with a nuclear guarantee in July 1960.234
Although ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba deepened between 1960 and 1962, it is
not clear what Soviet intentions in this alliance were. Sergo Mikoyan argues that the motivations
behind Khrushchev’s Cuba policy were largely defensive; he wanted to protect Cuba from a US
invasion. Mikoyan argues that “Khrushchev was not a cynic, but a romantic. That is why it was
important for him to rescue Cuba, and it was his main objective.”235 The Soviet leaders, most of
them middle-aged or older, were captivated by the young Cuban revolutionaries, who brought
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them back to the memories of their younger days. They wanted to protect this nascent socialist
movement in Latin America from US aggression. While the defense of Cuba was important to
Khrushchev and other policymakers in the Kremlin, it is unlikely that this was their sole
motivation in building ever closer ties to the island.
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy and Naftali point out that Cuba was promised a
delivery of SA-2 air defense missiles and Soviet tanks in September1960, but by December
1961, these missiles and tanks had never arrived, much to Castro’s consternation.236 Only events
in Cuba and in the arms race would make Cuba a priority. In April 1962, Castro thwarted a
challenge to his authority from Anibal Escalante, the head of an umbrella organization of leftist
parties known as Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI). Escalante had deep ties to the
Soviet Union and the KGB. Escalante’s downfall strained Soviet-Cuban relations, and
Khrushchev needed to do something to restore them lest he “lose” Cuba to the Chinese orbit or a
neutral Titoist path.237 Khrushchev also learned that the Soviet Union would not be able to catch
up in the arms race as quickly as he hoped. Throughout the winter of 1961-1962, news on the R16 and the R-9, the Soviet programs for second-generation ICBM’s, was consistently dour. The
liquid-fueled R-16’s were no match for a strike from the Americans’ solid-fueled Minuteman
missiles, and the R-9 missile was encountering serious flaws during its test flights.238 Gloomy
economic reports in the spring of 1962 meant that the Soviet economy was in no shape to
undertake a crash program to produce the ICBM’s rapidly. By April 1962, Khrushchev was
looking for ways to enhance Soviet nuclear power vis-à-vis the United States. It was in this
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context that Khrushchev first queried his defense minister, Rodion Malinovsky: “what about
putting one of our hedgehogs down the Americans’ trousers?”239
Khrushchev wanted to “save Cuba,” but he primarily wanted it to become a base from
which the Soviet Union could project military power against the United States. The United
States, after all, was projecting power from Turkey, Italy, and other places in Europe with
medium-range missiles. Why could the Soviets not do it? Indeed, doing so would even the
balance of terror between the Soviet Union and the United States, giving the former more
bargaining leverage in future negotiations. This motivation is clear from Khrushchev’s private
statements. In Bulgaria in May 1962, among his advisors, Khrushchev said of the Cuban missile
idea, “now they [the US] would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at
you; we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine”240 (italics
mine). Just before the delegation that was to convince Castro to accept the missiles assigned to
Cuba, Khrushchev told them at a party: “The missiles have one purpose, to scare them, to
restrain them…to give them back some of their own medicine.”241 The planned conventional
deployment to Cuba also spoke of larger strategic motivations. The Soviet Union would send Il28 bombers, MiG-21’s, nuclear-armed FKR cruise missiles for coastal defense, the newest
Soviet tank, the T-55, nuclear and diesel-powered submarines, and a naval flotilla of two
cruisers, four destroyers, and 12 patrol boats. The Soviets also intended to build a submarine
base on the island. In all, over 50,000 Soviet troops would be stationed on the island.242 This
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package was much more than the 10,000 troops and SA-2 air defense system that the Cubans
thought necessary for their defense and approved before Operation Anadyr in April 1962.243
The pattern and timing of the missile deployment suggest that it was about far more than
only the protection of Cuba. If Khrushchev wanted to prevent an invasion, he could have stopped
with the approval of the air defense missiles, Sopka cruise missiles for coastal defense, and other
conventional weapons on April 12.244 The Cubans recognized that the deployment under
Operation Anadyr was different than this original deployment. When the Cubans accepted the
offer for stationing the missiles, they insisted on dividing between “defensive” weapons for
defending the island and “offensive” weapons that would be used for Soviet purposes.245 He also
could have made the alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union agreed to in late August
public.246 The air defense and cruise missile deployment plus a public security guarantee could
have protected Cuba without deploying nuclear missiles to the island.
The real purpose of the missile deployment was to use Cuba as a base from which to
project military power, which would improve the global balance of forces in the Cold War. By
1962, Khrushchev was stuck on negotiations regarding Berlin and a nuclear test ban treaty.
Khrushchev believed these negotiations were stalling because the United States did not respect
Soviet military power. If he could secretly move nuclear missiles, troops, and a host of
conventional weapons’ platforms to Cuba, then the United States would have much greater fear
of Soviet military power. This would allow Khrushchev to conclude an agreement on Berlin that
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featured the removal of NATO troops from West Berlin. Khrushchev would then offer the test
ban treaty as a face-saving measure to help Kennedy cope with the retreat.247
The future balance of military power in the Cold War was a core interest for both sides in
the dispute. However, the US arguably had an edge in resolve because Cuba was in its
geographic core, and it was in the Soviet Union’s geographic periphery. As I show later, when
compared to an area that was in the geographic core for both countries, Berlin, this allowed for
more room for the United States to use conventional military power. Conventional options
should be more consequential to the outcome of and events in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
However, it also raises the possibility that the United States could have used nuclear threats
alone to achieve a successful outcome in the crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis is illustrative of the
benefits of conventional options for escalation but should be taken with caution until paired with
other cases.
The Outcome of the Crisis: Draw or US “Victory?”
The background to the crisis reveals the objectives each side had during the Cuban
Missile Crisis. The United States’ minimum priority was to prevent the Soviet Union from using
Cuba as base from which to project military power into North America. Allowing the Soviet
Union to keep troops and missiles in Cuba would have harmed a core US foreign policy goal that
dated to well before the rise of Castro: to prevent foreign powers from establishing bases of
military power in the Americas. The United States also wanted to remove Castro from power,
but this was a secondary goal. As will be pointed out later, the Jupiter missiles in Turkey are not
important in this picture. They irked Khrushchev and Soviet defense officials, but the Americans
did not view them as an integral component of Cold War policy before the crisis began.
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Khrushchev believed that projecting military power from Cuba was the type of pressure
that could get the US to change its attitude towards the larger outstanding issues in the Cold War.
By 1962, Khrushchev’s attempted coercion over West Berlin had failed, and negotiations over a
nuclear test ban treaty had stalled. Khrushchev believed his coercion failed and that the test ban
negotiations were at a standstill because the United States did not respect Soviet military power.
If he could secretly move nuclear missiles, troops, and a host of conventional weapons’
platforms to Cuba, then the United States would have much greater fear of Soviet military
power. This would allow Khrushchev to conclude an agreement on Berlin that featured the
removal of NATO troops from West Berlin. Khrushchev would then offer the test ban treaty as a
face-saving measure to help Kennedy cope with the retreat.248 To accomplish these larger goals,
Khrushchev first needed to keep Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba. Therefore, the main issue in
the Cuban Missile Crisis was whether or not the missiles would stay in Cuba. This is not to say
that defense of the Castro regime was unimportant to Khrushchev. It certainly was, but the fate
of the MRBM’s and IRBM’s was the central issue of dispute in the crisis.
Indeed, the desire to project nuclear military power from Cuba against the United States
was about much more than the protection of Cuba from an American invasion. The Presidium
summary from the meeting in which the missile plan was proposed states that “this will be an
offensive policy.”249 Khrushchev likely considered the missile deployment to be part of his
“meniscus strategy.” While the Soviet Union was behind in the nuclear arms race, Khrushchev
announced in a speech to the Presidium on January 8, 1962 that the Soviets should put pressure
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on the weak points of the United States in the world in order to “not let the enemy live
peacefully.”250 The goal of this pressure was not to start conflict, hence the metaphor of the
“meniscus, which according to the laws of surface tension in liquid, is generated in order that the
liquid doesn’t pour out past the rim.”251 Rather, the aggressive strategy was meant to contain the
United States and prevent it from taking advantage of the Soviet Union. The goal of the missile
deployment must be seen in a global perspective, which is the way Khrushchev saw it.
It is in this global context that the outcome of the crisis should be measured. The Soviet
Union agreed to withdraw its missiles and all “offensive” military equipment from Cuba (this
included MiG’s and Il-28 bombers) in return for a non-invasion pledge from the US and private
assurance that the Jupiter missiles would be removed from Turkey. At first, this may seem like
an even bargain. Indeed, that assessment is shared by scholars, most notably Richard Ned Lebow
and Graham Allison, who claim that the outcome of the crisis “ended in a compromise, not a
one-sided American victory.”252 Thomas Blanton argues that “both sides blinked” in that both
sides made concessions to de-escalate the crisis and resolve the dispute over the missiles.253
While this assessment has some truth in that both the United States and the Soviet Union
made concessions, it ignores the fact that the latter “blinked harder” than the former. The noninvasion pledge was important to Khrushchev, but the Jupiter withdrawal affected secondary
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goals for the Soviets during the crisis. In order to get these concessions, he had to withdraw
nuclear missiles from Cuba, which caused him to abandon hopes for fresh negotiations on a
range of larger issues in the Cold War. In short, the most important sticking point in the crisis for
both sides was whether the missiles would remain in Cuba, and the Soviet Union backed down
on this point.
This was a major blow to Khrushchev’s hopes of pressuring the US to compromise on
foreign policy issues in other areas around the world. Soviet leaders perceived the outcome of the
crisis to be a setback for their country at the time. General Nikolai Detinov, deputy head of the
air defense section of the Communist Party’s Military-Industrial Sector, recalled that the crisis
“was like a cold shower for the government, which realized that weaknesses had to be
overcome.”254 This sentiment indicates that the political settlement that ended the crisis favored
the United States. This interpretation of the crisis’ outcome is similar to the ICB dataset’s coding
as well as recent studies of nuclear crises.255
From the US perspective, it is better to think of the non-invasion pledge and the Jupiter
withdrawal as face-saving concessions, something that allowed Khrushchev to back off his main
goal with some dignity. In the heat of the crisis, when Khrushchev sent the second, “hard” letter
to Kennedy outlining the missile swap idea, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn
Thompson told Kennedy that “the important thing it seems to me to Khrushchev is to be able to
say ‘I saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion.”256 With the missiles out of Cuba, they could not be
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used to pressure the United States on other Cold War issues. Meanwhile, Khrushchev could say,
as he did to General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Antonin Novotny, “they
helped us to wrench out of the imperialists the statement that they would not attack Cuba, and
they thus served their main purpose.”257 One could take this as evidence that the Soviet Union
viewed the protection of Cuba as an important goal, but as mentioned previously, if the
protection of Cuba was the only goal in the crisis, the Soviets could have done far less than send
nuclear missiles to the island. The non-invasion pledge allowed Khrushchev to publicly present
the outcome as a success while privately knowing that withdrawing the missiles was a costly
concession.
The non-invasion pledge was also not a major one for the US to make. While there were
military plans for an invasion of Cuba, Kennedy planned to use them only to support a successful
counterrevolutionary effort. After the Bay of Pigs, the CIA confirmed that “external support will
be essential to their [counterrevolutionaries’] survival. The United States must be ready with
sufficient military assistance to guarantee the success of any uprising.”258 An overt military
invasion not preceded by a strong rebellion would have turned international public opinion,
especially in Latin America, against the United States.259 Covert operations to oust Castro,
codenamed Operation Mongoose, were ended shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the life
expectancy of those efforts in the fall of 1962 were low to begin with. Mongoose accomplished
nothing other than further antagonizing Fidel Castro and striking fear into Khrushchev about the
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likelihood of an American invasion of Cuba.260 Such an ineffective program was unlikely to stick
around.
Khrushchev could know in private that the United States agreed to withdraw the Jupiter
missiles from Turkey. However, this was also not a major concession for the United States nor a
great win for the Soviets. Kennedy complained that he did not want the Jupiters in Turkey even
before the crisis,261 and they would go on to be replaced by much less vulnerable Polaris
submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean. Khrushchev wanted to place the nuclear missiles in
Cuba in order to level the nuclear balance in the Cold War. He would then be in a better position
to negotiate over Berlin, a nuclear test ban treaty, and other issues that may arise in the future.
The United States removing their Jupiter missiles from Turkey did nothing to change the nuclear
balance.
Against this argument is the contention that some decision-makers in Washington
considered the Jupiter withdrawal to be a sticking point in negotiations to end the crisis. Kennedy
believed that withdrawing the Jupiters in exchange for the Soviets taking out the missiles from
Cuba was a favorable deal, but the Excomm did not share Kennedy’s assessment that the Jupiter
withdrawal was a wise concession.262 When Khrushchev’s second letter arrived outlining the
new demand to withdraw the Jupiter missiles, Paul Nitze and McGeorge Bundy wanted Kennedy
to ignore the demand. Nitze argued in a 10:00 AM meeting on Saturday, October 27 that “I
would suggest that what you do is to say that we’re prepared only to discuss Cuba at this time.
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After the Cuban thing is settled we can thereafter be prepared to discuss anything.”263 Speaking
for most of the Excomm, McGeorge Bundy advised President Kennedy that if the United States
publicly accepted the Jupiter-Cuba missile trade, “to our NATO people and to all the people who
are tied to us by alliance, we are in real trouble.”264 American officials feared that a public
acceptance of Khrushchev’s offer to return the missiles from Cuba in exchange for dismantling
the Jupiters in Turkey would harm the US’ reputation as an ally.
Yet, this concession did not generate many hard consequences for the United States.
Much of this was due to the American insistence and Soviet cooperation to keep the Jupiter
withdrawal private. Secretary of State Dean Rusk first proposed a private assurance to the
Soviets that the Kennedy wanted the Jupiters out and would remove them after the crisis. As
Bundy, a previous skeptic of the Jupiter withdrawal recalls, this “proposal was quickly supported
by the rest of us and approved by the president.”265 Because it was given in the form of an oral
private message, it did not strain US relations with its NATO allies. That the Soviet Union
agreed to keep the Jupiter withdrawal private suggests that they felt they had little leverage with
which to press this point. Indeed, as I say later, Khrushchev likely decided to withdraw his
missiles from Cuba before he heard about the American offer to withdraw their missiles from
Turkey.266 It may have been unnecessary to make this concession to end the crisis. Plus, the
Jupiter withdrawal did not diminish the US nuclear deterrent, as Polaris submarines were put in
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the Mediterranean in 1963 to cover the targets for which the Jupiter missiles were responsible.
Because it could be kept private and would not diminish the nuclear deterrent, the Jupiter
concession wound up being a minor concession for the United States to make.
Meanwhile, the removal of the Cuban missiles represents a failure to attain the main goal
of strengthening the Soviet Union’s nuclear military power, and it led to the surrender of its
pursuit to attain even more ambitious goals to change the status quo in Europe.267 Even though
the Soviet Union was able to achieve two secondary goals in the crisis, this should not be
mistaken for a successful political settlement with the United States. As Arnold Horelick pointed
out shortly after the crisis, “to regard the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis (sic) as coinciding
in any substantial way with Soviet intentions or interests is to mistake the skillful salvage of a
shipwreck for brilliant navigation.”268
In sum, the United States achieved its core goal during the crisis – preventing the Soviet
Union from using Cuba as a military base from which it could enhance its nuclear military
power. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had to remove the missiles from Cuba, thus
surrendering an ability to project nuclear military power onto America’s doorstep. This led the
Soviets to give up on a subsequently planned endeavor aimed at achieving core foreign policy
goals – settling the Berlin, test ban, and other larger Cold War issues on favorable terms. The
Soviet Union did achieve an important goal in protecting Cuba and a secondary goal in securing
the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, but it paid a steep price to do so. The United States
got more out of the deal that ended the crisis than the Soviets did. The mismatch in the outcome
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of the crisis is reflected in the attitudes of the actors in the aftermath. US officials did not want to
appear too elated in the outcome for fear of provoking the Soviets into rekindling it. Soviet
officials used the outcome to attack Khrushchev in their successful attempt to oust him from
power in 1964.
The Role of the Conventional Military Balance
As mentioned previously, before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev and his military
advisers did not think that conventional military strength would play a role in deciding nuclear
crises. This view was ultimately mistaken. American naval superiority in the Caribbean during
the Cuban Missile Crisis meant that the Soviet Union had no effective response to the blockade
of Cuba. The blockade thus prevented Soviet IRBM’s from ever reaching Cuba. American air
and land superiority meant that the Soviet Union could only respond to a US invasion of Cuba
with tactical nuclear weapons, a decision that would likely spark general thermonuclear war.
Conventional superiority gave the US graduated options for escalation. In turn, these options
built coercive leverage over the Soviet Union. The US did enact an SAC airborne alert of its
bomber forces during the crisis,269 but this played less of a role in convincing Khrushchev to
back down than the threat of an American invasion of Cuba. The fear of the use of further
conventional force and the lack of a proportionate response convinced Khrushchev to withdraw
his MRBM’s and IRBM’s from Cuba.
Blockade and Negotiate: The Decision to Quarantine Cuba
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President Kennedy learned of the deployment of nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBM’s) to Cuba on the morning of October 16. That same day, he convened the first
meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Excomm). Regional
conventional preponderance gave US decision-makers a variety of options for the use of force.
Kennedy focused on four scenarios: 1) a surgical air strike against just the missiles, 2) a general
air strikes against the missiles plus Soviet MiG-21’s, 3) an invasion of Cuba, and 4) a blockade
of Cuba to prevent other Soviet military equipment from entering the island.270 In the October 16
meeting, the initial reaction of Kennedy and the Excomm was to execute an airstrike against the
missile sites. As Kennedy concluded the meeting, he said “We’re certainly going to do number
one. We’re going to take out these missiles.”271 Debate within the Excomm was not over whether
to use military force, but how to do so, and in what sequence.
The debate over military force was complicated by new intelligence and analysis on
October 17 and 18. In the Excomm meeting on the morning of October 18, the discovery of new
missile sites that could host intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM’s) expanded the range of
targets needed to be destroyed by an air strike.272 One day prior, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met and
agreed that a strike limited to the missile sites was too risky. “This is a point target, Mr.
President. You’re never sure of having, absolutely getting everything down there.”273 These
findings meant that US leaders “would consider nothing short of a full invasion as a military

270

Fursenko and Naftali, 1997, 224.

271

May and Zelikow, 1997, 71.

272

Dobbs, 2008, 20-21.

273

Fursenko and Naftali, 1997, 226.

126

action.”274 The need for a large-scale operation to remove the missiles by force removed the
limited air strike as an option.
This split the Excomm into two camps: those who favored a full invasion and those who
favored a blockade. Military leaders like General Maxwell Taylor favored an invasion: “We
can’t prevent these constructions going ahead by any threat,” Taylor declared in the October 18
meeting.275 Civilian advisors, particularly Robert McNamara and Llewellyn Thompson, favored
the blockade approach. The blockade was seen as a moderate option that projected military force
but also carried a low risk of escalation. Indeed, supporters of the blockade wanted it to be
conducted in such a way as to reduce the probability of a quick escalation. A memo to General
Taylor from Captain William Houser advised that “we want to use minimum force to prevent
entry of these vessels to Cuba.”276
Nevertheless, supporters of the blockade never viewed it as an alternative to military
force. Rather, it was a way to explore diplomatic alternatives while also building up to a potential
invasion. As Llewellyn Thompson put it:
“I think we should be under no illusions, this is probably in the end going to lead to the same thing. But
we do it in an entirely different posture and background and much less danger of getting up into the big
war.”277

Towards the end of the meeting Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara underscored that
point, summarizing the debate between the blockade and an air strike this way:
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“But one is a minimum military action, a blockade approach, with a buildup to subsequent action. The
other is a very forceful military action with a series of variances as to how you enter it.”278

In a meeting at the Oval Office on Saturday, October 20, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a
supporter of the blockade strategy, “referred to an airstrike as chapter two,” with the blockade
being chapter one.279 President Kennedy took the decision to go with the blockade but also “to
take actions necessary to put [the US] in a position to undertake an air strike on the missiles and
missile sites by Monday or Tuesday.”280 The President’s brother, Robert Kennedy, agreed with
him, saying that the US needed to be prepared “for an air strike to be launched later if we so
decided.”281
The decision for the blockade was a blockade and negotiate strategy with the threat of
further military action to be used as the leverage in the negotiations. Because the United States
possessed conventional preponderance in the Caribbean, it could credibly threaten an invasion of
Cuba as a follow-up military action it would take should the Soviets refuse to remove their
missiles. The United States could use the prospect of further military force to convince
Khrushchev to remove the missiles via negotiation rather than through force. As one document
outlining the blockade option put it, “The advantages of the plan are that it contemplates a series
of ascending political and military steps, at each stage of which Khrushchev and Castro can find
an ‘out’ if they desired” (italics mine).282 The blockade was thus chosen as the first stage in a
strategy of conventional compellence against the Soviet Union.
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Why was the blockade and negotiate strategy successful? One reason was that the Soviet
Union had no means to respond to the blockade. As mentioned previously, Khrushchev
originally planned to deploy four destroyers, two cruisers, twelve patrol boats, seven Golf
submarines, and four Foxtrot submarines. However, the close scrutiny of NATO reconnaissance
on Cuban convoys made Khrushchev afraid that such a large naval deployment would arouse
Western suspicion. Khrushchev halted the naval deployment except for the four Foxtrot
submarines.283 The Foxtrot submarines were diesel-powered, and they needed to come to the
surface, or “snorkel,” in order to recharge their batteries. These submarines were also noisy,
making them detectable to the US Navy’s Orion planes throughout the Atlantic and submarine
detection stations across the Caribbean.284 There was little possibility the Foxtrots would be able
to run the blockade.
US ASW ships and aircraft would be able to swarm each of the four submarines. The
only way for the commanders of the Foxtrot to defeat the enemy would be to use the nucleartipped torpedo deployed on the submarine before heading to Cuba. This put submarine
commanders in a position where they had to choose between surfacing to show themselves to US
naval forces or using a nuclear weapon to escape them. The result of the Foxtrot deployment was
a close call with nuclear war unknown to high-level policymakers at the time. One Foxtrot, the
B-59, was detected by US ASW forces, and they started dropping practice depth charges on the
submarine. The commander of the sub, Valentin Savitsky, thought that these charges were the
start of a wartime confrontation, so he asked for the nuclear torpedo to be prepared. The
commander of the Foxtrot flotilla, Vasily Arkhopov, voted to not use the torpedo, and eventually
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persuaded Savitsky to surface.285 Soviet naval forces had no conventional response to the
blockade, forcing Soviet commanders to choose between initiating nuclear use or surrendering to
the enemy. The same choice would be presented to Khrushchev in a different form.
The second reason the blockade was so effective was that the Soviet Union had no
conventional military response to a US invasion of Cuba. The 42,000 Soviet troops, MiG-21’s,
and Il-28’s would not have bolstered Cuban defenses to the point where a full US invasion could
be thwarted. As Anastas Mikoyan assessed:
“It is well-known that we had almost 42,000 soldiers stationed on the island to provide a smokescreen for
the missiles and building teams, but our air force presence was insufficient. The Il-28 bombers were
inadequate for repelling a strike insofar as they were extremely vulnerable to enemy fighter jets. The
MiG-21s were also there, but they were not of a caliber to so much as challenge US air supremacy…We
had surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but their presence on the island was well known to the
Americans…And so, by scrambling their available local forces, the Americans would have enjoyed clear
and overwhelming superiority in the air…they would have been able to bear down on Cuba with all their
military might.”286

Soviet forces on Cuba could only thwart a US invasion by using tactical nuclear
weapons. FKR cruise missiles with nuclear warheads for coastal defense were part of the original
deployment.287 On September 7, worried about a US invasion, Khrushchev decided to deploy
Luna missiles that would be fitted with 2-kiloton nuclear warheads for use by the Soviet ground
forces.288 Any US invasion would prompt Soviet forces to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.
Lieutenant General Nikolai Beloborodov, commander of the Soviet nuclear forces deployed to
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Cuba, described this military predicament: “It was clear that in the conditions of the existing
balance of forces in conventional arms, which was ten to one against us, there was only one way
we could repel a massive assault—by using tactical nuclear weapons against the invaders.”289
This caused Khrushchev much consternation during the crisis, as evidenced by his
reversal of the original instructions about the use of the tactical nuclear weapons sent to the local
commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, General Issa Pliyev. Instead of authorizing the use of
tactical nuclear weapons when Pliyev thought it was wise, Khrushchev forbade him from using
those weapons in response to a US invasion. “Use all means except those controlled by Statsenko
[Major General Igor D. Statsenko, the commander of the rocket units] and Beloborodov [Nikolai
K. Beloborodov, of above].”290 The blockade was effective because the next threatened use of
military force, an invasion to remove the missiles by force, would prompt Khrushchev to choose
between surrendering or initiating the use of nuclear weapons. This was a decision Khrushchev
wanted to avoid.
The Fear of an Invasion and the Decision to Withdraw the Missiles
The Soviet Union had no recourse to respond to a US invasion with conventional means,
but was an invasion a real possibility? And did it seem real to Soviet decision-makers? On the
first question, President Kennedy told his friend Dave Powers on October 28, as the most intense
stage of the crisis wound down, “Do you realize we had an air strike all arranged for Tuesday?
Thank God it’s all over.”291 It is difficult to know if President Kennedy would have given the
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order to strike on Tuesday, October 30, but we do know that preparations for an invasion were
afoot. By October 26, Ernest May and Philip Zelikow note that “the largest concentration of US
armed forces since the Korean War” had amassed in the southeastern United States.292 The Joint
Chiefs of Staff were arguing that any delay in the use of military force “is to the benefit of the
Soviet Union,” and therefore “CINCLANT OPLAN 312 [should] be executed no later than
Monday morning, October 29.”293 In line with this, at the Excomm meeting at 4 PM on October
27, General Taylor recommended to President Kennedy to plan for the invasion of Cuba on
October 29.294
President Kennedy favored keeping American forces ready to use military force at a
moment’s notice during the crisis. In a meeting on October 21 with Generals Taylor and
Sweeney, Kennedy “directed that we be prepared to carry out the air strike Monday morning
[October 22] or any time thereafter during the remainder of the week.”295 On October 22, in a
meeting with the Senate leadership, Kennedy remarked that “we are taking all military
preparations for either an air strike or an invasion.”296 In the Excomm meeting on Saturday
afternoon, it appears that Kennedy operated under the assumption that a Soviet refusal of an
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American offer in reply to Khrushchev’s telegram would lead to escalation. When deciding to
address Khrushchev’s remarks on the missiles in Turkey, Kennedy says that ignoring those
demands “is not going to be successful…Otherwise, he’s going to announce that we’ve rejected
his proposal. And then where are we?”297 The answer was an invasion of Cuba to remove the
missiles.
The US was going to negotiate to remove the missiles or do so via military force. As
Kennedy said to McNamara, “the situation is moving there fast, Mac. And if we don’t [accept it]
– if for the next 24 or 48 hours – this trade has appeal. Now, if we reject it out of hand, and then
have to take military action against Cuba.”298 On the night of October 27, after Robert Kennedy
delivered the US offer for withdrawing the missiles to the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin,
President Kennedy approved an order by McNamara to call up 24 troop-carrier squadrons from
the Air Force Reserve.299 Of course, the invasion may never have happened if the Soviets had
rejected the offer presented by Robert Kennedy. President Kennedy said on October 27 that “I’m
not convinced yet of an invasion, because I think that’s a bit much.”300 Kennedy also tried to use
former UN official Andrew Cordier to send a message to UN Secretary-General U Thant to
convince the latter to call for a Cuba-Turkey swap.301 Nevertheless, preparations for an airstrike
then invasion of Cuba went apace. Kennedy faced pressure from the Pentagon and some of his
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civilian advisors to start the operation as soon as possible. The US threat to invade Cuba should
the Soviet Union refuse to remove the missiles was therefore highly credible.
The threat of a successful US invasion of Cuba scared Khrushchev, and it dictated his
behavior throughout the crisis. Three days after Kennedy’s quarantine speech, on October 25,
Khrushchev and the rest of the Presidium decided to shift strategy in response to American
military pressure. They outlined a plan to offer the removal of the missiles in exchange for a US
non-invasion pledge towards Cuba.302 The Presidium decided to wait and see if the US kept up
pressure for a few more days, and if so, they would send this compromise message. However,
one day later, intelligence from the United States about its military preparation suggested that an
invasion of Cuba was imminent. In response, Khrushchev decided to send the non-invasion offer
immediately.303 When no invasion came over the next 24 hours, Khrushchev became calmer and
decided to push for the Cuba-Turkey missile swap. Khrushchev stated his renewed belief in
American restraint during the afternoon of October 27: “Can they attack us now? I think that
they won’t venture to do this.”304 It was in this mood of restored optimism about Operation
Anadyr that Khrushchev dictated the second letter to Washington including the demand to
remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
When Khrushchev received Kennedy’s official response to his letters which did not
contain a reference to the Jupiter missiles, he decided to accept it. One reason was that Oleg
Troyanovsky, one of Khrushchev’s assistants, relayed the results of Dobrynin’s meeting with
Robert Kennedy and informed Khrushchev along with the rest of the Presidium that the US

302

Fursenko and Naftali, 1997, 259.

303

Ibid, 262-263.

304

Ibid, 274.

134

“didn’t see any insurmountable difficulties” in removing the Jupiters.305 The more important
reason for accepting the letter was renewed fear of a US invasion. Fursenko and Naftali show
that Khrushchev was ready to accept just an American non-invasion pledge and end the crisis
before hearing about Robert Kennedy’s statement on the removal of the Jupiter missiles.306
Moreover, Soviet military intelligence picked up a rumor that Kennedy was to give a nationallytelevised speech on the night of October 28, perhaps to announce the start of the invasion of
Cuba.307 In addition, Dobrynin’s report said that Kennedy was under intense pressure from the
Pentagon to act, and he needed a response to his offer on Sunday. As Troyanovsky later recalled:
“I began to read my notes on Dobrynin’s report. They [Khrushchev and the others] asked me to
read the notes again. It goes without saying that the contents of the dispatch increased the
nervousness in the hall by some degrees.”308
Both Soviet and American officials’ statements about how the crisis ended show the logic
of conventional options theory in action. For instance, Sergo Mikoyan, drawing on his father’s
recollection of the crisis, argues that “the sword of Damocles that took the form of a threatened
air strike followed by an invasion gave the United States the ability exert pressure in any talks. It
was precisely this sword that in the end played the deciding role in accelerating Khrushchev’s
proposal for a compromise.”309 Anastas Mikoyan himself said that the American military threat
made it “more and more clear that we would have to give in.”310
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US analysts close to the crisis also calculated that Khrushchev’s decision to “crate and
return” the missiles from Cuba was due to US threats of conventional escalation. A CIA memo
summarizing the implications of Khrushchev’s pledge to withdraw the missiles stated that
Khrushchev’s decision was “motivated almost entirely by fear that US military action against
Cuba and the Soviet bases there was imminent.”311 Daniel Ellsberg, in his autobiographical
account of his time in the Defense Department during the Cuban Missile Crisis, also credits US
conventional superiority in the Caribbean with putting pressure on Khrushchev. He writes:
“I was thinking all week – from Wednesday on, when the Soviets didn’t choose to challenge the blockade
– that Khrushchev had [sic] to back down without any real concession on our part. He was looking down
the barrel of US invasion forces that were fully primed to go on the following Monday or Tuesday, if not
earlier. We had him outgunned at every level in the Caribbean: in the air, at sea, on the ground, in
conventional weapons. And none of us, that I knew of, imagined that to redress that conventional
imbalance, Khrushchev would allow any combat use of the nuclear missiles he was deploying.”312

The Department of Defense came to a similar conclusion at the time of the missile crisis.
Certainly, the consensus within DoD went, the nuclear forces of both sides meant that the use of
military force could lead to a nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence thus operated on both Kennedy
and Khrushchev. However, the United States’ conventional preponderance in the Caribbean
allowed it to exert more military pressure on the Soviet Union. The potential of an American
invasion was credible enough, and disastrous enough, to force the Soviet Union to find a way out
of the crisis and to concede more while doing so. As a summary of the crisis in March 1963 from
the Department of Defense explained:
“The umbrella, or shield, was our nuclear power; the sword was our conventional power. Undoubtedly,
the most important factor which kept this crisis from growing, which kept the Soviets from making a
counter-move elsewhere in the world, was the danger that any US-USSR confrontation carries within it
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the seeds of a possible nuclear exchange. But what enabled us to produce this confrontation was our nonnuclear power, which we were not only able to apply but to make clear what we would apply in an
ascending escalation of violence to a point where the Soviets would clearly find it excessively dangerous
to pursue the game. Our unmistakable conventional superiority in the Caribbean, and our unmistakable
intent to use it, placed on the Soviet leadership the clear choice of either backing down on their
aggressive move, or expanding the crisis beyond the Caribbean theater, with the consequent danger that
it would eventually lead to the destruction of the Soviet homeland.”313 (italics mine)

Scholars writing in the aftermath of the crisis shared the Defense Department’s assessment.
Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, for example, wrote in their analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis:
“The United States also had an immense local superiority in conventional forces. The Soviet Union
clearly would have lost the non-nuclear exchange. Chairman Khrushchev stepped down to avoid a clash
of conventional forces in which he would have lost. To avoid this level of loss he would have had
irresponsibly to risk very much higher levels.”314

All of these statements point to a process of the crisis that reflects the mechanisms of
conventional options theory. Khrushchev could not counter Kennedy’s blockade of Cuba or a
threatened airstrike and invasion with a conventional military response. He had to threaten to use
tactical nuclear weapons to thwart any American use of conventional force. This threat was both
not credible and paralyzed Moscow’s own decision-making. Quickly realizing the downsides of
relying on a nuclear threat alone, Khrushchev searched for a way out of the crisis. He found one
by proposing the non-invasion pledge from the US as a face-saving measure. He added the
Jupiter concession to his second letter when he thought that the US was not going to invade after
all. However, he became ready to forget about the Jupiter demand once a US invasion again
appeared likely. By putting pressure on Khrushchev to choose between escalating very high up
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the escalation ladder or backing down, the inability of the Soviet Union to counter the
Americans’ conventional actions shaped the outcome of the crisis in favor of the United States.
Other Factors: Nuclear Threats, Luck, and Resolve
This account is not to suggest that US superiority in conventional options was the only
factor shaping the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The nuclear balance could have played a
role in producing a favorable outcome for the United States. The United States possessed a much
greater number of strategic nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union had. During the crisis, the US
put its nuclear forces into DEFCON 2, one warning condition below nuclear war, while the
Soviets did not put their forces on alert at all. Marc Trachtenberg writes that “their [the Soviets’]
strategic ‘inferiority’ appears to have had a profound effect on their behavior in the crisis.”315
Matthew Kroenig agrees with this assessment and goes one step further to argue that it was
American strategic superiority that caused the US to achieve a desirable outcome: “Policymakers
in the nuclear superior state, the United States, were cognizant of their nuclear advantage,
referred to their nuclear advantage in the heat of the crisis, and pointed to the advantage as a
reason for a forward-leaning US approach.”316 American nuclear superiority likely played some
role in convincing the Soviets to withdraw their missiles from Cuba, but I argue that the nuclear
balance only played a role because the Soviets lacked any options for using force conventionally.
Because of this, they had to contemplate immediate escalation to the nuclear level, at which
point the grim outcome of a nuclear contest with a nuclear-superior United States could have
given the Soviets extra motivation to back down.

315

Trachtenberg, 1985, 161.

316

Kroenig, 2018, 90.

138

There was also an element of luck involved in the outcome in that the US may have went
ahead so stridently in their preparations for an invasion because US leaders were not aware of
Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba or ignored their significance.317 This does not take away
from the impact that US conventional capabilities had on the Soviet decision-making but could
raise some doubts about how easily a state could use tactical nuclear weapons to substitute for
conventional inferiority in other cases.
In addition, it is hard to overlook the fact that the US had conventional inferiority in
Berlin, and it is odd given my theory of why the Soviets did not exploit that during the crisis.
One element of my theory is the stakes involved in a dispute, and the Soviet Union was disputing
the fate of missiles in their geographic periphery. West Berlin was tied to the fate of the United
States’ alliances in a core region of Western Europe. The room the US had for using
conventional force in the Caribbean without running too high a risk of triggering a Soviet nuclear
response was likely greater than the room the Soviets had for using force in West Berlin. Indeed,
Khrushchev may have learned from the Berlin Crisis that the US was willing to use nuclear
weapons to defend West Berlin. This could have caused Khrushchev to view a blockade or
seizure of West Berlin in the missile crisis as a form of “horizontal conventional escalation” that
was beyond his level of resolve. A comment by Mikoyan is instructive in this regard: “Certainly,
we would have tried to limit our actions only with the Berlin operation and the use of
conventional weapons…Despite all the efforts of both the USSR’s and the United States’
governments, there could have been the danger of a nuclear war – in other words, a total
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catastrophe.”318 Thus, the different effects of conventional superiority in Cuba and Berlin could
be evidence of my second hypothesis that the effects of conventional options are greater in the
periphery.
With that argument, it is also important to point out that the Cuban Missile Crisis
represents an illustration my theory of conventional options. Because the US had high resolve, it
may have been able to use nuclear threats alone to get its way in the crisis. Indeed, they also
played a role in influencing the crisis’ outcome. Nonetheless, the Cuban Missile Crisis provides a
strong foundation for the plausibility of conventional options theory. In a situation where
conventional options could play a role in shaping the crisis outcome, they did. The state with
more conventional options, the United States, was successful because of my hypothesized
mechanism of putting the inferior state, the Soviet Union, into a resolve-capability gap. This
shows that the effect of conventional options on bargaining power exists and exerted influence
on policymakers in one of the most important episodes of the nuclear age. The number of
conventional options therefore merits serious attention as a variable to measure in determining
the outcome of nuclear disputes.
Conclusion: The Implications of the Cuban Case
The Cuban Missile Crisis represents a clear illustration of conventional options theory’s
mechanisms. The United States possessed conventional preponderance over the Soviet Union in
the Caribbean, but it was afraid of the consequences of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.
In this context, the United States was able to enact a strategy of conventional coercion in order to
convince the Soviet Union to remove its missiles from Cuba. The conventional coercion strategy
was effective because the Americans could threaten the Soviets with escalation to multiple levels
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of conventional conflict. The Soviets had no recourse to respond in kind. Instead, it would have
had to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in order to break through an American blockade or halt
an American invasion of Cuba. American escalation to the blockade and the threatened
escalation to an air strike plus invasion presented Khrushchev with the choice between removing
the missiles or starting nuclear conflict. Khrushchev chose the former. If the Soviet Union had
had more conventional forces in the area, they could have deterred the US from implementing a
blockade or contested one if it was implemented. More Soviet forces could have lowered the
probability of success of an American invasion, making the American threat of an invasion of
Cuba less credible. In sum, American conventional preponderance in the Caribbean made US
threats to use military force during the Cuban Missile Crisis more credible. Soviet conventional
inferiority encouraged the Soviet Union to find a way out of the crisis as soon as it could.
In addition to illustrating the mechanism behind my first hypothesis that greater variety
leads to better crisis outcomes, the case also it provides some informative value for testing my
hypothesis about the value of resolve in shaping the benefit of conventional variety. Cuba lay in
a region of peripheral interest to the Soviet Union, and it would be expected that possessing
superior conventional variety would matter a lot for their ability to achieve their security goals. It
appears that it did. With inferior conventional variety, the Soviet Union was forced to back out of
its Cuban strategy within a few months of launching it.
On the other hand, the United States viewed Cuba as an important security interest, and it
lay close to the US homeland. The resolve to remove Soviet-installed nuclear weapons from
Cuba was thus high. This means that nuclear threats alone from the United States may have been
enough to persuade Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles. Plus, the United States did send its
strategic nuclear forces into an alert posture during the crisis, raising the possibility that may be
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used. One could say that theories based solely on resolve work just as well to explain the
outcome of the crisis. That counterargument ignores evidence of the mechanisms of my theory –
superior conventional options forcing an adversary into a space for exploitation – at work in the
crisis. Nevertheless, the possibility that higher American resolve in the crisis could have made
nuclear threats alone sufficient to coerce Khrushchev into removing the missiles means that the
Cuban Missile Crisis is not a “smoking gun” case for conventional options theory. It will be
important to examine a case where the United States made nuclear threats over a peripheral
objective.
The next two studies are devoted to examining whether or not these dynamics shaped
outcomes in other important nuclear crises during the Cold War. The first case will be the Berlin
Crises in 1958 and 1961 done as a single case study. This is a case where the United States faced
a threat to an interest near its core, but it had a fewer conventional options than the Soviet Union.
My theory predicts that US leaders will have to run high risks of nuclear escalation to defend
their interests, but they should be able to do so because their level of resolve will be high. The
second case will be the Taiwan Straits Crises in 1954-55 and 1958. This case is “hard” because
the offshore islands were seen as “indefensible” conventionally, and the crisis was used as a
motivating example in the construction of brinkmanship theory (mostly by Thomas Schelling).
Plus, the offshore islands over which the crisis occurred were peripheral to US interests.
However, I point out that the US had deployed extensive naval power to the area before both
disputes. This gave them some conventional options for escalation, and it was these conventional
options that stopped the Chinese challenge to the offshore islands, not nuclear threats. This will
be an informative case in that it will show how conventional options theory better predicts the
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process by which the United States defended the offshore islands better than theories based on
resolve and brinkmanship.
In sum, the Cuban Missile Crisis was arguably the most important episode during the
Cold War. My theory highlights how the United States’ conventional military superiority in the
Caribbean gave it a variety of conventional options to which it could escalate. This gave it a
bargaining advantage during the crisis which helped it to secure a favorable outcome. I hope to
show that this dynamic is not particular to the Cuban case in the next two case studies on the
Cold War.
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Chapter 4: The Berlin Crisis and Conventional Options Theory
On November 10, 1958 and June 4, 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev issued
ultimatums to the United States along with its NATO allies stating that they had six months to
withdraw their military forces from West Berlin, which would then be turned into a “free city.”
At the end of that time, whether the Western powers had withdrawn their forces or not, the
Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with East Germany (GDR), handing over formal control
of the inter-German border to East Germany and forcing the Western powers to officially
recognize the East German regime. This would give formal recognition to the division of
Germany. With these ultimatums, Khrushchev hoped to detach West Berlin from the rest of
Western Europe and, by coercing official recognition of East Germany, cause the Western
powers to renounce any hope of German reunification. Either of these actions could have
prompted West Germany to leave NATO and thereby undermine the cohesion of the entire
transatlantic alliance. None of these uninviting outcomes came to pass. The United States and its
allies preserved the status of West Berlin despite Khrushchev’s threats, and the Soviets never
signed a peace treaty with East Germany. The United States was able to accomplish its main
goals in the crisis. Can conventional options theory explain this successful outcome for the
United States?
On the face of it, the Berlin Crisis is a difficult case for the theory. When discussing the
crisis, IR scholars and historians often reference the utter lack of conventional options for the
United States and its total reliance on nuclear deterrence in Western Europe.319 American
Thomas Schelling argued that the NATO conventional troops in Berlin constituted a “trip wire” or “plate-glass
window.” Their sole use was to “die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot
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policymakers were frustrated by the lack of conventional military strength with which to combat
the Soviet challenge against West Berlin. President Dwight Eisenhower, soon after the first
ultimatum, told his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that the US military position in West
Berlin was “basically untenable.”320 The US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn
Thompson, told President John F. Kennedy that Khrushchev has “always felt that he had us over
a barrel in Berlin.” Kennedy responded with a laugh: “Yeah. I think he does.”321 The United
States was inferior in the conventional balance in Europe, yet it was able to get its way in the
Berlin Crisis. This seems to contradict the idea that more conventional options give a state more
bargaining power in a nuclear crisis.
Indeed, traditional explanations of the Berlin Crisis by IR scholars point to the utility of
nuclear deterrence and brinkmanship tactics. The “tripwire theory of escalation” predicts that the
United States should see success in the Berlin Crisis due to the high nuclear danger surrounding
any attempts to change the status quo. Thomas Schelling argues that the United States, by
placing troops in West Berlin and putting tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, made a “threat that
leaves something to chance.”322 The United States was successful because it bid up the risk of
West Berlin “was not defensible by NATO. If the East Germans and the Soviet Union wanted to squeeze Berlin they
could so.” “Berlin and the Cold War.” In The Berlin Wall Crisis. Eds. Gearson, John and Schake, Kori, eds. New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, pp. 1-9, 6. David Holloway mentions that the Soviets possessed “overwhelming
conventional superiority around West Berlin.” “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962.”
In The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I. eds. Westad, Odd Arne and Leffler, Melvin. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 376-397, 392. Daniel Ellsberg argues that “there was never any way to
safeguard Berlin from Soviet conventional and nuclear-armed forces in East Germany except to threaten nuclear
weapons and express a readiness to escalate to a nuclear first strike.” The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a
Nuclear War Planner. New York: Bloomsbury, 2017, pp. 173-174.
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nuclear war erupting suddenly and inadvertently. This risk was too high for the Soviet Union to
use its conventional superiority to take West Berlin via force or to use their conventional
superiority as a tool of coercion.
I argue that conventional options theory can add to this explanation by pointing out that
NATO’s conventional capabilities made the risk of nuclear war more salient. They did so by
being able to escalate to a limited conventional war in Germany in response to a quick attempt to
seize West Berlin via a fait accompli. NATO could force a stalemate in this limited war, which
would force the Soviet Union to escalate to a large-scale conventional conflict in order to bring
its conventional superiority to bear upon the United States and its allies. In such a high-intensity
conflict, the risk of nuclear use would be so high as to be intolerable to Soviet leaders. In
addition, the defense of West Berlin was a core interest for the United States during the Cold
War, making any threat to use nuclear weapons in a conflict over the city highly credible. The
importance of West Berlin and NATO conventional strength combined to make the chances of
nuclear escalation quite large in any war over the city. This caused Soviet leaders to realize that
they could not use their conventional superiority in Europe to generate coercive leverage over the
Americans. After realizing this for good in 1961, Khrushchev decided to abandon his aggressive
strategy for changing the status quo in Berlin, much to the Americans’ benefit.
There are two pillars to this explanation of the Berlin Crisis. The first is the claim that
the United States and its European allies could hold their own in a limited conventional war in
Europe. While this point goes against International Relations orthodoxy, there is good evidence
to support it. A careful comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact strengths indicate that the former
was inferior in the conventional balance but not far behind. Appraisals of conventional forces in
Europe from the early 1960’s show some cautious optimism about how a limited conflict would
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unfold. My assessment is not based on new information unavailable to policymakers. Rather, I
take the information available and reach a conclusion similar to McNamara’s analysts in the
Office of Systems Analysis, or the “Whiz Kids,” that NATO was not far inferior to the Warsaw
Pact in Europe. The image of a dominant Soviet Union in terms of the conventional balance is
based on an inflated assessment of Soviet capabilities as well as a pessimistic assumption that the
Soviets would not hesitate to escalate to a full-scale conventional war in Europe at the outset of a
conflict. In such a conflict, the United States and its European allies would indeed be at a great
disadvantage.
The second pillar is that maintaining the status of West Berlin was a core interest for the
United States. How is this the case for an enclave of three million people deep inside communist
territory? In Chapter 2, I defined a core interest as any objective which included “the defense of
strategically vital areas” where “threats to a state’s own territorial integrity might materialize
through those lands.”323 The status of West Berlin, while small, was tied to whether West
Germany would remain in NATO or go neutral, thereby undermining the defense of Western
Europe. If the United States retreated out of West Berlin, it would make the West Germans feel
as if they could not rely on the US for their security. They would be tempted to chart a “neutral”
course in which they would be tied to neither NATO nor the Soviet bloc. Similarly, if the United
States officially recognized East Germany as a way to keep access to West Berlin after the
Soviets signed a separate peace treaty, that would constitute an admission that the United States
had stopped pushing for German reunification. Again, this would cause the West Germans to
believe that the path for reunification lay through working with the Soviets to create a neutral,
but unified, Germany. Either of these actions would lead to West Germany leaving NATO,
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which could have caused the entire transatlantic alliance to crumble. It was therefore paramount
to the maintenance of the transatlantic alliance system for US leaders to preserve the status of
West Berlin as a part of West Germany and to prevent official recognition of East Germany.
The Soviets’ main advantage in conventional options came in being able to win a largescale conventional war. The importance of West Berlin increased the risks of nuclear escalation
in any conflict, especially a high-intensity one. As a result, conventional options theory would
predict that the Soviet Union would not be able to use its advantage in conventional options to
coerce the United States. The status of West Berlin should remain unchanged, which would
constitute a success for the United States. Traditional explanations of the Berlin Crisis highlight
the inability of the Soviets to use their conventional superiority in West Berlin due to high
American resolve. Conventional options theory says that high American resolve to defend West
Berlin plus US conventional capabilities in Europe worked in tandem to neutralize the threat
from Soviet conventional capabilities. If the Soviets really did have overwhelming conventional
superiority, they may have been able to seize West Berlin via fait accompli.
This case study proceeds in six parts. First, I detail the conventional balance in Europe
between 1958 and 1961. This section shows that the US and NATO possessed less conventional
options in Europe than the Soviet Union, but the former were not at an overwhelming
disadvantage. Second, I explain that both sides were disputing core interests, despite West Berlin
being a small piece of territory. Third, I go through the predictions of the outcome and the
process by which that outcome should occur according to conventional options theory. Fourth, I
trace the development of the First Berlin Crisis, noting how Eisenhower’s behavior and
Khrushchev’s reasoning for dropping the first ultimatum do not follow the logic of conventional
options theory. Fifth, I trace the development of the Second Berlin Crisis in 1961 and argue that
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the conventional preparations by the Kennedy administration played a role in convincing
Khrushchev to back off his second ultimatum. I conclude by summarizing the case study,
explaining what conventional options theory adds to our understanding of the Berlin Crises, and
discussing the crisis in light of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The Military Balance in Europe
The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies held a conventional military advantage over
the United States and NATO. This advantage was not dominant, as is sometimes assumed,
meaning that the United States and its European allies could have been able to force a stalemate
in a limited war confined to Central Europe. Nevertheless, NATO conventional inferiority did
mean that the United States could not rely solely on its conventional capabilities to defend West
Germany and Western Europe. In a large-scale conventional war involving more than 300,000
troops, the United States would have had to make the decision to back down or use nuclear
weapons first. This raised the question: would the threat of nuclear escalation in such a highintensity conventional conflict be credible?
I base my assessment of the balance in conventional options via a broad overview of the
number of troops, tanks, tactical aircraft, transport aircraft, surface combatants, and submarines
in both blocs in 1958 and 1961. According to National Intelligence Estimate Number 11-4-58
(NIE 11-4-58), in 1958, the Soviet Union deployed a total of 78 divisions in Eastern Europe and
the Western Military District (MD), 22 in the former and 56 in the latter.324 The NIE assessed
that the divisions in Eastern Europe are half tank and half motorized rifle, which represented the
most armored type of divisions in the Soviet Army. NIE 11-4-58 does not give the composition
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of the Western USSR line divisions, but in National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-61 (NIE 11-461), there are 8 tank divisions in the Western USSR and 75% of the Soviet Union’s motorized
rifle divisions were deployed in Eastern Europe and the Western MD. With 27 motorized
divisions total in NIE 11-4-58, that would make approximately 21 motorized divisions in Eastern
Europe and the Western USSR in 1958. Since NIE 11-4-58 already cites 11 motorized rifle
divisions in Eastern Europe, this translates to 10 motorized rifle divisions in the Western part of
the Soviet Union in 1958. This accounts for 18 of the line divisions in the western USSR, and the
other 38 western USSR line divisions would be rifle or mechanized. Assuming that the ratio of
rifle to mechanized divisions was the same in the Western MD as in other parts of the Soviet
Union, this would yield 16 rifle and 22 mechanized divisions.
In a large-scale war with NATO, the Soviet Union would augment these forces by
mobilizing troops from its Northwestern and Southwestern military districts (MD’s) in the
USSR. NIE 11-4-58 reports nine line divisions in the Northwest MD and 20 in the Southwest
MD. NIE 11-4-58 does not give a breakdown of the types of divisions in these districts, so I used
the breakdowns of these divisions in NIE 11-4-61 to provide an estimate. This estimate yields 3
motorized rifle, 2 airborne, and 3 rifle divisions along with one 1 tank division in the Northwest.
There would 13 motorized rifle and 7 rifle divisions in the Southwest. This yields a total of 107
line divisions facing NATO. The Soviet Union could also count on the divisions in its Warsaw
Pact allies in Central Europe. According to NIE 11-4-58, East Germany had 5 motorized rifle
and 2 tank divisions, Poland possessed 5 rifle, 7 mechanized, and 2 tank divisions, and
Czechoslovakia could contribute 8 rifle, 4 mechanized, and 2 tank divisions.325 Using the
estimate of the “actual” troops per division within the Soviet and Warsaw Pact units rather than
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the “table of organization and equipment (TOE)” estimate of troops per division, this breakdown
of divisions yields an estimate of 1,222,700 troops that the Soviets and their allies could use in a
war in Germany.
This number looks imposing, and it appeared so to American policymakers, too. NIE 114-58 flatly states that “Soviet ground forces are capable of conducting large-scale operations on
several fronts into peripheral areas, separately or concurrently.”326 When compared to the 20 and
two-thirds divisions possessed by NATO for war in Germany, the total of 107 Soviet divisions
facing Europe “was so huge that any significant NATO resistance without nuclear weapons did
indeed seem impossible.”327 In terms of total troops, NATO was closer to the conventional
strength in Central Europe than a comparison of division numbers would suggest, but they were
nonetheless inferior. The United States deployed the Seventh Army to Germany, which was
complete with 5 divisions and 3 armored brigades.328 The United States deployment was the
same in 1961.329 In fact, the main source of improvement in the number of troops and equipment
in Europe between 1958 and 1961 came in the form of the growth of West German military
power. In 1958, they contributed 5 and two-thirds divisions to SACEUR’s command.330 By
1961, this was up to 8 divisions with a ninth forming.331 If we assume that all other countries
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besides West Germany contributed the same number of divisions in 1958 as in 1961, France
would have 2 divisions, the UK would have 3, and Belgium and the Netherlands would have two
each.332 This would yield a total of 20 and two-thirds divisions in 1958. There are 229,000 troops
in the US divisions in Germany,333 and using an estimate of the number of troops per division in
other NATO countries derived from The Military Balance, there would be 663,760 troops in
SACEUR’s command facing the Warsaw Pact forces.
While this indicates superiority for the Soviet Union, this is less than a 2:1 advantage in
troops, which is not overwhelming. However, the Soviet advantage in the number of main battle
tanks was larger, and this is another metric that made American policymakers wary of engaging
in a conventional conflict in Europe. In the NIE’s, there is no estimate of tanks per armored
division or tanks per mechanized rifle division in the Soviet Army. The Military Balance, 1961
estimates that there are 400 tanks per tank division and 250 tanks per mechanized rifle division
in the Soviet units in East Germany.334 Applying this estimate to all tank and mechanized rifle
division in the 107 line divisions facing NATO and adjusting for the smaller size of similar
divisions in Warsaw Pact allies,335 this yields a total estimate of 20,080 tanks available for war in
Europe.
The US forces in Europe contained 2 armored divisions and 3 armored brigades. West
German forces had 3 armored infantry divisions and 1 armored division. To round out the armor,
France had 1 armored division, the UK had 3, and the Belgian and Dutch divisions were
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equipped with tanks.336 There is no reliable estimate of tanks per armored and armored infantry
division in the US or any other NATO ally at the time. To compensate, I assume a lower “teethto-tail” ratio for NATO divisions than for Warsaw Pact divisions and then adjust for their larger
size. This would come out to around 350 tanks per armored division in NATO and 200 per
armored infantry. Taking the 3 American brigades as one division for counting purposes,
counting the Belgian and Dutch divisions as armored infantry, this yields 2800 tanks across 8
fully armored divisions and 1400 tanks in the 7 armored infantry divisions for an estimate of
4200 tanks. This is about 5 times less tanks than the Soviet Union, without much compensation
for relative quality or technological advancement. Thus, when it comes to armor, the Soviets did
have a clear and recognizable advantage.
The Soviets also had a quantitative advantage in terms of air power, though to a lesser
degree than they had in armor. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets had deployed 810 day fighters, 145
all-weather fighters, 90 ground attack fighters, and 230 light bombers for a total of 1275 aircraft.
In the Western and Northwestern parts of the USSR, the Soviets stationed a total of 5525 combat
aircraft (3250 day fighters, 680 all-weather fighters, 75 ground attack, and 1520 light bombers).
Warsaw Pact allies contributed 3070 more aircraft for a total of 9870 combat aircraft.337 Against
this array of combat aircraft, the United States had 1054 tactical combat aircraft either stationed
in Europe or assigned to NATO.338 The other NATO allies had close to 1700 tactical aircraft at
the time.339 This yields a total of 2754 aircraft.
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In transport aircraft, the Soviets held a quantitative advantage, with 1960 to the United
States’ 709.340 But the United States held a qualitative advantage in this area, with over 50
percent of its transport force consisting of “heavy” or “medium” transporters such as the C-124
and the C-130. The US also had more tanker aircraft for in-flight refueling in the form of over
200 KC-135 to around 100 heavy Bison bombers that the Soviets could use as tankers.341 Of the
1860 transport aircraft in the Soviet military, 1670 were light and only 190 were medium. In
terms of tactical air power, the Soviets held superiority, though not to an overwhelming degree,
and in terms of tanker/transport aircraft for deploying force over long distances, the
countervailing quantitative and qualitative advantages meant that the balance was close to even.
In terms of surface naval power, the United States held an advantage. There were 133
surface combatants in the 2nd (Atlantic) and 6th (Mediterranean) fleets in 1958 compared to 120
in the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea fleets in the Soviet Navy.342 In addition, the United States
included aircraft carriers in its fleets while the Soviet Union’s did not, giving the US an extra
capability that the Soviets did not possess. The undersea balance was close to even. The Soviet
Union held a large quantitative edge, possessing 293 submarines to the United States’ 73.343
However, more of the American submarines were nuclear-powered than the Soviet submarines,
and they tended to be quieter than Soviet submarines. This “passive acoustic advantage” gave the
US better anti-submarine warfare capability (ASW) than the USSR.344 This suggests that the
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Soviet advantage in undersea naval power is smaller than the gap in submarine number would
indicate.
Overall, in 1958, the Soviet Union possessed a conventional advantage in Central
Europe, but this advantage was not overwhelming. This is seen in the values of the US for
conventional variety in 1958. Counting only equipment, the USSR would have a value of 0.7366.
With a small correction for better American quality in surface combatants and transport aircraft,
that value falls to 0.5835, and large correction for improved quality yields a variety index of
0.5381.345 The degree of superiority for the Soviet Union was probably larger than these values
indicate. To soothe West German fears about the consequences of a war with the Soviet Union,
NATO committed to a conventional defense “as far forward as possible.”346 This forward
defense strategy may not have been feasible with existing NATO forces in 1958. Alliance
politics therefore constrained the conventional defense options that could be implemented during
the Berlin Crisis.347 I explain how this affected the overall balance in conventional options
below. Overall, this conventional variety balance indicates, in a vacuum, that the Soviet Union is
more likely to prevail in the First Berlin Crisis in 1958-59. As I explain later in the case, that
may have been a reason why Khrushchev felt his ultimatum strategy would be successful and
could explain the onset of the Berlin Crises.
American intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets still held an advantage in
conventional variety in 1961, though it decreased somewhat from 1958 levels. This estimate was
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due to a combination of a reduction in Soviet defense spending in 1959 and 1960, better
measurement of actual Soviet military strength, and the growth of West German conventional
military power within NATO. On December 8, 1959, Khrushchev announced to the Presidium
that the Soviet Union “should now undertake a further reduction of armaments in our country,”
and “that one could cut by perhaps a million or a million and a half [troops].”348 The CC Plenum
approved this recommendation for reduction in the armed forces on December 26.349 The
Military Balance, 1961 reports that the planned reduction was to go from 3.62 million soldiers in
the Soviet military to 2.42 million. By the middle of 1961, when the suspension of this reduction
policy was announced due to renewed tension over Berlin, around 600,000 troops had been
demobilized such that the Soviet military force numbered close to 3 million soldiers.350 NIE 114-61 documented the subsequent reduction in the total number of line divisions from 175 in 1958
to 147 in 1961.351
The estimated gap between Soviet and American military power in Europe decreased
between 1958 and 1961 partly due to better measurement of Soviet military strength. American
intelligence experts knew that Soviet divisions were maintained at three different degrees of
readiness, with full-strength, medium-strength, and so-called “cadre” or “ghost” divisions.352 The
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first two were considered “combat-ready,” with an average of 70-80% of its official strength in
manpower and equipment, and the last type considered “low-strength,” with only about 30% of
its official strength. NIE 11-4-61 differentiated between these categories and found that 90
Soviet divisions were combat-ready and 57 were low-strength.353 This presented a picture of a
less imposing force than the one that was depicted in 1958. In the Western USSR, the number of
divisions was reduced from 56 to 49, and 21 of those were low strength. With this reduction in
troops and accounting for cadre divisions, US intelligence estimated 967,900 Soviet and Warsaw
Pact troops ready for war in Central Europe, a 20 percent decrease in manpower.354
NATO conventional military strength increased between 1958 and 1961 due to the
growth of the West German armed forces. In 1958, West Germany contributed 5 and two-thirds
divisions to SACEUR. By 1961, they contributed 8, with a ninth coming soon.355 This growth
included one more armored infantry and one more armored division, representing a total increase
of 65,240 troops and 550 tanks to NATO’s strength in Central Europe.356 For a war in Germany,
NATO possessed an estimated 729,000 troops and 4750 main battle tanks. In terms of troops,
NATO now had 75% of the strength of the Warsaw Pact, compared to 54% three years earlier.
The improvement in tank numbers for NATO did not, however, translate into a more
favorable armor balance in 1961. This was because the Soviet Union put more tank divisions into
Eastern Europe between 1958 and 1961 as part of its reorganization of its armed forces. The
Soviet Union had 14 tank divisions in Eastern Europe, all at full strength. It maintained 8 tank
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divisions in the Western USSR, also at full strength, and it had one tank division in the
Northwest MD at low strength.357 The Soviets did not make any reductions to its armor and
made all of it available for a war in Central Europe in 1961. Coupled with the number of tanks in
the military forces of its Eastern European allies, NATO would have had to face approximately
22,258 main battle tanks. The Soviet advantage in tanks remained stable over the three years of
the crisis.
Soviet reductions also hit tactical air forces, transport air, and surface combatants.
Tactical combat aircraft in the Warsaw Pact decreased from 9870 in 1958 to 8020 in 1961. The
Soviet Union had 1805 transport aircraft in 1958 compared to 1960 in 1958.358 The biggest cut
came in surface ships, with only 93 in 1961 across the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea fleets
compared to 120 three years earlier.359 Soviet submarine forces remained about the same, with
274 subs in 1961.360 At the same time, NATO’s tactical air forces improved slightly to around
3000.361 The transport air stayed about the same at 700.362 American surface naval strength
increased slightly to 148 surface combatants, and submarines stayed the same at 73.363 In terms
of tactical air forces, transport air, and surface naval strength, the United States and its allies
improved in relative terms vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies, while the submarine balance
remained stable.
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Overall, the Soviet Union and its allies held an advantage in conventional variety over the
United States and its allies in Central Europe. This advantage was not overwhelming, and it
decreased over the course of the crisis. The variety index for the Soviet Union in 1961 was
0.6693 without a correction for quality, 0.5469 with a small correction for quality, and 0.5014
with a large correction for relative quality. This sounds like an even balance, but it is important
to emphasize that the Soviets had an advantage in Berlin and the area immediately surrounding
it. East German territory surrounded West Berlin, and NATO forces would have had to fight 100
miles into Warsaw Pact territory to defend the NATO garrison in the city. France, the UK, and
the US each stationed a brigade in West Berlin to make a total of around 12,000 NATO
troops.364 There was not much these forces could do against a sudden Warsaw Pact assault. This
gave rise to Schelling’s famous comment that their sole purpose was to “die heroically.”365
However, in response to a low-intensity fait accompli attempt, the United States could respond
with a medium-sized conventional conflict limited to Central Europe and involving 200,000300,000 troops. In this conflict, the US and its NATO allies could have forced a stalemate,
prompting the Soviet Union to escalate to a large-scale conventional war by deploying forces
from its homeland. In this war, the Soviets would be able to defeat the US and its NATO allies
conventionally. Against a determined Soviet attack, the United States would have to use nuclear
weapons to prevent a conventional defeat. The United States deterrent in Western Europe
ultimately rested on the threat to use nuclear weapons, but it still retained a plausible
conventional option.
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How did American military leaders view the conventional balance during the Berlin
Crisis? American military leaders were pessimistic about a low-intensity and a high-intensity
conflict, but they evinced cautious optimism about a conflict of intermediate size. Regarding a
low-level conventional conflict around Berlin, the Joint Chiefs noted in a report in March 1959
to Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy their agreement with an SNIE analysis that should NATO
send a division-sized force into East Germany, “the Soviets would commit the forces they
considered necessary to defeat and drive out the Allied units in a minimum of time.”366 In a
memorandum to President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1961 implied
that a low-level conflict was a losing fight, saying that any conventional use of force in Germany
would “require more than two divisions.”367 In a medium-sized conflict, military officials
expressed less pessimism. The Joint Chiefs in April 1961 assessed that an “intermediate level of
non-nuclear ground forces to attempt to restore ground access” could cause a stalemate which
would produce “a test of will offering both the United States and the Soviets a wide range of
alternatives.”368 In the air, comments on National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 109
said that “opposing strengths probably be roughly comparable. Military success locally is not
impossible.”369 At sea, the US and NATO could “exploit pronounced Allied naval superiority” to

“Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense: Alternative Uses of Military Force.” March 17, 1959. White House
Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961. Executive Secretary’s Subject Files Series. Box 7,
Berlin (1)-(3) [1959] [Berlin contingency planning]. Eisenhower Library.
366

“Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” May 5, 1961. Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National
Security Files. Series 01: Countries. Germany: Berlin, General, Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I, 5/5/61.
Box 081, Item 14. Kennedy Library.
367

“Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense: Berlin.” April 28, 1961. Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential
Papers, National Security Files. Series 01: Countries. Germany: Berlin, General, Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Part I, 5/5/61. Box 081, Item 14. Kennedy Library. Hereafter, “Memo for the SecDef.”
368

“National Security Action Memorandum 109: US Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict.” October 23,
1961. Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files. Subjects. National Security Action
Memoranda. Box 332, Item 11. Kennedy Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/assetviewer/archives/JFKNSF/332/JFKNSF-332-011.
369

160

impose a blockade of the Soviet Union.370 This cautious optimism faded when military leaders
considered escalation to a high-intensity conventional war. In a high-intensity conflict, superior
Soviet numbers and reinforcement capability gave American leaders a dim view of their chances
in an all-out conventional conflict. If the Soviets “used such force which clearly lied in their
capabilities to apply,” which included their forces in the European portion of the USSR, then
“the pattern of events could prove disastrous for the allies.”371
From an estimate of the conventional balance in 1958 and 1961 and the statements of
American military officials, it appears that the United States lacked options for low- and highintensity conflict but did possess a conventional option in the form of an intermediate-sized
conflict in Central Europe. If the US did have a conventional option in Europe in the form of a
limited war confined to Central Europe, then why were American policymakers so pessimistic
about the conventional balance in Europe? One reason was that the prospects for keeping a war
at the “intermediate” level were slim. It would require the Soviet Union to not escalate and use
its advantage at higher levels on the conventional escalation ladder, and that assumption could
not be the basis for contingency planning.372 American military planners had to assume that the
Soviets would fight at the conventional level with all available forces. This assumption is
implied by the statement in NSC 5727 that “if the USSR should attack Berlin with its own
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forces, the United States will have to act on the assumption that general war is imminent.”373 If
the Soviet Union used its 175 total divisions against NATO’s 25, then a conventional defense
would fail.
This brings up another reason why the estimates of the military balance were pessimistic
during the late 1950’s and 1960’s: US military analysts routinely mismeasured Soviet military
power. This was due to a lack of information and fallacious thinking. Alain Enthoven and K.
Wayne Smith point out that the 175-division figure was inconsistent with aggregate economic
data, total manpower levels, and military budget estimates for Soviet forces. The upshot of these
various “paradoxes” was that the Soviets did indeed have 175 divisions (or close to it), but there
was far less manpower per division in the Soviet military than in NATO forces.374 Many military
leaders, especially in the 1958-1961 period, treated the Soviet and NATO divisions as
equivalent, causing them to have a more pessimistic outlook on the conventional balance than
was warranted. I use the information available to Enthoven, Smith, and other “Whiz Kids” in
McNamara’s Defense Department and come to a similar conclusion that they did: NATO was
not hopelessly outgunned in Europe.
In sum, the balance in conventional options was such that the Soviet Union could win a
low-intensity conflict involving forces in Berlin and the surrounding area. In response, NATO
could start a conflict of intermediate size that was confined to Central Europe and involved less
than 300,000 troops and force a stalemate. This would force the Soviet Union to escalate to a
large-scale conventional war in order to attain victory in the conflict. The Soviet Union had an
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advantage in this type of conflict. In response, the United States would have to use nuclear
weapons first or back down. American military leaders recognized this and assessed that any
defense of West Berlin would rest on the credibility of US nuclear threats. Was the American
threat of nuclear escalation credible in a war over West Berlin?
The Stakes Involved in the Crisis
Whether the Soviets would press their conventional advantage in a high-intensity conflict
or realize that they could not use this advantage depended on how seriously they regarded US
nuclear threats. The credibility of the US nuclear deterrent, in turn, rested on the stakes involved
in the crisis for the United States. For both the United States and the Soviet Union, the status of
West Berlin was a core interest, which should cause the Soviet Union to have greater fear of the
chance of nuclear escalation, attenuating the effect of the Soviets’ advantage in conventional
options in the crisis.
The issue of Berlin engaged major foreign policy goals for both countries. The fate of
Berlin connected to the future direction of important allies in Europe for both countries and
therefore control over the European continent. Berlin was therefore related to the defense of a
“strategically vital area,” fulfilling the third criterion of a core interest. Usually, the fate of one
city is not crucial to keeping an alliance together, but in the unique case of West Berlin, this was
true. If the US abandoned West Berlin, West Germany may have left the Western orbit, decided
to become neutral, and sought reunification. If East Germany collapsed due to the continued
outflow of refugees through the open border in Berlin, that would do great damage to either
superpower’s security position. From the perspective of American and Soviet policymakers,
Berlin may have been small in size, but it was integral to their Cold War efforts. This made it a
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core interest despite being a small piece of territory not directly threatening the survival or
territorial integrity of the Soviet Union or the United States.
US Objectives
The United States aimed to maintain its garrison and access rights for its troops in West
Berlin (as well as that of other NATO forces). It wanted to make sure West Berlin remained a
part of West Germany and continue its policy of non-recognition of East Germany. The success
of the United States’ foreign policy in Western Europe hinged on keeping West Germany in the
Western orbit.
To understand why that is the case, it is necessary to understand how the United States
became committed to the defense of West Berlin and how West Germany became a member of
NATO. At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United
States agreed to a plan where Germany was divided into four sectors: each of the three countries
would control one sector and France would control the fourth. The city of Berlin would be
similarly divided, with the Soviets controlling the eastern half of the city and the US, the UK,
and France controlling their own sectors in the western half.375 In 1947, the four powers agreed
to set up regional governments for their zones, and the Soviets worked to bring communists to
power in their sector. Fearing the encroachment of communist influence upon their zones, the
French, the British, and the Americans started consolidating their zones into one entity, first
Bizonia with the British and Americans combining their zones and then Trizonia when the
French joined theirs.
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The Soviets were incensed at Western efforts to combine their zones into one entity.
Andrei Smirnov, the head of the European department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, told the
head of the Foreign Ministry, Vyacheslav Molotov, that allied efforts were “a matter not of
propaganda or political blackmail but a real threat of the political and economic division of
Germany and the inclusion of western Germany with all its resources in a western bloc created
by the United States.”376 This fear was not far off the mark. In June 1948, the French, the British,
and the Americans drew up plans to create a separate West Germany. To stabilize the economy
within their zones of control, they extended Marshall Aid funding and established a new
currency, the DeutscheMark. Angered over this development and wanting to coerce the US and
its allies into halting its policy of consolidating their occupation zones, Soviet Premier Joseph
Stalin blockaded West Berlin, which lay inside the Soviet sector.377 The Americans, British, and
French responded with an airlift to supply the city, which was successful in breaking the
blockade and convincing Soviet leaders to lift it in May 1949. The First Berlin Crisis accelerated
the efforts of the allied powers to forge their zones into an independent political entity. Just as
important, it prompted the United States to tie itself more deeply to Europe’s defense, with
NATO being established on April 4, 1949, one month before the blockade was lifted.378 Thus,
the borders and the fate of a divided Germany and a divided Berlin emerged as flashpoints in the
earliest days of the Cold War.
The consolidation of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the formation of NATO, and the
formation of West Germany created a conundrum for US foreign policy. The United States had
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to contain the Soviet Union, but to do so, they would have to resuscitate West German military
strength. After NATO was first established, the idea of West German rearmament was rejected,
the memories of WWII being too fresh. The outbreak of the Korean War changed that policy and
brought the vulnerability of Western Europe to Soviet aggression into sharp relief.379 By 1953,
NSC 160/1 argued that “US security interests require that the continent of Europe be made as
impregnable as possible against Soviet attack or subversion. This requires participation in
Western defense…of West Germany.”380 Yet, this would frighten France, Great Britain, and
other NATO allies.381 To use West Germany as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, the United
States needed to make West Germany a member of NATO, both to direct its military and
economic power against the Soviets and assuage European anxieties about West Germany’s
rearmament. If the United States failed, and West Germany became neutral, the whole project of
building European cohesion in an effort to balance against the Soviet Union would crumble. The
following quotation references American objections to a neutral, unified Germany, but the same
could have been said about a neutral West Germany:
“A ‘neutralized’, unified Germany… would deny Germany strength to the West, wreck present and
prospective plans for building augmented European strength through union, and open up the whole of
Germany to Soviet intrigue and manipulation which would aim at the absorption of Germany into the
Soviet bloc.”382

Keeping West Germany tied to the American-led European security framework was thus a
pivotal element of the policy of containment.

Warner, Geoffrey. “Review: The United States and the Rearmament of West Germany, 1950-54.” International
Affairs, 61, No. 2 (Spring 1985): pp. 279-286.
379

“NSC 160/1: United States Position with Respect to Germany.” August 17, 1953. Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1952-1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1. Hereafter “NSC 160/1.”
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v07p1/d214.
380

381

Gavin, Francis. Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2020, p. 20.
382

NSC 160/1.

166

If the United States decided to let East Germans control access to Berlin, that would be
tantamount to recognition of East Germany, causing West German leaders to think that the path
to reunification ran through a neutral course rather than one tied to the West. NSC 5803
recognized that “the West Germans themselves may eventually accept a neutralized status
outside NATO in order to achieve unification.”383 To prevent this, the United States had to
convince West Germany that its best chance for reunification was through closer ties to the West.
As an earlier NSC paper on Germany noted: “…to reduce the likelihood of unilateral West
German efforts to solve the reunification problem, the West must convince the West Germans
that it will seek, as and when possible, to achieve unification.”384 To make sure that West
Germany stayed within the Western orbit, US officials had to stress reunification on Western
terms in public, though internally they knew that the Soviets would “never agree to a Germany
united, armed, and free to associate with anyone (including the West).”385
To work with East German officials on access rights would start a ride down a “slippery
slope” towards recognition of East Germany, and with that an official repudiation of hopes for
reunification.386 As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked to himself, to do this “would

“NSC 5803: Statement of US Policy Toward Germany.” February 7, 1958. Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1958-1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959-1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v09/d243.
383

“NSC 5727: Draft Statement of US Policy on Germany.” December 13, 1957. Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955-1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v26/d136.
384

“Memorandum on Germany Policy Paper.” August 4, 1953. White House Office, Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961. NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries. Box 6, NSC 160/1 – US Policy with
Respect to Germany (3).
385

“Notes of Discussion at a Meeting in the Office of Acting Secretary of State Herter.” March 14, 1959. White
House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961. Executive Secretary’s Subject Files Series. Box
8, Berlin Contingency Planning (File #2) (6). Eisenhower Library. See also, Burr, William. “Avoiding the Slippery
Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958 – January 1959.” Diplomatic History,
18, No. 4 (April 1994): pp. 177-205.
386

167

dishearten and dismay the population of Berlin and, I would assume, the large majority of the
people in the Federal Republic. It would expose the lack of willpower in the Western alliance
and encourage further pressure.”387 To go even further and retreat from West Berlin or agree to
make it a “free city” would cause West Germany to abandon the West entirely, with dire
consequences for the future of NATO. In William Burr’s words, this made Berlin a
“superdomino” in the eyes of American foreign policymakers, especially President Eisenhower;
if it fell, so would the rest of Europe.388
The NATO garrison in West Berlin also served as an outpost of the capitalist system in
the middle of communist territory, and its comparative success gave the United States a large
propaganda victory. David Coleman writes how Eisenhower, Kennedy, and John Foster Dulles
often used terms such as “showplace of freedom,” “beacon of hope,” and “window to the West”
when describing West Berlin.389 The city thus came to have a “symbolic” value as a
representation of Western culture that outstripped its intrinsic importance. In short, the success of
US foreign policy in Western Europe was linked to the ability to keep troops in West Berlin, to
do so without going through East German officials, and to keep West Berlin a part of West
Germany. To compromise on those issues would jeopardize its solution to the German problem
and undermine its containment of the Soviet Union.
Defending West Berlin was therefore a core interest. This is not to say that it was vital.
Favorable geography and a large nuclear arsenal kept the United States homeland secure from
Soviet aggression. The United States could lose its position in West Berlin, have West Germany
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turn neutral, and see greater tension among Western European nations and still be secure from
attack and have a strong economy, albeit with more instability and a greater opportunity for
Soviet influence in a core region of the world. Thus, the defense of West Berlin was important,
but the failure to do so did not immediately imperil the survival of the United States. That West
Berlin did not constitute a vital interest meant that there was a credibility problem with
threatening nuclear war over the city. It was a problem that would go on to prove vexing to
American policymakers throughout the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, giving them doubt about
whether they themselves would push the nuclear button to protect West Berlin. But American
interests were invested enough that in any large-scale conventional conflict, the risk of nuclear
escalation was high, even if it was not automatic.
Soviet Objectives
It is more difficult to pin down Soviet objectives during the crisis, as we do not have as
much evidence as we would like on Soviet decision-making during the Cold War. Nevertheless,
there is still ample information from which to estimate what Soviet objectives in the crisis were
and how Khrushchev reacted to the military balance. One thing that stands out is that the Soviet
Union had a wider range of goals in the Berlin Crisis than the United States. Its first goal related
directly to West Berlin. It wanted to kick the armed forces of the Western powers out of West
Berlin and make it into a “free city.” This was the core demand in its two ultimatums in 1958 and
1961. The Soviet Union’s second goal was to stabilize its East German ally, which was
experiencing a “brain drain” of its younger, more highly educated citizens to West Germany.
One way it sought to do this was through forcing the Western powers to recognize East Germany
as a country by having them work with East German officials on access to West Berlin. This was
implicitly suggested in the two ultimatums. Finally, the Soviet Union aimed to prevent the
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proliferation of nuclear weapons to West Germany, and it was using bargaining over Berlin as a
lever to get the United States to work with it on that issue. For the Soviets, these were core
issues, though they were not vital, meaning that it had a similar stake in the outcome of the crisis
as the United States.
The goal of removing Western troops from West Berlin and turning the city into a “free
city” was the Soviet Union’s most ambitious and most prominent goal. Khrushchev regarded
West Berlin, with its Western troops and attraction for East German refugees, as a “bone in my
throat,” and by the autumn of 1958 he ventured a bold strategy that would eliminate the problem.
Khrushchev announced the first part of this strategy on November 10 in a speech at the Soviet
sports palace to a Soviet-Polish friendship rally. He outlined a plan to hand over control of
access to East Berlin to East German officials, and it would be up to the East Germans to
determine who and what is allowed into West Berlin. When Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka
heard of Khrushchev’s plan before the speech, he understood that Khrushchev’s goal was to
“liquidate the Western part of Berlin.”390 Handing over the access rights to East Germans would
force a standoff with NATO troops, one that the Soviets would meet with conventional force of
their own, and that would force the United States to back down due to the fear of nuclear war.391
With Western troops out of the city, the second part of the strategy aimed to create a new
status for West Berlin as a “free city” detached from NATO and West Germany. This idea was
developed by Anastas Mikoyan as a concession to the Western desire for a non-Communist West
Berlin, and Khrushchev believed it was a “serious concession” to Western interests.392 The

Fursenko, Aleksandr and Naftali, Timothy. Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary.
New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006, pp. 198-200.
390

391

Ibid, 199.

392

Ibid, 207-208.

170

Soviet Union put these demands into an ultimatum sent on November 27 to the United States,
United Kingdom, and France to sign a peace treaty with the two Germanies in six months or the
Soviet Union would sign their own treaty with East Germany. Soviet officials hoped that under
the pressure of an ultimatum, the United States and its allies would choose to abandon the desires
of West Germany and agree to the free city and East German access proposals. By failing to
stand up for its West German ally, Khrushchev hoped that a successful ultimatum would
decouple the FRG from NATO.393 Coercing the Western powers into removing their troops and
making West Berlin a free city was ambitious, if not foolhardy. Petr Lunàk points out that
“Khrushchev’s aims, as outlined in the ultimatum, went beyond the bounds of any conceivable
compromise.”394 Despite its loftiness, the Soviet demands represent a firm goal of changing the
status quo in Berlin to be more in line with Soviet interests.
The Soviet Union wanted to accomplish three other goals with the challenge over Berlin,
either on their own or as a consequence of changing the status of West Berlin. One of these goals
was to stabilize East Germany. The rapid growth in the economic power of the FRG threatened
to cause the GDR to collapse. Vladislav Zubok notes that “the early signs of ‘economic miracle’
in the FRG produced a panicky conclusion…the FRG could swallow the GDR.”395 This is
because the widening disparity in living standards between East and West Germany was causing
large numbers of young, intellectual, and professional workers to flee to the West through the
open border in Berlin. If this continued for too long, Soviet leaders feared that the GDR would
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be absorbed into the FRG through “conquest without war” via economic strangulation.396 By the
mid-1950’s, it was clear that to stabilize its East German ally, Soviet leaders had to solve the
open door problem in West Berlin.
Vojtech Mastny puts the problem faced by Khrushchev in obvious terms: “Any Soviet
leader, however, had to be concerned about the political and economic impact of West
Germany’s thriving democracy on the stability of the artificial East German state. Its leader,
Walter Ulbricht, assiduously cultivated Soviet resentment of the disruptive influence of West
Berlin, surrounded by East German territory, and clamored for the elimination of the enclave.”397
Khrushchev chose to solve the issue by demanding a change in the status of West Berlin and
forcing the Western powers to recognize East Germany. If West Berlin was a free city detached
from West Germany, it could no longer serve as an escape valve from communist rule. Forcing
NATO powers to work with East Germany on access to the city would give East Germany a
degree of international recognition that would bolster its domestic legitimacy. Zubok writes that
one of the main effects of the November 1958 ultimatum was that it “gave decisive support to
Ulbricht’s regime in the GDR.”398 Thus, one of the Soviet Union’s primary goals in the crisis
was to stabilize the communist regime in East Germany.
Related to the complaint about Western troops in West Berlin was Khrushchev’s grumble
that it was a “nest of spies” for the West. Khrushchev repeatedly used this phrase when
describing West Berlin. Many people at the time thought it was some sort of joke, but
Khrushchev was right to use that term due to the number of intelligence agents stationed in West
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Berlin.399 Blocking their access to East Berlin, and by extension, East Germany, would hinder
these agents’ efforts in collecting intelligence on the Soviet bloc.
The final goal that the Soviet Union hoped to accomplish was the prevention of the
spread of nuclear weapons to West Germany. Indeed, this goal was so prominent in Soviet
communications and statements that Marc Trachtenberg argues that “the German nuclear
question lay at the heart of Soviet policy during the Berlin Crisis.”400 Khrushchev wanted above
all else to convince the United States to not let West Germany acquire nuclear weapons, and he
“decided to put press on the western powers where they were most vulnerable…Berlin.”401
Soviet leaders had good reason to be worried about this in the fall of 1958. In January of that
year, the Bundestag passed a law allowing the Bundeswehr to acquire nuclear weapons.402 In a
meeting with Mikoyan in April, Adenauer said that West Germany planned to buy the Matador
missile, which was capable of carrying nuclear warheads, from the United States.403 As
Trachtenberg put it, if the Soviets were scared of a West German nuclear capability, “they were
not simply being paranoid.”404 That this was an impetus behind the initiation of the Berlin Crisis
is clear from a Presidium meeting on November 6, four days before the issuing of the first
ultimatum, when Khrushchev stated flatly that the United States “attracted Germany into NATO,
they are giving her atomic weapons…Is it not the time to begin rejecting the Potsdam
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Accord?”405 With nuclear weapons, Soviet leaders feared that West Germany would undertake
an economic and military offensive against the GDR. This could be the opening salvo of a larger
campaign against the Soviet bloc. Thus, Soviet Ambassador to East Germany Andrei Smirnov
told Ulbricht on October 5 that a key goal of Soviet foreign policy was “to keep putting a braking
influence on the formation of the Bundeswehr.”406
Even if stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to West Germany was not the
overarching goal of the Berlin Crisis, it was at least as important as changing the status of West
Berlin and shoring up East Germany. In fact, all three goals were interwoven together in
Khrushchev’s mind. Changing the status of West Berlin would provide more stability to East
Germany. Preventing nuclear proliferation to West Germany would reduce the military threat to
the GDR. Providing a solution to the emigration problem for East Germany would make living
with a divided Berlin more tolerable. Despite their interconnectedness, all three goals can be
treated as distinct. I will measure the degree of Soviet success in the crisis according to these
three aims, knowing that success or failure in one can lead to success or failure in another.
Finally, the stakes involved in accomplishing these goals were central to the Soviet Union’s Cold
War foreign policy, but they were not vital. Due to its large military force and nuclear weapons,
it would be secure from a US or European attack. Nevertheless, an East German collapse, which
could happen without any Soviet challenge on the German issue, would have sent shockwaves
through the rest of Soviet bloc, sowing discord within the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union
therefore had similar stakes involved in the crisis as the United States.
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Predictions and Outcome
What would conventional options theory predict about the outcome of the crisis given the
value of the independent variables? The Soviet Union possessed an advantage in conventional
options during the Berlin Crises. The Soviet Union could win a low-level conflict involving
forces in Berlin and the area immediately surrounding it. The United States and its NATO allies
could respond with a medium-sized conventional conflict confined to forces in Central Europe,
which would likely result in a stalemate. In response, the Soviets could escalate to a large-scale
conflict that it would likely win. The Soviet Union’s advantage in conventional options was such
that it could put the United States into a resolve-capability gap by escalating to a large-scale
conflict in Western Europe. In this type of conflict, the US would have to choose between
backing down or escalating to nuclear use.
For both sides, the Berlin Crisis engaged core interests, making resolve high. In any
large-scale conflict, the credibility of threats to escalate to the nuclear level were high, which
should attenuate the effect of an advantage in conventional options. According to conventional
options theory, the Soviet Union should realize in both crises that it could not use its
conventional advantage in Europe and back off of its coercive threats. This outcome, by keeping
the status of West Berlin intact, would benefit the Americans more than the Soviets.
Conventional options theory would say that the combination of an option for a medium-sized
conventional conflict plus the high stakes involved in the Berlin Crisis should cause the United
States to maintain the status of West Berlin. Of course, the Soviets dropped their ultimatums in
both crises. Did this constitute a successful outcome for the United States?
When it comes to changing the status of West Berlin, the Soviet Union failed to achieve
its primary goal while the United States achieved theirs. West Berlin did not become a “free
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city” under UN trusteeship with NATO forces out of the city. West Berlin remained a part of
West Germany and NATO troops continued to be garrisoned there. There was also little
movement towards the recognition of East Germany, another point of contention in the Berlin
Crises. The United States did offer compromises that would go towards de facto recognition of
the GDR, but the Soviet Union never accepted them as part of a deal to end the crisis. Plus, even
if they had, they never would have come close to constituting the de jure recognition that a peace
treaty with the GDR would have conferred.
On the goal of stopping East German emigration through Berlin, the Soviets were more
successful. The construction of the Berlin Wall staunched the flow of people to West Germany
and solved the “nest of spies” problem. However, it was an ignominious solution that not so
tacitly conceded the superiority of the Western economic and political system. One could
therefore regard the resort to the Berlin Wall as a net negative for the Soviets. Some, such as
Fred Kempe, argue that the Wall represents an American concession to the Soviets and
“Kennedy’s mishandling of the events surrounding Berlin in 1961.”407 This is a stretch.
American goals in the crisis never included the protection of travel rights for people living in
East Germany, and American officials accepted that the Soviets and East Germans could do as
they pleased on their side of Berlin. The United States, during both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations, cared about the status of West Berlin, and the Berlin Wall did not threaten West
Berlin’s integrity. It thus did not harm the United States’ main goals in the crisis. The Wall did
help the Soviets achieve a major goal, but it did so in a way that was counterproductive.
Finally, West Germany did not acquire nuclear weapons during the crisis years, and the
Kennedy administration told Soviet officials that they were working to keep nuclear weapons out
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of the hands of West Germans. However, this nonproliferation success was only partial. First, it
is not clear that an acquisition of an independent nuclear arsenal with American assistance was
ever a serious possibility, even under Eisenhower.408 The Soviets were complaining about the
nuclear sharing arrangements that the United States had established with the West German
military, but dual key arrangements remained in place after the crisis and continue to do so to
this day.409 Therefore, the statements from the Kennedy administration on nonproliferation are at
most partial achievements of the goal of keeping West Germany non-nuclear..
For the United States, the overall outcome represents the achievement of its main goals.
West Berlin remained intact as a part of West Germany, East Germany remained unrecognized,
and the transatlantic alliance system held firm. For the Soviet Union, the crisis outcome failed to
achieve any progress on one of its main goals: changing the status of West Berlin. It was a partial
success on shoring up the stability of East Germany. While the refugee problem was solved via
the Berlin Wall, the GDR remained unrecognized by the West and the Wall itself harmed the
legitimacy of the Soviet political and economic system around the world. It was a partial success
on West German nonproliferation, too. It received pledges from the Kennedy administration to
not give West Germany independent control over nuclear weapons, but dual key arrangements
remained in place. This outcome represents a better deal for the United States than the Soviet
Union. This is why I code the outcome of this crisis as a US victory. As Richard Betts explains:
“The American victory was far from clear and uncompromising, but in giving up the demand for
a separate treaty and revocation of occupation rights in Berlin, the Soviets conceded more from
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their opening position than did the Americans.”410 Did this successful outcome come about
through the mechanisms that conventional options theory says should operate in disputes over
core interests?
The Effects of Conventional Options in the Crisis
Can conventional options theory explain this success for the United States? In the
Eisenhower administration, I argue that it is difficult to explain events with reference to the
theory. The Eisenhower administration was more pessimistic about the conventional balance
than was warranted and relied on a threat of rapid nuclear escalation to keep the Soviets in check.
However, Eisenhower was not inclined to compromise with the Soviets. This goes against the
mechanism of conventional options theory, which says that states that place heavy reliance on
nuclear threats should be induced to compromise. Plus, it is unclear that American conventional
capabilities played any role in Khrushchev’s decision to drop his first ultimatum in 1959. In the
second Berlin Crisis during the Kennedy administration, there is more evidence that
conventional options theory can explain US success. US conventional preparations in the
summer of 1961 impressed upon Khrushchev that he would have to escalate to a large-scale
conventional war in order to get his way in Berlin via armed force. Judging that this carried too
high a risk of nuclear war due to the stakes involved in the Berlin Crisis, he decided to drop his
second ultimatum. This sequence of events lends more support to conventional options theory.
The First Berlin Crisis and the Eisenhower Administration, 1958-1959
The Eisenhower administration was more pessimistic about the conventional balance
than it should have been given the balance in troops and equipment. This meant that President
Eisenhower viewed the United States as much inferior to the Soviet Union in Europe. Consistent
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with conventional options theory, this caused the United States to resort to a strategy of rapid
nuclear escalation to defend West Berlin. The United States would start with a conventional
response to probe Soviet intentions, but once a certain threshold of conventional conflict was
crossed, the United States would initiate nuclear war. This was because American military
strategists and civilian policymakers thought that winning a conventional war in Europe against
the Soviet Union, at any level of intensity, was an unlikely proposition.
During the Eisenhower administration, conventional forces would be used only to test
Soviet intentions and then spark an incident that would make the Soviets seem like the
aggressors. In the event that access to West Berlin was cut off, NATO would first send a
platoon-sized probe down the Autobahn to see if Warsaw Pact forces fired upon it or resisted its
progress by force. If that force was stopped, then NATO would send a force “not to exceed a
reinforced division” to reopen ground access to West Berlin.411 If this division was met with
significant Soviet resistance, this would trigger escalation to nuclear conflict, because the it was
presumed that the United States could not win if the war remained conventional. An NSC
document on US policy on Berlin stated that policymakers within NATO would have to
“recognize that Berlin is not militarily defensible and that if determined Soviet armed opposition
should develop when US units attempt to force their way into or out of Berlin, no additional units
would be committed, but resort would have to be made to general war.”412 US strategy for
defending West Berlin thus relied on using troops as “tripwires” that would then instigate a
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nuclear strike. Using a poker analogy, President Eisenhower expressed this policy as avoiding
the slow escalation of white chips up to blue chips. Instead, the US should put the Soviets “on
notice that our whole stack is in play.”413 Underlying this strategy of threatening rapid nuclear
escalation was the belief that the Soviets were bluffing over Berlin and that they would back
down once they saw how much risk the United States was willing to bear to protect the city.414
Thus, the Eisenhower administration’s strategy for defending West Berlin was to rely on
rapid escalation to nuclear force to deter a Soviet challenge. There was some vigorous debate
between Eisenhower and the JCS on one side and civilian officials in the NSC on other over how
rapid this nuclear escalation should be. General Nathan Twining, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff envisioned an automatic escalation from the convoy to the division-sized force,
complaining that if civilian policymakers did not commit to that course of action they would “go
half way [sic] and then quit.”415 Dulles disagreed, as did McElroy, and they advocated for a
“wait-and-see” approach that built in time for deliberation among NATO allies between the
convoy and division stage. Preparations for general war would still be made prior to that
decision, mostly as a way to convince the Soviet Union to negotiate over access to Berlin. If the
convoy was stopped, then “the decision to apply further military pressures by the use of
additional force would be subject to governmental decision.”416 Dulles, McElroy, and other
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civilian officials wanted to keep open a space for negotiation before the final decision for general
war would have to be made. US decision-makers agreed to Dulles’ “double-barreled” approach
in which they would prepare for general war while also consulting with allies on the use of force.
Nevertheless, everyone in the administration believed that the United States would have
to threaten nuclear use early in a fight over Berlin. In a meeting where the timing and sequence
of the conventional probes and resort to nuclear war were being discussed, Eisenhower remarked
toward the end that “we do not have sufficient forces in Europe, six equivalent divisions [size of
the US force in Germany] are not enough to do this job conventionally.”417 The United States
would have to use nuclear threats to defend its position in Berlin, and NSC 5803, an update to
NSC 5404 that was approved a week after the meeting, kept the escalatory strategy intact.418
Officials within the Eisenhower administration believed that if the United States threatened
nuclear use seriously enough, then the Soviet Union would be dissuaded from pursuing a
challenge. In a conversation between Secretary Dulles and his aide on Berlin, the aide remarked
that “if the Russians think we will use it, we won’t have to. The Sec. [Dulles] said that has been
our whole policy all along.”419 Mostly out of necessity and partly out of a belief in the
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, the United States enacted an escalatory strategy to defend its
position in West Berlin. Or, as one of Daniel Ellsberg’s colleagues once described it to him: “we
send in a series of increasingly larger probes. If they’re all stopped, we fire a [nuclear] warning
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shot. If that doesn’t work, we blow up the world.”420 The threat to carry out such reckless
planning, it was believed, would deter the Soviets from challenging the US position in West
Berlin.
Relying to such a large extent on nuclear escalation should have painted US decisionmakers into a corner where they had to choose between over-escalation and backing down. It
appears that Eisenhower and officials within his administration felt disadvantaged by being in
this bargaining position. On November 30, three days after the Soviets sent their ultimatum,
Eisenhower “expressed unhappiness” about the American political commitment to West Berlin
and called it “wholly illogical” in relation to its military capabilities.421 Kara Stibora Fulcher
writes that a combination of the necessity to defend West Berlin and the perceived lack of
military means to defend it meant that “a diplomatic solution was the only acceptable possibility”
to Western policymakers.422 In addition, Eisenhower administration officials in 1959 and 1960
felt frustrated by the lack of conventional options and felt that it constrained them from pressing
their demands on the Soviets to the extent they wished.423 To this end, the United States, France,
and Great Britain sat down to talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva in May 1959.
However, the maximum amount of concessions given by the United States, embodied in
Secretary of State Christian Herter’s proposal to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on
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July 28, represented a continuation of the status quo and moved little in the direction of Soviet
demands. It called for the maintenance of the NATO garrison in West Berlin (though at a
reduced number), free movement throughout all of Berlin, and a couple of concessions to not
station atomic weapons in Berlin or conduct any subversive activities from the city.424 This
proposed settlement was not the type of compromise to resolve the crisis quickly that a country
that felt itself so deficient in conventional options should give.
The adverse negotiating position therefore did not lead to the predicted concessions. The
lack of concessions did not lead to an escalation of the conflict by the Soviet Union either, as
they let the ultimatum deadline quietly lapse without any hint of signing a separate peace treaty
with East Germany. There are a couple reasons for this. First, Khrushchev may have viewed
negotiations with the Western powers to be itself a concession and diplomatic victory. Zubok
argues that in 1959, Khrushchev “decided to use the Berlin Crisis as a stepping stone for his
personal diplomacy.”425 On June 16, 1959, Khrushchev intimated to Ulbricht that the Geneva
negotiations represented progress because it showed that “the Western powers were at least
prepared to discuss the future status of Berlin and to have observers from East Germany in the
room as they did so.”426 Khrushchev also earned a trip to the United States through his Berlin
gambit, and he spoke of his personal diplomacy with Eisenhower in glowing terms, declaring
that in President Eisenhower he had a counterpart who “sincerely wishes to see the end of the
Cold War.”427 That Khrushchev dropped the ultimatum because he thought he had achieved an
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important diplomatic goal is somewhat consistent with conventional options theory: the side with
more conventional options perceived themselves as accomplishing dispute success.
The second reason for dropping the ultimatum is that Khrushchev decided to pivot
towards improving the consumer economy and raising the living standards of the Soviet people.
To do this, Khrushchev decided to reduce military spending and shift the savings into spending
on the civilian economy.428 If Khrushchev was going to reduce military spending, he needed to
lower the temperature in the Cold War. I find this explanation to be more likely. As noted in the
military balance section, the resulting cuts to the Soviet military were drastic, amounting to
hundreds of thousands less troops and as much as 28 less divisions. In this atmosphere,
Khrushchev likely calculated that it was better to put off superpower confrontation for the time
being. This would also explain why he did not issue a new ultimatum after the failure of the Paris
Summit in May 1960. The standoff caused by the first ultimatum therefore fizzled out due to a
shift in Soviet foreign policy away from diplomatic pressure. The balance in conventional
options may have had little to do with Khrushchev’s decision to drop the first ultimatum.
However, he dropped the ultimatum in May 1959 while leaving the wider issues about the status
of Berlin and the future of Germany unresolved. By the end of Eisenhower’s term in office, the
Berlin issue was very much alive.
The Effect of the Conventional Balance in 1961
President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was sworn in on January 20, 1961, and one of his first
priorities was finding a better military strategy for defending Western Europe. This included
developing conventional options for escalation in a crisis with the Soviet Union over Berlin. This
effort culminated in a military strategy that came be to known as “Flexible Response.” The
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strategy called for multiple options for the use of force to be able to meet a Soviet challenge at
any level of conflict.429 Officials within the Kennedy administration believed that an overreliance on nuclear deterrence harmed US bargaining positions in situations of limited or strictly
conventional Soviet aggression. The Kennedy administration thus proposed increasing
conventional capabilities as a way to improve the American capability to meet limited Soviet
aggression. The Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) for 1961, mirroring and then negating
the language of BNSP’s during the Eisenhower administration, declared that against limited
aggression, the US would “place main, but not sole, reliance on non-nuclear weapons”430 (italics
mine). At the macro level, the Kennedy administration recognized the adverse negotiating
position that inferior conventional options could put the United States in, and in response they
decided to invest more in conventional capabilities rather than rely on immediate nuclear
escalation.
Khrushchev’s second ultimatum accelerated the Kennedy administration’s search for
conventional options. After the ultimatum on June 4, Kennedy was not as sure as Eisenhower
that Khrushchev was bluffing over Berlin. Khrushchev’s sharp language in Vienna no doubt
played a role in forming this improved assessment of Soviet resolve. Kennedy and his aides put a
higher probability on the chance that Khrushchev was serious when he said the “USSR can delay
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no longer” a peace treaty with East Germany.431 Soviets may want to fight over Berlin, and a
threat of rapid nuclear escalation may not be credible enough to deter them. As a result, the
United States would need to develop a credible conventional option. During a meeting at
Hyannisport on July 8, Kennedy instructed his military advisor General Maxwell Taylor to tell
McNamara to make recommendations for the use of force “on the assumption that main reliance
will not be placed on the use of atomic weapons at the outset of a military engagement with the
USSR in Europe.”432
The search for conventional options led Kennedy to call for a $3.2 billion increase in
defense spending to pay for greater conventional capabilities in his July 25 speech to Congress
on Berlin and to contemplate a callup of six divisions of reservists.433 Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, Acheson, and other high-ranking officials calculated that these increased
conventional forces would add to the credibility of the nuclear deterrent by “creating a chain of
plausible US response in which each stage would believably lead to the next higher chain of
force.”434 The six-division mobilization, however, was never implemented with regards to Berlin
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in 1961; it was not logistically feasible, and declaring a national emergency to call up six
divisions worth of reservists would have caused too much unease domestically.435
Yet, the Kennedy administration did not need to send six divisions to Western Europe in
order to have conventional option to use against the Soviets. American decision-makers started
to realize the extent of their conventional options after a systematic appraisal of conventional
forces conducted during the first few months of Kennedy’s presidency. In this review of
conventional capabilities, McNamara concluded that in a conflict involving 250,000-300,000
American troops or less, the “non-nuclear forces of the United States are highly trained, ready
and competent to accomplish tasks assigned to them by the basic war plans of the United
States.”436 This means that the Soviets may not be able to win a medium-intensity conflict over
Berlin with using only their capabilities in Eastern Europe, where they had 231,600 troops and
the United States had 229,000.437 In order to bring about their preferred outcome in Berlin
through force of arms, the Soviets would have to escalate to a large-scale conventional conflict
using its reinforcements from the western USSR. Of course, past the threshold of 300,000 troops,
nuclear use in a conflict over core interests is likely to occur and therefore threats to initiate
nuclear war are more credible. In short, McNamara’s appraisal of conventional capabilities
suggests that the United States and its NATO allies had a conventional option if they were
willing to escalate to a medium-level conventional war over Berlin.
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There is evidence that US policymakers recognized this capability and felt that it gave
them more bargaining power over the issue of Berlin. General Maxwell Taylor, a military
advisor to President Kennedy and a former Chief of Staff of the Army, gave a briefing to
Adenauer and his Defense Minister Josef Strauss during their visit in November 1961 about the
military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.438 In this briefing, he assessed that the
balance of the forces currently stationed in Central Europe were close to even and that the Soviet
Union could gain a quantitative advantage only through reinforcements from the western USSR.
For example, because of the growth in the West German military, NATO and the Warsaw Pact
now had “rough numerical equality in effective divisions currently deployed in the area critical
to the Berlin situation. We can now count 21 effective NATO divisions in comparison with the
22 Soviet divisions in East Germany and Poland.”439 The Soviet Union would have been able to
reinforce up to 55 divisions with NATO only being able to reinforce to around 40, but this
numerical disadvantage was “far from an unfavorable ratio for the defender,” which NATO
would be in a conflict in Central Europe.440 The same situation was true in the air, where the
immediate local balance was even but the Soviets could bring reinforcements to have a
quantitative edge in the first month of a conflict.441
According to General Taylor, what were the strategic implications of this conventional
balance? It was not that NATO could win a large-scale conventional war in Europe or that it
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could thwart a minor incursion, but that NATO conventional capabilities were enough to mount
a non-nuclear defense “in the middle ground.”442 If NATO could force the Soviet Union to
escalate to a large-scale conventional conflict in order to win in Europe, then it could raise the
risk of nuclear use from a possibility into a likelihood. Because a high-intensity conventional war
in Europe carries so much risk of a nuclear war, the Soviet Union would be deterred from
“responding with the full non-nuclear strength available to them.”443 Taylor summed up the
conventional balance by saying that NATO was at a conventional disadvantage, but “only
through major non-nuclear attack could the Soviets make serious inroads into NATO territory.
There can be no doubt that such an attack would draw a nuclear response with fatal implications
for the USSR.”444 A successful conventional defense in medium-intensity war could therefore
persuade the Soviet Union to back down in a conflict, and the prospect a successful defense in
the middle level of conflict could deter the Soviets from initiating an armed challenge at all.
NATO had thus had some bargaining power as a result of its conventional capabilities.
This assessment of the balance is at odds with the statements of other policymakers and
military leaders during this time. How does one explain the disconnect between General Taylor’s
assessment and other calculations of the conventional balance in Europe? Pessimistic
assessments of the conventional balance were based on the outcome of a conventional conflict in
which the Soviet Union used its full conventional strength against NATO forces. In a report on
May 5, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed that the success of armed attempts to reopen
ground access to Berlin depended on whether “the Soviets would use force sufficient to crush the
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operation, which they are capable of doing if they so choose.”445 If the Soviets mobilized and
deployed troops from their country, then they would prevail in a conventional conflict. If they
did not, the outcome was more in doubt. The Warsaw Pact held a 3:2 advantage in forces in
Germany, which is not overwhelming, and if the US took preparatory measures, then NATO’s
deployed ground and air forces would have “approximate numerical parity with Soviet and East
German forces deployed west of the USSR border.”446 Thus, despite overall conventional
inferiority, American preparations to fight at the conventional level presented a serious military
problem to the Soviets. In response to improved NATO conventional capabilities, the Soviet
Union would have had to escalate to a large-scale ground conflict in order to get their way in
Berlin and Germany.
The participation of NATO countries, especially West Germany, in the conventional fight
for Berlin was critical to its success. This is why General Taylor’s military briefing was designed
to convince the West Germans to buy in to the administration’s Flexible Response strategy and
continue building up its conventional forces. One way to show that Flexible Response was a
strategy that could enhance deterrence was by showing that NATO already had a usable
conventional capability. In a meeting after the briefing, President Kennedy communicated to the
West German leaders that he wanted them to still be confident in the United States’ commitment
to use nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent in Europe.447 Does this discredit the analysis?
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While the analysis had clear political motivations, this does not mean it had a false conclusion.
NATO forces in Central Europe were indeed close to equal with Warsaw Pact forces in the
region, and Soviet conventional superiority lay in its reinforcement capacity. For instance, it is
both true that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lyman Lemnitzer, wanted to “see 30
divisions on the central front” and that those divisions “would provide a difficult military
problem for the Soviets.”448 Based on the estimates provided by American intelligence at the
time, General Taylor’s analysis was sound, and it could serve a political purpose to convince the
West Germans to support the administration’s Flexible Response strategy.
To sum up, the growth in NATO’s relative conventional capabilities gave it the ability to
thwart Soviet attempts at changing the status quo in Berlin and Germany in a medium-intensity
conflict. The Soviet Union would have to escalate to a high-intensity conventional conflict in
order to get their way in central Europe through force of arms. This made American
policymakers more confident in its bargaining power in the Berlin Crisis. That did not, however,
have an effect on its bargaining position, as the United States continued to attempt to maintain
the status quo without giving meaningful concessions to the Soviets. Did the United States and
NATO’s conventional capabilities help convince the Soviet Union to drop its ultimatum in 1961?
The Conventional Balance and Soviet Calculations in 1961
When Kennedy came into office, Khrushchev believed that he had a negotiating partner
with which he could embark on a Soviet-American rapprochement. During the presidential
campaign, Khrushchev wondered aloud if Kennedy was another Roosevelt (FDR) and believed
that Kennedy “had people around him prepared to reach some sort of compromise on West
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Berlin.”449 Intimations that Kennedy wanted to meet for talks with Khrushchev only confirmed
this feeling. When Khrushchev heard from GRU agent Georgi Bolshakov, his back-channel
diplomat to the Kennedy administration, in May that “President Kennedy wanted to talk about
practically anything else but Berlin” in their upcoming summit, he grew disappointed and
impatient.450 Khrushchev wanted a settlement on West Berlin, and if Kennedy was not ready to
propose a deal, he would force one on the American president. Plus, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco
in April, Khrushchev believed he was working with “a weakened American president, who
would back off in a crisis situation.”451 Khrushchev decided that he would sign a unilateral peace
treaty with East Germany by the end of the year, and he would use the Vienna Summit with
Kennedy to announce it. He told the Presidium at the end of May that “if we want to carry out
our policy…it is necessary to be firm.”452
On June 4, Khrushchev confronted Kennedy at their summit in Vienna with another
ultimatum over Berlin. Khrushchev made it clear to Kennedy that if the United States did not
agree to a settlement to make West Berlin a “free city,” he would sign a separate peace treaty
with East Germany at the end of the year. Khrushchev’s threat and his language during the
conversation with Kennedy confirmed that the withdrawal of the first ultimatum was only a
temporary lull in the broader dispute over Berlin. Khrushchev averred that “the decision to sign a
peace treaty is firm and irrevocable and the Soviet Union will sign it in December if the US
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refuses an interim agreement.”453 If the United States and its allies tried to assert its access rights
to West Berlin once the peace treaty was signed, then “force would be met by force.”454 There
was no room for compromise. President Kennedy icily “concluded the conversation by observing
that it would be a cold winter.”455 Khrushchev went into the Vienna conference thinking that the
new US president would buckle under the pressure of a Soviet military threat. Kennedy’s initial
reaction proved him wrong.
Part of the reason Khrushchev thought that the United States would be responsive to such
coercion and therefore issued his second ultimatum was that he believed the Americans would
not dare to fight a conventional conflict in Europe. The threat of nuclear war was so high that
only a foolish Western statesman would initiate a war over the signing of a peace treaty with
East Germany, and “there are no such idiots or they have not yet been born.”456 Plus, the
conventional balance favored the Soviet Union, meaning that if a war did remain non-nuclear,
the Soviets would likely win anyway. This gave the Soviets a bargaining advantage according to
Khrushchev, who said ‘The Russians have the advantage…’ This means, they will agree. We
will present this proposition and insist on it. Then this matter will be accepted.”457 Yet, other
Soviet policymakers were worried about a conventional conflict in Germany, most notably
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Anastas Mikoyan, who said “they [NATO] could initiate military action without atomic
weapons.”458
Mikoyan’s fears turned out to be correct. Kennedy’s response to the Soviet ultimatum, as
laid out in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 58, was to order the military to
prepare for “large scale non-nuclear ground action within four months of such time after October
15 as it may be ordered—with tactical air support, as necessary—assuming appropriate use of
forces in Europe and assuming reinforcement from the US as necessary to permit the use of two,
four, six, and twelve divisions in Europe.” In these operations, the Department of Defense should
“ensure that nuclear weapons now in Europe are not used in the course of such action without
direct Presidential authorization.”459 This conventional escalation would be done by expanding
the scope of the conflict as well as by adding more ground forces in Europe. In NSAM 109,
Kennedy’s directions for a response to a challenge on Berlin included “maritime control, naval
blockade, and other worldwide measures, both for reprisal and to add to general pressure on the
Soviets.”460 In a meeting on July 17 with his top advisors, Kennedy also decided to add over $3
billion to the request for the defense budget to pay for calling up reserves to fill out US-based
Army divisions and air and naval forces that could be sent to Europe and for greater procurement
of conventional weapons.461 Kennedy announced this decision to the public in a national address
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on July 25.462 With this speech, Kennedy declared the United States’ resolve to fight at the
conventional level over Berlin.
Khrushchev had erred, and in realizing the weight of this error, he changed his
calculations over the risks of following through on his June 4 ultimatum. Fursenko and Naftali
write that Khrushchev was “not prepared for the scale of the conventional buildup initiated by
the United States.”463 Khrushchev knew that with NATO capabilities as they were, they could
successfully engage in a medium-intensity conflict and force the Soviets to send in their
reinforcements. This escalation would make the conflict a full-scale conventional war, with all
the risks of nuclear war such a conflict over a core interest in the status of Berlin carried. As
Khrushchev noted years later, a military confrontation strictly around West Berlin “would
quickly have been resolved in our [the Soviets’] favor…But this would have been only the
starting point. It would have meant shooting on some scale, small or large. War might have
broken out…We only wanted a surgical operation.”464 Against a fait accompli in West Berlin,
the US and its allies had a credible conventional option in escalating to a medium-intensity
conflict in Central Europe, one that would force the Soviets to escalate to large-scale war. In
such a war, the threat of initiating nuclear war was much more credible.
Kennedy’s willingness and ability to engage in a medium-scale conventional conflict
caused Khrushchev to think that his ultimatum strategy had become too risky. Robert Slusser
writes that in response to Kennedy’s July 25 speech, Khrushchev saw that “the United
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States…had raised the stakes to a level which the Soviet Union could not afford to match.”465
This caused Khrushchev to shift from the “maximum objective” of changing the status of West
Berlin to the “minimum objective” of solving the emigration problem from East Germany.466 To
accomplish the minimum objective, Khrushchev decided, with the cooperation of East Germany,
to construct the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961. The Soviet Union continued its campaign of
diplomatic pressure on the West after the Wall went up, but this was being done while the
Soviets were looking for ways to ratchet down the crisis. Indeed, in late August, while at the
resort town of Pitsunda in Georgia, Fursenko and Naftali argue that Khrushchev “was looking
for an excuse to call off his ultimatum.”467
The Kennedy administration was open to negotiations and talks between Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Dean Rusk began in New York on September 21. On
September 24, Soviet press attaché Mikhail Kharlamov told Kennedy’s press secretary Pierre
Salinger that “the storm in Berlin is over.”468 When Kennedy got this message, he recognized it
as a ramping down of tensions, saying that “he’s [Khrushchev’s] not going to recognize the
Ulbricht regime – not this year, at least – and that’s good news.”469 On October 17, Khrushchev
announced to the 22nd Party Congress of the Communist Party that he would drop his June 4
ultimatum. He would still negotiate for West Berlin to be a free city, but he would no longer do
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so through a military challenge.470 The willingness to engage in a medium-intensity conventional
war combined with the stakes in the dispute over Berlin had convinced Khrushchev that he could
not use his conventional advantage to coerce the United States. He therefore decided to deescalate the Berlin Crisis.
How was the threat of a conventional stalemate in a medium-intensity conventional
conflict enough to bring about such a successful outcome for the US? One explanation puts less
emphasis on the stakes involved in a dispute over Berlin and instead points out that the United
States had limited nuclear options to which it could escalate, making its strategic nuclear threats
more credible. Carl Kaysen led an effort to develop options for the limited use of nuclear
weapons in 1961.471 In fact, that was one of the main purposes of Flexible Response. A report by
Thomas Schelling on the possible benefits of a “demonstration” nuclear strike was in President
Kennedy’s briefing book on the Berlin Crisis in July 1961.472 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that
limited nuclear options increased US resolve in the crisis. The rhetorical emphasis on tactical or
limited uses of nuclear weapons never matched the actual ability to use nuclear weapons in a
limited fashion. Operational obstacles prevented the development of employment options outside
of the SIOP. In December 1963, McNamara reported to President Lyndon B. Johnson that “we
do not have an adequate basis at this time for placing greater dependence on a tactical nuclear
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strategy.”473 It is unlikely that limited nuclear options increased US resolve because there was no
plan for a limited nuclear strike in 1961.
Summary: The Effect of NATO’s Conventional Option
The Soviet Union possessed a superiority in the number of conventional options available
in the Berlin Crises. However, this advantage would have allowed the Soviets to put the
Americans in a resolve-capability gap only by escalating to a large-scale conventional war. This
type of conflict would have forced the United States to choose between nuclear escalation and
backing down. Due to the seriousness with which the United States regarded the stakes in West
Berlin and the risks inherent in a large-scale conflict, the US would have had a credible threat of
“over-escalation” to the nuclear level. Because of this credible threat of nuclear escalation, if the
United States threatened to escalate to a medium-intensity conflict confined to Central Europe,
the Soviets would have realized that they could not use their conventional advantage to coerce
the Americans in Berlin. This would lead to the Soviets dropping their ultimatums and the
preservation of the status quo.
Events did not follow this course in the First Berlin Crisis in 1958-59. The Eisenhower
administration was more pessimistic about the conventional balance than was warranted, yet this
did not lead to concessions from the United States. Instead, the United States used threats of
rapid nuclear escalation to see their way through the first crisis. Khrushchev withdrew his first
ultimatum instead of putting more pressure on the United States, and there is little evidence that
US conventional capabilities had anything to do with this decision. The Second Berlin Crisis
gives much more support to the logic of conventional options theory. The Kennedy
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administration threatened the use of conventional force in response to the second ultimatum and
the threat of a blockade of West Berlin. This caused Khrushchev to realize that he would have to
escalate to a large-scale conventional war if the Soviet Union was to get its way in Berlin via
armed force. Given the stakes in the Berlin Crises, this carried a high risk of nuclear escalation.
Khrushchev realized he could not use his conventional advantage to coerce the Americans,
prompting him to drop his ultimatum. Because the Americans were defending the status quo, this
caused the US to accomplish more of their primary goals in the crisis than the Soviets. The
stakes involved plus the limited conventional options the United States possessed combined to
prevent the Soviet Union from enacting a strategy of conventional coercion over West Berlin.
This more closely follows the logic of conventional options theory.
This reading of the Berlin Crisis is unorthodox, but it can explain Fursenko and Naftali’s
finding that Kennedy’s willingness to engage in conventional conflict over Berlin convinced him
to drop his ultimatum in 1961.474 If the Soviet Union was superior in overall conventional
capabilities in Europe, why would it be afraid of American threats to fight a conventional
conflict? NATO’s conventional power did not equal Soviet conventional power, but it had taken
away their advantages in limited conventional conflict. Preparations for conventional war thus
indicated to Khrushchev that a move on Berlin could not be kept “a surgical operation” and
pressured him to back down from his June 4 ultimatum. Evidence that the Soviet military no
longer thought a victory in a limited conventional war was feasible comes in the war plan the
Warsaw Pact instituted in October 1961. In response to the growth of NATO conventional
capabilities, the Warsaw Pact scrapped plans for a war in Europe that would remain purely
conventional, and instituted a war plan codenamed “Buria,” meaning “nuclear war,” in which
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nuclear weapons were used in an attack on Western Europe from the outset.475 Khrushchev was
wary of Kennedy’s preparations for conventional war because NATO conventional capabilities
could thwart a Soviet fait accompli over West Berlin, thereby bolstering the credibility of the US
nuclear deterrent.
The case study also highlights the contrast between the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban
Missile Crisis. The United States was able to get more out of its conventional superiority in the
latter than the Soviet Union was in the former. One reason for this according to my theory is that
the United States was more resolved to fight in Berlin and Germany than the Soviet Union was
to fight in Cuba and the Caribbean. The defense of West Berlin was a core interest that was in an
area where other key US allies resided. While the defense of the missile sites in Cuba was a core
interest for the Soviets, the defense of Cuba itself was peripheral, and it lay in an area in Latin
America that was in the Soviets’ geographic periphery. This meant that there was more room for
conventional force to be used in Cuba before running an intolerable risk of nuclear war. This
allowed the United States to use conventional force in the Cuban Missile Crisis and for
conventional options to have a coercive effect. The difference in the level of resolve between the
United States and the Soviet Union can account for why the side with greater superiority had
more room to press its conventional advantage in Cuba but not Berlin.
This shows that for interests that are much more peripheral than what the Soviets had in
Cuba nuclear threats may not be effective at coercing an adversary. In these instances, a state
will need to build superior conventional options for escalation in order to achieve its interests.
Before Berlin and Cuba, the United States attempted to use nuclear threats to achieve a
peripheral objective. How successful was this attempt? Were limited conventional capabilities
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more effective than nuclear threats in this case? With these questions in hand, I now turn to the
Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and 1958.
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Chapter 5: The Taiwan Strait Crises and Conventional Options Theory
From September 1954 to April 1955 and again from August to October 1958, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) shelled and assaulted some the offshore islands held by the
Republic of China (ROC), which was based in Taiwan. The biggest of these islands was Jinmen
(Quemoy), but the PRC also shelled Mazu (Matsu) and captured Yijiangshan Island during these
crises. US officials believed that the operations against the offshore islands were a prelude to a
larger invasion of Taiwan. That these armed challenges did not lead to the capture of Jinmen and
Mazu or the opening of an attack against Taiwan is usually explained by the success of US
nuclear threats. US decisionmakers at the time believed that the PRC could have defeated the
ROC forces on these islands via an amphibious assault, but they chose not to do so.476 Moreover,
US policymakers thought they needed to use tactical nuclear weapons in order to successfully
defend the islands. This meant that policymakers relied on nuclear threats to deter a PRC
attack.477 In both crises, hostilities subsided with the two largest islands still in Nationalist hands.
After the first crisis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles attributed this outcome to successful
US nuclear deterrence. He told a group of senators that “we have worked very hard to
produce…the result’ that had inhibited Communist China’s intentions ‘to follow a Pacific raw
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belligerent course.”478 The United States successfully postured their forces in such a way that
they communicated to the PRC a credible risk of uncontrolled escalation should it decide to
attack Jinmen and Mazu. Furthermore, the United States was able to execute this nuclear threat
without having conventional options for defending these islands. The case thus became
important in the development of nuclear deterrence theory in the 1950’s and 1960’s.479
The Taiwan Strait Crises is therefore a hard case for conventional options theory. The
United States had little conventional capability, yet it was able to deter a PRC attack in an area
peripheral to the larger Cold War struggle. However, there are important differences between the
two crises in terms of the achievement of secondary goals. As defined earlier, the primary goal is
the top strategic end for which a state is acting in a given crisis. For the United States in the
Taiwan Strait Crises, this end was the defense of Taiwan from an attack by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). A secondary goal is any goal that is less important than this top
interest but is still valuable for the country to achieve. Secondary goals may be valuable on their
own terms or for the contribution they make to the primary goal. For the United States, keeping
the offshore islands in Nationalist hands was the secondary goal in the Taiwan Strait Crises.
They were important insofar as they aided the defense of Nationalist China materially and
psychologically. The conventional options a state possesses influence the achievement of
primary and secondary goals by affecting the state’s crisis bargaining behavior. States with few
conventional options to defend a primary or secondary interest should be more willing to make
concessions on those goals in order to end a dispute. In the Taiwan Strait Crises, evidence for the
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mechanism of crisis bargaining behavior can be examined by pointing out the willingness of
American officials to concede the offshore islands to the Communist Chinese.
The United States was able to achieve its primary goal of defending Taiwan and
strengthening its relationship with the Nationalist regime in both crises, but it was more
successful in defending the offshore islands in the second crisis. I argue that this divergence in
outcomes on secondary goals can be traced to the different levels of conventional military power
the United States and its Taiwanese ally was able to bring to bear in the crises. In both crises, US
policymakers searched for conventional options for escalation, and they deployed the Seventh
Fleet into the waters around Taiwan in order to deter Chinese or Soviet aggression in the area.
However, due to military sales to the ROC, improvements to the deployability of air forces,
improvements in naval aviation between 1955 and 1958, and greater willingness to deploy
carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait in 1958, the United States had more conventional options in
the 1958 crisis. This led to two different outcomes. In the 1954-1955 crisis, PRC forces put US
decision-makers into a resolve-capability gap over the Tachen Islands, leading them to concede
the islands to the PRC. In addition, the lack of conventional options prompted US policymakers
to consider convincing the ROC to abandon Jinmen and Mazu to the PRC. Had the PRC
escalated the use of force in the first crisis, they may have been able to coerce the Americans into
convincing the ROC to abandon the rest of the offshore islands. The PRC called a sudden
ceasefire in April 1955; it was uneasy and solved none of the underlying issues of the crisis. In
1958, the United States had the capability to convoy ROC resupply efforts to the island of
Jinmen, preventing them from taking the island via air or artillery interdiction. The success of
this conventional operation forced Mao Zedong into a resolve-capability gap of his own,
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convincing him to switch to a less bellicose strategy in 1958 after he realized that he could not
force the ROC to evacuate Jinmen through artillery or air bombardment alone.
The application of conventional military power by the United States helped it to ensure
that the ROC held on to Jinmen and Mazu. Moreover, United States’ ability to conduct lowerlevel conventional operations imposed high costs on any PRC attempt to take Jinmen and Mazu.
Because the PRC did not have confidence in the reliability of the Soviet Union’s nuclear
deterrent, it decided that the risks of an assault, with the resulting chance of a confrontation with
American forces, were too great. While there is ambiguous evidence that this calculus entered
the minds of Chinese decision-makers in the 1954-55 crisis, it was prevalent in the 1958 dispute.
Improvements in conventional variety between 1955 and 1958 contributed to a better outcome
on secondary goals for the United States in Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
I contrast this interpretation of the crisis to one based on a theory of nuclear coercion.
According to a theory of nuclear coercion, the United States deterred the PRC from taking an
overt challenge to Taiwan and the offshore islands due to the success of its nuclear threats. The
United States made the PRC aware of its potential to use nuclear weapons against it, and as a
result, the PRC decided to back off its initial challenge against the offshore islands and Taiwan.
Because the United States used brinkmanship tactics over the PRC and its ally the Soviet Union
in both crises, such a theory would predict a successful outcome in terms of the primary goal of
protecting Taiwan in both cases. This is what happened, which is why it was so useful in the
formulation and exposition of deterrence theory. However, this theory cannot explain the
variation in the ability to defend the offshore islands between the two crises. It would predict the
successful defense of the offshore islands in both crises, but this did not occur. Conventional
options theory can explain the success in the primary goal of defending Taiwan and the pattern
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of failure and success in achieving the secondary goal of holding on to the offshore island.
Because of that, I argue that variety of capabilities theory can better capture the differences and
continuities between the two crises. Finally, the United States did have greater resolve to defend
Jinmen and Mazu as compared to the Tachen Islands, but within this higher level of resolve, the
US had more conventional options with which to pursue its interests in the 1958 crisis. The
overall evidence in the case points to the improvement in conventional options as the reason for
the improved outcome in terms of secondary goals between the first and second crisis.
Nevertheless, I cannot eliminate resolve or nuclear weapons as a source of bargaining leverage
for the United States. This means that, overall, the Taiwan Strait Crises provide moderate
support for conventional options theory.
This case study proceeds in five parts. First, I outline the background to the First Taiwan
Strait Crisis, the objectives of each side, and the military balance in the Taiwan Strait area.
Second, I summarize developments in the 1954-55 crisis and show how the lack of conventional
power near the Tachen Islands encouraged US policymakers to concede them to the PRC and
how a similar resolve-capability gap caused the United States to consider a plan to have the ROC
cede control over all offshore islands. Third, I describe the improvement in US and ROC
conventional capabilities up to August 1958. Fourth, I describe the background, objectives, and
military balance in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 and show how American
conventional power helped the US keep Jinmen and Mazu in Taiwanese control. Fifth, I
conclude by assessing the role of nuclear coercion and the relative merit of an explanation
focused on conventional options.
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Mao Zedong, Chiang Kaishek, and the Problem of the Offshore Islands
The dispute over the offshore islands was a consequence of the Chinese Civil War. On
October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong entered Beijing and declared the founding of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). His opponent, Chiang Kaishek, took 600,000 troops from his
Nationalist armed forces and retreated to Taiwan, where he would continue to run the Republic
of China (ROC). During the retreat to Taiwan, the Nationalist forces also occupied several
islands off the coast of China, most notably Jinmen, Mazu, and the Tachens.480 These islands
were less than 12 miles off the coast of China and lay over 100 miles from Taiwan, causing no
end of frustration to the Communist Chinese. Nationalist occupation of the islands ensured that
ROC and PRC military forces would be within shooting distance of each other, and it would
remind the international community that the civil war was not over. For the PRC, the recovery of
the offshore islands and the capture of Taiwan was the final stage in the Chinese Civil War.
When victory was near in June 1949, Mao Zedong instructed local commanders in East China to
prepare to attack Taiwan and the offshore islands. However, difficulties in capturing Jinmen in
late 1949 set this plan back.481 The start of the Korean War in 1950 relegated Taiwan to the
status of a secondary concern. Kuomintang (KMT) control over Taiwan and the offshore islands
remained a loose end.
After the end of the Korean War, the PRC regarded the offshore islands as a tool for
propaganda and for raising concerns over US policy in East Asia. They also saw them as the first
targets to capture in an eventual war against the Nationalist government. Nationalist and
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Communist forces resumed hostilities in the areas around the offshore islands. These hostilities
were so frequent that the first day of the shelling of Jinmen, September 3, 1954, was not
significant to Chinese decisionmakers.482 In late July 1954, Mao Zedong decided to implement a
“Liberate Taiwan” campaign which began with the headline “We Must Liberate Taiwan!” in The
People’s Daily on July 23.483 The vulnerability of the offshore islands to Chinese military
pressure gave the Communist Chinese government a means with which to communicate their
dissatisfaction with the United States’ emerging alliance with Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist
government. The United States and Taiwan had been building ever stronger defense ties since
the start of the Korean War. The government in Beijing came to believe that this was the
beginning of an American strategy to “turn Taiwan into a military base for attacking China.”484
US interference in the Taiwan Strait also made the dispute between Chiang Kaishek and
the PRC seem like an international rather than an internal affair. If this version of the dispute
became accepted by the international community, that would lend support for a “two-China”
policy.485 Thus, the other major reason behind shelling the offshore islands was to challenge US
interference in the Taiwan Strait.486 Mao considered the policy of disrupting the budding USKMT alliance as a necessary corollary to his Liberate Taiwan policy. He phoned Zhou Enlai on
July 23, 1954 (the same day the Liberate Taiwan policy started) to say that the new propaganda
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policy was being done “in order to break up the collaboration between the United States and
Chiang and to keep them from joining military and political forces.”487
The United States viewed the defense of Taiwan as another part of the struggle in the
Cold War. The collapse of Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist government in mainland China was a
shock to the American psyche. Many people in the foreign policy establishment, the media, and
Congress blamed President Harry Truman for “losing” China, and it accelerated the fear of a
Communist advance both at home and abroad.488 To counter Communist gains, the Truman
administration recognized Chiang Kaishek’s government in Taiwan as the official government of
China, and it was determined to keep Taiwan out of Communist hands.489 This commitment took
a military form with the start of the Korean War. On June 27, 1950, Truman dispatched the
Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to ensure that it was secure from Chinese attack during the
war.490 Eisenhower deepened the American commitment to Taiwan. In late 1953, NSC 146/2
concluded in a preliminary policy review that Nationalist control over Taiwan was critical to US
security, and the United States should intervene to protect Taiwan and the Penghu Islands from a
PRC invasion.491
After the Korean War, the United States kept the Seventh Fleet stationed in Japan in
order to deter Communist aggression in East Asia. The Seventh Fleet included multiple aircraft
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carriers, destroyers, cruisers, patrol boats, reconnaissance planes, and attack fighters; these forces
were stationed for rapid reaction against the use of force by China or the Soviet Union.492 One of
the Seventh Fleet’s missions was to monitor and defend the Taiwan Strait, and a US Taiwan
Patrol Force was formed for this purpose.493 The patrol force consisted only of a few destroyers
and some reconnaissance aircraft, and if the PRC used force against the patrol force, it would be
defeated. The Taiwan patrol was thus a tripwire; an attack on one craft would spark the
involvement of the much larger Seventh Fleet.494 However, this tripwire was not strictly nuclear
in nature. Although Seventh Fleet forces were trained in nuclear operations, they could also
intervene with purely conventional operations. Edward Marolda, a historian of the US Seventh
Fleet, argues that the fleet’s air and sea surveillance operations, buildup of bases, and
conventional operations during the two Taiwan Strait Crises played an independent role in
deterring Chinese aggression.495
The commitment to defend Taiwan raised awkward political issues for the United States
regarding the offshore islands. Was the defense of Jinmen, Mazu, and other small islands critical
to the defense of Taiwan? Would it be worth starting a war to keep them in Nationalist hands?
American leaders answered the first question in the negative, but the second question was not so
straightforward. The Eisenhower administration regarded Jinmen and Mazu as peripheral to US
interests. Eisenhower admitted that it was “probably better” to lose some face by letting the PRC
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capture the offshore islands rather than go to war to defend them.496 Jinmen and Mazu were
better used as staging areas from which to launch raids against ports on the mainland rather than
as stepping stones to an invasion of Taiwan.497 Military leaders agreed that “none of these
offshore islands was essential to the defense and security of Formosa itself.”498 If the main
interest was the preservation of Nationalist control over Taiwan, then control over the offshore
islands was intrinsically unimportant.
On the other hand, US officials attached great “psychological” importance to continued
KMT control over the offshore islands for three reasons. One reason for this is that Chiang
Kaishek placed 50,000 front-line troops on these islands, and the loss of those troops would have
a deleterious effect on the KMT’s military strength.499 Second, the United States believed that
the PRC was aiming for preponderance in East Asia.500 Gaining control over Taiwan would give
the PRC a base from which to exert greater influence in the region.501 American leaders feared
that the fall of Jinmen and Mazu would weaken Nationalist morale, making it more vulnerable to
a Communist takeover. The logic of domino theory linked the defense of the offshore islands to a
major US foreign policy interest, one that was worth using military force over. The United States
needed to act “if these islands are not to be swallowed up by the Communists one by one and if a
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significant defeat for US policy in the area is to be avoided.”502 Finally, the PRC’s challenge in
September 1954 appeared to flout previous US deterrent threats. The United States had
dispatched the Seventh Fleet and given significant military aid to Chiang Kaishek in part to
dissuade China from attacking the Nationalists.503 If the United States failed to respond to this
PRC military challenge, it could make future threats to use force ring hollow. In an NSC meeting
on September 9, 1954, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that “our
[US] prestige had been committed 100%.”504 Though US decisionmakers considered the defense
of the offshore islands to be peripheral concerns, they attained importance due to their perceived
psychological value to the KMT’s defense of Taiwan.
In sum, the primary issue at stake in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis was the security of
Taiwan. The PRC wanted to dissuade the United States from forming an alliance with Chiang
Kaishek, prevent the US from deploying naval forces to the Taiwan Strait, and put themselves in
a position to take Taiwan in the future. The secondary issue for the PRC was to gain control over
the offshore islands by taking the Tachens and testing the Nationalist and American commitment
to Jinmen and Mazu.
Before the first Taiwan Strait Crisis in early 1954, Mao approved a plan by the East
China Military Command to take the offshore islands, starting with the Tachen Islands.505 In late
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August, the Central Military Commission in Beijing authorized military leaders in eastern China
to prepare an attack on Tachen and to shell Jinmen as a cover.506 Seizing the Tachen Islands was
therefore an objective in its own right that Mao and other Chinese leaders were seeking in the
first crisis. With regards to Jinmen and Mazu, Mao wanted to coerce the United States into
staying out of their defense. If he could so, he would drive a wedge between the US and Chiang
Kaishek, depriving him of his greatest international supporter.507 Such a setback could possibly
convince Chiang to remove his troops from the offshore islands, thereby relinquishing them to
PRC control.508
If the PRC had complex political motives, so did the United States. They wanted to
strengthen Nationalist rule on Taiwan, retain Nationalist control over the offshore islands, and
maintain their forward-deployed position in the Taiwan Strait.509 The first was the primary goal,
while the latter two were secondary goals that contributed to the accomplishment of the primary
aim. However, the United States also set out to restrain and exert more control over Chiang
Kaishek during the crisis.510 As mentioned above, the offshore islands were useful areas from
which to launch raids on the mainland, and KMT troops had been doing this since 1949.
Eisenhower believed such actions, especially after the conclusion of the Korean War, to be
needlessly provoking conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The United States therefore sought closer ties
with Chiang so that it could stop these raids and “cool off’ the Chinese Nationalists from,
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intentionally or accidentally, provoking increased hostilities with the Chinese Communists.”511
This does not mean that it did not want the ROC to retain control over the offshore islands; US
leaders recognized their value for Chinese Nationalist “morale.”512 It means that the US sought
to have the Nationalists maintain control over the islands while seeking a general ceasefire in the
Taiwan Strait.
Given this mix of priorities for the United States and the PRC, did they accomplish a
“success,” a “draw,” or a “failure” in the two crises? The outcome for the US in the first crisis
was a draw, since the United States achieved its primary goal of defending Taiwan but the PRC
also partially achieved its main goal of taking offshore islands from the ROC. The outcome in
the second crisis was a success. The United States was able to defend Taiwan and keep control of
the offshore islands in the face of PRC pressure. The PRC did not achieve any of their primary
goals of taking Jinmen and Mazu or breaking apart the US-Nationalist alliance. Can conventional
options theory explain this variation in the degree of success the US experienced between the
two crises?
The Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait
At the beginning of the first crisis, the Communist Chinese held an advantage over their
Nationalist counterparts in the area around the offshore islands. SNIE 100-4-54, a study by the
Intelligence Advisory Council, noted that the Nationalist Chinese had stationed tens of thousands
of troops on the offshore islands, with 10,000 on the Tachen Islands, 5,000 on Mazu, and 43,000
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on Jinmen.513 Moreover, the defense of these islands were “aided by fortifications, by small
beach areas, and by weather conditions unfavorable to amphibious movement and debarkation
from October through March.”514 Nevertheless, with the exception of Jinmen, the IAC study
estimated that the PRC has “sufficient troops and means of improvising amphibious lift to
overwhelm within a few days after the commencement of an assault any one of the Nationalist
islands.”515 Important to making this calculation was the estimation that if committed in great
enough numbers, PRC air capabilities could “gain air superiority over the Nationalist air force in
the area of the islands and make Nationalist naval support operations costly.”516
At an NSC meeting on September 9 chaired by Vice President Richard Nixon, John
Foster Dulles added more details to this estimate of the relative strength of the PRC and ROC
forces. He reported that the Nationalist Air Force was “estimated to be capable of 175 air sorties
per day.”517 The Nationalist naval forces possessed “two destroyers, three destroyer escorts, and
additional smaller vessels” for the defense and resupply of Jinmen.518 Even so, Dulles estimated
that it would require “150,000 men” to seize Jinmen, and “well over this number of Chinese
Communist troops were available within 150 miles.”519 In the same meeting, Admiral Arthur
Radford, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, concurred with the statement that “the Chinese
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Nationalists would be unable to hold these offshore islands without United States assistance.”520
There is scant availability of hard data on the number of troops and different types of weapons
platforms for the PRC and the ROC in the area around Taiwan in September 1954. Nevertheless,
evidence from American estimates depicts a Communist Chinese military force that could
capture the offshore islands from the Nationalist forces, especially if the PRC invested a
maximum level of time and manpower.
American forces would have to intervene for Nationalist forces to hold on to the offshore
islands. What military forces did the United States have in the Western Pacific that could be used
to defend the offshores? The closest forces to the dispute were the Taiwan Patrol Force (TPF),
which consisted of four destroyers cruising through the Taiwan Strait, though operational
difficulties meant that only two were usually operating concurrently while two others were in
maintenance.521 The United States Seventh Fleet was stationed in Yokosuka, Japan. During the
crisis, Seventh Fleet commander Admiral Alfred Pride, Jr. dispatched five carriers and their
cruiser and destroyer escorts near the Taiwan Strait.522 There was far less airpower deployed to
the Far East before the crisis. The Pacific Air Force (PACAF) had only been formed in July
1954, and the 18th fighter-bomber wing (F-86’s) from Japan was rotated to Taiwan starting in
November 1954.523 By February 1955, the 18th wing was operating 65 combat-ready aircraft
from bases in Taiwan.524
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were unsure if this array of conventional power
would be able to protect the offshore islands. Admiral Radford explained that the adequacy of
US forces depended “in the last analysis on the size of the Chinese Communist effort.”525 If PRC
operations remained limited, then “the United States could provide an adequate defense of the
islands with the forces that were available in the Western Pacific at the present time.”526
However, if the PRC put in all their effort to attacking the offshores, US forces would have to
“step up” their operations by attacking targets on the mainland.527 For US military officials, a
large-scale attack against the offshores centered on an attack against Jinmen. Hence Admiral
Radford’s view that “the minute we knew that the Chinese Communists were about to launch an
air attack on Jinmen, we should go after the airfields in China from which they would launch
such an attack.”528
President Eisenhower retorted that discussing any attack against the mainland meant
“talking about war.”529 Yet this would be a war in which the US would have no backing from its
allies or support from among its own public, both of whom saw the offshore islands as
intrinsically meaningless. However, the Eisenhower administration predicated its Far East policy
on vigorously defending any Communist advance. It could not successfully execute that policy
and be seen as abandoning an ally in the region. The United States was caught between avoiding
an unpopular and costly war against China on the one hand and maintaining its credibility as an
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ally on the other. US policymakers feared an all-out attack by the PRC because it would present
them with this “horrible dilemma.”530 But confronting this dilemma was not inevitable. It would
only come about if the Communist Chinese conducted a heavy assault on the offshore islands.
With US help, the Nationalist forces could successfully repel a low- to medium-intensity conflict
over the offshore islands, especially in Jinmen and Mazu. It was in a high-intensity conflict that
the PRC forces would likely have the upper hand. Concern over a looming initiation of a highintensity assault on the offshore islands would drive US policymakers’ behavior throughout the
first crisis.
US Diplomatic Efforts in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis
How did US policymakers react to the conventional balance? I argue that, given their
conventional inferiority, American decision-makers based their actions on perceptions of likely
Communist Chinese behavior in the Taiwan Strait. In the first half of the crisis, US policymakers
viewed a large-scale use of force to take the offshores as unlikely, and they pursued a diplomatic
strategy to obtain a general ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait in which they stood firm on keeping all
of the offshore islands. Starting with the operation to seize the Tachen Islands, US policymakers,
especially Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, feared that the PRC was preparing for the allout attack on the offshores for which the United States did not have a conventional response. It
then issued nuclear threats to deter a PRC attack on Taiwan and made plans to evacuate
Nationalist troops from Jinmen and Mazu and concede them to the Communists. The crisis
ended with the success of a last-ditch diplomatic effort at the Bandung Conference on April 23,
1955, during which Zhou Enlai called for a halt to the artillery shelling of Jinmen and Mazu.
This ceasefire, however, did not solve any of the underlying issues that sparked the crisis in the
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first place. Nuclear coercion contributed to achieving the ultimate outcome, but the lack of
conventional options prompted US policymakers to cede some offshore islands and make offers
to concede all of them to the PRC, suggesting that all of the offshore islands could have gone to
the PRC had the crisis continued.
First Impressions: Artillery Shelling and the Initiation of Diplomacy
US leaders were concerned but not alarmed by the PRC shelling of the offshore islands in
the opening phase of the crisis. Both Secretary Dulles and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that
the most important of the offshore islands, Jinmen, “could not be held indefinitely without a
general war with Red China in which the Communists are defeated.”531 That is, in a heavy
assault on the offshore islands which focused on capturing Jinmen, the United States would have
to strike Chinese air bases on the mainland, likely provoking a larger war with Communist
China.532 For the time being, US policymakers did not think this to be too likely. Secretary of
State Dulles remarked that the “adverse weather conditions” in the Taiwan Strait between
October and March precluded any large-scale attack.533 In addition, Dulles believed that the
concentration on Jinmen by the PRC “may prove to be a feint, with the Tachen Islands the actual
objective.”534 This was a belief he repeated to the Ambassador from New Zealand, Leslie Munro,
in a meeting on October 4 about the offshore island situation.535
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With hostilities simmering at a low-level intensity, Dulles explained in an NSC meeting
that “we do not need to anticipate a critical situation regarding the offshore islands for some
time. This, therefore, gives us more time to consider the question.”536 Dulles argued that the
United States had time to take the offshore islands matter to the UN Security Council. A Security
Council Resolution “to maintain the status quo” would redound to American interests by
painting the PRC as aggressors, keeping the offshore islands in Nationalist hands without having
to undertake an unpopular armed intervention, and fostering greater cooperation with the British
in the Far East.537 The NSC meeting on September 12 adjourned with authorizing Dulles to
undertake this diplomatic effort to solve the “horrible dilemma” at the UN before matters came
to a head.
To get a ceasefire through the UN Security Council, the US would need British backing.
Considering that the United Kingdom had recognized the Communist government of Mao
Zedong as the leader of China in January 1950, this entailed bridging serious differences
between British and American Far East policy.538 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, in a
conversation with Dulles in London, explained that the price of British backing would be a quid
pro quo between the Communists and Nationalists. The Communists would agree to stop
shelling in exchange for a pledge by Chiang Kaishek to not attack mainland China.539 The US
were amenable to this, accepting that taking the proposal to the UN would “suspend military
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action” and foster discussion of a “comprehensive settlement.”540 The U.K. and the US also
agreed to use New Zealand as an interested third party to bring up the matter in the Security
Council in a diplomatic operation codenamed Oracle.541 The US quickly secured an agreement
with the British on how to calm the situation in the Taiwan Strait, and it seemed that getting a
Security Council resolution could also move swiftly, perhaps having the matter introduced in
November.542
US leaders knew they would have to get the Nationalist Chinese to assent to the deal, and
American efforts shifted to managing the Nationalists’ “unfavorable reaction.”543 Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter Roberston, argued in a memo to Dulles that the
“conclusion of a mutual defense treaty with the GRC (Government of the Republic of China) is
… an essential move to offset the effects of the contemplated action in the UN.”544 Dulles and
Eisenhower agreed, yet they knew that any treaty with the Nationalists that explicitly protected
the offshore islands would appear to the British like a blank check for Nationalist raids against
the mainland. Thus, Dulles told Robertson that the treaty should be “truly a defense treaty and
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that we are not going to defend our partner while our partner attacks.”545 Dulles dispatched
Robertson to Taiwan to inform Chiang of the planned UN resolution and to initiate negotiations
on a defense treaty.
As expected, Chiang Kaishek was indignant at the news of the plan to neutralize the
Taiwan Strait with a resolution from the UN Security Council. He said that the plan would “play
into Communist hands” and exert “a destructive effect on the morale of his troops.”546 However,
Chiang would withhold public criticism of the UN move if it was paired with a US-ROC defense
pact. A treaty with the Nationalists made the British uneasy. Dulles was able to elicit their tacit
support for the treaty by telling Eden that it “would be clearly defensive” and aimed at protecting
Formosa only. Meanwhile, the UN resolution would neutralize the offshore islands.547 With
these conditions assured, the British gave their support to the United States’ “two-pronged
strategy” of a UN move to neutralize the offshores and a defense treaty to placate the Nationalist
Chinese. The rest of the year was spent in negotiations with Chiang’s regime and in discussions
with the British and the New Zealanders over logistics for the UN resolution. In sum, during the
period of low-level operations by the PRC, the US felt that they could use diplomatic
maneuvering to strengthen ties with the ROC and did not feel pressure to give up any of the
Nationalist-held offshore islands.
The Crisis Heats Up: Invasion of the Tachens
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Most of the diplomacy in November and December of 1954 focused on getting the
Nationalist Chinese to agree to a defense treaty that did not include any public American
commitment to defend the offshore islands or any language suggesting that the US would
tolerate a Nationalist attack on the mainland. This was difficult, since Nationalist officials
believed that both of those stipulations were a way for the US to shirk its security commitment
and “write off Formosa.”548 The success of the diplomatic strategy, though, depended on the
ROC accepting these requirements as the price of a defense pact with the US In a conversation
with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru found that they were
agreeable to negotiations over the offshore islands as long as any US-ROC defense treaty did not
include any sign that the US would allow Nationalist attacks on the mainland.549
American diplomats attempted to overcome this dilemma by getting the Nationalists to
agree to a treaty that only covered Taiwan and the Penghu Islands but then have an exchange of
notes stipulating that the ROC cannot use force against the mainland or move forces to the
offshore islands without American consent.550 The possibility of US tolerance for Nationalist
attacks on the mainland irked the PRC, prompting Eden to speculate that the Chinese
Communists did not have the “minimum willingness” needed to negotiate over the offshore
islands at the UN.551 By December 17, Eden told Dulles that the British were suspending their
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participation in Oracle due to the “heated atmosphere resulting from the prisoner of war issue
and the signing of the US-Chinese Nationalist treaty.”552 By the end of 1954, American efforts to
resolve the offshore islands dispute at the UN were effectively stalled.
It was in this context that the Chinese Communists began their assault against the Tachen
Islands, the northernmost of the offshore islands.553 The beginning of this assault motivated US
officials to restart Operation Oracle and get the British back on board. However, that would take
time to be effective, meaning US officials had to decide quickly to try to defend the islands or
concede them. A major factor to take into consideration on this question was that the Nationalist
Air Force was unable to “provide adequate air defense for Tachen.”554 Dulles and Eisenhower
agreed that the Tachen Islands were “really quite an indefensible position.”555 Dulles told his
Chinese Nationlist counterpart, George Yeh, that the United States could provide air cover for
the Tachen Islands, but that it would be unwise to do so. The islands were “too far from our [US]
air bases,” Dulles explained. “It would be necessary to provide air cover from a carrier. It would
not make any military sense to tie up a major unit of our fleet and its protecting vessels in order
to defend a rocky islet of no strategic importance.”556 In order to keep the Tachens in Nationalist
hands, the US would have to escalate to a level past their point of resolve. As a result, they
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decided to concede these islands and convince the Nationalists to withdraw from them. These
remarks should not be taken as evidence that American policymakers viewed the withdrawal
from the Tachens as a good outcome. In fact, McGeorge Bundy notes that Eisenhower’s decision
to withdraw from the Tachens went “against the advice of the majority of the chiefs of staff.”557
American officials would rather not have withdrawn but losing the Tachens was of insufficient
importance to justify the effort needed to keep them.
US officials’ reasoning for conceding the Tachens leaves room for the role of both
conventional options and resolve. The United States had low resolve, and within this lower level
of resolve, it did not have the capabilities to provide air defense for the forces on the islands. As I
show later, for Jinmen and Mazu in 1958, the United States had higher resolve, such that they did
deploy two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait, and they had more capabilities with which to
resist PRC challenges.
During the Tachens row, Dulles contacted the British Ambassador to the US, Sir Roger
Makins, to kickstart a new round of Operation Oracle.558 The British government was chary of
approving a public declaration by the United States to defend Jinmen and Mazu. Any such
declaration, they felt, would destroy any hope of carrying out a successful UN-brokered
ceasefire.559 Dulles was able to convince the British to move ahead with Oracle was long as the
explicit commitment to Jinmen and Mazu remained private and the US did not allow attacks
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from those islands against the mainland.560 Despite heated objections, Chiang Kaishek agreed to
remove his troops from the Tachen Islands and concede them to the PRC.561 In addition,
Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, which authorized the President to use force to protect
Taiwan, the Penghus, and “related positions and territories now in friendly hands.”562 The United
States had avoided a military disaster in the Tachens, kept a commitment to defend Jinmen and
Mazu vague, and convinced the British to rejoin its diplomatic effort at the UN.
Despite the belligerence by the PRC against the Tachens, the original American strategy
outlined in the first phase of the crisis still seemed to be salvageable. New Zealand introduced
the resolution at the UN Security Council to discuss a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese
Communists rejected this proposal on February 3, stating that it was meant to “intervene in
China’s internal affairs and to cover up the acts of aggression by the United States against
China.”563 The PRC’s rejection of UN mediation prompted the British to withdraw their
participation from Oracle.564 The PRC’s rejection also alarmed Dulles as to future Communist
intentions. He wondered out loud to the British Ambassador “whether Peiping [Beijing] really
wanted peace.”565 The evacuation of the Tachen Islands seemed to have done nothing to mollify
the PRC. They were still developing airfields and concentrating troops on the mainland across
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from Jinmen and Mazu. This continued belligerence in face of a UN offer of diplomacy only
confirmed to American policymakers the aggressive intentions of the Communist Chinese. To
Dulles and others in the Eisenhower administration, the situation was starting to look like the
start of another war against China. The crisis was about to enter its most dangerous phase.
Before moving on to the dynamics behind the resolution of the first crisis, I will offer a
few remarks about what events in this second phase of the first crisis mean for conventional
options theory. This phase is significant because the United States faced a PRC assault on a
group of islands that were defensible by conventional means, but only with the use of two
aircraft carrier groups. This was more force than the US was willing to invest in keeping the
islands. It thus conceded the islands to the PRC and encouraged the Nationalists to evacuate
them. In this phase, US estimates of the likelihood that the PRC would conduct a heavy assault
on Jinmen and Mazu increased, islands that US leaders did not think were conventionally
defensible in such a contingency. This is why Dulles and other US diplomats pursued diplomacy
at the UN with such haste and vigor. They wanted to obtain a ceasefire in the region before the
Communists started a heavy assault against Jinmen and Mazu. This is evidence for the
mechanism of inferiority in conventional options leading a country to search for a compromise to
end the crisis.
The End Game: Nuclear Threats and Declaration of the Ceasefire
Dulles and other US officials grew wary of PRC intentions regarding an all-out attack
against Nationalist China during the month of February. In late February, Dulles added a trip to
Taiwan on his itinerary to gain on-the-ground information about what was happening in the
Taiwan Strait. The information Dulles reported back was alarming. Dulles “was impressed by
the Communist program of steady build-up airfields, artillery emplacements and roads which
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would be required to take the Matsus and Quemoy islands.”566 Dulles feared that such a buildup
could not be cleared except with “massive US intervention, perhaps with atomic weapons.”567
During a meeting with Foreign Minister Eden, Dulles argued that “we are in a battle for Taiwan”
and that the “Chinese Communists still give every evidence intention take Taiwan by force and
no indication willingness seek possible settlement [sic].”568 The worst-case scenario laid out in
the September 1954 meeting in Denver was that the PRC would conduct an all-out assault on the
offshore islands as the opening salvo in an invasion of Taiwan. Whatever Dulles saw on his East
Asia trip convinced him that that scenario was now highly likely.569
To deal with the now likely contingency of a Communist attack, the US took a twopronged response. First, they prepared US forces to use tactical nuclear weapons to take out the
airfields on the Chinese mainland, and they decided to publicize these preparations both to issue
nuclear threats to the PRC and “normalize” these weapons to the American citizenry in an effort
to minimize public backlash. Eisenhower instructed Dulles to put into his “proposed speech a
paragraph indicating that we would use atomic weapons as interchangeable with the
conventional weapons.”570 Dulles explained to Senate leader Walter George “that an effective
defense of these islands would require the use of atomic weapons because it would not be
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possible to knock out airfields and gun emplacements with conventional weapons in the face of
Chinese manpower and capacity to replace and rebuild.”571 Dulles reiterated this point to the
National Security Council, saying that the PRC was gearing up for war against Taiwan and that
“atomic weapons were the only effective weapons which the United States could use against a
variety of mainland targets.”572 In order to convince the Communist Chinese to not attack the
islands, the United States needed to stress its willingness to use the only weapons that could stop
them.
Dulles further explained that the US public was unaware of this “very grave prospect”
and that the US needed to “create a better public climate for the use of atomic weapons if we
found it necessary to intervene in the defense of the Formosa area.”573 When asked about
possible nuclear use for the defense of Taiwan by a reporter, Eisenhower remarked that “we have
been, as you know, active in producing various types of weapons that feature nuclear fission ever
since World War II. Now, in any combat where these things can be used on strictly military
targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly
as you would use a bullet or anything else…I would say, yes, of course they would be used.”574
A day later, Nixon reiterated the threat to use tactical atomic weapons in response to a
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Communist Chinese attack, declaring that "tactical atomic weapons are now conventional and
will be used against the targets of any aggressive force.”575
The urgency with which the United States needed to pursue diplomacy and make nuclear
threats was caused by the belief in an imminent, all-out attack by the PRC against the offshore
islands as the opening of an invasion against Taiwan. Available evidence led Eisenhower and his
staff to think that such an attack could only be repelled with tactical nuclear weapons. In order to
achieve the primary goal of defending Taiwan, the US needed to enact a strategy of nuclear
coercion. If such an attack was not forthcoming soon or if an attack would be smaller in scale,
then calmer, long-term responses, such as taking action to prevent the problem from arising in
the future, were more prudent.
Secretary Dulles spearheaded arguments that the PRC was about to attack, reporting to
the NSC that the situation in the Taiwan Strait was “critical and acute” and that “the question of
a fight for Formosa appeared as a question of time rather than a question of fact.”576 The Joint
Chiefs gave a calmer assessment of the situation in a meeting with Eisenhower, with General
Nathan Twining saying that “it was obvious that the Chincoms [sic] were not going to attack
Formosa at this time, because there had not been a sufficient build-up of mainland airfields.”577
Eisenhower used this information to remark that the US should, at first, intervene with
conventional weapons and that any use of atomic weapons “should come only at the end, and we
would have to advise our allies first.”578
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A report from Admiral Stump on the situation in the Taiwan Strait confirmed the
prudence of Eisenhower’s decision. Any Communist attack against the offshores would have to
include heavy use of airpower to be successful. Because there was no evidence a large buildup of
air forces across from Jinmen and Mazu, Stump argued that “an all-out attack will not occur until
after at least four weeks from now in the case of Matsu, and eight weeks from now in the case of
Quemoy.”579 These arguments, however, were in favor of temporary restraint rather than longterm restraint. As Admiral Radford explained, the state of intelligence on Chinese Communist air
buildups was so weak that the absence of evidence for such a buildup “should not be taken to
mean that such a build-up is not going on.”580 This uncertainty, plus the belief that the PRC
wanted to invade Taiwan eventually, prompted the United States to rely on the possibility of
nuclear use to protect their Nationalist allies’ rule over Taiwan.
While US officials debated whether or not the PRC would soon attack the offshore
islands, the Chinese Communists sat idle. No attempt to seize the offshore islands happened in
March. Reflecting on this, Eisenhower wrote in his diary that “I believe hostilities are not so
imminent as is indicated by the forebodings of a number of my associates.”581 On March 28,
White House Press Secretary James Hagerty wrote in his diary that he discussed stories in the
press that the Communist Chinese would invade Jinmen and Mazu by April 15. Eisenhower was
irate at these stories. He exclaimed: “They’re going to look awful silly when April 15th comes
along and there is no incident, because honestly our information is that there is no build-up off
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those islands as yet to sustain any attack, and believe me, they’re not going to take those islands
just by wishing for them. They are well-equipped and well-defended and they can only be taken,
if at all, by a prolonged all-out attack.”582
In addition to Eisenhower’s doubts about the likelihood of an attack, Secretary Dulles
began to have doubts about the benefits of nuclear weapons. He opined in a State Department
meeting that “an atomic attack on the mainland as a beginning would be a poor way to gain the
support of the Chinese people for his [Chiang’s] cause” and that “we cannot splurge our limited
supply of atomic weapons without serious danger to the entire international balance of power.”583
During an NSC meeting on March 31, Secretary Dulles voiced “considerable concern about the
political repercussions of the proposed use of atomic weapons.”584 What caused this shift in the
Secretary’s attitude is unclear, but by the end of March he was much less sanguine on the
efficacy of relying on nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait. The Secretary’s pessimism about
nuclear weapons and Eisenhower’s calm assessment of the situation created space for the United
States to enact a long-term solution to the problem.
This led to the second strategy that the United States took to solve the “horrible dilemma”
of the offshore islands. They decided to cede them to the PRC and subsequently build up
Nationalist conventional strength on Taiwan. As Eisenhower summed it up in a meeting on April
1, the best solution would be “to convince Chiang the should: 1) voluntarily evacuate Jinmen and
Mazu and 2) entrench himself on Formosa.” As part of this plan, the US would “land a division
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of Marines on Formosa” and “augment US Air Forces and aircraft defenses on the island.”585
With the perceived threat of an imminent attack gone, the US attempted to escape from its
reliance on over-escalation by conceding the offshore islands and increasing conventional
military strength on Taiwan itself. The dual-track policy of making concessions and seeking to
add rungs at the conventional level along the escalation ladder makes sense within the context of
conventional options theory. Few conventional options made the United States willing to make
concessions in the short term and enhance its conventional capabilities in the long term.
The President decided to dispatch Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary Robertson to
Taiwan to convince Chiang Kaishek to withdraw his forces from Jinmen and Mazu.586 In the
meantime, Dulles and Eisenhower tried one last attempt at achieving a ceasefire via diplomacy at
the Bandung Conference.587 The Secretary urged the British Ambassador to press his
government to call for a ceasefire at Bandung, telling him that if “some resolution or statement
could come out of Bandung calling for a cease-fire and calling on both parties not to resort to
force, the chances of maintaining peace in that area would be very considerably enhanced.”588
Eisenhower vetoed Nationalist attacks against mainland targets in order to give the Bandung
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diplomatic gambit a chance to succeed.589 For reasons that are not yet clear in the historical
record, Zhou Enlai agreed to call a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait and said that the PRC was
“willing to enter into negotiations with US.”590 The public call by the PRC for a ceasefire was
well-timed, as Chiang Kaishek staunchly rebuffed the American proposal to voluntarily evacuate
Jinmen and Mazu.591
Dulles jumped on Zhou Enlai’s ceasefire proposal, advising Eisenhower that “we should
be prepared to indicate receptivity to any ‘cease fire’ proposal.”592 In a press conference on April
26, Dulles announced that the United States looked with approval on the ceasefire proposal and
that it would be willing to enter into negotiations with the PRC.593 The ceasefire proposal ended
a period of uncertainty for US decision-makers in February through April 1955. They thought
that the time for nuclear use may be near, and they were wary at having to make such a decision.
Zhou’s ceasefire gave them a way to escape the decision between nuclear use and conceding the
offshore islands. Nevertheless, the military balance that produced the unpalatable choice still
prevailed the day after the ceasefire. The Nationalist Chinese and the United States did not have
enough air defenses to combat heavy use of air power by the PRC to destroy the garrisons on
Jinmen and Mazu. Furthermore, the PRC’s ceasefire was only temporary. Eisenhower wrote to
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Dulles that despite the diplomatic success at Bandung, “we are still on the horns of the dilemma
that you and I have discussed a number of times.”594
The Role of Nuclear Deterrence in Producing the Temporary Ceasefire
Zhou Enlai called for a ceasefire after the United States issued threats to use nuclear
weapons in a conflict over Taiwan and the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu. After the crisis,
Dulles took this to mean that nuclear brinkmanship was effective, remarking in an interview with
Life magazine that: “"Of course we were brought to the verge of war.... If you run
away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost.”595 Some scholars would dispute
Dulles’ boasts and argue that the nuclear threats of March played a limited role. The Communist
government may not have even meant to seize Jinmen, but used the shelling as a way to disrupt
the growing ties between the Nationalist government and the US596 In fact, the PRC could have
viewed the shelling of Jinmen as a natural extension of their diplomatic strategy protesting US
interference in the Taiwan Strait.597 There was not even a military plan to capture Jinmen in
September 1954.598 In addition, these scholars point out that the link between Zhou Enlai’s call
for a ceasefire at the Bandung Conference and the United States’ nuclear threats is not ironclad.
US officials made their nuclear threats in mid-March, but the conciliatory statement from Zhou
came over a month later. Moreover, Zhou understood himself to be making an “impromptu
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response” to questions about Taiwan from other Asian diplomats that was consistent with
preexisting policy.599
However, it is difficult to argue that nuclear coercion played no role in convincing the
PRC to back down. The Eisenhower administration made multiple public statements that it was
prepared to use nuclear weapons to keep Nationalist rule intact on Taiwan. After these
statements, the PRC decided to declare a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait. For the primary goal of
protecting Taiwan, nuclear deterrence was useful. An explanation based on conventional options
can better at explain why the US was not as successful in the protecting the offshore islands.
With the Tachen Islands indefensible by conventional means except with two aircraft carriers,
the United States thought it better to convince Chiang Kaishek to withdraw his forces from the
islands. The frantic pace with which the United States sought to convince the Nationalists to
surrender the rest of the offshore islands was due to the Americans’ feeling of vulnerability
prompted by the lack of conventional options available for defending a peripheral interest. This
constitutes evidence for the mechanism of willingness to compromise that should be caused by
possessing few conventional options. This suggests that if the PRC decided to escalate its use of
force in April 1955, it may have been able to obtain a US-backed Nationalist withdrawal from
Jinmen and Mazu.
Finally, my theory can still explain why the PRC did not attack Taiwan. Nationalist
resistance to an invasion of Taiwan would have been fierce, and the PRC may have found that
the price of attacking it were too steep.600 Moreover, it is doubtful the PRC would have been able
to take Taiwan even with an all-out assault. As H.W. Brands put it, “its [Taiwan’s] security had
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never been in serious doubt, as American intelligence sources reported from the beginning.”601 In
sum, nuclear deterrence theory can explain why Taiwan was protected during the First Taiwan
Strait Crisis, but conventional options theory can also explain it. Plus, conventional options
theory is better at explaining the United States’ trouble in achieving its secondary goal of
retaining control over the offshore islands.
The Interim Peace and Conventional Buildup between April 1955 and August 1958
The underlying issues that sparked the First Taiwan Strait Crisis remained unresolved.
The Nationalist Chinese still held islands only a few miles from the Communist mainland, and
neither side had agreed to a general renunciation of the use of force to change the status quo.
During the ceasefire period, the United States and the ROC built up their conventional military
strength to be better prepared for another Communist provocation against the offshore islands. In
particular, US and Nationalist officials focused on improving their air defense capability in the
Taiwan Strait. As seen in evaluations of the military balance in the first crisis, the success of a
Communist attack against Jinmen and Mazu depended on their ability to destroy the offshore
islands’ defenses and cut off any reinforcements from the air. Thwarting the Communist ability
to gain air superiority would therefore make it difficult for them to seize the offshore islands.
Three developments occurred in the interim between the first and second crisis that added
a rung on the American and Nationalist escalation ladder at the level of winning air superiority.
First, the United States sold to Chiang Kaishek F-84 and F-86 fighter jets soon after the end of
the first crisis.602 The Nationalist Defense Minister Yu Ta-Wei stated that the ROC air force had,
by February 1956, “two F–84’s and one F–86 wing now combat ready.” He then added that his
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goal was to have five groups by the end of this year.”603 By March 1957, all five F-84 and F-86
air groups were combat ready.604 A study by the air force of developments between the two
crises remarked that the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF) was “strengthened by the
acquisition of F-86F fighter-interceptors.”605 The addition of the F-84 and F-86 aircraft helped
increase the size of the CNAF to “nearly 500 jet aircraft,” and the improvement in the number of
fighter jets also prompted improved air facilities on Taiwan, though “many inadequacies
remained.”606 What would become an important capability in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
was that these aircraft could be equipped with the Sidewinder missile, an air-to-air missile with
infrared homing that was “probably the most widely used guided missile in the world” at the
time.607 Improvements in Nationalist air defense capability would end up bolstering the
American escalation ladder. This is because the United States would be able to deny air
superiority to the PRC with less investment of its own forces than it would have had to make to
accomplish the same mission in the first crisis.
The second development that aided US air defense efforts was the introduction of
supersonic jet aircraft that could be deployed throughout the globe on short notice. Starting in
“Memorandum for the Record by Rear Admiral Truman J. Hedding, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.” FRUS, 1955-1957, China, Volume III. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus195557v03/d153.
603

“Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington.” December 18, 1956. FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. III.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v03/d224. In this conversation, Defense Minister Yu
states that all groups are combat ready except for one F-86 group, but he says that that group will be ready by
March. That assessment may be optimistic, but even so, that air group was probably combat ready before August
1958.
604

605

Van Staaveren, 1962, 10.

606

Ibid.

607

Department of Defense. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Defense and the Semiannual Reports of the
Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force: Fiscal Year 1957. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1958. https://www.loc.gov/resource/sgpmbbpres.00416159695/?st=gallery. Hereafter
“FY1957 Secretary of Defense Report.”

238

1955, the “century series” of supersonic jet aircraft was introduced into the US Air Force
(USAF).608 The two century series aircraft that were deployed to Taiwan were the F-100D and
the F-104A. These aircraft quickly set speed and altitude records for USAF planes, and they led
to a “remarkable development” in the Tactical Air Command’s (TAC’s) mobility and reach.609
Paired with the introduction of these new, more mobile aircraft was the creation of “composite
air strike forces” aimed at improving the capacity of the Air Force to “react swiftly to military
demands anywhere in the world.”610 F-100 and F-104 aircraft were sent to air bases in Taiwan
from Okinawa, Philippines, California, and even Texas.611 In addition to greater deployability,
these aircraft could be equipped with more firepower than previous aircraft. Even though the
USAF was decreasing its number of tactical air wings in the late 1950’s, improvements in
striking power on new aircraft meant that “the 105 wings of 1959 will have at least as much
effective striking power as the 137 wings of 1957.”612 Between 1955 and 1958, the United States
introduced new fighter aircraft that possessed greater range and striking power than previous
models. These aircraft would end up improving the air defense capability in the Taiwan Strait.
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The third development that improved US air defense capability was the deployment of a
Nike-Hercules battalion to Taiwan in 1958. The Nike-Hercules missile was a surface-to-air
missile with nuclear capability that was introduced to Army units in June 1958.613 The Joint
Chiefs called for a battalion to be deployed to Taiwan on August 25. However, operational plans
had not yet even been developed for deployment of the Nike-Hercules to East Asia when the
order went out. This meant that the Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft battery was not combat ready
until October 25, shortly after the crisis ended.614 The Nike-Hercules missile was thus a less
important contribution to US air defense than the improvements in CNAF air strength and US
tactical air mobility. However, if the crisis had continued, the arrival of the Nike-Hercules would
have further reinforced US and Nationalist ability to deny the PRC air superiority over the
Taiwan Strait.
Although it did not involve the development of a new capability, another move that
increased the conventional military power of the United States in the Taiwan Strait was the
deployment of a second carrier group to the region in the second crisis. US decision-makers were
not willing to tie down two carrier groups in the Taiwan Strait in the first crisis, but they had no
such qualms in the second one. In addition to the Midway, which was assigned to the Pacific
theater, they deployed the Essex along with its destroyer escorts from the Mediterranean early in
the crisis.615 The aircraft aboard the Essex and Midway also contributed to the American air
defense capability in the Taiwan Strait.
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One objection to this description of improvements in air defense capability is that these
deployments were made with the goal of enhancing the nuclear capability of the United States
Air Force. The development of the Composite Air Strike Force was meant to give the United
States the ability to use tactical nuclear weapons within local conflicts.616 The Nike-Hercules
missile was nuclear-capable. In addition to the developments I mentioned above, the United
States also deployed a Matador missile squadron to Taiwan, which was equipped with tactical
nuclear warheads.617 Finally, PACAF’s plan for defending Taiwan and the offshore islands in the
event of a PRC attack, Ops Plan 25-58, called for the use of nuclear weapons early in the
conflict.618 I do not dispute that the United States increased its nuclear options in the Taiwan
Strait between 1955 and 1958. However, the United States also increased its conventional
capabilities in the Taiwan Strait during this time. Plus, as I show below, the evidence from the
case indicates that the improvements in conventional options proved more consequential to US
success in defending the offshore islands in the second crisis.
In sum, the United States and its Nationalist Chinese ally increased their air defense and
naval capabilities in the Taiwan Strait. This improvement gave the US and the ROC a rung on
their escalation ladder at the level of thwarting PRC air interdiction and bombardment efforts. If
the PRC wanted to take Jinmen and Mazu, it would now have to escalate beyond the use of air
power alone. The deployment of a second carrier group to the Taiwan Strait also buttressed
efforts to resupply the Nationalist garrisons on the islands. Did the addition of these rungs to the
escalation ladder change the American bargaining strategy in the second crisis? Did it raise the
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costs of seizing Jinmen and Mazu to the Chinese? And did it lead to a better outcome for the
United States? These are the questions I will answer in the next section detailing the events of
the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
The Effects of American and Nationalist Conventional Military Power
Tensions continued to simmer in the Taiwan Strait from 1955 to 1958. The United States
had deployed more military power to the Taiwan Strait in the interim period, and in November
1957, US and ROC forces resumed joint naval and air exercises.619 These moves gave the United
States more conventional rungs on its escalation ladder, but it also increased the military threat to
the PRC coming from Taiwan, and they increased the chance that Taiwan would become an
independent entity.
By the spring of 1958, Mao and other top officials in the PRC began contemplating the
use of force to combat US and ROC actions in the Taiwan Strait. Some of this was done with an
eye towards larger foreign and domestic aims. On May 23, Mao said that in order to deter the US
from continuing its “occupation of Taiwan,” the PRC needed to “demonstrate [sic] our
boldness.”620 Mao also wanted to justify the mass mobilization at the core of his Great Leap
Forward: “It [sparking tension in the Taiwan Strait] is to our advantage in that it will mobilize all
our positive forces…It can [help] us increase steel as well as grain [production].”621 Mao also
had a more direct, limited aim of taking Jinmen and Mazu through coercion. In July and early
August, Chinese military forces were preparing for renewed operations against Jinmen. The PRC
moved 173 aircraft received from the Soviet Union to airfields in Fujian Province in the first
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three weeks of August, and several air battles took place between ROC and PRC forces during
this time.622 On August 19, Mao said that “after a period of shelling, the other side might
withdraw its troops from Jinmen and Mazu,” at which point PRC forces could simply occupy
them.623
US intelligence had no knowledge of these remarks, but PRC preparations and low-level
confrontations with Nationalist forces caused some alarm among top US officials, who raised the
issue with President Eisenhower. The US decided to make their own contingency plans in the
first weeks of August for the use of force.624 Similar to the first crisis, the United States’ primary
aims were to maintain close ties to Taiwan, defend it from any PRC invasion, and keep the
offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu in Nationalist hands.
Despite reservations about hitting US military forces, Mao decided to initiate the shelling
of Jinmen on August 23, 1954.625 Unlike in 1954-55, this time Mao aimed at capturing Jinmen
and Mazu. On August 20, when Mao gave the orders about the renewed Jinmen campaign, he
made clear that it may lead to the capture of the island: “After being hit by us for a period of
time, the enemy might consider either evacuating from Jinmen/Mazu or putting up a last-ditch
resistance there. Whether we attack these islands will depend on how the military situation
changes. One step at a time.”626 Mao was optimistic that an artillery bombardment alone could
force Chiang Kaishek to retreat, mostly because the United States would not choose to intervene
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to protect Jinmen. Mao did not take into account American and Nationalist improvements in air
power and therefore believed that the United States was too weak at the conventional level to
defend the offshore islands. On September 5, Mao said in a speech at the Supreme State
Conference that “I really don’t know how they can manage a war with us [over Jinmen and
Mazu]…In order avoid a war with us, America has to find a way out. How? The only way is to
withdraw the 110,000 [KMT] troops from Jinmen and Mazu as they did for Tachen in 1955.”627
Frustrated with developments over Taiwan, Mao decided to bombard the KMT garrison on
Jinmen in the hopes that it would deter US involvement in the Taiwan Strait and coerce Chiang
into removing his troops from the island. This would allow Mao to occupy Jinmen.628
Recognizing the challenge to their position in Taiwan, United States policymakers began
formulating a response to the artillery bombardment. The Departments of State and Defense
dispatched the aircraft carrier USS Essex and four accompanying destroyers to the Taiwan Strait
on August 25.629 US decisionmakers also decided to bolster Taiwan’s air defenses, with 121
USAF fighters deployed to bases in Taiwan during the crisis.630 The US also decided to convoy
(in international waters only) the Nationalist ships charged with resupplying the garrison on
Jinmen.631 These conventional operations were chosen because US decisionmakers wanted to
delay for as long as possible the need to use tactical nuclear weapons. There were three phases to
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the plan for defending the offshore islands, OP-Plan 25-58. Phase I was a convoy operation;
Phase II was to retaliate against the PRC attacking forces; Phase III was to destroy the PRC’s
capacity to wage war against Taiwan.632 The second phase would involve the use of tactical
nuclear weapons. Knowing this, President Eisenhower issued a directive saying that the
Pentagon should come up with several “graduated courses of action which might be pursued
short of use of nuclear weapons” in the first phase.633 In response, Defense and State agreed that
several courses of action would be pursued in the first phase, and the decision to move to the
second phase would be taken only with another high-level meeting.634 Consistent with this,
Admiral Felt, the commander of CINCPAC, told the Joint Chiefs in a telegram that all
preparations were being made to conduct non-nuclear operations.635 By September 7, the US had
sent six aircraft carriers, two of which were attack carriers (CVA) and four of which were antisubmarine carriers (CVS), and over 500 warplanes to the Taiwan Strait.636 Even though US
leaders knew that “small atomic weapons” would need to be used if the PRC decided to conduct
an all-out invasion of Jinmen, they had recourse to conventional options in response to the PRC’s
artillery interdiction operation.637
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The level of deployment shows that the United States had higher resolve to protect the
offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu in 1958 than they did to protect the Tachens in 1954-55.
This could have contributed to the better outcome in keeping the former in Nationalist hands in
1958. However, the list of conventional weapons just described also shows that United States
had greater capabilities within that higher level of resolve to defend Jinmen and Mazu. I will
show how these conventional options affected the dispute outcome in 1958 while also
acknowledging some role for increased resolve compared to 1954-55.
The PRC reacted to these measures by continuing their artillery bombardment of Jinmen,
albeit at a less intense level than in the first days of shelling.638 At the same time, the PRC
recognized that these American conventional operations meant that the confrontation over
Jinmen was more serious than previously thought. Now that the US had demonstrated a
willingness to use some force to defend the offshore islands, PRC considered negotiating with
the Americans. On September 6, Zhou Enlai remarked that the PRC was “ready to accept the US
offer of early August to resume the Sino-American ambassadorial talks.”639 The PRC embarked
on these diplomatic steps while refusing to budge from their belligerent policy towards Jinmen
and Mazu. Gong Li shows that Chinese decision-makers decided to maintain a “noose policy”
with regards to the offshore islands in which they would be used to nettle the American position
in East Asia.640 Li says this is evidence that Mao did not want to take Jinmen or land troops on
the island, but it is likely that he still hoped that the bombardment would lead to the capture of
Jinmen at this time. On September 8, Mao told the Supreme Conference for State Affairs that
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Jinmen was untenable for the US to defend and that they will want to get its forces out of the
area soon. The way of getting out of Jinmen and Mazu would be “to remove the 110,000 KMT
troops from there.”641 US deployments of conventional troops and weapons platforms to the
Taiwan Strait encouraged Chinese Communist leaders to seek negotiation, but it did not
convince them to change their strategy of trying to capture Jinmen through artillery interdiction.
Over the course of September, the situation in the Taiwan Strait developed into a
stalemate. The first few days of the convoy effort were unsuccessful, as Nationalist ships failed
to unload supplies on Jinmen under heavy artillery fire.642 On September 12, Dulles expressed
frustration to the British Ambassador to the United States, Harold Caccia, about PRC success “in
preventing Nationalist resupply of the islands [Jinmens].”643 Dulles also noted in a conversation
with Eisenhower that the resupply operation may need to be reconsidered if it continued to
struggle.644 The difficulties of resupplying the islands prompted CINCPAC commanders to start
pushing for escalating the conflict by allowing Nationalist planes to attack artillery batteries on
the mainland and allowing US ships to sail into territorial waters.645 US decision-makers decided
to stay with the resupply operation but encourage Nationalist forces to use better unloading
tactics to deal with the heavy artillery fire.
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This worked, as by September 19, Nationalist forces were able to unload 118 tons of
supplies on Jinmen even while taking heavy artillery fire from the mainland.646 The unloading
missions continued at this level for the next two weeks, effectively breaking the PRC’s
interdiction effort. On September 26, Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs,
John Irwin, wrote in a memo to Dulles that “the resupply of Kinmen appears gradually to be
improving.”647 Three days later, General Nathan Twining, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told
Eisenhower that the military was “no longer concerned” about the supply situation.648 A CIA
assessment on October 1 from an officer in Taiwan proclaimed that the supply situation on
Jinmen had stabilized and that the blockade was broken.649
The improved CNAF dominated the battle for air superiority during the crisis. In 25
engagements against Communist aircraft, Nationalist air forces “destroyed 32 aircraft, probably
destroyed 3 others, and damaged 10. They lost only 2 F-86F’s and 2 F-84G’s.”650 One of the
United States’ newest weapons aided in this winning effort. The F-86F’s were equipped with the
newly developed Sidewinder missile, and in an air battle on September 24, five of these weapons
were aimed at Communist aircraft, “scoring bulls-eyes on four, sending them to earth.”651 That
air battle on September 24 was the largest in the crisis, with “an estimated 100 Red aircraft aloft

646

Halperin, 1966, 300.

“Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to Secretary of
State Dulles.” September 26, 1958. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, China, Vol. XIX.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d132.
647

“Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower.” September 29, 1958. Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1958-1960, China, Vol. XIX. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d140.
648

649

Halperin, 1966, 368.

650

Van Staaveren, 1962, 38.

O’Neill, 1958, 38. O’Neill claimed that the “Sidewinder Accounts for Itself” in the section where he describes
the battle for air supremacy.
651

248

over the Taiwan Straits.” The CNAF shot down ten while sustaining no losses of their own.652
Throughout the crisis, air engagements were “limited to occasional air clashes between the two
Chinese air forces,” and the “anticipated struggle for aerial supremacy over the Taiwan Strait did
not materialize.”653 Still, the dominant performance shown by Nationalist air forces in limited
engagements could hardly have encouraged PRC leaders that they would win an intense battle
for air superiority. These details come from an operational history of the US Air Force,
specifically the Fifth Air Force, in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. These operational histories
tend to exaggerate the capabilities of their services, meaning that some figures should be
discounted. Nevertheless, the overall thrust of the details that the United States and its
Nationalist Chinese ally were able to win the limited battle for air superiority fits with other,
non-USAF sanctioned, accounts of the crisis.654
By the end of September, the PRC recognized that Jinmen could not be blockaded or
captured through artillery interdiction alone.655 This caused Mao and other Chinese Communist
leaders to drop their effort to coerce the KMT into removing their troops from Jinmen. Instead,
PRC strategy would focus on combating the US’ “two Chinas” policy. On October 3, Mao
convened the Politburo Standing Committee to consider new strategies for the offshore islands,
and they decided to let the KMT retain Jinmen and Mazu in order to keep them more closely tied
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to the mainland.656 Plus, the vulnerable position of these islands meant that the PRC maintained
the ability to exert pressure over the United States and the KMT, which would, in Mao’s mind,
“make it easier to solve the problem of Taiwan, Jinmen, and Mazu once and for all in the
future.”657 To enact this new policy, Mao declared a ceasefire on October 6 as long as American
ships ceased convoying in the area, which they did. On October 13, the ceasefire was extended
for another two weeks.
Dulles traveled to Taiwan on October 20 to meet with Chiang Kaishek and convince him
to reduce his garrison on Jinmen. US decision-makers felt that Chiang had deliberately placed
his troops in a vulnerable position in order to entangle the US in a peripheral conflict, and they
wanted to make sure that a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait was less contentious. Policymakers
hoped that Chiang would reduce his garrison, therefore making the offshore islands more
expendable, in exchange for enhanced amphibious lift capabilities.658 When Dulles arrived in
Taiwan, the PRC resumed intense shelling of Jinmen to send a message that it retained some
leverage over the situation. Chiang Kaishek balked at the American proposal, but Dulles was
able to convince Chiang to sign a joint communique in which he pledged to seek reunification of
Taiwan and the mainland “through peaceful means.”659 The PRC also agreed to use peaceful
means to seek reunification. However, it also wanted to signal that it had leverage over the KMT
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regarding the offshore islands and that any move toward a “two China” policy would be met with
hostility.660 It thus began a policy of intermittent shelling of Jinmen on October 25, with
bombardment restricted to the beaches on odd days and no shelling on even days. The beginning
of this intermittent shelling effectively marked the end of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
Assessment: The Roles of Nuclear Coercion and Conventional Military Operations
On the primary goal of securing Taiwan, the outcome of the second crisis was the same
as the first. There is some role for nuclear deterrence in producing this outcome. Mao and other
Chinese leaders did not want to get US forces involved in combat during the crisis for fear that
this would turn the incident into a war. In such a war, the PRC knew that the US was likely to
use tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union declined to extend its nuclear umbrella over the
PRC if it was attacked by nuclear weapons in response for a provocation against Taiwan. This
episode caused strain in the Sino-Soviet relationship, and one effect of the crisis was that it
reinforced the PRC’s belief that it needed to pursue an independent nuclear capability.661 In
addition, the United States deployed nuclear-capable Matador missiles to Taiwan, making
manifest their latent nuclear threat. That the PRC decided to back down in the face of American
nuclear superiority is suggestive evidence that nuclear coercion contributed to US success in
protecting Taiwan in the second crisis.
Similar to the first crisis, the defense of Taiwan could have been successful without
nuclear coercion; the United States and its Nationalist ally maintained large conventional forces
in and around the island. On the secondary goal of protecting the offshore islands from PRC
seizure, conventional options theory would predict that the US would be more successful. This is
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because improved conventional capabilities raised the cost of taking Jinmen and Mazu for the
PRC.
The evidence indicates an important role for conventional denial in convincing the PRC
to back down from its challenge on the offshore islands in the second crisis. Once American
policymakers were alerted to the coming of a confrontation over the offshore islands, they
scrambled to develop conventional options. President Eisenhower in particular, wanted to
manage the escalation of the conflict and avoid making the nuclear decision, remarking that “I
kept to myself the decision to employ US forces.”662 Regional commanders chafed at the
suddenness with which they needed to craft plans for conventional operations,663 but these efforts
nevertheless ended in a plan to convoy Nationalist ships to resupply Jinmen and break the PRC’s
artillery blockade. The strength of the US bargaining position hinged on the success of the
resupply effort and the battle for air superiority. In a call to the Secretary of Defense, Neil
McElroy, Dulles explained that he felt good about the outcome of the crisis “if he felt we could
keep the supply business going.”664 With regards to the air superiority battle, the United States
could feel confident. The success of Nationalist engagements against PRC aircraft and the
existence of further US air power on Taiwan and on the deployed aircraft carriers gave the PRC
little hope that it could gain control of the skies over the Strait. The success of the resupply effort
was more in doubt, but once it started to succeed US policymakers became more confident in a
positive conclusion to the crisis. It was this success that caused the US and the ROC to defend
Jinmen and Mazu. As Eisenhower writes: “But while speeches were made, statements issued,
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and resolutions passed, the crisis was really eased by the success of the Nationalist Navy, with
the help of United States advisers, in defeating the Red interdiction of Quemoy [Jinmen].”665
Crucially for conventional options theory, the convoy operation was implemented so as
to minimize the risk of further escalation. US ships could only escort to within three miles of
Jinmen, far enough to remain in international waters.666 This decision made a direct
confrontation between U.S and PRC forces less likely, which is the antithesis of a brinkmanship
tactic. The focus of the conventional response was to implement a successful conventional
defense, not introduce the prospect of an immediate PRC-US battle.
If the United States could assist Nationalist forces in successfully resupplying Jinmen and
thwarting the PRC’s ability to conduct airstrikes, it would raise the costs of seizing Jinmen and
Mazu for the PRC. They would have to choose between escalating the conflict to an amphibious
assault against Jinmen or they could change their policies toward the offshore islands and cease
the bombardment. They chose to do the latter. From this viewpoint, the change in policy to focus
on the “two Chinas” aspect of the issue was due to the failure of the artillery interdiction. As
Morton Halperin explained in his history of the 1958 crisis for the US government, “probably
looming larger in the Chinese decision to stop their artillery fire was to halt before it became
clear that the blockade had been broken by the G.R.C convoys with US escorts up to three
miles.”667 The announcement of the ceasefire may have been timed come before an American
convoy was set to embark for Jinmen. American and ROC officials had “no doubt that the
convoy would succeed and would go a long way toward making it clear to the world that
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Quemoy [Jinmen] could be resupplied under current military conditions.”668 In a conversation
with the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Theodore Green, Dulles said that the
success of the resupply meant that the PRC would have to at least escalate to airstrikes against
Jinmen in order to seize the island. But the efforts to increase US and Nationalist air power made
airstrikes untenable, and an amphibious assault carried a greater immediate cost and risk of
escalation. Because of this, the PRC decided on a ceasefire.669 The ability to convoy Nationalist
ships, resupply the garrison on Jinmen, and deny air superiority to PRC forces allowed the US to
resist PRC pressures to convince Chiang to remove his forces from the island. It also put the
decision to escalate the conflict back in PRC hands, which they declined to do.
The second Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrates the logic of conventional options theory.
The United States made nuclear threats, but the success of American and Nationalist Chinese
arms at lower levels of conflict determined their degree of success in the dispute. This
explanation fits with the analyses of other scholars. Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann
conclude from their case study of the crisis that “China’s conventional military weakness –
particularly in the air – loomed far larger [in its decision to back down] than its vulnerability to
nuclear attack.”670 Bundy concludes that “the one man closely engaged who can press the
nuclear button becomes the man most interested in doing well enough in the ‘tiny’ war to avoid
the choice between nuclear weapons and defeat. The bomb, present in the wings, makes both
sides focus on the lesser onstage battle.”671
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One counterargument is that part of the success of being able to keep Jinmen and Mazu in
Nationalist hands, as opposed to failure to do the same for the Tachens, could be due to the
higher resolve to defend the former. Dulles described the main Tachen island of Yijiangshan as a
“rocky islet of no strategic importance.” While US policymakers did not think much of the
intrinsic importance of Jinmen and Mazu, they thought more highly of it than they did for the
Tachens. This does not mean that all of the success should go to the role of resolve in the crisis.
Rather, within this higher level of resolve, American policymakers had more options for
conventional escalation in the 1958 crisis. Eisenhower and Dulles felt less confident that they
could defend Jinmen and Mazu in 1955 as compared to 1958, and they made more efforts to
convince Chiang Kaishek to remove his forces from the islands because of this. Even so, the fact
that resolve was higher for protecting Jinmen and Mazu means that greater resolve could have
played some role in producing a better outcome in the achievement of secondary goals in the
second Taiwan Strait Crisis. This is why I say that the crisis only gives moderate support to
conventional options theory.
Conclusion: Implications for Conventional Options Theory
How do the Taiwan Straits Crises illustrate or question the mechanisms of variety of
capabilities theory? On the one hand, the ultimate outcome of both crises, the successful defense
of Taiwan, is explained well by nuclear deterrence theory. The United States made nuclear
coercive threats, both implicitly and explicitly, to the Communist Chinese that they would use
tactical nuclear weapons to protect Taiwan. Available evidence suggests that the PRC took these
threats seriously, and in the first crisis, the PRC backed down only after the Eisenhower
administration made overt nuclear threats. In the second crisis, the US placed nuclear-capable
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Matador missiles in Taiwan. US leaders believed that their nuclear coercion prompted PRC
restraint after its initial belligerence.
However, in terms of explaining the differences in achieving secondary goals between
the two crises, nuclear coercion theory performs less well. During the first crisis, US
policymakers believed that in the face of an all-out PRC attack on the offshore islands, they
would have to respond with tactical nuclear weapons to prevent PRC seizure of the islands. As
the fear of a Communist Chinese invasion increased, so did the feeling among American
policymakers that they were in a resolve-capability gap. In response, they issued statements
intended to normalize nuclear weapons to the general public and indicate willingness to use
nuclear weapons to the Communist Chinese. However, the stress of relying on the use of nuclear
weapons caused Eisenhower and Dulles to consider conceding the offshore islands to the PRC. It
convinced the Nationalists to withdraw from the Tachen Islands, and it hatched a plan to
convince them to withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu before the PRC called a temporary ceasefire
in the Strait in response to international pressure. This implies that the PRC could have obtained
a Nationalist withdrawal from Jinmen and Mazu had they escalated their use of force. While this
ceasefire cooled tensions for a time, the outcome of the crisis left one set of offshore islands in
Communist hands and kept the basic structure of the dilemma over Jinmen and Mazu
unresolved. Little conventional options made it difficult for American leaders to hold on to the
offshore islands.
In the second crisis, improvements in the United States’ conventional variety, mostly
through augmenting Nationalist air power and giving greater deployability to US air forces, gave
it greater bargaining power, leading to less concessions on the offshore islands. The United
States, due to additions to its Pacific air and naval forces and aid to its Nationalist Chinese ally,
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calculated that it could hold out from a Communist artillery bombardment and win control over
the skies above the Taiwan Strait. This gave Eisenhower greater confidence to start by
responding with conventional force and to keep using conventional force throughout the crisis.
US officials also never decided to attempt to withdraw Nationalist forces from Jinmen and Mazu
during the crisis. In the end, the United States’ capability at lower levels of the escalation forced
the onus for escalation back onto the PRC, and it resulted in the PRC backing down due to high
costs of an amphibious invasion. The PRC ceasefire, intermittent shelling, and pledges by both
Chinas to not use force against the other froze the status quo, keeping Jinmen and Mazu in
Nationalist hands indefinitely. Finally, conventional options theory can explain why the United
States could defend Taiwan in both crises. The US and the ROC had a large air and naval force
in and around Taiwan. If there was an absence of a nuclear threat hanging over such an attack, it
was doubtful that the PRC could have invaded Taiwan successfully anyway. Thus, conventional
options theory can explain the pattern of success in the primary outcome but differences in the
ability to achieve secondary goals. In the end, higher resolve to defend Jinmen and Mazu than to
defend the Tachens makes it difficult to pin all of the difference in dispute outcome to improved
conventional variety. Therefore, the Taiwan Strait Crises give only moderate support to Variety
of Capabilities theory.
In addition to providing evidence in moderate support of the logic of conventional
options theory, the case also sheds light on how the theory should operate in other contexts. The
capability to carry out successful conventional operations at the lower rungs of the escalation
ladder was the most important difference in accounting for the increase in US bargaining power
between the two crises. That could bring up the possibility that “low-level dominance” may be
more consequential than comprehensive variety, especially when the risk of nuclear escalation is
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present. In fact, lower level superiority could bolster the credibility of nuclear threats. In the
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decided not to escalate to an
amphibious invasion because the risks of nuclear use in such an intense conflict were intolerably
high. The United States had nuclear superiority in this crisis, and for states with superiority in the
nuclear balance, low-level dominance coupled with high-level threats may be sufficient to win a
dispute.
The Taiwan Strait Crises also show the relevance of conventional options theory to
conflicts between nuclear states and non-nuclear adversaries. In the crisis, the PRC did not have
nuclear weapons, but the United States still viewed nuclear escalation as too costly for two
reasons. First, they feared retaliation by the Soviet Union in the event of nuclear use against the
Chinese mainland. Second, they feared the international backlash that would result from using
nuclear weapons and breaking an emerging “non-use norm.” Such international opprobrium and
norm-breaking could hurt their alliances and give the Soviets an excuse to use the bomb in a
future conflict. This illustrates the unilateral costs to using nuclear weapons. Because of these
unilateral costs, keeping escalation below the level of nuclear use is still important in disputes
with non-nuclear adversaries. Because the logic of conventional options theory can apply to nonnuclear adversaries, I can apply it to the conflicts the United States had in the aftermath of the
Cold War, which I do in my next chapter examining the utility of conventional options in the
Gulf War.
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Chapter 6: The Gulf War and Conventional Options Theory
On August 2, 1991, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in order to gain
control over the country’s oil and augment his power in the Middle East. This touched off what
could be considered as both the first international crisis of the unipolar era and the last crisis of
the Cold War.672 It is through both of these framings that I can apply the predictions of
conventional options theory to the Gulf Crisis. What would conventional options theory predict
about the success of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq in achieving their goals in the
crisis?
In terms of outcomes, conventional options theory would predict that the United States
would achieve all of its goals, which in this case consists of the defense of Saudi Arabia, the
eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and the destruction of Iraq’s offensive military power. Iraq
would be unable to retain control over Kuwait, and the Soviet Union would fail in its objective to
convince the United States and their allies to halt the air campaign and forgo the ground
offensive. In terms of the process by which these outcomes occurred, the United States should
succeed because its ability to build multiple conventional options allowed it to keep the use of
force below its level of resolve. This would then force Iraq and the Soviet Union to contemplate
escalating past their points of resolve or backing down. The Soviet Union would think that the
risk of nuclear escalation was too high to justify pressing its demands to avert a ground war on
the United States. Iraq would accept defeat because it saw a larger, all-out war as too costly.
Did the events in the Gulf War correspond to the predictions of conventional options
theory? I argue that the case gives moderate support to the theory. At the outset of the Gulf War,
Iraq possessed superiority in conventional options in the Persian Gulf region despite facing an
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opponent in the United States that had global conventional superiority.673 This gave Iraq a brief
window in which it controlled the pace of events in the conflict and could have put the United
States into a resolve-capability gap if it attacked Saudi Arabia. However, the United States
military had a high level of deployability, which allowed it to transfer hundreds of thousands of
troops and tons of equipment to the Persian Gulf in a short period of time. This gave the United
States preponderance in conventional options in the Gulf vis-à-vis Iraq. After using global
capabilities to build superiority in conventional options in the Persian Gulf, the United States
achieved its goals of defending Saudi Arabia, evicting Saddam’s forces out of Kuwait, and
destroying Iraq’s offensive military power. The last goal brought the United States into conflict
with the Soviet Union, which had recourse to zero conventional options in the Gulf crisis. The
Soviet Union was unable to achieve its goal of averting a ground war. In terms of matching
independent variables to crisis outcome, the resolution of the Gulf War corresponds to the
predictions of conventional options theory.
In terms of the process through which the outcomes of the crisis occurred for each side,
the United States’ war effort provides strong support for the theory. By building conventional
options that Iraq and the Soviet Union could not match, the US was able to keep the cost of using
force below its level of resolve. This put Iraq and the Soviet Union into their own decisionmaking binds of whether to escalate to unconventional uses of force or back down. The process
behind the Soviets’ failure to avert war provides weak support for the theory. The Soviet Union
could have pressed their compromise proposals to avoid war with the threat of armed force, and
they had no means to do this except for threatening nuclear use. This put them into a resolve-
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capability gap. However, there is no evidence as of yet that the Soviet Union backed off its
proposals because they were afraid of the costs of nuclear use or that they even contemplated
making militarized threats against the US The process through which Soviet diplomatic
initiatives failed provide inconclusive evidence for or against the theory. Finally, the process
behind Iraq’s defeat provides support to the theory. As expected, Iraq did seek to withdraw from
Kuwait once it realized that it had no effective response to the allies’ air campaign. However, the
United States rejected all Iraqi proposals for doing so. Once the ground war started, Iraq opted to
surrender rather than launch chemical or biological weapons. Most evidence points to this being
due to the fear of escalation, but it could have also been due to purely tactical considerations.
The case study expands on this argument in four parts. First, I outline the military balance
in the Persian Gulf region among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq both at the outset
of the crisis in August 1990 and on the eve of war in January 1991. This will show how the
United States built conventional preponderance in the region. Second, I go over the goals of the
United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq in the crisis, highlighting how the Soviet Union did not
want to see the US and its allies go to war against Iraq, making a dispute out of what had been
superpower cooperation in the crisis. Third, I connect the military balance to the ability of the
United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq to achieve their goals in the crisis. Fourth, I assess the
implications of the Gulf War for conventional options theory. I explain how the case fits with the
theory’s predictions, and I discuss how it reveals both the benefits and potential temptations of
conventional military preponderance and unipolarity.
The Military Balance in the Persian Gulf
The main independent variable is the options for the use of conventional force available
within a dispute. This is shaped by the number of conventional forces that a state has in the area
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where a dispute takes place. States can deploy conventional capabilities to a region to augment
their conventional options within a crisis. The extent to which a state sends forces from outside
the area of a dispute depends on its resolve and the deployability of its forces. Sending forces
sends a signal of a state’s resolve by communicating the areas on the escalation ladder at which it
may be willing to fight and by messaging that the state cares more about this dispute than it does
about disputes in other areas that may arise. But not all states with similar resolve will deploy the
same level of forces into a theater. Some states have more capability to project their power over
long distances. These states have a greater ability to turn inferiority in conventional options into
superiority within the course of a crisis. By deploying forces into the area where a dispute takes
place, the state signals high resolve but also adds to its conventional capabilities. Deploying
forces leads to crisis success either by signaling that a state has more resolve or because added
conventional options allow a state to put its adversary into a resolve-capability gap.
For a crisis where the deployment of capabilities from outside the theater of a dispute
could be important to determining the balance in conventional options, there are four factors to
examine. What is the local conventional balance at the beginning of the crisis? What is the
relative deployability of each side’s forces? How did the deployment of capabilities change the
local conventional balance? Did the deployment signal that a state had more resolve than its
adversary? Over the next two sections, I note that Iraq had a large conventional advantage in the
Persian Gulf region at the outset of the crisis, but the United States used its high relative level of
deployability to send forces into the area that gave it a conventional advantage. This deployment
signaled to the Soviet Union that the US was more resolved than it was, and it confirmed for Iraq
that the Americans had similarly high resolve as them.
The Balance in August 1990
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At the outset of the Gulf War, both the United States and the Soviet Union had little
conventional capabilities in the area where the crisis where the crisis took place. I count the
Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, the Levant, Turkey, and Iran as forming the crisis
theater. Iraq had ample military power relative to both countries in this area, which meant that
neither of the superpowers had much coercive influence over Iraq’s behavior in August 1990. In
this phase of the crisis, both superpowers had the same goal of stopping Saddam Hussein from
moving into Saudi Arabia and of convincing him to leave Kuwait. None of them had any
conventional options to deter or coerce Iraq. However, the United States’ military had a high
level of deployability thanks to their power projection capabilities and an easing of Cold War
tensions.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the responsibility for commanding any
US forces that would respond to the invasion fell to Central Command (CENTCOM) and its
commander-in-chief (CINC), Army General Norman Schwarzkopf. CENTCOM, though it had a
staff at MacDill AFB in Tampa of 700, was a “largely a paper command,” which would have to
draw units from other areas of the world in a crisis.674 CENTCOM had 6 principal surface
combatants and 1 aircraft carrier deployed to the Persian Gulf region at the time hostilities broke
out.675 In Turkey, outside of CENTCOM but bordering Iraq, the United States had 1200 Army
and 3600 Air Force troops.676 This meant that the United States would have to deploy forces to
the Gulf region if it wanted to deter Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia or coerce him out of
Kuwait.
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This was little match to the large number of armored forces that Iraq used in its invasion
of Kuwait, giving the US few conventional options with which to deter further aggression by
Saddam in August 1990. Even once the US had deployed 16,000 paratroopers from the 82nd
Airborne and sent the F-15’s from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing to the Gulf on August 6,
American military leaders did not feel confident in their conventional capabilities relative to the
Iraqis.677 In a conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell,
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney fretted that “we’ve only got a few paratroopers over there,
and wing or so of aircraft, so far…We don’t have enough muscle to stop anybody yet. Suppose
all we do is provoke Saddam, push him to invade the Saudis? There isn’t a damned thing we
could do.” Schwarzkopf writes in his memoir that on August 9 if Saddam had started executing
employees of the US embassy in Kuwait City, “Central Command had little to offer short of a
nuclear strike on Baghdad. I would never have recommended such a course of action, and even if
I had, I am certain the President would never have approved it.”678 In the first few weeks of the
Gulf War, the United States had little or no conventional options with which to respond to an
Iraqi provocation.
However, the United States military had a high level of deployability such that it could
quickly generate conventional options in the Persian Gulf. Once the decision was made to send
troops to Saudi Arabia, Powell writes that the US military formed a “pipeline” to send soldiers,
weapons, and materiel to the Gulf. Indeed, in the exchange above he calmed Cheney’s fears by
saying that “the flow goes on.”679 By early September, the buildup “was starting to reach
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mammoth proportions.”680 The United States had the capability to deploy a large amount of
conventional military strength to the Persian Gulf in the space of a few months due to its
unmatched airlift and sealift capabilities as well as its superior naval power. Just as crucial was
the the easing of Cold War tensions, which freed up troops and weapons that had been stationed
in Western Europe.681 While the United States started the crisis with no leverage over Iraq due to
a paucity of conventional capabilities, that would soon change due to the ability of the United
States to deploy superior conventional strength to the Gulf.
It is good to note here that there are two further reasons that the United States was able to
deploy a large number of forces to the Gulf, both of which lie outside the scope of conventional
options theory. First, the end of the Cold War allowed the US to take forces away from Western
Europe without worrying about encroachment or opportunism by the Soviet Union. If the
invasion of Kuwait had occurred in 1985 rather than 1990, the crisis would have gone much
differently. As Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz said, if the Soviets were around, “none of this
would have happened.”682 Second, without the permission of Saudi Arabia, the United States
would have been hard-pressed to build a sufficient number of conventional options in the region
with which to challenge Iraq. This may not have happened had Saddam not put even more
military force into Kuwait and southern Iraq after his invasion, thereby (inadvertently)
threatening Saudi Arabia. Given the condition that these factors went the United States’ way, the
US was able to capitalize due to its high level of deployability. The Soviet Union also had
limited military strength that it could exert in the Middle East at the beginning of the Gulf Crisis.
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The Soviet Union was in the midst of a reduction in its military forces, cutting its military budget
by close to a hundred billion dollars and its armed forces by almost 1,000,000 soldiers between
1988 and 1991.683 In addition, the Soviet leadership had to send troops to deal with internal
unrest that threatened to dissolve the country into its constituent republics.684 The Soviets had no
forces in the Persian Gulf area and only a few thousand troops in the Middle East as a whole
serving in advisory roles.685
The Soviet Union did have troops in the Trans-Caucuses Military District less than 1000
miles from Baghdad. This district held 12 total motorized rifle divisions and 1 airborne division,
with the airborne division at full strength, 6 of the motorized rifle divisions at half-strength and
the other 6 at three-quarters strength.686 Each full-strength Soviet division had close to 10,000
troops, and using this rough estimate yields an approximation of 85,000 troops in TransCaucasus MD. This force was equipped with 240 tactical combat aircraft and around 2400 main
battle tanks.687 The troops in the Trans-Caucasus, if they could be used, represented some
military strength that the Soviet Union could exert in the Gulf. There was a cap on how much
military strength the Soviet Union could bring to bear, however. Compared to the United States,
Soviet forces had much lower deployability, with inferior airlift and sealift. Plus, as mentioned
previously, domestic unrest likely made Soviet leaders reticent to use military force abroad. The
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Soviets had little ability to shape events in the Gulf at the outset of the crisis, and it would be
hard-pressed to increase its capability to do so as the conflict progressed.
Iraq was the strongest military power in the Middle East at the outbreak of the Gulf War.
It boasted a force of about 1,000,000 troops, the vast majority of which were in the Army. The
Army was heavily mechanized and armored, with over 5500 main battle tanks spread across 6
crack Republican Guard divisions and 7 armored divisions among the regular troops.688 The Iraqi
Air Force possessed 689 tactical combat aircraft.689 Its Navy, however, was weak, with only 5
frigates and 38 patrol and coastal craft, meaning that it could not deny entry to its water space to
a great power.690 Nevertheless, Iraq’s forces gave it one of the world’s largest militaries at the
outset of the Gulf War.691 While Iraq did not use all of these forces in the invasion of Kuwait, it
could still draw on all of them in a confrontation with the United States. US leaders saw the
military threat from Iraq as a great challenge. In a briefing to President Bush at Camp David on
August 4, General Schwarzkopf assessed that “Saddam had approximately double the number of
troops needed for his country’s arsenal against its neighbors. His arsenal included some of the
best weapons the international arms bazaar had to offer.” Iraq’s military was strong in its ability
“to wage an offensive with chemical weapons.”692
At the outset of the Gulf War, Iraq possessed the most powerful military in the Gulf,
giving it the ability to ignore any diplomatic pressure applied by the Soviet Union or the United
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States. It also gave it control over the pace of events. The first two weeks of August was “the
time of greatest disparity between the capabilities of several divisions of deployed Iraqi troops
and the few thousand American forces in place and operational.”693 Both of the great powers
possessed limited capabilities to coerce Iraq into leaving Kuwait in August 1990. However, the
United States could rectify this by deploying hundreds of thousands of troops rapidly into the
Persian Gulf region. The Soviet Union could not. This would affect how the military balance and
the bargaining power of each country changed over the course of the crisis.
The Military Balance in January 1991
By January 1991, the United States had deployed over 500,000 troops to the Gulf
region.694 This deployment included the full panoply of US military capabilities, with heavy
armor, special operations forces, carrier strike groups, tactical air wings, and guided missiles. In
all, the US order of battle on the eve of Desert Storm included 2170 main battle tanks, 1272
artillery pieces, 420 attack helicopters, 1285 tactical combat aircraft, 6 aircraft carriers, 58
surface combatants, and 6 nuclear-powered submarines.695 US allies poured in an additional
200,000 troops,696 967 tanks, 270 artillery pieces, 88 attack helicopters, 164 combat aircraft, and
30 surface combatants.697 The addition of more troops and a diverse array of weapons platforms,
each in large numbers, gave the US many conventional options to use in the Gulf crisis.
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This assembly of forces gave the United States the bargaining advantage to press for its
maximum demands. The calculation was no longer if the US could succeed but what would be
paid to do so. Colin Powell wrote, after seeing the massing of “planes, tanks, artillery, armored
vehicles, ammo dumps, and hundreds of thousands of troops…any military men on his
[Saddam’s] staff with an ounce of guts or sense would have to tell this nonsoldier, nonstrategist
that his way was madness.”698 General Schwarzkopf wrote that with the Iraqis’ exposed flank not
being covered as January 15 closed in, “Iraq’s best chance for a successful defense was slipping
away.”699 This point about expected victory clashes with public perception in the winter of
1990/91 and some of the remarks made by the military leaders cited above.700 On December 3,
1990, Powell gave a “cold, hard appraisal of what we faced” to the Senate Armed Services
Committee.701 Schwarzkopf wrote that “we had no idea what our casualties would be, how the
American public would react, or even whether the coalition would hold together.”702
These pessimistic assessments on the part of military leaders should be read as concerns
about what Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called the “friction” of war, or the
inherent uncertainty involved in any use of force against an adversary.703 These leaders knew
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that the Pentagon’s calculations put the most likely estimates of American casualties in the few
thousands. Secretary Baker chafed at the performance of Democratic Congressman Peter
Kostmayer who asserted in Bakers’ hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that
250,000 troops could die. Baker knew that the Pentagon’s worst-case estimates left a few
thousands US military casualties, but he could not say that in public.704 In a briefing to President
Bush, Powell came in at an estimate of 3000 US casualties, with Schwarzkopf estimating
5000.705 This estimate, while high, was in the range of acceptability for US policymakers. The
only variable that could change this calculus, and hence provide uncertainty about the outcome,
was whether or not Iraq would use chemical or biological weapons. The implication of this
potential escalation will be discussed below.
In sum, the United States and its allies had amassed a massive military presence in the
Gulf by January 1991. This gave US policymakers near certainty that they would defeat the Iraqi
military, allowing them to press for maximum demands in pre-war negotiations with Iraq.
Against this array of American strength, the Soviets had not deployed any military
capability of their own into the Gulf region. In fact, the Soviets likely had less military power
they could send to the area than at the beginning of the conflict. From 1990 to 1991, at least ten
divisions had been disbanded as part of arms reductions implemented by Soviet Premier Mikhail
Gorbachev.706 Two of these divisions may have been in the Trans-Caucasus Military District,
which had 10 motorized rifle divisions and 1 airborne division in 1991 rather than 12 and 1.707
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Soviet leaders were also preoccupied with the disintegration of their multinational empire.708 The
Soviets had little military power with which to pursue their goals in the Gulf crisis.
Since the invasion of August, Iraq had moved more troops and weapons into the Kuwaiti
theater of operations in anticipation of a conflict with the United States, what Saddam Hussein
called the “mother of all battles.” In early December, Powell testified before the Senate that Iraq
had 450,000 soldiers, 3800 tanks, and 2500 artillery pieces in or near Kuwait.709 By the eve of
war, Schwarzkopf’s team estimated the opposing Iraqi force at 545,000 men, 4300 tanks, and
3100 artillery pieces.710 Iraq was weak against the United States in the air, whose 1285 aircraft
nearly doubled what Iraq possessed and was far superior technologically.711 Saddam
incorporated Iraqi air inferiority into his strategy, which gambled on making the ground fight a
war of attrition.712 Moreover, in land strength, Iraqi numbers belied their weakness. Michael
Gordon and General Bernard Trainor write that “most infantry divisions were sent to the Kuwaiti
theater undermanned, short of equipment (or with poor equipment), and with little or no idea of
what they were to do upon arrival…According to Army intelligence, front-line and secondechelon units deployed at no more than 80 percent, and in some cases 50 percent, of their
authorized strength.”713 The numbers of Iraqi soldiers may therefore have been lower than
Powell and Schwarzkopf indicated. Plus, many military leaders had serious doubts about the
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quality of Iraqi units. Marine General Walter Boomer wrote to a colleague: “I believe that we
have a rather hollow Army facing us, despite the amount of equipment they possess…these guys
are not in our league except in total amount of equipment. My gut feeling is that they are very
shaky.”714 Iraq had put a large quantity of land power in or near Kuwait to fight the US and its
coalition allies, but they were inferior in terms of weapons technology, unit quality, air power,
and naval power. This inferiority to the United States gave Iraq little bargaining power in prewar and intra-war negotiations.
American, Soviet, and Iraqi Goals in the Crisis
For what purposes were these military forces put to use in the Gulf War? The United
States had three goals in the Gulf War: the protection of Saudi Arabia, the restoration of
Kuwait’s independence, and the destruction of Iraq’s offensive military power. All of these were
core goals for the United States, as they were tied to whether Iraq would be able to revise the
status quo in a strategically important region. The defense of Saudi Arabia was the minimum
goal of the United States in the crisis. On August 4, President Bush decided in an NSC meeting
on August 4 that “the first imperative was to deter an Iraqi move on Saudi Arabia.”715 If Iraq
gained control over Saudi Arabia’s oil fields, they could wield considerable economic and
military power in the Middle East, an outcome regarded as a disaster by American political and
military leaders. The first 200,000 troops sent to the Gulf region were there to achieve the
defensive mission of protecting Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi invasion.716 This American goal is
what Powell referred to as the “line in the sand.”717
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Coupled with this objective was the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the
restoration of Kuwait’s government. This coercive goal was decided on early in the crisis, with
President Bush famously telling reporters on the White House lawn on August 5, 1990 that “this
will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.”718 At first, US policymakers hoped they could
accomplish this goal via economic sanctions, namely by preventing Iraq from selling its oil.
However, by October, once enough troops were in place to defend Saudi Arabia and economic
sanctions were fully instituted by the UN, US policymakers were frustrated that Saddam was
“impervious” to economic pressure.719 In order to accomplish its coercive goal, the United States
had to send in troops to conduct offensive operations against the Iraqi military. Bush decided to
more than double the number of American troops in the Gulf to 500,000 at the end of October
and announced this increase on November 8, stressing that the deployment resulted in an
adequate offensive option when he did so.720
The final goal of the United States, and one that emerged later in the crisis, was the
destruction of Iraq’s offensive military power. This war aim started out as an operational
imperative. The United States could not eject Iraq from Kuwait if it did not destroy a lot of Iraqi
military forces. But the destruction of Iraq’s offensive firepower became an end in itself by
January 1991. Haass recounts that the small group of advisers close to the president wanted to
“cut Saddam and the Iraqi military down to size and thereby reduce the scale of the postwar
threat we would have to contend with.”721 By the middle of February, US policymakers were
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hesitant to support any compromise with Saddam Hussein because they felt that by withdrawing
he could use his military strength to threaten neighbors in the future.722 US leaders wanted to
prevent Iraq from being a regional threat after the war, thereby protecting the status quo in a
region that at the time was a source for most of the world’s oil.723
This goal became operationalized as the destruction of the Republican Guard. In a
briefing to his field commanders, Schwarzkopf said that “we need to destroy – not attack, not
damage, not surround – I want you to destroy the Republic Guard. When you’re done with them,
I don’t want them to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don’t want them to exist as a
military organization.”724 That this goal went beyond the liberation of Kuwait became clear in
the last two days of the ground war, where Gordon and Trainor write that “the outcome of the
offensive to liberate Kuwait was a foregone conclusion. The question now was whether the
Army would be able to destroy the Republican Guard before the war’s denouement.”725 In short,
the United States’ minimum goal was the defense of Saudi Arabia, its main goal was the
restoration of Kuwait’s independence, and its maximum goal was the destruction of Iraq’s
offensive military power.
What I do not count as a goal for the United States during the Gulf War was the removal
of Saddam Hussein from power. The Bush administration was criticized for not continuing the
fight to Baghdad and deposing the Iraqi leader, most notably by British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher who quipped: “Now, just look, there is the aggressor, Saddam Hussein, still in power.
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There is the President of the United States, no longer in power. There is the Prime Minister of
Britain who did quite a lot to get things there, no longer in power. I wonder who won?”726 These
criticisms miss the mark, as the Bush administration never shared an explicit goal, even in
private, of ousting Saddam. Powell writes that the Bush administration knew that, “barring a
lucky bomb hit, Saddam would likely survive the war.”727 This was fine, as the Bush
administration was afraid of the consequences of Iraq becoming too weak as a result of the war.
President Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, write that they did not want
to see a “breakup of Iraqi state.”728 US Ambassador to Syria Charles Freeman wrote during the
Gulf War that Iraq should have enough power to “constrain Iran and/or Syria” after the war.729
Plus, the Bush administration had internalized the coalition’s goals as its own. The
mandate from the UN called for the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Coalition members,
especially Saudi Arabia, may have accepted Saddam being cut down to size in the course of the
fighting. However, they would not have accepted the US “unilaterally exceeding the United
Nations’ mandate” by going all the way to Baghdad and enacting regime change.730 Such an
action would have caused the coalition to collapse and turn the US into the one thing they were
fighting against: an occupying power. Due to the high costs of removing Saddam from power,
the Bush administration never developed it into a war aim. American policymakers hoped that
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defeat would cause a popular revolt or military coup to unseat Saddam,731 but this was a wish
more than a goal. The line between a goal and a wish can be murky at times, but in this case, I
consider the removal of Saddam in the Gulf War an example of the latter.
The Soviet Union also wanted Saddam to not attack Saudi Arabia and to leave Kuwait.
However, it also wanted to avoid a war between Iraq and the American-led coalition, putting
them in a dispute with the United States in January and February 1991. By August 1990, the
Soviet Union had surrendered the Cold War struggle and was trying to save itself from internal
collapse. To keep the Soviet Union intact, Gorbachev implemented a series of domestic
economic reforms under the program of perestroika. In order for these economic reforms to
succeed, he needed to reduce the Soviet defense apparatus that diverted resources away from the
domestic economy. To do that, he had to enact a foreign policy that prioritized cooperation,
rather than competition, with the United States.732 This led to a radical shift in how the
superpowers engaged with each other, marked by Soviet acceptance of the unification of
Germany, pro-democracy movements in its Eastern European satellite states, and reductions in
nuclear arsenals by the thousands.733
The Soviet Union’s aims in the Gulf War need to be understood in this context. Iraq was
a client state of the Soviet Union, and its invasion threatened to undo the progress in cooperation
between the Soviet Union and the United States.734 In an oral interview with PBS Frontline,
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Gorbachev said that “this action seemed done with an idea to explode all this. This is why it
surprised me and angered me. I resented it.”735 Gorbachev wanted to negotiate with the United
States a new international order that maintained the norm of territorial integrity and the norm
against conquest. If the Soviets and the Americans could not work together in the Gulf Crisis to
enforce those norms, then Gorbachev’s international vision would take a serious blow. As
Gorbachev put it: “A country was occupied. If we were not able to cope with that situation,
everything else would have been made null and void.”736 Plus, the prospect of a strong Iraq in its
near abroad controlling a large share of the world’s oil supply likely disquieted Gorbachev. For
these reasons, the Soviet Union and the United States had a shared interest in reversing the
invasion of Kuwait and preventing further aggression.
The crucial difference between the Soviets and the Americans was that the Soviet Union
did not want the coalition to go to war against Iraq to reverse its conquest of Kuwait. For the
United States to use overwhelming force against a former client state would show the degree of
American influence in the sensitive Gulf region and the extent of Soviet decline. For Soviet hardliners who had always been skeptical of Gorbachev’s reforms, this would be too much to bear.737
As a client state, the Iraqi military was equipped with mostly Soviet equipment and advised by
Soviet military officials such that its tactics and operations reflected Soviet military doctrine. If
the American-led coalition dominated the Iraqi military, this would reflect poorly on Soviet
military power. Secretary Baker recalls Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev telling him in the Helsinki
Summit in September 1990 that “you should not underestimate these boys [the Iraqis]. They will

PBS Frontline. “Oral History: Mikhail Gorbachev.” PBS Frontline: The Gulf War.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/gorbachev/1.html
735

736

“Oral History: Mikhail Gorbachev.”

737

Engel, 2012, 48.

277

put a very good fight. And it will not be easy.’ Now, Akhromeyev and other senior Soviet
military officials had to be extremely nervous that a ground war would not simply defeat Saddam
but expose even more starkly the myth of Soviet military power.”738
If the Soviet Union wanted to avoid war, it would have to either convince Iraq to leave
Kuwait before the air or ground war started or convince the United States to desist in its efforts
to wage war on Iraq. As I discuss in detail below, the Soviets attempted both. The Soviet Union
sent Yevgeny Primakov on a mission to Baghdad to broker a compromise in which Iraq
withdrew from Kuwait. It protested against draft language in UN Resolution 678 that specifically
used the phrase “use of force.” Gorbachev called Bush multiple times during the crisis in an
effort to convince him to stop Desert Storm. In sum, the Soviet Union and the United States,
despite their initial cooperation, entered into a dispute over whether or not the coalition would
use force against Iraq.
Despite its importance, this objective amounted to a peripheral interest for Moscow.
Gorbachev was consumed with domestic troubles as he attempted to hold the Soviet Union
together. The outcome of war in Iraq would be of little consequence to the Soviet Union should
the latter cease to exist, and the war’s outcome would likely not accelerate or slow down Soviet
decline. This means that the United States had more at stake in the Gulf War than the Soviet
Union, likely giving the US higher resolve.
Iraq aimed to keep its gains from the conquest of Kuwait. Iraq entered 1990 economically
spent from the long war with Iran between 1980 and 1988. It was over $80 billion in debt and
had economic reconstruction costs estimated at over $230 billion.739 Saddam perceived a power
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vacuum in the region with the retreat of the Soviet Union, one that would likely be taken by the
United States if Iraq did not act now.740 Indeed, Iraqi leaders thought that the United States was
already trying to smother Iraq by 1990. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz remarked that “By the
end of June we started to realize that there is a conspiracy against Iraq, a deliberate conspiracy
against Iraq, by Kuwait, organized, devised by the United States.”741 Iraq faced economic crisis
and what it believed to be a looming geopolitical threat. Both could be overcome by striking
quickly to take Kuwait and sell its oil. That would alleviate Iraq’s economic pain and augment its
geopolitical power so that it would be better positioned to resist US attempts to impose
hegemony in the Middle East. What is crucial here is that the taking of Saudi Arabia’s oil
reserves was not a goal for Iraq in 1990-91. Many American officials, notably Secretary Baker,
believed that Saddam was about to move against Saudi Arabia in a few months were it not for
quick US troop deployments to Saudi Arabia.742 This may have been a goal for Saddam Hussein,
but from the evidence we have of Iraqi war aims there is no indication that they intended to keep
going past Kuwait in the near future. Thus, Iraq’s goal in the Gulf War was to hold on to its
Kuwaiti conquest so that it could reap profits from the sale of Kuwait’s oil. Because this would
affect Iraq’s power position in its home region, I count this a core interest for Iraq.
Did the American deployment of conventional forces to the Gulf signal that it had more
resolve than the Soviet Union or Iraq? This is possible in the case of the Soviet Union, as the
United States had more at stake in the crisis, and the deployment of American troops to the Gulf
may have been the signal that confirmed this for the Soviets. For Iraq, the troop deployment only
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confirmed that the United States was highly resolved to fight over Kuwait. Saddam had been
expecting and boasting about winning a war with the United States throughout 1990: “We are
ready to fight America. And if God wills, we will fight them. With the help of God we will fight
them and kick them out of the entire region.”743 As Paul Avey explains, Iraqi leaders thought that
Kuwait and the United States were part of a conspiracy to weaken and destroy Iraq. He quotes
Tariq Aziz saying that “we started to realize that there is a conspiracy against Iraq, a deliberate
conspiracy against Iraq, by Kuwait, organized, devised by the United States.”744 If Iraqi officials
believed the US was working with Kuwait to weaken Iraq, then it would be odd to think that the
US would not retaliate against an invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, in a response to a question about
the effect of the meeting with US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie on July 25, 1990, Aziz
stated: “She didn’t tell us in the sense that we concluded that the Americans will not
retaliate. That was nonsense you see. It was nonsense to think that the Americans would not
attack us.”745
If the global balance in conventional capabilities can cast a shadow on crisis dynamics if
one side has a high level of deployability and sufficient resolve to transport forces into the
dispute area, then why was Saddam optimistic about a victory? Saddam’s bravado was a product
of his belief that he could win a war against the United States by inflicting high casualties on
American forces, prompting the US to give up the war. In February 1990, Saddam gave a speech
in which he noted the United States’ quick withdrawal from Lebanon and said that the US had
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recently “displayed some signs of fatigue.”746 Iraq believed that the US was likely to retaliate,
but the global conventional balance did not deter it from attacking Kuwait because it had a
theory of victory in a war with the United States.
Rungs on the Ladder of Escalation and the Theory’s Predictions in the Gulf War
Did the balance in conventional options affect the ability of each side to achieve its goals
during the Gulf War? To answer this, I need to specify the rungs on the escalation ladder each
side’s military capabilities gave them. I will then use that to see whether success was caused by
the ability to tailor the use of force to the level of resolve and whether defeat was caused by the
pressure to avoid escalating past the state’s point of resolve.
The United States had seven rungs on its ladder of escalation. The first rung was the use
of naval forces to blockade Iraq. This would involve minimal force and low risk of casualties,
making it the least escalatory option. The second rung was a defensive ground war to protect
Saudi Arabian territory against Iraqi attacks. This would expand the conflict into the land domain
and involve higher risk of US military casualties, constituting a greater escalation. The US put
the forces in place to acquire these two rungs early in the Gulf War, and the US executed both of
them as the basis of Operation Desert Shield. This mission aimed to defend Saudi Arabia from
an Iraqi attack and impose economic sanctions on Iraq by preventing it from exporting its oil.
The third rung was a limited air war against select Iraqi military targets. This air campaign would
only target Iraqi positions in or near Kuwait. The fourth rung was a strategic air war against Iraqi
command and control targets and civilian infrastructure. This would constitute an escalation by
expanding the geographic scope of the war and exposing US pilots to more danger from Iraqi air
defenses, causing greater casualties. In the first part of Operation Desert Storm, the US escalated
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straight to the fourth rung, going after Iraqi military positions in the Kuwait Theater of
Operations, command and control targets in Iraq, and civilian targets at the same time.
The fifth rung was a limited ground offensive that would be confined to Kuwait and
involve 250,000 to 300,000 troops. The sixth rung was a large ground offensive that would
involve more troops and incursions into Iraqi territory. The ground war phase of Desert Storm
constitutes an escalation past the fifth rung and straight to the sixth one. The objective of the
ground offensive was to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and then destroy Iraq’s Republican
Guard units positioned in Iraq. Rungs three through six were interconnected. If the air war did
not succeed in degrading Iraqi C2 and softening up the Iraqi Army’s front lines, the ground
offensive would be a much more difficult fight. One reason for this interconnectedness was that
the air campaign was necessary to keep the Iraqi military from shifting forces to the west to
counter the United States’ “left hook” strategy. The air war would knock out Iraq’s
reconnaissance capability and then prevent any Iraqi forces from shifting west if they somehow
found out about the flanking strategy.747 Having to fight a frontal assault would increase military
casualties.748 In addition, air war planners wanted to destroy 50 percent of Iraq’s armor and
artillery in the theater of operations.749 If it could succeed in knocking out a fraction of that, the
Iraqi forces would be an easier target for US ground forces to go after. Thus, the strategic air war
needed to succeed in order for the large ground offensive option to fall below the US level of
resolve.
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The seventh and final rung was the conduct of a full-scale war that went all the way to
Baghdad and imposed a regime change in Iraq. This rung lay above the US level of resolve for
two reasons. First, as noted previously, American leaders were sensitive to the physical costs of a
postwar occupation of Iraq and the diplomatic costs of far exceeding the coalition’s mandate for
the use of force. Second, the escalation to a full-scale war raised an intolerable risk of Saddam
using his chemical or biological weapons (CW or BW) on US forces. Fighting Iraq after it used
chemical or biological weapons would be past the American point of resolve. The latter were
particularly worrisome, as they could have caused more destruction than chemical weapons.
Though biological weapons were worse, I mention them in the same phrase because US
policymakers talked Iraqi escalation by referencing both types of weapons. “The Iraqi biological
arsenal,” Powell wrote, “hung like a specter over the desert.”750 Two factors would cause the use
of CW or BW to make the war too costly for the Americans. First, it could lead to very high
military casualties. Schwarzkopf said that, due to the uncertainty surrounding whether or not Iraq
would use CW/BW, he “didn’t know bloody the ground war might be…if they choose to dump
chemicals on you, they might even win.” Indeed, “the possibility of mass casualties from
chemical weapons was the main reason we had sixty-three hospitals, two hospital ships, and
eighteen thousand beds ready in the war zone.”751 Second, the escalation contemplated in
response to CW or BW use was the use of “unconventional means” by US forces. This included
bombing the dams on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to cause mass flooding as well as the use
of nuclear weapons.752 This would entail a large reputational cost on the part of the United States
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to inflict this level of punishment, a cost that was likely too high to justify attacking Iraq in the
first place.
The Soviet Union had zero conventional rungs on its ladder of escalation, and its only
rung was the use of nuclear weapons to stop the United States from attacking Iraqi forces. That
this was well beyond the Soviets’ level of resolve is easy to grasp; using nuclear weapons would
have meant widespread opprobrium and national suicide. As I discuss below, even though the
changing geopolitical context severely limited the credibility of a Soviet nuclear threat, it would
have lacked credibility in a more competitive environment because the Soviets had no
conventional options with which to bolster such a threat.
By January 1991, Iraq was left with two rungs on its escalation ladder. Iraq had no
response against a US-led air campaign. In the first three days of the air war, Iraq lost 14 fighters
to only one loss of an FA-18 for the Americans. During the rest of Desert Storm, Iraqi planes
would hide in concrete shelters, where they were pounded by coalition airstrikes, or take
sanctuary in Iran. In all, the United States and its allies flew 69,000 fighter or bomber missions to
just 910 for the Iraqis.753 The allies gained air superiority at the outset of the war, hampering
Iraq’s ability to successfully prosecute a defense against a large ground invasion. This left Iraq
with only two options that carried a plausible chance of victory. The first was the firing of Scud
missiles against Israel. The United States kept a coalition of Arab allies together by promising
that Israel would not be involved in the war. If Saddam could provoke Israel into attacking, US
officials feared that the coalition would break up, putting the entire war effort in peril.754 This
rung fell below Iraq’s level of resolve, given that firing the Scuds involved little extra cost and
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did not invite any extra use of force from the United States. The second option was the use of
CW or BW against coalition forces. This was likely above Iraq’s point of resolve. By increasing
coalition casualties, using CW or BW could have prompted the United States and its allies to
decide the objective of freeing Kuwait was not worth the level of pain being experienced.
However, such a move would invite even further international condemnation and the chance of
nuclear retaliation upon Iraq.
The implication of this analysis is that all sides in the conflict had a rung on their ladder
of escalation to which they could escalate and achieve their objectives. However, doing so would
go above their point of resolve. This makes the Gulf War amenable to an analysis through the
lens of conventional options theory. For the theory to add to our understanding of the Gulf War,
three questions need to be answered. Did the United States succeed because the presence of
multiple conventional options allowed it to keep the cost of the war below its point of resolve?
Did the Soviet Union feel constrained in its bargaining position by the inability to use
conventional forces and the incredibility of threats to use nuclear weapons? Did Iraq back down
because it saw CW or BW use as too costly or risky? Below, I go through the evidence from the
Gulf War to answer these questions.
Testing the Mechanisms of Conventional Options Theory in the Gulf War
Explaining US Victory
The outcome of the Gulf War, a US victory, matches my prediction of how the balance of
conventional options should affect the outcome of a conflict. Moreover, I argue that the
conventional options the United States was able to build in the Persian Gulf were a key
mechanism in producing a US victory. I count the outcome as a US victory because the United
States achieved its main objective of expelling Saddam’s army from Kuwait and destroying
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Iraq’s offensive military power. Iraq lost because it failed to achieve its main objective of
maintaining possession of Kuwait. Some would say that Saddam never surrendered or lost, and
thus, the US did not win, because he stayed in power and kept some of his military power intact.
As mentioned previously, this criticism misses the mark. The United States never had an explicit
policy goal of toppling Saddam and imposing a regime change on Iraq, meaning the dispute
outcome should not be measured in those terms. Plus, while the United States would have liked
to destroy more of Iraq’s military power, Iraq still left the Gulf War with 68% less tanks, 46%
less armored personnel carriers, and 69% less artillery pieces than they had before the war. This
level of devastation was such that “four years afterward, its army was still half its original
size.”755 The US accomplished its primary objectives while Iraq did not, making the Gulf War a
US victory.
Superiority in conventional options contributed to American success was because the
United States had the ability to deploy forces to the Gulf in a short period of time. As mentioned
in the Theory Chapter (2 in the current outline), without a high level of deployability, it is
difficult to give yourself conventional options in a faraway theater of operations. American airlift
and sealift capability allowed it to build conventional options for the use of force in the Gulf.
Without this level of deployability, the United States would not have been able to leverage its
overall conventional superiority over Iraq.
General Schwarzkopf articulated the gap between what forces the US could potentially
bring to bear against Iraq and what it actually could early in the conflict. He said that “I want a
list of options, minimal up to full-scale attack. If the president comes to me and says ‘I have to
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retaliate,’ I have got a platter to pick from.”756 To do that, he needed troops and equipment
deployed from the United States and from the nearby island of Diego Garcia. The beginning of
Desert Shield kicked off a massive deployment of US military power to the Persian Gulf. The
United States military moved “3.9 million tons of cargo and 540,000 people to the Gulf between
August 1990 and February 1991.” This entailed “15,000 airlift missions to the Persian Gulf, and
another 7,000 within the theater…the Military Sealift Command operated an average of 210
cargo ships a day during the crisis.”757 Operational analyses of the Gulf War are actually critical
of this logistics effort, particularly the sealift portion. Gordon and Trainor point out that the Navy
had only 8 fast sealift ships due to years of underfunding sealift programs to transport the
Army.758 Moreover, the Ready Reserve Fleet, was aging and needed maintenance, as well as
more longshoremen to load the ships. Only 17 of the 96 vessels included “Roll-On, Roll-Off”
capability, and of the 72 vessels activated, just one-third arrived in the Gulf on schedule.759
These criticisms reflect tactical as opposed to strategic shortcomings. The United States
still displayed a capability for force deployment that far exceeded any other country in the world.
Powell puts these problems in context by pointing out that “in the first six weeks of Desert
Shield, we brought in more tonnage than in the first three months of the Korean War.”760 It took
six months to position all the forces necessary for the Persian Gulf, but no other country could
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have transported that much manpower and equipment in such a short span of time. If the United
States had addressed the problems behind these tactical issues, namely by allocating more
funding for heavy cargo planes and fast sealift ships, they would have gotten their troops and
weapons to the Gulf faster. As it is, the United States deployed its forces in a reasonably short
amount of time and at an acceptable cost. This allowed it to build the “platter of options” General
Schwarzkopf demanded.
Another way in which superiority in conventional options played a role in US success
was that superiority in multiple platforms across different domains lowered the overall cost of
using force. As mentioned above, success in the strategic air phase of Desert Storm would lower
the expected casualties in the ground offensive phase. The United States was quickly able to gain
air superiority over the Iraqi air force, and with control of the skies the US and its coalition allies
conducted 23,340 air strikes against Iraqi ground units.761 The CIA and CENTCOM differed on
their assessment as to how much of Iraq’s tanks, APC’s, and artillery pieces these strikes
destroyed.762 Nevertheless, all intelligence agencies agreed that the air campaign had sapped the
Iraqi will to resist a large ground offensive. On February 21, an intelligence official named
Charles Allen briefed Pentagon officials that “we judge the majority of Iraqi forces will not have
the will to leave their defensive positions and try to prevent an encirclement.”763 After a briefing
from CIA director William Webster that same day, President Bush “expressed confidence to his
family that the ground war would be relatively brief.”764 Air power had decimated the Iraqi

761

Cohen, Eliot. Gulf War Air Power Survey. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1993.

762

“Gulf War Air Power Survey,” 142.

763

Gordon and Trainor, 1995, 335.

764

Ibid, 337.

288

force, making any ground offensive much easier to execute. Bernard Trainor remarked that at the
conclusion of the air war “desertions, abandonments, and surrenders became widespread. Air
power had been stunningly successful.”765
After the air war, the ground campaign quickly pushed out the Iraqis from Kuwait and
destroyed much of Iraq’s offensive military power with minimal casualties. The Marines job in
the frontal assault up the Kuwaiti coast was to hold the Iraqis in place. Instead, they punched
through the enemy defenses on the first day and by the second day were fighting in and around
Kuwait City.766 By the third day of fighting, Kuwait City was liberated, and of the 42 Iraqi
divisions in the theater at the beginning of war, 27 had been eliminated or overrun and six more
were “combat ineffective.”767 The fourth day of fighting was spent hounding the Republican
Guard units and bombing Iraqi equipment as it moved out of Kuwait. This created the “Highway
of Death” that worried US policymakers with its optics.768 By the end of the fourth day,
Schwarzkopf exclaimed that the “gates are closed.”769 The US declared a ceasefire on February
28. They had taken over 60,000 Iraqi soldiers as prisoners of war and tens of thousands of Iraqi
soldiers killed.770 The US suffered just 382 soldiers killed.771 That the casualties were kept low
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was critical to the success of the ground campaign. From August to January, it was not clear that
the United States public would be willing to fight to liberate Kuwait. The vote to authorize the
use of force passed on January 12, 1991 with a thin majority in the Senate of 52 to 47. The
domestic audience in the United States was ambivalent about the war effort, and any ground
offensive that involved close to 10,000 casualties could have swayed the public to oppose the
war. Thus, the success of the air war, by making the ground offensive easier to execute, may
have prevented the United States from being in its own space for exploitation.
The success of the air and ground operations put the Soviet Union and Iraq into a resolvecapability gap. This is yet another way in which conventional options shaped US success. For the
Soviet Union, the success of the air war put it in a bind: it wanted to convince the United States
to stop the air campaign and avert a ground war, but it had no conventional means with which to
bring any pressure to bear on the United States. Should it resort to threats to use nuclear weapons
to get their way? For Iraq, the success of the ground offensive put it in its own conundrum.
Should it accept defeat, or should it use CW or BW against coalition troops in an effort to get
them to retreat? The United States’ successful use of conventional options exposed the lack of
conventional options for its adversaries, which should occur according to conventional options
theory. The question then becomes: did this lack of capabilities convince US adversaries to back
down?
Explaining Soviet Failure to Avert War
In January and February 1991, the Soviet Union made several attempts to stop the air war
and avert a ground offensive by cajoling the Iraqis into accepting a withdrawal deal from Kuwait
and attempting to convince the United States to accept such a deal. On January 18, 1991,
Gorbachev called Bush and told him that “now that war is beginning, our number one priority
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should be to shorten it and make sure it does not spread.”772 Gorbachev called to inform Bush
that he was trying to get Saddam to agree to leave Kuwait, and he was asking Bush whether, if
Saddam did agree to withdraw, “you would be ready to pause in the military action.”773 Bush,
wanting to make sure Iraqi military power was cut down to size, demurred, saying that “a lot of
his [Saddam’s] military power is still intact” and that with “the coalition participants highly
motivated…a cessation now would clearly be a victory for Saddam Hussein.”774 On February 12,
in another attempt to avert a ground war, Gorbachev sent Yevgeny Primakov as an envoy to
Baghdad. Primakov found the Iraqis amenable to a negotiated withdrawal, and the Soviets
invited Aziz to come to Moscow for further talks.775
Talks with Aziz produced an agreement in which Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait over
a period of six weeks, which became the basis for last-minute negotiations to avert war. After
hearing US objections, Aziz agreed to make this timetable three weeks and to drop any
connection to holding Arab-Israeli peace talks. In a call with Gorbachev on February 22,
however, Bush rejected this deal as “totally unacceptable.”776 On February 23, Gorbachev called
again and said that the Iraqis had now agreed to withdraw within four days, “that is to say we
have a white flag from Saddam Hussein.”777 Bush rebuffed this Soviet diplomatic effort as well,
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telling Gorbachev that there was no time left for diplomacy and that the United States would not
accept “any other choice but the instant acceptance of these conditions [the 12 UN Resolutions]
immediately.”778 In sum, the Soviet Union spent considerable effort to avert war by making deals
with the Iraqis and trying to convince the United States to accept them.
In line with the predictions of the theory, the Soviet Union was unable to convince the
United States to halt the war effort and drop its goal of destroying Iraq’s offensive military
power. The outcome of last-minute US-Soviet diplomacy provides support to my theory. The
side with no conventional options to buttress its nuclear deterrent was unable to gain any positive
bargaining outcome. However, the evidence is inconclusive that that failure was due to the
Soviets’ lack of conventional options. The Soviet Union never publicly extended its nuclear
umbrella over Iraq or privately did so in communication with American leaders. There is no
evidence that the Soviet Union viewed their disagreement with the United States in the terms of a
military dispute.
For my theory to explain the Soviet failure to find a negotiated solution, there would need
to be evidence that Soviet leaders thought among themselves about extending the nuclear
umbrella over Iraq or at least using military force to assist Iraq. They then decided not to make
nuclear threats or use force because they recognized that they had no conventional response if
the United States went ahead and used force against Iraq anyway. They would then need to
recognize that this would leave them with the decision to use nuclear weapons or not, and they
would see that using nuclear weapons would be too costly. In short, conventional options theory
would be confirmed if Soviet leaders thought about using a military threat to prevent the United
States from going to war against Iraq, but they backed off due to prospective assessments of the
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ultimate bind that such a threat would put them in. As of yet, there is no evidence that this
occurred.
Even if the Soviet Union did think in terms of a military dispute, the United States could
have succeeded because it had more resolve than the Soviet Union in the Gulf crisis. As noted
previously, the invasion of Kuwait threatened to upset the balance of power in an oil-rich region
at a time when the US imported about half of its oil.779 This made the Gulf crisis a core issue for
the United States. The Soviet Union relied far less on imported oil, and it was consumed with its
own internal troubles. Gorbachev was much more focused on shoring up his precarious domestic
position. This made the invasion of Kuwait a peripheral issue for the Soviet Union. On this basis,
US success could have been due to more resolve to fight over the fate of Kuwait rather than its
superiority in conventional options.
Overall, the Soviet failure to avert war provides inconclusive support for conventional
options theory. The bargaining outcome is in line with the predictions of my theory. However,
the process by which it happened proves inconclusive because there is no evidence that the
Soviet Union thought in terms of a military dispute and even if it did, the US could have
succeeded due to having greater resolve.
Explaining Iraqi Defeat
Once the air war started, Iraq responded with two conventional options that were below
its level of resolve, firing Scud missiles at Israel and launching an attack on coalition forces at
Khafji in Saudi Arabia. The Scud is a short-range missile that is notorious for its inaccuracy,
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making it useful only for sowing terror among a civilian population.780 Without air superiority,
any Iraqi ground defense would likely fail, and one way to avert war and hold on to Kuwait at a
reasonable cost was by breaking up the US-led coalition. If Israel were provoked into fighting
the Iraqis, this would threaten the participation of Arab countries in the multinational force. The
Scuds were successful in stirring Israel to attack Iraq, with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
writing in a letter to Bush on January 23 that in response to the Scud attacks, “we believe we can,
and must, mount an operation that has a chance of carrying out the task and achieving the
objectives.”781 US military responses against the Scud attacks proved unsuccessful. Despite
hundreds of strikes against Scud launching sites between January 17 and February 28, the
mobility of the Scud launching teams made them difficult to track and target, such that “national
intelligence resources did not definitely confirm any of the claimed ‘kills’” of Iraqi Scuds.782 The
United States gave Israel Patriot anti-missile batteries to Israel to defend against the Scuds, but
more than half the time, Patriot missiles deflected rather than destroyed the incoming Scuds,
“leaving their warheads to fall where they might.”783 However, the Scuds failed to achieve Iraq’s
strategic aim of bringing Israel into the war and fracturing the coalition. One reason was military,
as coalition airstrikes caused the number of Scud attacks to fall after the first two weeks of the
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war.784 But the failure to bring Israel into the war is due to a diplomatic scramble by the United
States and restraint on the part of Israeli PM Shamir.785
Once it was clear that the Scuds would not achieve their strategic objective, Saddam
made a desperate attempt to provoke a bloody brawl with an offensive against coalition forces at
Khafji in Saudi Arabia. By late January, Saddam knew that to keep taking damage from air
strikes would dash his hopes for an effective ground defense. He needed the ground war to start
now, and if the allies would not come north, he would go south to them.786 On January 29,
Saddam sent his 5th mechanized division and the 3rd armored division of the III Corps in a twopronged attack with the 1st mechanized division from IV Corps providing a screen to the west.
An advance guard from the 5th division took Khafji,787 but this success was short-lived. Marine
reconnaissance teams were able to spot Iraqi forces leaving Kuwait and relay information on
Iraqi movements to their commanders.788 By the next day, January 30, the coalition was
punishing the forces meant to reinforce Khafji with airstrikes, a total of 262 between January 28
and 31.789 By January 31, Saudi forces had retaken Khafji and Iraqi units were in retreat. The
Iraqis lost 90 tanks and armored personnel carriers in and around Khafji, and they suffered 2000
casualties and 300 vehicles lost in the entire operation.790
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The failure at Khafji left Iraq in a resolve-capability gap. They could either back down or
fight a losing ground war. Either way, Saddam was not going to achieve his goal of holding on to
Kuwait. Trainor writes that “from that point on, according to intelligence analysts, the Iraqis
knew they were beaten. The best that Saddam could hope for at that point was to preserve what
forces he could and survive as a ruler.”791 Powell said that by February, “they [the Iraqis] had
shown us everything they had, and it was nowhere near enough to stop our left hook.”792
This brings me to a puzzle for conventional options theory within the Gulf War. If the
Iraqis knew by the beginning of February that they would lose a ground war, why did they fight
one? In fact, Iraq did make compromises to withdraw from Kuwait in mid-February. It was the
US that was intransigent in negotiations and continued to press for its maximum demands of
destroying Iraqi military power. As early as January 18, Bush told Gorbachev that by accepting
any Soviet-brokered deals with Iraq to withdraw, “they [the US’ Arab allies] would see this as
the one thing we said we wouldn't do--compromise. They would see Saddam Hussein, though
weakened, with a military still intact, his ground forces in particular.”793 In the middle of
February, Iraq agreed to Soviet-brokered proposals to withdraw from Kuwait without a ground
war. They were giving up on their main goal in the crisis. However, the US did not accept these
compromises from Iraq, mostly because the timetable for withdrawal was too long and Iraq was
demanding that the UN sanctions be rescinded once the withdrawal was over. Baker complained
that these deals were too lenient. In discussing the compromise proposals of mid-February,
Baker said that “the air war had finally pushed Saddam to the edge of reality. Now he wanted to

791

Trainor, 1992, 210.

792

Powell, 1995, 514.

793

“Telephone Conversation with Gorbachev.” January 18, 1991.

296

be released from the other consequences of his unprovoked aggression.”794 On February 22,
Baker told Gorbachev that the United States demanded an immediate ceasefire, a full Iraqi
military withdrawal from Kuwait within one week, and continued application of the UN
sanctions after the withdrawal.795 Baker knew full well that the second demand would require
that the Iraqis abandon their armored and heavy weapons in Kuwait, therefore crippling their
military capability. In addition, he said that the Iraqis had to agree to these terms by the next day,
February 23, at 12 PM Riyadh time. This demand the Iraqis found to be unacceptable and
logistically infeasible. That the side with preponderance in conventional options would reject
compromises and press for the achievement of its maximum goals is in line with the predictions
of conventional options theory.796
Iraq was still in a resolve-capability gap once the ground war started. It could either
surrender or escalate to the use of chemical or biological weapons. At the outset of the ground
war, if the Iraqis did not use chemical or biological weapons, “the question was not whether the
allies would win. They had the full might of the American military, and the Iraqis were already a
defeated force.”797 The biggest variable that left American commanders uncertain as to the
outcome and level of casualties they would experience in the war was the possible use of
chemical or biological weapons by the Iraqi military. Using reports from Iraqi deserters,
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American intelligence reports “had predicted that the Iraqis would use chemical weapons.”798
Schwarzkopf wrote in his CINC log that “Iraq’s leaders are telling their troops to prepare for
chemical warfare because the Americans are going to use chemical weapons against them. This
is the same technique they used in the Iran War when they used chemicals.”799 American leaders
had good reason to fear that Iraq would unleash chemical weapons once the fighting began, but
they did not and accepted defeat once the Americans called a ceasefire. However, exactly why
the Iraqis abstained from using chemical or biological weapons is still not explained.
If the lack of chemical weapons use was due to the fear of retaliation, then the choice to
abstain and accept defeat would be in accordance with the predictions of conventional options
theory. The lack of chemical weapons use could have been due to practical or tactical
considerations such that using those weapons would not have altered the battle in Iraq’s favor. If
that is the case, then conventional options theory would have less power in explaining Iraq’s
defeat, since it can be due to the lack of any options with which to counter the Americans. There
is more evidence that the Iraqis held off from using CW or BW due to fear of US nuclear
retaliation. There is some evidence that the decision to not use CW or BW was based on tactical
considerations. Trainor writes that Iraq had an “inability to locate lucrative targets for chemical
attack for lack of a target acquisition capability.”800 In addition, the use of chemical weapons
may not have benefitted the Iraqis, as they “had shoddy chemical-protective gear and were illequipped to survive on a chemical battlefield.”801
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Most officials in the United States and Iraq cite the probability of nuclear retaliation by
the United States as the reason for choosing to surrender rather than use CW or BW. Dick
Cheney “recalled that the Iraqi military intelligence leader said after the war that they thought
that if Iraq used chemical weapons the allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the
price will be too dear and too high.”802 During the war, in November 1990, Tariq Aziz stated that
using chemical or biological weapons “would give them [the United States] an excuse for a
nuclear attack.”803 Aziz hinted at this concern in an interview after the war with PBS’ Frontline
having this exchange with an interviewer:
“Q: Why didn’t you use your chemical weapons?
Aziz: Well, we didn’t think it wise to use them.
Q: Could you tell me in more detail…?
Aziz: That's all I can say. It was not wise to use such kind of weapons in such kind of war, with such an enemy.
Q: Because they had nuclear weapons?
Aziz: You can…make your own conclusions…”804

Overall, Iraq’s acceptance of defeat instead of escalating to chemical or biological
weapons use provides support for conventional options theory. Iraq’s attempts to compromise
once its Scud firings and attack on Khafji failed to dent the coalition’s war effort are in line with
the predictions of conventional options theory. Iraq found itself in a resolve-capability gap and
attempted to get out of it by agreeing to withdraw from Kuwait, the occupation of which was its
main goal in the crisis. Iraq’s decision to surrender rather than use chemical or biological
weapons was likely due to the high risk of retaliation that the latter action carried. Again, faced
with a resolve-capability gap, there is evidence that Iraq decided to concede rather than risk
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further retaliation from the Americans. Furthermore, as noted previously, both Iraq and the
United States were fighting over core issues, making it possible that both sides had relatively
even levels of resolve. The totality of Iraqi behavior in the Gulf War therefore provides moderate
to strong support for conventional options theory.
In sum, the outcome of the Gulf War is consistent with the predictions of conventional
options theory given the conventional balance. The process through which those outcomes
occurred offers varying levels of support for the theory for each actor. The theory explains the
success of the US quite well. The United States succeeded because they were able to build a
large number of conventional options in a short amount of time in the Persian Gulf region. They
used these options to keep the use of force within its level of resolve. This may be the way in
which a conventionally preponderant country brings its power to bear on an adversary, which is
something I address below in the conclusion.
This forced the Soviet Union and Iraq into resolve-capability gaps. The process through
which the Soviets failed to avert a ground war offers inconclusive support for the theory. The
Soviets, with no conventional options, would have had to rely on the extension of their nuclear
umbrella, which they never tried. They accepted the United States ground invasion and chose not
to threaten nuclear use. However, it is not clear if the Soviets were even contemplating making a
nuclear threat to the United States during the conflict, and even if they did, the United States
could have succeeded due to greater resolve. The process through which the Iraqis were defeated
provides moderate to strong support for the theory. The Iraqis tried to respond with two options
below their level of resolve, and once it was clear that those options would not work, they
accelerated their attempts at compromise to leave Kuwait. However, there is no conclusive
evidence on why they decided not to use chemical or biological weapons. Without such
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evidence, it is hard to say whether Iraq accepted defeat due to the risks of escalating past its point
of resolve or simply because there were no options they could use against the United States.
Conclusion: Implications for Unipolarity
The Gulf War provides three lessons for thinking about the benefit of conventional power
preponderance in a nuclear world. The first is that having preponderance in conventional options
for the use of force in the area where a dispute is taking place allows a state to press for its
maximum demands. More importantly, pressing for maximum goals is not synonymous with
getting what you want without going to war. Indeed, by pushing the cost of war lower, a state
with overwhelming conventional superiority may prefer to go to war if that is the only way to
achieve its maximum demands. This Gulf War case study gives credence to the idea that
conventional military preponderance leads to “imperial temptation.”805
Second, having a comprehensive variety of conventional capabilities at the global level
means having a large force with a diverse array of weapons platforms. It also means having a
force with forward-deployed positions and that is rapidly transportable. This level of variety
allows a state to build several conventional options within a region on short notice. Conventional
variety is the mechanism through which conventionally stronger states bring their power to bear
on smaller ones. Stronger states build a variegated force structure and then use that capability to
build conventional options in the local theater of a crisis. Conventionally stronger states that do
not send enough forces to an area to build more conventional options than their adversaries will
be at a bargaining disadvantage despite their overall superiority. For example, despite the United
States being much stronger in conventional military terms than Iraq, if it had chosen not send
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troops to the Gulf, then it would have been unable to build bargaining leverage over Iraq.806 This
gap between conventional options and aggregate strength can be due to low deployability (and
hence, low conventional variety), or it could be to geopolitical constraints that tie up the stronger
state’s resources in another area.
This last possibility brings me to the third lesson of the Gulf War about the value of
unipolarity. One benefit of unipolarity is that the sole great power can concentrate a lot of
resources on one adversary without having to worry about opportunism or competition from
another great power in another area. It therefore knows that in whatever major dispute arises, it
can bring a preponderance of military power to bear given that it has adequate deployability. The
United States was able to shift so many military resources to the Gulf because it did not have to
worry about competing with the Soviets in Europe or that the Soviets would use America’s
preoccupation with the Gulf to make a gain in Europe. I use this point about the upside of
unipolarity in my discussion of my theory’s implications for grand strategy in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Implications US Grand Strategy
My dissertation has laid out and tested a theory of the usefulness of conventional military
superiority in the nuclear age. I posit that in nuclear disputes, having more options for
conventional escalation gives a state more bargaining power in a nuclear dispute by shrinking its
resolve-capability gap. This gap is the distance between its level of resolve and the highest
intensity of conflict represented by the conventional option below that level. In this gap,
decision-makers must face the choice between over-escalation, accepting the costs and risks of
sudden nuclear use associated with escalating past their level of resolve, and backing down.
States with more options for conventional escalation are more likely to avoid this gap and force
their adversaries with less conventional options to confront this dilemma. Because the costs of
backing down relative to the costs of over-escalation are higher over core disputes, nuclear
threats should be more effective in disputes over core interests. Therefore, the bargaining
advantage from having superior conventional options should apply most over peripheral
disputes.
The number of conventional options for escalation has in each dispute is determined by
the capabilities that a state has in the area where a dispute takes place as well as by its ability to
rapidly deploy forces into that area. It is hard to know where the next crisis will take place or
what form it might take, and to meet the range of contingencies that a state may face, states are
incentivized to build a variety of conventional weapons platforms. The logic of conventional
options theory therefore argues that the benefit of conventional military superiority in the nuclear
age lies in having a large, diversified military force with forward-deployed troops and rapid
deployability. This presents a paradox of conventional military power in the nuclear age. States
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build larger forces and spend more on defense to capture bargaining advantages over issues on
the periphery of the threat space.
To test the logic of this theory, I first conducted a quantitative overview of disputes
between nuclear states to see if the balance in conventional options affected dispute outcomes. I
used the local conventional balance as a proxy for the balance in conventional options, with the
idea that states with more forces across a range of platforms would have more conventional
options for escalation. I find that, overall, states with local conventional superiority perform
better in nuclear disputes. There is some evidence that this benefit is larger in disputes over
peripheral issues that do not affect a state’s survival, territorial integrity, or strategically vital
areas that impinge on the former. This provides support to the core logic of conventional options
theory that having more conventional options for escalation enhances bargaining power in a
nuclear dispute.
I moved to the Cuban Missile Crisis as my first case study in order to examine the causal
process through which states with more conventional options for escalation obtain better dispute
outcomes. In that crisis, the United States had local conventional preponderance in the
Caribbean. They used this conventional power to escalate to a naval blockade of Cuba that the
Soviets could not respond to. The US then threatened an invasion and air strike of Cuba to
remove the Soviet nuclear-tipped missiles from the island. The Soviets could only respond to this
by using their tactical nuclear weapons stationed with their forces in Cuba. This put Khrushchev
into a decision-making bind: either he risks further escalation and the high costs of tactical
nuclear use or he withdraws the missiles. He chose to withdraw the missiles, and the United
States gave up two concessions to help Khrushchev save face– the non-invasion pledge of Cuba
and removing the Jupiter missiles from Turkey – in exchange.
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The Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates that the core causal process of the theory can operate
in important nuclear disputes. I then apply the theory to the Berlin Crisis. I show here that the
United States was inferior to the Soviet Union in terms of conventional options. However, the
United States was disputing a core interest in the form of the fate of West Berlin, and it was not
so inferior to the Soviets that it had zero conventional options. This allowed the United States to
raise the credibility of its nuclear threat by threatening to engage in a medium-sized conventional
conflict in Germany. This would have caused Khrushchev to escalate to an even larger
conventional war, in which the probability of nuclear use would be quite high. Khrushchev
realized that he could not use his conventional advantage to coerce the Americans in Berlin. A
combination of American resolve and limited conventional options in Central Europe combined
to bring about a successful dispute outcome for the United States in the Berlin Crisis. This
provides moderate support to the logic of conventional options theory, and it indicates how the
conventional options of states with less conventional military power in areas where they have
core interests at stake can support a brinkmanship strategy. The case also serves as a useful
reference point for Cuba. If the side with more conventional options (Soviet Union) did not
succeed in Berlin, why did the side with more conventional options (United States) do so in
Cuba? Cuba was in the Soviet Union’s geographic periphery, while Berlin was in the middle of a
divided Germany, over which both countries’ hopes for the Cold War hinged. There was more
room to use conventional force in Cuba than in Berlin.
Indeed, in disputes over peripheral interests, conventional capabilities will be important
for gaining successful dispute outcomes. The Taiwan Strait Crises show that nuclear threats are
unlikely to be effective over peripheral interests. The United States attempted to use the threat of
tactical nuclear weapons to defend the offshore islands in the First Taiwan Strait Crises. They
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were successful at defending Taiwan, but they could not prevent the capture of the Tachen
Islands, allowing the PRC to accomplish one of its main goals in the crisis. This assessment of
the outcome of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis is more pessimistic than the one shared by US
policymakers at the time. However, it fits with the ICB’s coding of the outcome as being a
stalemate for the US and a partial success for China. The Communist Chinese initiated another
crisis in an attempt to seize Jinmen and Mazu via coercion of the Nationalist Chinese in August
1958. Improved ROC and US naval and air power in the area around the Taiwan Strait allowed
the US to rebuff Communist coercion attempts and raise the costs of seizing Jinmen and Mazu.
This caused the PRC to back off its challenge over Jinmen and Mazu for good. The US was more
successful in achieving the goal of defending the offshore islands in the second crisis. The
implication of this finding is that in peripheral disputes, conventional options for limited
escalation are likely to play a greater role than nuclear threats. The possibility that the United
States had more resolve to defend Jinmen and Mazu than they did to defend the Tachens could
have affected the differential outcome between the two Taiwan Strait Crises, however. This
means that the case gives a moderate amount of support for conventional options theory. The
Taiwan Strait Crises also show that the theory can apply to disputes between nuclear states and
non-nuclear adversaries.
This is helpful for the Gulf War case study which illustrates how a state with
conventional preponderance in the aggregate brings its power to bear on an adversary. At the
beginning of the conflict, Iraq had superiority in conventional options in the Persian Gulf region,
allowing them to take Kuwait and giving them the ability to put the United States into a resolvecapability gap if they invaded Saudi Arabia. However, the United States was able to use its
strategic mobility and forward-deployed forces in the Indian Ocean to send hundreds of
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thousands of troops to the Persian Gulf region in only a few months. This gave them near fullspectrum dominance over the Iraqis in the Gulf War. That level of superiority allowed the United
States to use conventional force in a sufficiently limited fashion that it kept the costs of war
below its level of resolve. It also allowed the US to pursue its maximum objective of destroying
Iraq’s offensive military power. This is why the United States rejected Iraqi concessions
wrangled out of them by the Soviets, who wanted to avoid a war between Iraq and the US-led
coalition. This case shows that the benefit of conventional preponderance lies in the ability to
build conventional options for escalation in several areas around the globe. In turn, this shows
that if states want to be able to respond to a range of contingencies in several areas, they need to
build a large and diversified military force at home and deploy forces abroad.
I summarize how each test provided support, rejected, or qualified my theory in the table
below:
Table 7.1: Summary of Evidence for Conventional Options Theory
Test
Quantitative Analysis

What it showed

Level of support for theory

More conventional options

Moderate

lead to better dispute
outcomes; advantage may
apply more to peripheral
issues
Cuban Missile Crisis

Use of conventional options
can put adversary into
resolve-capability gap; this
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Strong

can force adversary to back
down
Berlin Crisis

Can overcome resolve-

Moderate

capability gap if defending
core interest; conventional
capabilities still play role in
helping US
Taiwan Strait Crisis

Hard to overcome resolve-

Moderate

capability gap over
peripheral interest; better to
build up conventional
capabilities for limited
conflict; can apply to nonnuclear adversaries
Gulf War

Conventional military

Moderate to Strong

superiority benefit comes
through having variety of
capabilities that you can
deploy rapidly (versatility of
military forces)

In sum, the benefit of conventional military superiority in the nuclear age lies in having
more conventional options for escalation than your adversary in areas where nuclear deterrence
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is less likely to be effective. In order to face a range of contingencies and have options for
escalation in particular disputes, states build a commensurate variety of weapons platforms and
capabilities. The benefit of conventional superiority, however, is more likely to apply to disputes
at the periphery of the threat space, presenting a paradox of conventional military power in the
nuclear age. States build more types of weapons, prepare for a wider range of contingencies, and
deploy more forces abroad in pursuit of peripheral objectives. What does this mean for US grand
strategic choices? Should the United States lean into this paradox by building a large, diversified
military, investing in strategic mobility systems, and stationing forces and equipment abroad? Or
should it keep its troops at home and not contest the peripheral objectives over which
conventional options for escalation would be useful?
Answering this key question requires answering two underlying questions. First, over
which objectives are nuclear deterrence likely to be effective, and in which cases are
conventional superiority likely to be useful? Second, would the benefits of achieving advantages
in the latter cases justify the costs necessary to maintain the large, diversified, and diffuse
military force with which you can create conventional escalation options? To the first question, I
argue that the United States can use extended nuclear deterrence to ensure the survival and
territorial integrity of its major allies such as those in Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea.
There are three areas in which conventional options for escalation would be useful in its relations
vis-à-vis Russia and China: maintaining command of the commons, protecting Eastern European
NATO allies, and preventing Chinese aggression against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
To answer the second question, I assess the opportunity costs of defense spending to
accomplish each set of objectives relative to the opportunity costs of giving up the bargaining
advantage conferred by conventional superiority for each of them. At the aggregate level, I argue
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that the United States does not currently face high opportunity costs for maintaining high levels
of defense spending. The opportunity cost of a dollar spent on defense increases as the public
debt becomes harder to service and domestic needs rise. While both areas are becoming more
constraining on the federal budget, interest rates on the debt are still low and it is still possible to
fund social entitlement programs. This means that the United States does not yet face a
meaningful resource constraint on its defense budget at its current level. This could change,
though, if the United States needed to undertake a large increase in defense spending to achieve a
certain objective.
Over the command of the commons, US efforts are worth the benefits it provides,
meaning that the United States should maintain conventional options for escalation in any fight
to keep the world’s waterways and airspace open. For Eastern Europe, the United States would
need to dramatically increase defense spending to gain more conventional options for escalation
than Russia. This would make the opportunity cost of defense spending higher than the
opportunity cost of giving up a bargaining advantage in a dispute over Eastern Europe. The
United States will need to lean on its European allies and try to close the “credibility gap” in
NATO to make its nuclear deterrent more credible. Finally, US efforts to rebuff Chinese attempts
at expansion in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan are worth the security benefits.
The United States currently has several conventional options in East Asia, and no East Asian ally
would be able to provide the naval and air power that the US does in the region. However, China
is becoming more powerful over time, meaning that in the long run, the US will have to increase
its defense spending to keep up with China. Within the next ten years, the US should also focus
on strengthening its allies’ military power in East Asia, which it can do with arms sales and
military advising.
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Conventional options theory says that conventional superiority is most useful over in
disputes over peripheral interests, but these objectives are still important. For command of the
commons and defending the Western Pacific, the benefit of the bargaining advantage conferred
by having more options for escalation is worth the cost to maintain this advantage. For other
objectives, it is not. My recommended force posture would thus be to maintain a strong Air
Force and Navy, keep air and naval forces stationed abroad in East Asia, have a quick reaction
force for rapid deployment, invest in strategic mobility, and scale back deployments of ground
troops overseas, especially in Europe and the Middle East. This would result in a grand strategy
that I call “deep engagement with a light boot print.”
The chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I review the grand strategic options facing the
United States and what conventional options theory says to each side in the grand strategic
debate. Second, I lay out the areas in which superiority in conventional options could be useful
for the United States. Third, I explain the opportunity cost framework for defense spending, and I
apply it to the objectives outlined in the previous section. Fourth, I conclude with a discussion of
what the resulting grand strategy would be by examining the costs and benefits of forwarddeployed forces through the lens of conventional options theory.
At Home or Abroad: The Two Main Force Posture Options Facing the United States
Grand strategy is a “means-end chain” linking the resources a state has to the objectives it
needs to keep it safe from threats. It is a theory about how a state will “cause” security for
itself.807 This theory can be in the form of an explicitly held “grand plan,” or can be implicitly
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stated through a state’s “grand principles” or “grand behavior.”808 The United States can
implicitly or explicitly take one of four choices before it: restraint, deep engagement, liberal
internationalism, and conservative primacy.809 One of the central questions that will guide
American policymakers in this choice is whether forward-deployed conventional forces
contribute to US security and how they do so. On this question, restraint is alone in arguing that
the United States does not need to station forces abroad to the level that it does in order to make
itself secure.810 Advocates of deep engagement argue that forward-deployed conventional forces
undergird the global economic system that provides disproportionate economic benefits to the
United States.811 They also claim that they help to keep the peace in Europe, East Asia, and the
Persian Gulf.812 Advocates of liberal internationalism and conservative primacy go even further
and claim that conventional troops are good for changing regimes and institutions in other
countries.
I do not address the latter contention, and I focus my attention on the central question of
whether forward-deployed forces contribute to stability vis-à-vis great powers. If they cannot do
this, then the bedrock of liberal internationalism and conservative primacy are also undermined. I
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therefore focus only on the debate about the utility of forward-deployed conventional forces
between restraint and deep engagement. Restraint argues that the advantages of geography and
nuclear deterrence keep the United States safe from a major power challenger such as Russia and
China: “Given its geographical advantages and nuclear arsenal, the United States would be very
secure even if Japan, China, and Russia matched its defense expenditures.”813 In addition, US
allies can do the job of balancing against China, Russia, and other regional threats themselves,
especially if they acquire nuclear weapons.814 Continuing to provide security in the form of
forward-deployed forces only encourages NATO and East Asian allies to “free-ride” on US
strength.815 The use of forward-deployed forces to bolster extended nuclear deterrence may keep
major challengers in check, but it raises the chance that the United States would become
entrapped in a catastrophic war. As Barry Posen argues, “one lesson of the Cold War should
therefore be that extended deterrence is a risky business, and the United States ought to have
been glad to shed such commitments after the Soviet Union collapsed.”816 According to restraint,
forward-deployed forces are at the very least redundant given America’s defensive advantages
and potentially counterproductive given their negative effect on allies’ incentives to build their
own military forces and the chances of entangling the United States in a large war.
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Proponents of deep engagement argue that forward-deployed forces enhance US security
by helping to keep the peace in major areas of the globe. Brooks and Wohlforth, instead of
arguing that extended deterrence is a risky endeavor, stress that US alliances are well structured
to deter potential adversaries. One reason this is the case is that “actual US forces are deployed
abroad in order to…increase the speed and firepower of early responses to any use of force,
decreasing the chances for quick victory by adversaries.”817 Hal Brands argues that it is a “robust
US forward presence” that prevents Russia and China from taking actions to alter the status quo
in Europe and East Asia.818 At the very least, forward-deployed troops make the American
nuclear umbrella more credible.819 Moreover, US forward-deployed military power provides the
backbone of the international economic order that disproportionately favors the United States.820
The security and economic benefits of a large and forward-deployed force posture are larger than
the costs of maintaining this force.
What is odd in this debate is that the implications of the utility of extended deterrence are
not fully explored for either side. If it works as well as advocates of deep engagement says it
does, then the United States can reduce its overseas forward presence and still deter Russia and
China. In other words, if nuclear weapons can keep the peace in a region with little US
conventional forces present, then the response of the United States should be to stay in the
extended deterrence business, not leave it. Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky hint at this when they
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argue that “the Cold War’s great power peace…was overdetermined. Nuclear weapons brought a
restraining influence… US engagement was not necessary for peaceful great power relations
during the Cold War.”821 If extended deterrence is difficult to make credible, then the United
States will need to back up its security commitments with extensive conventional options for
escalation. Identifying limitations to the usefulness of nuclear threats indicates that forwarddeployed troops can contribute something tangible to the achievement of certain security goals.
Therefore, adjudicating whether a forward-deployed force posture is beneficial requires
understanding where nuclear threats are likely to be effective and where conventional options are
likely to have their greatest benefit.
Another source of disagreement between restrainers and deep engagers is on whether the
United States can bear the costs of maintaining a large and diffuse military force. Advocates of
restraint argue that the United States’ defense spending prevents it from allocating more
resources to other social and economic problems, such as public health, infrastructure, education,
etc. Lowering the defense budget can free up dollars for these priorities, which would make the
United States stronger in the long run.822 As Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky put it, “the greatest
foreign policy threat to US prosperity is that America will spend too much on the military.”823
Advocates of deep engagement argue that this tradeoff is not real: US defense spending does not
constitute any undue burden on the US economy. Norrlof and Wohlforth, for example, show that
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the US defense budget is not a significant contributor to US sovereign debt.824 The debate over
the costs of a large, forward-deployed conventional force posture brings up the possibility that
the costs of such a force posture may outweigh its security benefits.
The Benefits of Conventional Military Superiority in US Grand Strategy
The debate over US grand strategy brings up two questions: what are the benefits of
forward-deployed conventional forces? And are those benefits worth the costs of maintaining
conventional military superiority? Conventional options theory sheds light on the first question
by showing where and in which contexts conventional options for escalation are likely to be
more successful than nuclear deterrence. The theory predicts that over core interests, states can
use nuclear deterrence to substitute for conventional options for escalation in order to deter an
adversary. Over peripheral interests, conventional options for escalation, and their ability to close
the resolve-capability gap, are more valuable. What constitutes a core interest for the United
States? The most obvious starting point is the survival of the American state and territorial
integrity of the United States mainland. The United States can easily make their adversaries
believe that any serious threat to these objectives would be met with a nuclear response.825 Other
countries in similar situation, such as Pakistan and North Korea, are able to make the threat of
nuclear retaliation believable if their survival were threatened by a conventional attack.826
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A core interest also includes the defense of “strategically vital areas” that, if controlled by
an adversary, could allow them to threaten a state’s survival or territorial integrity. For the
United States, these areas include its coastline on the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, Western
Europe, and Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia. Control over the United States’ near
abroad would give a country the opportunity to invade should it choose to do so. Control over
Western Europe would cause a state to become a regional hegemon on the European continent,
giving it sufficient economic power to harm the US economy and enough military power to
jeopardize US territorial integrity in the future. The same holds true for Japan and South Korea.
If China were to gain control or influence over those countries, that would make it the regional
hegemon in East Asia, giving it enough resources to one day be able to threaten the territorial
integrity or survival of the United States.
In these areas, the US can credibly communicate that the expected costs of overescalation are lower than the expected costs of backing down in a dispute that could affect who
controls them. Evidence from the Berlin Crisis demonstrates that, for these core interests, the
United States does not need to have more conventional options for escalation than its adversary.
For the defense of Western Europe and Japan and South Korea, extended nuclear deterrence is
effective. The Berlin Crisis also indicates that it does help to enhance the credibility of the
nuclear threat if there are enough conventional forces to make any conventional war a large one
in which the chances of nuclear escalation are higher. Would this not indicate that forwarddeployed forces make extended deterrence more effective? I argue no, because today, US allies
in Western Europe and East Asia can provide that level of conventional strength themselves. In
the Cold War, the size of the Soviet military and the existence of an open plain in North
Germany meant that NATO needed to place a lot of conventional forces in Europe in order to
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force the Soviets to escalate to a high-intensity conventional war.827 Without US deployments,
the NATO European allies may not have been able to raise the required forces themselves.
Today, in Western Europe, the main threat is Russia, which has a much smaller military
than the Soviet Union, and Russia would have to first go through Eastern Europe before it
threatened to take control over the western half of the continent. The biggest three European
NATO powers, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have less armored vehicles, artillery
pieces, tactical combat aircraft, and manpower combined than the Russian military.828 However,
these countries have a combined GDP that is greater than 2.5 times that of Russia’s.829 Russia’s
military spending was 3.9% of its GDP in 2019,830 while the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany spent 2.14%, 1.84%, and 1.38% of their GDP on defense, respectively.831 Even with
that, the combined defense budgets of the UK, France, and Germany are greater than Russia’s
defense spending.832 Western European NATO countries have the capacity to spend more on
defense and spend their defense dollars on more firepower. This plus the advantages of
geography mean that the United States’ NATO partners in Western Europe can build the
requisite conventional forces to make a war in Europe costly by themselves.
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China poses a much bigger military threat to Japan and South Korea than Russia does to
Western Europe. Nevertheless, the advantages of geography and the economic strength of South
Korea and Japan mean that they also can build enough conventional capabilities to force China
to escalate to a high-intensity war in order to gain control over East Asia. Eric Heginbotham and
Richard Samuels show that even though the Japanese military is inferior to the Chinese military,
it can use a strategy of “active denial” to prevent a quick Chinese victory, causing the conflict to
be costly to China and giving time for US forces to deploy from the American mainland.833 The
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is enhancing its capabilities in the Korean Peninsula, but the
advantages of being separated by water from China also allow South Korea to engage in
maritime denial of quick gains by China, similar to Japan.834 China could attack South Korea
through North Korea over land, but this would require a high-intensity use of force. East Asian
allies have the requisite forces and capacity to make conventional conflicts costly, forcing China
to escalate to high-intensity war in which US nuclear threats would be more credible. In sum,
America’s key allies already have the large conventional forces that helped raise the cost of war
in the Berlin Crisis. Adding more forward-deployed forces would offer little help in terms of
protecting their territorial integrity and sovereignty.
There are three areas outside of the defense of major allies in which conventional
superiority would have a positive effect on the ability of the US to accomplish its security goals.
The first area is in defense of the “global commons,” or the sea, space, and airspace above
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15,000 feet.835 The foundation of the different grand strategic choices facing the United States is
that it currently commands the global commons.836 A threat by an adversary to contest this
command would have major implications for US foreign policy and any international order it
attempts to implement.837 Examples of a threat to global commons would be an attempt by one
country to gain control over a key waterway for its own use, such as the Straits of Malacca, the
Strait of Hormuz, or the Suez Canal. It could also be an attempt to gain control of some airspace
above 15,000 feet and deny its use to others. In a conflict over these objectives, US threats to use
nuclear weapons would not be credible. If the United States were fighting Russia or China, there
is little reason to think that the United States would risk the fate of its citizens for the sake of
keeping the Straits of Malacca open to transit. Even if the United States were not fighting a
nuclear-armed adversary, the normative and strategic implications of using nuclear weapons for
the first time in 75 years would be too great to justify the benefits of winning the dispute.
Conflicts over control of the global commons are likely to take place in peripheral areas,
and because of this, conventional options for escalation are necessary for the United States to
prevail in these conflicts. Moreover, the United States wants to avoid having to fight a large,
costly conflict in these areas, giving priority to having several conventional options that can keep
the conflict below the United States’ level of resolve. This would have the extra benefit of
forcing the adversary to consider fighting a large-scale war to keep control over a piece of the
global commons or backing off its challenge. Therefore, in fights to defend certain waterways or
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airspaces, the United States will need to lean on its conventional capabilities, making the
possession of more conventional options for escalation than its adversary helpful.
The second area in which conventional options for escalation would add to the United
States’ bargaining power in a conflict is in Eastern Europe. The Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania – and several countries in the Balkans are part of NATO, which has, at its heart, a
collective defense commitment in the form of Article 5. The United States could use nuclear
deterrent threats to make this security commitment credible in the Cold War. However, the fate
of the Eastern European member countries is not as vital to American security as control over the
resources of Western Europe. This creates a “credibility gap” within NATO where the United
States could be willing to risk New York City for the sake of London but a threat to risk Boston
for the sake of Vilnius is not believable. As Joshua Shifrinson writes: “where the United States
could plausibly claim to trade Boston for Bonn prior to 1991, no amount of reassurance can
make the promise to trade Toledo for Tallinn credible today—the stakes of the game are too
low.”838 The incredibility of nuclear use can explain why NATO created a 4,000-strong rapid
reaction force as a way to respond to Russian aggression against the Baltic States.839 That NATO
will need to rely on conventional forces to defend the Baltic States and other Eastern European
members stresses the alliance’s military leaders.840 For a dispute over the Baltics or in other parts
of Eastern Europe, having more conventional options for escalation would provide a security
benefit to the United States.
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The third area in which conventional options would add to US security is in the western
Pacific. This area is related to the first objective of defending command of the global commons
in that it involves the defense of major waterways whose control could have ramifications for the
openness of the global economy.841 However, it also involves quasi-territorial disputes with US
allies and partners in the region, such as the dispute with Vietnam, the Philippines, and others
over island-building in the South China Sea. Against a Chinese challenge to control over Taiwan,
the islands in the South China and East China Seas, or full control over all of these, a US nuclear
response is not credible. In such a conflict, the United States will need to lean on its naval and air
capabilities. Having more conventional options for escalation in these domains would benefit the
US bargaining position over security issues in the South China Sea. Table 7.2 below summarizes
where extended nuclear deterrence is likely to be effective and where conventional options built
by forward-deployed forces are likely to be beneficial.

Table 7.2: Summary of Where Conventional Options Would Yield Security Benefit
Where Nuclear Deterrence is Effective;
Forward-Deployed Forces Unnecessary
• Defense of Western Europe
•

Where Conventional Options are Effective;
Forward-Deployed Forces Helpful
• Maintaining command of the
commons

Defense of Japan and South Korea

841

•

Defense of Eastern Europe

•

Defending western Pacific

To hear a good argument for how a Chinese challenge to these waterways could affect the openness of the global
economy, see Lissner, Rebecca and Rapp-Hooper, Mira. An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for
Twenty-First Century Order. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020.
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The Opportunity Costs of Defense Spending
Would the benefits of forward-deployed conventional forces in the areas just mentioned
outweigh the costs of maintaining those forces? Answering this type of question is often a
subjective enterprise. The costs of military spending are measured in an objective dollar figure,
while there is no objective and discrete measure for “security benefits.” The question could be
asked in a different way, one that is more objective. Does the United States face a resource
constraint in the attempt to provide superior conventional options for escalation in the global
commons, Eastern Europe, and the western Pacific? The way to gauge the resource constraint is
to consider the opportunity costs of defense spending. Each dollar a state spends on its military
could either be saved or spent on other domestic priorities. These opportunity costs can be
weighed against the costs of giving up an advantage in conventional military power in the
regions where it could be helpful. If the United States faces high opportunity costs on defense
spending, then the attempt to gain a bargaining advantage in peripheral areas could be considered
harmful to American prosperity. Estimating the level of opportunity costs associated with
defense spending can therefore be an objective way to measure whether pursuing conventional
superiority in peripheral regions is a net benefit.
I begin gauging the level of opportunity costs associated with defense spending by
specifying that each dollar spent on defense could either be saved (not spent at all) or spent on a
domestic program. The first alternative use of a defense dollar is touted by libertarians who want
to reduce the federal budget and begin decreasing the national debt.842 The other references the
popular “guns vs. butter” tradeoff cited by progressives who seek a way to pay for larger social
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service programs.843 This opportunity cost is not fixed but changes according to economic and
fiscal conditions in a country. For example, studies in defense economics find that defense
spending hampers economic growth and productivity.844 They also find that military spending
results in the creation of less jobs than spending on domestic programs in health care, education,
and clean energy.845 These adverse effects do not have uniform impacts on all countries,
however. China’s GDP growth is already above 6% per year; cutting defense spending in order
to boost growth is only going to have a marginal economic benefit.846 In 2019, the United States
unemployment rate fell from 4.0% to 3.5%, reaching below the presumed level of natural
unemployment in the US847 In that type of jobs environment, who cares if spending less on
defense and more on other defense programs would boost employment? Conversely, if a country
were facing an economic crisis and needed to boost growth and employment, the opportunity
cost of spending on defense would be quite high.
In the US context, the opportunity costs of defense spending can be estimated because a
certain amount of money must go into paying off the interest on the federal debt and to
entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare. As these requirements increase, a
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defense budget that stays at the same level (adjusted for inflation) would take more and more
federal funding away from non-defense discretionary programs. I gauge the opportunity costs
associated with the United States’ defense spending by judging the requirements for servicing
the national debt, providing Social Security and Medicare, and addressing issues at home. Before
going into the rough estimate, it is important to stress that the tradeoff between defense spending
and the alternative use of a defense dollar is between short-term security provision and long-term
preservation of American welfare. As noted earlier, defense spending is at a little over 3 percent
of GDP and adding an extra $50 to $100 billion a year would not bring this figure into the levels
of defense spending by percent GDP seen in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or the Ronald
Reagan presidency.848 On a current, per-year basis, the tradeoff would look small. However, the
consequences of rising public debt and mounting domestic requirements will be felt over the
course of decades. Similarly, most of the benefits of domestic spending and reducing public debt
occur over time and require long-term fiscal commitments. If policymakers chose to spend extra
money on defense every year, it would eventually harm long-run efforts to tackle budgetary and
social problems. Thus, I am comparing the costs of neglecting challenges to long-term prosperity
versus the short-term benefits of forward-deployed forces.
In terms of the national debt, the United States can continue to run high deficits for now,
but it may reach a point in the next couple of decades where the debt becomes a meaningful
resource constraint. Federal debt stands at 78 percent of GDP and is projected to rise to 92
percent of GDP by 2029, more than twice the 50-year average between 1969-2019.849 The
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United States is more insulated from the effects of public debt because interest rates are low. In
addition, the dollar is the international reserve currency, and the United States can issue debt
using that currency.850 However, the interest rate to service the national debt could rise over time.
Payments for interest on the debt could then take more money away from spending on
discretionary items such as infrastructure and education. Plus, it is possible that the United States
is not yet feeling the effects of high public debt. The economies of countries with high levels of
public debt grow more slowly than countries with low levels of debt, and this may be because
more government funds must go towards servicing the debt.851 The United States may start to
feel the downward pressures of debt on growth as it accumulates over time.
Most importantly, increasing defense spending without passing new taxes would increase
the national debt. This would increase the amount of money necessary to service the debt and
may increase interest rates as the government borrows more money and lenders begin to worry
about the US government’s ability to pay them back.852 This means that the opportunity costs
associated with each extra dollar on defense increases as the defense budget increases. The
United States may not be facing a constraint on its ability to borrow money and service its debt
now, but it could in the future, providing a greater opportunity cost to defense spending. Plus,
higher defense spending itself will increase the marginal opportunity costs of an extra dollar
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spent on defense. These are resource constraints to keep in mind when thinking of the
requirements for building conventional options for escalation in peripheral areas.
In terms of spending on social programs, the United States faces rising opportunity costs
as well. This is in large part due to the “Baby Boomer” generation aging into Social Security and
Medicare. All of the baby boomer generation will be over 65 by 2030, increasing the share of
people aged 65 and older in the population to around 20 percent.853 This aging will occur as the
fertility rate is projected to remain at a historically low level of 1.9 children per woman.854 Even
now, the Social Security Administration cannot fund its current level of benefits with taxes and is
using its reserve funds to remain solvent.855 The United States will need to increase entitlement
spending on Social Security and Medicare over the next two decades, which could put a squeeze
on the amount of money available to spend on discretionary budget items. Thus, increasing
domestic demand for social programs is also raising the opportunity costs of dollars spent on
defense.
Does the United States need to use its discretionary spending on non-defense, domestic
efforts? If the share of money allocated to discretionary spending programs is likely to shrink in
the future, but demand for non-defense related projects is projected to be low, then the
opportunity costs of defense spending could still remain manageable. Unfortunately, the United
States’ domestic needs in areas not covered by entitlement spending are growing. The American
Society of Civil Engineers claims that there is a $1.5 trillion “funding gap” for US infrastructure
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that needs to be close by 2025.856 In addition, maintaining a leading economy into the future
requires a large base of people well-skilled in science and mathematics, but American students
rank in the middle of the pack in those subjects.857 The requirements of mandatory social
spending will shrink the amount of discretionary spending that can go towards improving
infrastructure and education. If policymakers choose to pursue the benefits of a forwarddeployed defense posture and spend a high amount of money on defense, the military could take
up a bigger share of discretionary spending. This could reduce the amount of federal dollars
going towards infrastructure and education at a time when the United States should be increasing
its funding of both. This is yet another reason why the opportunity costs of defense spending are
likely to increase for the US over the next two decades.
Overall, the United States is facing growing opportunity costs on its defense spending
due to rising public debt, increasing requirements for entitlement programs, and urgent domestic
needs in infrastructure and education. The United States can maintain its current level of defense
spending for now and do so in the future (as a percentage of GDP). However, any peripheral
security goal that requires the United States to increase defense spending as a percentage of GDP
by any significant margin is likely to prove counterproductive. The opportunity costs of spending
enough on the military to achieve that security goal are probable to be larger than the costs of
giving up a bargaining advantage over that objective. It is with this benchmark in mind that I
assess whether or not stationing conventional forces in the areas where they would be helpful
would provide a net benefit.
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Is the Game Worth the Candle?
In which of the three areas identified above – the global commons, Eastern Europe, and
the western Pacific – would the forward deployment of conventional forces provide a security
benefit larger than the costs of maintaining that deployment? I start by gauging the requirements
for defending the global commons. One important naval mission is to maintain command over
sea lanes of communication (SLOC’s) in the open ocean and at various chokepoints. Performing
this mission on the open oceans requires a technologically sophisticated and large surface fleet
and anti-submarine force that can operate multiple mission simultaneously around the world.858
Fortunately, the United States already possesses such a force, and it has reached an “economy of
scale” with its technological base such that its qualitative superiority in naval forces will be hard
for major rivals to match any time soon.859 Applied to the defense of the open oceans, this means
that China and Russia do not have the submarine capability to wage a sustained campaign to
disrupt transoceanic shipping.860 It is possible that regional powers could lay down mines and
use anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM’s) to close chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz or the
Straits of Malacca.861 The United States, with a little more investment in anti-mine and
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) capabilities so that it could take out any ASCM’s on
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shore, could neutralize these threats. Protecting the maritime portion of the global commons is a
valuable mission well within current US capabilities and capacity to accomplish.
In terms of airspace, it is also possible that the United States could accomplish this within
its means, though with more difficulty. The United States has qualitatively superior aircraft
compared to any country, including major rivals such as Russia and China.862 It has also
improved its suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) capabilities over the years with doctrinal
innovations and investments in new weapons platforms such as the F-16CJ with HARM (highspeed anti-radiation missile) firing capability, the upgraded EC-130H, and the EA-18G.863 In
airspaces outside of Russia and China, the United States’ air-to-air capabilities and ability to
suppress ground-based air defenses should allow it to maintain air superiority with continued
levels of investment and forward deployment.
In the air over Russia and China and in airspace very close to those countries, the United
States faces a “problem of scale.”864 That is, the United States has the ability to shoot down
Chinese and Russian fighters and disable and evade their air defense systems, but it does not
have enough fighters and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft to gain complete control of the skies
over or very near to Russia and China. In the short-term, further investments in building more
fighters and EW aircraft could give the US an advantage in these areas, but it appears that
improvements in air defense are moving faster than the US can keep up.865 However, the United
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States could use its high-end assets to gain temporary advantages in the air over a fixed area to
give time for ground and naval forces to operate unmolested. This could help provide some more
conventional options in a dispute, and it is within current US capacity to provide it. Therefore,
over the medium to long term, it makes sense for the United States to forward deploy naval and
air assets to maintain command of airspace above 15,000 feet across most of the world. In a
conflict very close to or on Russian or Chinese territory (e.g., Taiwan Strait), the United States
will need to accept that it will work in contested airspace and use its forward-deployed assets to
gain any temporary advantage it can.
The difficulties of operating in airspace close to or over the territory of a major power
implies that in certain areas where conventional superiority could be useful, the costs of
conventional capabilities would outweigh their benefits. I argue that this is the case in Eastern
Europe. Against its neighbors, Russia maintains escalation dominance, as illustrated by a quick
glance at the size comparisons between the Baltic NATO states and the Russian armed forces:
18,300 Army and 2250 Air Force troops in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia combined compared to
280,000 Army and 165,000 Air Force troops in Russia.866 NATO supplements this with around
4,000 troops in its Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States plus Poland, with 857 of these
troops coming from the United States.867 Russia maintains a complex integrated air defense
system (IADS) focused around its S-400 and S-300V4 surface-to-air missiles (SAM’s) that make
it difficult for NATO to gain control of the skies in the opening stages of a conflict.868 This, in

The Military Balance, 2020, 100, 122-123, 194. This is a view shared by Lanoszka, Alexander. “Russian Hybrid
Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe.” International Affairs, 92, No. 1 (2016): pp. 175-195.
866

867

The Military Balance 2020, 65.

Bronk, Justin. “Modern Russian and Chinese Integrated Air Defence Systems: The Nature of the Threat, Growth
Trajectory and Western Options.” RUSI: Occasional Papers. January 15, 2020.
https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/modern-russian-and-chinese-integrated-air-defence-systems-nature.
868

331

turn, makes it harder for US and NATO troops to operate on the ground in a conflict or even
enter a conflict zone in the Baltic States or elsewhere in Russia’s near abroad.
To match this, the United States would need to implement a commitment of land and air
forces far greater than its current 23,750 ground troops in Germany and its two fighter wings at
Spangdahlem and Aviano air bases respectively.869 Luis Simón argues that matching the Russian
conventional threat would require “a more permanent and sizable allied military presence in
Central and Eastern Europe.”870 Yet, the Russian capability to threaten its immediate neighbors
is only growing thanks to investments in long-range strike assets, improved C4ISR, and greater
deployability in its armed forces.871 Russia could also engage in hybrid warfare that uses
insurgent tactics to divide a state on its border and then quickly overrun an area to “restore
order” or “liberate” a Russian ethnic minority, similar to what happened in Crimea.872 To try to
match Russia at all levels of conventional conflict in Eastern Europe would prove costly to the
United States. The opportunity costs associated with the increased defense spending to maintain
a large conventional force in Eastern Europe would outrun the benefits conferred by this force. In
addition, it would send an aggressive signal to Russia, possibly raising the risk of war, and the
cost of a great power war would far exceed any momentary security benefit.
Therefore, the United States should focus on having its NATO European allies build one
option for conventional escalation. In response to a Russian fait accompli attempt, they could
create a force of seven brigades, most of them armored, to deny Russia a quick victory in the
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Baltic States.873 As noted earlier, the United States’ NATO allies in Western Europe have ample
capability to provide this level of military force. They can serve as a substitute for the military
power that the US currently brings to bear in the region. The United States can also have a
“managed withdrawal,” providing military assistance to strengthen European forces as it leaves
Western Europe over a period of five to ten years.
In the western Pacific, the US faces a growing challenge from China, but the United
States still has the capability to provide meaningful options for escalation at a reasonable cost.
Investments in ballistic and cruise missiles give China the capability to render US air bases in
Japan and South Korea inoperable in the opening weeks of a conflict over Taiwan. China’s antiship ballistic missiles (ASBM’s) and growing submarine threat will cause US surface ships to
operate farther from the Chinese mainland, decreasing American power projection capability. On
top of this, China enjoys a geographic advantage; it has 39 air bases within 800 km of Taiwan,
while the United States has 2. In any engagement over Taiwan, “PLA forces will become more
capable of establishing temporary local air and naval superiority at the outset of a conflict,” and
“the United States will probably not have the resources to prevent all further erosion of the
balance of military power over the next decade.”874 However, the United States would likely still
win a protracted conventional war over Taiwan, meaning that the US should not fully abandon it.
Rather, it should utilize its advantage in attacking Chinese air bases to make any conflict over
Taiwan costly to China.875 The US can also give military assistance to Taiwan to help it defend
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itself in the opening phases of a war and rely on sending forces from the United States to beat
back Chinese forces in long war.876
In a flashpoint with a major power far away from China’s territory, the United States
military will encounter less challenges to operate. It is within US capacity to bring to bear
superior conventional options in the South China Sea at the outset of a conflict. China poses a
formidable challenge in the South China Sea. Its Southern Theater Navy maintains 18 attack
submarines, two of which are nuclear-powered, 11 destroyers, 19 frigates, 11 corvettes, three
amphibious transport docks (LPD), and ten tank landing ships (LST).877 This is enough for China
to have superiority over all of its regional neighbors in Southeast Asia. In addition to these
surface ships, the PLA’s forward bases on the islands in the South China Sea give it advanced
C4ISR capabilities in the South China Sea, which are critical to the operation of its mainlandbased weapons platforms.878 The involvement of the United States changes this equation. The
Seventh Fleet stationed in Yokosuka, Japan has 1 aircraft carrier, 2 guided missile cruisers, 11
guided missile destroyers, 1 amphibious command ship, 1 LPD, 1 amphibious assault ship, 2
dock landing ships, and 4 mine countermeasure ships (MCO).879 It would also likely use around
8 nuclear-powered attack submarines in a campaign against Chinese surface ships.880
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The US can meet the Chinese threat with only a modest increase in its naval and air
capabilities in the western Pacific. One reason is that issue at dispute in the South China Sea is
whether it will be open to free navigation for the international community. The United States can
underscore the international openness of the South China Sea through daily presence and
frequent Freedom-of-Navigation Operations (FONOPS).881 Such presence and operations are
clearly within US capacity to provide and would not require a large increase in defense spending.
In addition, the United States currently has an advantage in anti-surface warfare against the PLA
Navy (PLAN) due to its superiority in submarine capabilities, and it can gain air superiority in a
conflict in the South China Sea.882 The United States can keep these advantages in the South
China Sea with modest increases in its capabilities in East Asia over time. Thus, in the South
China Sea, US conventional capabilities can provide a security benefit, and providing the
requisite capabilities would not place an undue burden on American society.
In sum, conventional options for escalation provide a benefit in the global commons,
Eastern Europe, and against China in the western Pacific. In the global commons and the western
Pacific, investing in those conventional options is within US means and will not come with high
opportunity costs. This is not the case for Eastern Europe, where Russia has a formidable
geographic advantage that will prove costly for the United States to try to match.
What force posture does this analysis lead to? It suggests that the United States should
continue to deploy its naval and air assets around the world in order to defend its command over
the global commons and to push back against any attempted Chinese revisionism in the South
China Sea, Taiwan, or East China Sea. This will require investment in the Navy and Air Force
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that are congruent with current levels of spending.883 The United States should reduce its ground
troop presence abroad, especially in Europe and the Middle East. In the area where it is
potentially helpful, Eastern Europe, the requirements for gaining a conventional advantage are
too high to justify the benefits. Instead, the United States should lean on its NATO allies to
provide the forces necessary to prevent a quick Russian victory in any conflict in Eastern Europe.
This force posture of forward-deployed naval and air assets with little ground presence shares
more in common with deep engagement than with a grand strategy of restraint. The implications
of my research are that forward-deployed conventional forces provide a security benefit, and
these forces are still a net benefit to the United States in certain areas. However, restrainers are
right to point to the domestic burdens of defense spending. This is why I propose a grand
strategy I call “deep engagement with a light boot print.” Such a grand strategy would keep the
opportunity costs of defense spending manageable, allowing for US conventional military power
to provide a net benefit to American well-being.
Conclusion: Extended Deterrence, Escalation, and the Role of Conventional Power
Major powers armed with nuclear weapons continue to invest in conventional capabilities
and place value on having conventional military superiority in any conflict with their nucleararmed rivals. This is despite the unprecedented power of nuclear weapons and the effect they
have of making great power war, even at the conventional level, highly unlikely. States can
utilize the destructive potential of nuclear weapons to ensure their survival and territorial
integrity as well as deter aggression against allies or valuable areas of the world. However,
brandishing the nuclear sword to achieve a security goal beyond survival or territorial integrity
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brings up a problem of credibility. How do you make an adversary believe the nuclear threat?
How will an adversary respond to your nuclear threats? Would they be willing to engage in a
conventional conflict? If so, could that conflict stay conventional? If it could, would it help to
have a backup option in case deterrence failed?
The logic of escalation articulated by the theory of the nuclear revolution (TNR) predicts
that states can make “threats that leave something to chance,” or a threat to use force which
would start a process that may get out of control. This threat takes advantage of the possibility of
uncontrolled, automatic warfare that nuclear weapons introduce to deter even limited forms of
conventional conflict. I argue that states operate according to an alternative theory of escalation,
one which posits that “a threat that leaves something to chance” is variable in its effectiveness
depending on the type of objective over which it is made. Over certain objectives, conventional
conflict may be possible, and you want to be prepared for that by building conventional options
for escalation. These options are made by having “portfolio superiority,” or superior
conventional capabilities across a range of potential military missions. By making these
preparations and actually using conventional force, you could put your adversary into a “resolvecapability” gap where it must make the choice between escalating past its level of resolve in the
crisis or back down. Conventional options for escalation can make it costly for adversaries to
challenge a state’s interests, encouraging them to back off from any armed aggression or
coercive threat. This logic operates most in the periphery of the threat space where the credibility
of nuclear deterrence is lower.
States are uncertain of where the next crisis will erupt, and they calculate that having
portfolio superiority in these disputes will give them a bargaining advantage. This incentivizes
states to maintain a large, diversified, and forward-deployed military force, or a comprehensive

337

variety of conventional capabilities. A state with a high variety of conventional capabilities
possesses a military force that has several different types of weapons platforms, is qualitatively
and quantitatively competitive in the global balance within those platforms, has an ability to
rapidly send troops into a conflict area, and stations troops around the globe. This presents a
paradox of conventional military power in the nuclear age wherein states invest more in their
power projection capabilities to capture a smaller benefit of conventional superiority than it
conferred in the pre-nuclear era.
Nevertheless, these peripheral interests are only peripheral in relation to the goals of
survival and territorial integrity. These objectives can still be important. This means that states
can use their conventional options for escalation to accomplish important security goals, as seen
in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Gulf War, and the Kargil War. Moreover, when
defending a core interest but facing an adversary that is defending a peripheral interest, a state
may decide to use their conventional options in order to lower the risk of nuclear escalation
while maintaining a bargaining advantage. As this final chapter shows, there are still areas where
the benefits of superiority in conventional options outweighs the costs of gaining and
maintaining that superiority.
This theory can explain two phenomena in the post-Cold War era. First, it can explain
why the United States perceives a benefit for aggregate conventional military preponderance. It
allows it to put conventional capabilities in place around the world such that it can have an
advantage in the number of military missions it can perform in almost any conflict. Under
unipolarity, when the US was the unquestioned sole great power, the United States could do this
without putting an undue burden on itself. Now, as Chinese and Russian military capabilities
grow, unipolarity and America’s conventional advantage are eroding. The US is trying to
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maintain its conventional edge in different areas around the world, but it is finding it increasingly
difficult to do this. This gets to the second phenomenon of the “targeted” conventional arms race
between the United States and its major adversaries, China and Russia. Both sides are building
anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to thwart US power in certain geographic spaces.
These capabilities are also targeted at lower points along the escalation ladder as well. By
making it difficult to conduct air combat missions or for aircraft carriers to operate, these
capabilities prevent the United States from keeping a conflict low on the escalation ladder. They
are forcing the US to consider longer, more intense conflicts in the defense of objectives in
Eastern Europe and the western Pacific.
The behavior of states with nuclear weapons has been one of the dominant questions in
international security scholarship since World War II. This study has identified and attempted to
explain one aspect of that behavior: the interest in gaining conventional military superiority and
the interest of one state, the United States, in maintaining conventional power preponderance.
More research can be done on the role of conventional weapons in the nuclear age. For instance,
do policymakers derive a psychological benefit from knowing they have conventional options?
Do they deter the onset of crises? In addition, more research can be done on what drives states’
decisions to arm. What part of that motivation is explained by security competition? How much
are bureaucratic or domestic politics responsible for the growth of the military? As scholars
attempt to answer these questions, it is the job of policymakers to recognize where conventional
military power could be helpful and then bring investment in conventional capabilities into
congruence with the benefits they provide.
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Appendix: Crisis Summaries, Coding Decisions, and Supplemental Tables
Crisis Summaries
Berlin Crisis, 1961
Note: This entry refers to the entire 1958-1961 episode of the Berlin Crisis, but it focuses on the
military balance in 1961, when the second ultimatum for a peace treaty with East Germany was
issued and then allowed to lapse.
Issue in dispute: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev issued two ultimatums, one in November
1958 and the other in June 1961, declaring that the forces of the Western powers, US, UK, and
France, must exit the city and make West Berlin a “free city” in six months. At the end of that six
months, the USSR would sign a peace treaty with East Germany and hand over all duties of
determining rights of access to its East German ally. The ultimatum itself raised three issues: the
status of West Berlin as a part of West Germany, the position of NATO forces in West Berlin,
the official recognition of East Germany as a state, and the ability of East Germany to control
emigration flows out of its country. Because compromising over the status of West Berlin would
anger the West Germans, the Soviet ultimatum brought into question the fate of West Germany
within the NATO alliance. For the United States, the cohesion of NATO was at stake.884 The
Soviet Union was also attempting to use Berlin as a lever to convince the United States to not
allow the proliferation of nuclear weapons to West Germany.885
Primary goals: For the US, the primary objective was to maintain the status of West Berlin as
part of West Germany, keep NATO troops in the city, and continue to not officially recognize
East Germany. For the Soviets, the primary goal was to change the status of West Berlin into a
free city, obtain official recognition of East Germany, halt the refugee flow out of the GDR, and
prevent nuclear proliferation to West Germany.
Secondary goals: For the United States, the secondary objectives were resisting setting the
boundaries of East Germany, not moving towards de facto recognition of East Germany, and the
having Soviets man the checkpoints into West Berlin/West Germany. For the Soviet Union, the
secondary goals were getting agreement on the boundaries of East Germany and obtaining some
form of de facto recognition of the GDR.
Variety balance: By 1961, the Soviet Union held a slight advantage in the variety of conventional
capabilities in Europe as a whole, and this advantage was greater in the immediate area around
Berlin. In terms of number of troops and armor, the Warsaw Pact held a 2:1 quantitative
advantage while being similar in quality, but this is offset by NATO’s qualitative advantage in
tactical air power, air transport, and naval power. The net result is NATO being slightly weaker
in conventional terms than the Warsaw Pact in Europe. However, because West Berlin was
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surrounded by East German territory, the Soviet Union possessed a bigger advantage in the area
around the city. This made the US and its allies vulnerable to the Soviet Union’s ultimatums.
Outcome: In both 1959 and late 1961, Khrushchev declared that the deadlines for signing a peace
treaty would lapse on the promise of continued negotiations over the status of West Berlin. In
both cases, the negotiations left the status quo intact, with Western troops remaining in the city,
West Berlin remaining part of West Germany, and no recognition for East Germany’s
sovereignty. In August 1961 the Soviets and the East Germans built the Berlin Wall, solving the
East German emigration problem in the Soviets’ favor. In addition, the Kennedy administration
agreed to not let West Germany acquire nuclear weapons, which was also to the Soviets’ liking.
However, this may have occurred as a result of a change in defense policy from the Eisenhower
administration and not as a result of Soviet pressure. Overall, the maintenance of the status quo
in West Berlin meant that the US achieved more of its primary goals than the Soviet Union, with
the latter having attained a “minimum objective.” This is coded as a win for the United States
and a loss for the Soviet Union.
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Issue in dispute: In the summer of1962, Khrushchev ordered the Soviet military to start
transporting nuclear warheads, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM’s), medium-range
missiles (MRBM’s), ground troops, air defenses, and naval power to Cuba as part of Operation
Anadyr. The United States discovered the surreptitious installation of the nuclear missiles on
October 15, 1962. This began a 13-day standoff between the two superpowers over whether or
not the missiles and their warheads would stay in Cuba.
For the United States, the missiles in Cuba could do serious harm to its national security, as it
would them much more vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack. It would also damage its prestige
by sending a message that the US could not respond to an affront in its own backyard. For the
Soviet Union, the withdrawal of the missiles would hamper its ability to accomplish several
foreign policy goals, as it would prevent them from equalizing the nuclear balance and from that
even position negotiate deals on Berlin, disarmament, nuclear testing, etc. However, Cuba lies in
an area that is well inside the Soviet Union’s geographic periphery. A threat to the missile bases
alone or the Castro regime could not turn into a threat against the Soviet Union’s territorial
integrity or survival. The Soviet Union has a core interest in keeping its missiles in Cuba, as it
was connected to negotiations over matters such as Berlin, nuclear testing, etc. What is not
captured in a dichotomous measure is that Cuba lies in the Soviet periphery, perhaps making it
less of a core interest than what the United States had at stake. I explore this possibility and its
implications in my case studies.
Primary goals: For the United States, the primary objective was to secure the removal of the
Soviet missiles in Cuba. For the Soviet Union, the primary goal was to keep their missiles
stationed in Cuba.
Secondary goals: For the United States, keeping the Jupiter missiles in Turkey was a secondary
objective. For the Soviet Union, the secondary goals were to protect Cuba from an American
invasion and to convince the US to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
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Variety balance: The United States held a preponderance of conventional military power in the
Caribbean, giving them many options for the use of conventional force. The Second Fleet could
overwhelm the four Soviet submarines in the area. Close to 250,000 ground troops could swamp
the 42,000 Soviet troops in Cuba. Finally, the US would be able to gain air superiority over the
Soviets and their Cuban allies.
Outcome: On the night of October 27 (early morning of October 28), Khrushchev decided to
withdraw the missiles and their warheads from Cuba along with almost all Soviet personnel and
military equipment. In exchange, the United States made a public pledge to not invade Cuba, and
President Kennedy gave a private assurance, through his brother, the Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, that the US would remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. This balance of
concessions favored the United States. They settled the main issue in dispute in their favor,
thereby solving a grave problem to its security, in exchange for concessions on secondary issues.
Meanwhile, the Soviets achieved their secondary goals in the crisis at the expense of their
primary objective. Thus, I code this as a win for the United States and a loss for the Soviet
Union.
Congo Crisis, 1964
Issue in dispute: The dispute occurred in the midst of the Simba rebellion (Communist
insurgency) against the government of Moshe Tshombe (anti-Communist). In November 1964,
Simba rebels rounded up the remaining white population in the city of Stanleyville and held
them hostage at the Victoria Hotel. This presented the US with two objectives: to free the
hostages and help the Congolese government break the communist rebellion. The Soviet Union
supported the Simba rebels and wanted to see them take over the government in Leopoldville
(Kinshasa).886 For both superpowers, the issue at stake was peripheral.
Primary goals: For the United States, the main goal was to free the hostages in the Victoria Hotel
and to keep the Tshombe government in power. For the Soviet Union, the primary objective was
to help the Simba rebels take over the government in Kinshasa.
Secondary goals: this category does not apply to this crisis, as the US and USSR did not link
other, more minor issues to this already peripheral dispute.
Military balance: Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any ground or air strength
in the area around the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United States, however, had
unrivaled naval strength in the Atlantic Ocean thanks to the Second Fleet. It also had a superior
air transport capability than the Soviet Union. Overall, this meant that the US had a far greater
variety of capabilities than the Soviet Union possessed in the dispute.
Outcome: On November 24, Belgian paratroopers dropped into Stanleyville using American C130 Hercules aircraft to commence Operation Dragon Rouge. They were able to take control of
the airfield, free most of the hostages, and escort them to the airfield for escape. Some hostages
were killed by the Simba rebels. The success of this operation ended up further weakening the
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Simba rebellion, which had already lost ground to the government.887 The Soviet Union became
concerned that this would lead to the end of the rebellion, but they were not able to prevent its
ultimate defeat in 1965. The US, with the aid of the Belgian military, were able to achieve both
of their goals, while the Soviet Union did not accomplish its main objective. I code this as a
victory for the US and a defeat for the Soviet Union.
Sino-Soviet War, 1969
Issue in dispute: On March 2, 1969, Chinese forces attacked Soviet forces across the Ussuri
River for control of Zhenbao Island. Soviet troops counterattacked on March 15 in response in an
effort to retake the island. While these clashes were inconclusive, they initiated a months-long
conflict over the fate of the proper border between the Soviet Union and China. For the latter, the
goal of initiating the crisis was to show Chinese resolve and thereby deter any future Soviet
attacks against its territory. The Soviets’ goal in the conflict was to bring Chinese Premier Mao
Zedong to the negotiating table and give up using force as a means to resolve the border dispute.
The fighting over Zhenbao Island was a lever to open bargaining over larger issues.888 For the
PRC, the issue of future Soviet intervention was a core issue, though the particular issue of
showing resolve and increasing its prestige by defeating Soviet forces in battle was peripheral. In
the end, the primary threat to China and the USSR was one to a piece of territory that was
peripheral to both of them. Whoever controlled Zhenbao Island could not then threaten the
survival or territorial integrity of the other side over the long-term. Thus, I code this as a
peripheral dispute.
Primary goals: For the Soviet Union, the primary goal was to bring Mao to the negotiating table
and to convince the PRC to not use force to redress border issues. For China, the main objective
was to deter the Soviet Union from using force to redress border issues.
Secondary goals: For Soviet Union, the secondary goal was to keep control over Zhenbao Island.
For PRC, the secondary objective was to wrest control over Zhenbao Island and to increase its
prestige/status in the eyes of other communist countries.
Military balance: The Soviet Union held a decisive advantage in terms of conventional variety.
While the PRC had more troops and aircraft, Soviet aircraft was of better quality, and the Soviet
Union possessed more tanks, more air transport, and far more naval power. The Soviet Union
thus had more options for conventional escalation at its disposal than did China.
Outcome: The outcome of the armed confrontations around the Ussuri River were inconclusive.
The Chinese resisted Soviet demands to negotiate for months, even as Soviet threats to use
nuclear weapons escalated. After American CIA Director Richard Helms told the press in August
that the Soviet Union was contemplating a nuclear attack on China, Mao took Soviet nuclear
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threats more seriously. He even put Chinese nuclear forces on alert on October 18. He finally
agreed to go to the negotiating table on October 20, 1969. China did not deter any Soviet
belligerence, and the Soviet Union was able to get Mao to agree to negotiate over border issues.
China did show resolve against Soviet forces and held onto Zhenbao Island for a few months, but
it ultimately ended up back in Soviet hands. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union accomplished its
main objectives while China did not. I count this as a victory for the Soviets and a defeat for
China.
Cienfuegos Dispute, 1970
Issue in dispute: During the summer of 1970, the Soviet Union attempted to build a naval base in
Cuba at the port of Cienfuegos. This base would be used to support submarines that were
travelling in the area. The United States discovered the construction of naval base facilities via
U-2 overflights in August. On September 25, in a press leak and a subsequent press conference,
the United States demanded that the Soviet Union honor their commitment under the deal to end
the Cuban Missile Crisis and cease work on the base at Cienfuegos.889 For the United States, this
was a threat to their military power in their own backyard, but the Soviet Union could not use a
small submarine base in Cuba as a way to threaten the United States’ territorial integrity or
survival. It therefore does not rise to the level of a core interest for the US For the Soviet Union,
this was a threat to their power projection capability and alliance relationship with Cuba, which I
count as a peripheral issue.
Primary goals: For the United States, the primary goal was to convince the Soviets to not
establish a submarine base in Cuba. For the Soviet Union, the primary objective was to set up a
submarine base at Cienfuegos.
Secondary goals: Neither side linked other issues to the dispute, so this category does not apply
here.
Military balance: Similar to 1962, the United States had clear superiority in conventional military
power in the Caribbean. This predominance gave the United States several options for
conventional escalation should the Soviets proceed with work on the naval base. The Soviets
would have had no recourse to conventional military options to counter American moves.
Indeed, they had less conventional strength in the area during this dispute than they had in the
Cuban Missile Crisis.
Outcome: On October 6, Soviet Ambassador to the United States and Central Committee
member Anatoly Dobrynin told Henry Kissinger that the Soviet Union would not be building a
naval base in Cuba. A week later, a report in the Soviet newspaper TASS denied that the USSR
had any intention of building a naval base at Cienfuegos.890 The US was able to get the USSR to
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quickly back down on the key issue of whether or not they would construct a submarine base in
Cuba. I count this as a victory for the United States and a loss for the Soviet Union.
War of Attrition, 1969-1970
Issue in dispute: The dispute began as a conflict between Israel and Egypt when the latter started
shelling Israeli defensive positions in the Sinai known as the Bar-Lev Line.891 By early 1970,
Israeli air raids into Egyptian territory were wearing down the Egyptian military and
undermining Gamel Abdel Nasser’s authority. The “nuclear” phase of the crisis began in March
1970 when the Soviet Union deployed an air defense system (along with the troops to operate it)
to its Egyptian ally. This pitted two nuclear powers, Israel and the Soviet Union, against each
other. The issue at stake here was whether the Egyptian military would stop Israeli air raids into
its territory and whether it would be able to destroy the fortifications along the Bar-Lev Line. For
Israel, the key objectives were defending the Bar-Lev Line and continuing air raids to degrade
Egypt’s military capability. For the Soviet Union, this was a peripheral issue, but it was a core
issue for Israel, as the success of the Egyptian military could jeopardize its survival and
territorial integrity.
Primary goals: For Israel, the primary goals were to maintain its control over the Sinai, preserve
the Bar-Lev Line, and keep the ability to conduct air raids into Egyptian territory. For the Soviet
Union, the primary goal was to help Egypt retake the Sinai, prevent Israeli air raids into Egyptian
territory, and destroy fortifications along the Bar-Lev line.
Secondary goals: The crisis actors did not link other minor issues to the primary issues listed
above. One secondary goal could be the destruction and removal of some fortifications for the
Soviet Union. For Israel, a secondary goal could be the maintenance of the territorial status quo
frozen for a specific time period.
Military Balance: The balance of variety in this case was about even. In terms of land and air
warfare, Israel was superior. It had over 75,000 troops compared to the 17,500 the Soviets had
deployed, and it possessed tanks and armored vehicles while the Soviet contingent did not. It
also had at least twice as many tactical aircraft as did the Soviet troops. However, the Soviet
Union possessed far more transport aircraft for sending more supplies to the area, and it had an
extensive naval capability in the form of the Black Sea Fleet that it could deploy to the Eastern
Mediterranean. This balances out to slight Israeli superiority or slight Soviet superiority
depending on how you code the exact number of tactical fighters.892
Outcome: On August 7, 1970, US Secretary of State William Rogers brokered a ceasefire which
froze hostilities and kept each side’s positions in place. This left the deeper issue of control over
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the Sinai unresolved. It represented a compromise for both sides in terms of immediate goals.
The Israeli fortifications remained intact, but they could no longer conduct air raids into Egypt.
Egypt was safe from Israeli raids, as the Soviet Union desired, but it could no longer shell the
Bar-Lev Line, jeopardizing its ability to undermine Israeli control over the Sinai. This ceasefire
kept tensions at a low simmer until the Yom Kippur War of 1973. For Israel, this deal froze the
status quo but kept open the possibility of Egyptian attacks in the near future, accomplishing a
secondary goal but not its primary ones. For the Soviet Union, this deal protected Egypt from
Israeli air raids but prevented from attacking Israel and retaking parts of the Sinai in the short
term. This partially accomplished one primary goal at the expense of others. Due to the
ambiguous nature of the ceasefire’s effects, I code this a draw for both the Soviet Union and
Israel.
Yom Kippur War Confrontation, 1973
Issue in dispute: The Yom Kippur War was a conflict in October 1973 between Israel on one
side and Egypt and Syria on the other. The Soviet Union supported Egypt and its Syrian ally in
the conflict while the United States backed Israel. The dispute in this dataset refers to the
confrontation the US and the Soviets had in the Mediterranean during the conflict. On October
24, in a bid to save its beleaguered Egyptian ally, the Soviet Union deployed its Black Sea Fleet
into the Mediterranean Sea and readied 7 airborne divisions for intervention into the conflict.893
The United States responded by having the Sixth Fleet confront the Soviet vessels and by
readying its nuclear forces to DEFCON 3. The United States also pressured Israel to agree to a
ceasefire that would freeze its gains in the Six Day War in 1967. The United States wanted to
prevent Soviet intervention in the Middle East and get the two sides to cease hostilities.894 The
Soviet Union wanted to intervene in the conflict while also saving its Egyptian ally from further
harm. For both sides, the outcome would not harm survival or territorial integrity in the future,
making it a peripheral dispute.
Primary goals: For the United States, the primary goals were to prevent Soviet intervention in the
Yom Kippur War and to obtain a ceasefire to end the war. For the Soviet Union, the primary goal
was to intervene in the Yom Kippur War to defend Egypt.
Secondary goals: For the Soviet Union, the secondary goal was to obtain a ceasefire that left
Egyptian military power intact. The United States did not link other issues or state any secondary
goals.
Military Balance: The balance in conventional variety slightly favored the United States, mostly
due to its superior naval strength in the Mediterranean. The Americans also had better air
transport capabilities for deploying troops to the region if the need arose. The Soviets countered
this with a quantitative advantage in tactical air power and land power. The latter, however, was
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not that relevant to the crisis. Overall, this made for a small advantage for the United States in
terms of conventional options for escalation.
Outcome: On October 26, 1973, the US and the USSR spearheaded a ceasefire resolution
through the UN Security Council, halting the war. This prevented the Soviet Union from
intervening in the conflict and kept the Egyptian Third Army, which had been encircled by
Israeli forces, from being overrun. It also led to Israel respecting the post-1967 boundaries. The
United States managed to prevent Soviet intervention and obtain a ceasefire that ended the war.
The Soviet Union was unable to accomplish its main objective of intervening in the crisis, but it
was able to protect the Egyptian military from further destruction. The United States
accomplished all of its primary goals, while the Soviet Union accomplished a secondary goal at
the expense of a primary one. Considering the balance of outcomes, I code this as a victory for
the US and a loss for the USSR.
War in Angola, 1975
Issue in dispute: After independence in January 1975, Angola quickly broke down into civil war
between three factions, the FNLA, the MPLA, and UNITA. My entry in the dataset refers to the
dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States over which faction would win the civil
war and control the government of Angola. The United States wanted the FNLA to emerge
victorious, but the Soviet Union supported the communist-leaning MPLA. For both countries,
the issue in dispute was peripheral.
Primary goals: For the United States, the main goal was to secure victory for the FNLA. For the
Soviet Union, the main objective was to have the MPLA gain control over the government in
Luanda.
Secondary goals: There are none for this crisis because neither crisis actors linked other minor
goals to this already peripheral dispute.
Military balance: At the time the civil war started, the United States had superiority in terms of
conventional options in the area around Angola. This is only because the US had a naval
presence in the Atlantic where the Soviets did not. Neither of the superpowers had any land or air
power deployed to sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is good to note that the Soviet Union sent a
lot of military equipment to the MPLA during the civil war and eventually sent a small naval
force to the Angolan coast. The United States provided military aid to Zaire that it would then
use to support the FNLA.
Outcome: On December 19, 1975, the US Congress declined to give aid to Zaire or the FNLA.
NATO declined to give aid as well. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, along with its Cuban ally,
continued to give military assistance to the MPLA. By February 1976, UNITA and the FNLA
called a retreat and a strategy of guerilla warfare, cementing the MPLA as the legitimate
government of Angola. The United States failed to bring about an FNLA victory, while the
Soviet Union successfully aided the MPLA. I count this as a victory for the Soviet Union and a
loss for the United States.
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979
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Issue in dispute: The dispute here refers to the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in
December 1979 and the immediate diplomatic aftermath between the USSR and the US. On
December 24, 1979, Soviet troops entered Kabul in order to depose the problematic communist
Afghani President Hafizullah Amin and replace him with a more compliant leader, Babrak
Karmal.895 This triggered a crisis for the United States, as they feared that the Soviet Union could
turn Afghanistan into another satellite state, creating a springboard for the Soviet military to
launch other adventures in the Middle East.896 The Soviet Union’s primary goal was to keep
troops in the country to defeat the Afghan insurgency and stabilize the new Karmal regime. Its
secondary interests were to enhance its prestige in South Asia and the Middle East. The United
States wanted the Soviet Union to withdraw forces from Afghanistan so that it could not threaten
the Persian Gulf or Pakistan. Its secondary priorities were to limit the growth of Soviet influence
in the Middle East. For the Soviet Union, the fate of Afghanistan was important, but a threat to
its survival or territorial integrity would be hard-pressed to arrive through there. It does not rise
to the level of a core interest, making it a peripheral dispute. The presence of Soviet troops was a
peripheral interest for the US.
Primary goals: For the United States, the main objective was to convince the Soviet Union to
remove its troops from Afghanistan. For the Soviet Union the primary goals were to overthrow
the Amin regime and to keep its forces in Afghanistan.
Secondary goals: For the United States, the secondary goal was to brand the Soviet intervention
as illegitimate in the eyes of the international community and limit the growth of Soviet power
and prestige in the Middle East and South Asia. For the Soviet Union, the secondary goal was to
increase its power position and status in the Middle East and South Asia.
Military balance: The Soviet Union had notable superiority in the number of conventional
options in the area around Afghanistan. In the Southern Military District in 1979, the Soviet
Union had over 240,000 troops, 650 combat aircraft, and 6000 main battle tanks. The United
States had none of these in South Asia or the Gulf region at this time. The US offset this with
better transport aircraft and a modest naval presence, but that was not nearly enough to
compensate for Soviet dominance in land and tactical air power.
Outcome: The Soviet Union was able to install Karmal as the new leader of Afghanistan and
establish a large troop presence in the country. However, this did not translate into greater
prestige in the region. The United States was unable to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw
from Afghanistan despite whipping up intense international diplomatic pressure. The United
States did, however, marshal countries in the region to resist the Soviet intervention. Because the
Soviet Union accomplished its primary objective in the short term while the United States did
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not, I label the outcome a Soviet victory and an American loss despite the US achieving a
secondary objective.897
Able Archer Incident, 1983
Issue in dispute: Between November 2 and 11, 1983, NATO conducted a theater-wide exercise
designed to simulate a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union in response to a Soviet
conventional invasion of Western Europe. The Soviet Union misperceived this exercise as a
smokescreen for preparing for a surprise first strike. The KGB informed its agents in Western
Europe to be on high alert for any evidence that a nuclear attack was about to start.898 The Soviet
Union also put its nuclear forces on high alert on November 8-9 in preparation for an attack. The
Soviet Union wanted to prevent a nuclear attack by the US and its NATO allies. The United
States wanted to stop the Soviets from launching its nuclear arsenal based on a total
misperception. Due to the potentially serious nature of the Soviet miscalculation that could have
threatened the survival of the US and the USSR, I code this a core issue at stake for both sides.
Primary goal: For the United States, the primary objective was to prevent the Soviets from
launching a nuclear strike based on a misperception. For the Soviet Union, their main goal was to
prevent a nuclear first strike from the United States.
Secondary goal: There was little to no diplomacy during this crisis, meaning the crisis actors did
not have the opportunity to link other issues to the primary objectives.
Military balance: The conventional balance was one of rough equivalence in the number of
conventional options. The US and NATO had increased the number of troops, main battle tanks,
and combat aircraft stationed in Western Europe relative to the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet
Union. The latter still had superiority in all those categories, however. NATO had superiority in
transport aircraft, surface combatants, and was tied in submarines. This translated into a rough
stalemate in terms of conventional options, with the Soviets having land superiority but naval
inferiority, while a stalemate held in the air. The ambiguity of the conventional balance is
reflected in the debate over NATO conventional war strategy at the time.899
Outcome: The war scare fizzled out once the exercise ended on November 11. Because the
United States was never actually planning any imminent nuclear strike, there was effectively
nothing to dispute over in the end. The only scare came from a Soviet misperception. Neither
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side launched nuclear weapons, fulfilling each country’s main objectives. I therefore label this
ultimate outcome a draw for both sides.
Kashmir Dispute, 1990
Issue in dispute: In the late 1980’s, Pakistan started giving more military and financial support to
Kashmiri rebels fighting for independence from India. This triggered a dispute with India after
Indian forces killed 50 pro-independence protestors on January 13.900 Over the next four months,
each side escalated their rhetoric and mobilized troops along the Indo-Pakistani border,
particularly along the Line of Control (LOC). India mobilized 200,000 troops while Pakistan
mobilized 100,000. India wanted to coerce Pakistan into ceasing its support for the Kashmiri
insurgency and prevent a Pakistani attack across the LOC. Pakistan wanted to deter an Indian
attack onto Pakistani territory.901 Kashmir is important for both sides, but control over the
province would not give one side the ability to threaten the survival or territorial integrity of the
other. I code this as a peripheral interest that does not quite rise to the level of a core interest.
Primary goals: For India and Pakistan, the main issue in dispute was whether the current Line of
Control would remain in place.
Secondary goals: For India, the secondary goal was to have Pakistan halt its aid to insurgent
groups in Indian Kashmir. For Pakistan, the secondary objective was to be able to continue its
support to anti-Indian forces in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir.
Military balance: India held just more than a 2:1 advantage in terms of conventional capabilities.
India had a little over 1.2 million troops in its military, with Pakistan having slightly less than
600,000. This ratio was similar in combat aircraft (760 to 440), main battle tanks (3150 to 1850),
and principal surface combatants (27 to 13). India was dominant in transport air. This translated
into more conventional options for escalation for India.
Outcome: On May 20-21, Deputy Director of the CIA Robert Gates and the National Security
Council aide for South Asia, Richard Haass, went to India and Pakistan to convince both sides to
back down from their mobilization. Their diplomacy worked. Pakistan agreed to shut down their
training camps for Kashmiri militants and pull their troops back from the border. India agreed to
withdraw their troops as well and invited a US military attaché to visit Kashmir to see that an
Indian invasion was not imminent. However, Pakistani support for the insurgency continued in
other ways, leaving the larger conflict unresolved. This meant that both sides achieved their
primary objective of keeping the territorial status quo intact. Both countries also had mixed
success on their secondary objectives. Due to the mutual nature of de-escalation around the LoC
and the unresolved nature of the overall dispute regarding Pakistani support for insurgents, I
code this outcome as a draw for both sides.
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1995-1996
900
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Issue in dispute: On May 22, 1995, the US issued a personal travel visa for Taiwanese President
Lee Teng-hui to visit the country. This angered China, which argued that it threatened Chinese
sovereignty and cross-strait relations. China retaliated by holding a series of military exercises
and missile tests in and near the Taiwan Strait, the first one occurring in July 1995 and
continuing through March 1996. The goal for China was to undermine the authority of the
Nationalist and pro-independence Lee Teng-hui in the hopes that he would lose the 1996
presidential election (Taiwan’s first). The United States responded to China’s provocative
military actions by sending the USS Nimitz, an aircraft carrier, into the Taiwan Strait in
December 1995 and a full carrier strike group through the Strait in March 1996 on the eve of the
election. The US goal was to shield Taiwan from Chinese coercion, protect the integrity of its
election, and convince China to stop conducting its missile tests. I code this as a core interest for
China and a peripheral one for the United States.
Primary goals: For the United States, the main objective was to stop Chinese missile tests in and
near the Taiwan Strait and to support an environment in which the Taiwanese elections could go
forth. For China, the main goal was to create an atmosphere in which the Taiwanese elections
either could not occur or Lee Teng-hui lost.
Secondary goals: No minor issues were linked to this dispute by the crisis actors, making this
category not applicable.
Military balance: The United States held a large qualitative advantage over the Chinese military,
especially in air and naval power. The US had less troops in the area, with China having over
225,000 in its Eastern and Southern Military Districts and the US having 90,000 in Japan, South
Korea, and the Seventh Fleet combined. The US had over 400 combat aircraft to the PLAAF’s
900, but the US planes were much newer and their pilots better trained. Most importantly, the US
had over 34 principal surface combatants that it could deploy to the area, while the PLAN had
28, and the American ships were much more advanced. The US also had an advantage in antisubmarine warfare.
Outcome: The Taiwanese election went on smoothly on March 23, 1996, with President Lee
Teng-hui winning. Chinese military exercises finished on March 25, as scheduled. This outcome
cemented Taiwan as an independent entity apart from Mainland China (though not as an
independent country in its own right). It also marked the transition of Taiwan from an autocracy
into a democracy. The United States accomplished its primary goals while China did not. I code
this outcome as a loss for China and a victory for the United States.
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests, 1998
Issue in dispute: On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests as a way of
showing its overt nuclear capacity to its main rival, Pakistan, and the rest of the world. This
triggered a crisis for both countries, as pressure mounted on both sides from the international
community and each other to not conduct any further nuclear tests. Due to the threat to survival
that a mutual overt nuclear capability represented to each side, I code this as a core issue for both
India and Pakistan.
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Primary goal: The primary goal for India was to use the pressure generated by its nuclear tests to
get Pakistan to agree to a no first-use agreement and to prevent them from testing their own
nuclear weapons. For Pakistan, the primary objective was to have India not test any further
nuclear weapons.
Secondary goal: A secondary objective was to have a temporary pause in nuclear testing for both
sides.
Military balance: India held an advantage in the variety of conventional capabilities. While the
numbers of troops, tanks, aircraft, and surface combatants were slightly different, they were not
systematically different from those in 1990. India still held a roughly 2:1 advantage in overall
capabilities, giving it superiority in the variety balance.
Outcome: On May 21, India publicly proposed a mutual no first-use agreement with Pakistan as
a way of defusing pressure. This did not work, as Pakistan conducted six underground nuclear
tests of its own on May 28 and May 30. On June 11, Pakistan announced that it would start a
moratorium on nuclear testing, and it invited other countries, namely India, to formalize this
arrangement. Both sides were able to test their nuclear weapons during the crisis and were able
to agree to a moratorium on testing to end it. India failed to accomplish its main objective of
preventing Pakistani nuclear tests and getting a no first-use agreement. Pakistan failed to stop
India from testing its second nuclear weapon on May 13. However, both sides agreed to a testing
moratorium that accomplished their secondary goal. I count this as a draw for both countries.
Kargil War, 1999
Issue in dispute: In late 1998 or early 1999, Pakistani forces of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI)
began infiltrating into Indian territory across the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil-Dras sector
of Kashmir.902 By early May, they had captured a 150-km swath of territory that overlooked the
main highway linking Kashmir’s capital, Srinagar, with the rest of India (National Highway 1-A,
or NH1-A). Pakistan did this in the hopes of taking some territory in Kashmir away from India
and attracting international mediation that would broker a deal that revised the status quo in
Kashmir by setting a new LoC.903 India wanted to maintain the integrity of the LoC by pushing
Pakistani troops back across it. The territory in question, while important, was not a major piece
of land to either side that would then shift the balance of power decisively in India or Pakistan’s
favor. I therefore regard the stakes involved as peripheral interests for both sides that do not quite
reach the level of core interests.
Primary goal: For India, the primary objective was to eject Pakistani forces from the Indian
portion of Kashmir. For Pakistan, the primary goal was to revise the territorial status quo in its
favor by gaining control over a portion of Indian Kashmir.
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Secondary goal: For India, a secondary goal could be getting a pledge from Pakistan to not
conduct future incursions across the LoC. For Pakistan, a secondary objective could be a smaller
revision to the territorial status quo than it was hoping for.
Military balance: Similar to 1990 and 1998, India held about a 2:1 advantage in overall
capabilities. India possessed 1.187 million troops to Pakistan’s 587,000, 733 combat aircraft to
Pakistan’s 305, 3400 battle tanks to Pakistan’s 2300, 230 transport aircraft to 19 for Pakistan, 26
surface combatants (including one aircraft carrier) to 10 for Pakistan (no aircraft carrier), and 16
submarines to Pakistan’s 9. This gave India greater conventional variety in the Kargil War.
Outcome: India faced hard fighting up steep mountain slopes to dislodge the Pakistani forces,
and Indian leaders chose not to cross the LoC during the war in a bid to keep the support of
international public opinion. This led to slow progress and the threat of military failure.
However, on June 20, Indian forces, with the help of air support, regained the highest point in the
Kargil sector, the Tololing Ridge. By early July, Indian forces had taken back many key posts
and were inflicting heavy losses on Pakistani forces.904 Under pressure from the deteriorating
military situation, the United States, and the international community, Pakistani President Nawaz
Sharif announced in a speech on July 12 that all Pakistani troops would retreat back across on the
LoC. They finished doing so on July 26, formally ending the Kargil War. India accomplished its
main objective of defending the territorial status quo and expelling Pakistani troops out of Indian
Kashmir. Pakistan failed to accomplish its primary goal of taking territory in Indian Kashmir and
revising the LoC. I code this outcome as a win for India and a loss for Pakistan.
Indian Parliament Terrorist Attack and Operation Parakram, 2001-02
Issue in dispute: On December 13, 2001, jihadist terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament and
killed five Indian security guards before getting killed themselves. In response, India launched
Operation Parakram, a mobilization of more than half a million troops along the India-Pakistan
border in Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan. The goal of this operation was to compel Pakistan to
renounce terrorism, release twenty criminals suspected of being in Pakistan, shut down terrorist
training camps in Pakistan, and stop militant infiltration from Pakistan into Kashmir.905 Pakistan
wanted to maintain its strategy of using terrorist proxies to harm India and undermine its control
over Kashmir. It also wanted to force new negotiations over the issue of Kashmir. Pakistan
responded to Parakram with its own mobilization of troops to the border. The Indian Parliament
attacks thus sparked a tense, months-long standoff between two sides over thorny, open-ended
issues. The presence of hundreds of thousands of troops on either side of the Indo-Pakistani
represented a threat to survival and territorial integrity, constituting a core interest for both sides.
Primary goals: For India, the main objective of the crisis was to coerce Pakistan into halting its
support for terrorist groups in India and Kashmir. For Pakistan, the main objective was to
continue supporting terrorist groups’ activities in India.
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Secondary goals: For India, the secondary goals were to secure the release of criminals suspected
of hiding in Pakistan and to show resolve against Pakistan in the wake of a terrorist attack. For
Pakistan, the secondary objectives were to show resolve against India in the wake of the Indian
Army’s mobilization.
Military balance: The conventional balance remained largely unchanged from 1999 to 2001-02,
with India holding a 2:1 advantage in overall strength. This translated into superiority in
conventional options for India.
Outcome: In January 2002, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf publicly declared that he
would ban the jihadist groups responsible for the Parliament attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-eMohammad. The troops of both sides remained mobilized, however, and the other issues India
identified remained unresolved. On May 14, 2002, another intense phase of the crisis began as
jihadist terrorists from Pakistan launched an attack on Indian troops at Kaluchak in Jammu,
killing 32 people. The mounting tensions prompted US involvement. In early June, American
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage secured a promise from Musharraf to not allow
militants across the border in Kashmir. In October, both sides started demobilizing and
withdrawing from the border. The underlying situation in Kashmir remained unresolved, and
despite Pakistan’s pledge, it appears that they did not act to stop insurgents from crossing the
LoC. India received a pledge from Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist groups and allowing
militants to cross the LoC in Kashmir, but this was only a partial fix to the problem of Pakistani
support for terrorist activity in India. Pakistan had to renounce its ties to terrorist groups publicly,
but it appears that it maintained some ties to militant groups after the crisis. This is also an
ambiguous and partial achievement of its primary objectives. Due to the unresolved nature of the
issues in dispute, I label the outcome a draw for both India and Pakistan.
Russian-Georgian War, 2008
Issue in dispute: Russia and Georgia fought a military conflict over the fate of South Ossetia.
That province, along with Abkhazia and Adzharia, are internationally recognized as belonging to
Georgia yet want to break away and become a part of Russia. This triggered a conflict between
Georgia and the three provinces, with the rebels in South Ossetia and Abkhazia being backed by
Russia. On August 7, 2008, Georgian forces attacked South Ossetian separatist forces and
Russian peacekeepers in an effort to take control over the breakaway province and reintegrate it
into Georgia.906 A day later, Russian forces attacked Georgian troops in South Ossetia. The aim
of Russia in this conflict was to establish further control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and
convince the United States and Europe that Georgia could not become integrated into NATO or
the EU. The United States did not directly contest Russia, but it sought to convince Russia to
restore the status-quo ante before the war with regards to the breakaway provinces. For Russia,
the strength and foreign policy of a country directly on its border was important, but control over
the breakaway provinces could not mutate into a threat to territorial integrity or survival,

Kofman, Michael. “The August War, Ten Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War.” August 17,
2018. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-therusso-georgian-war/
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meaning it does not quite rise to the level of a core interest. For the United States, this was a
peripheral interest.
Primary goals: For the United States, the primary goal was to have Russian troops leave Georgia
and restore the status quo in the breakaway provinces. For Russia, the primary goal was to gain
further control over the breakaway provinces, effectively expanding Russian territory. It also
aimed to show Georgia and other countries that they had little to gain from integration with
NATO and other Western organizations.
Secondary goals: For the United States, a secondary goal could be continuing international
recognition that Russia’s control over the breakaway provinces is illegitimate. For Russia, a
secondary objective could be obtaining minor revisions to the status quo in the breakaway
provinces.
Military balance: In the Caucasus and Southeast Europe, Russia held a conventional advantage.
On land, it had troops and tanks stationed near Georgia while the United States had none. It was
superior in the air as well, with more combat aircraft than the US had in the form of the fighter
squadrons in the Sixth Fleet. The naval balance was roughly even with the US with the
Americans having more submarines but less surface combatants. The United States’ surface
combatants were of better quality, however. The United States had superiority in air transport.
Overall, Russia was the side with better conventional options.
Outcome: Over the course of five days, Russian forces handed the Georgian military a string of
defeats and occupied major towns in South Ossetia. Russia and Georgia signed a ceasefire on
August 15, ending the war. Russian forces remain stationed in the two provinces, and they
successfully repulsed Western efforts at further integrating Georgia into the Western orbit.907
The international community did not recognize Russia’s territorial control over the breakaway
provinces, treating Russian authority there as illegitimate. Russia therefore accomplished its
main goal at the expense of a secondary one. The United States accomplished a secondary goal
but did not accomplish its primary objective. I label this as a victory for Russia and a loss for the
United States.
Scarborough Shoal, 2012
Issue in dispute: The Philippines and China dispute sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal, an
island in the South China Sea. On April 10, 2012, this disagreement boiled over into a
militarized dispute when the Philippine Navy starting boarding Chinese fishing vessels and citing
them for illegal fishing. In response, China asserted that it had sovereignty over the area and sent
two maritime surveillance ships to protect the fishing vessels from arrest by Philippine forces.908
China’s goal was to assert control over the Scarborough Shoal and eventually bring it de facto
into its jurisdiction. The goal of the United States was to defend the Philippines’ right to access
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the shoal and buttress its claim to sovereignty over the island. Control over the shoal could not
lead to a territorial or existential threat later, making it a peripheral interest for both sides.
Primary goal: For the United States, the main objective in the crisis was to prevent China from
extending its authority further into the South China Sea and to preserve Filipino access to fishing
around the shoal. For China, the main objective was to take control of the Scarborough Shoal and
to assert greater control over the South China Sea as a whole.
Secondary goal: For the United States, the secondary goal was to keep the South China Sea an
open waterway for navigation, delegitimizing China’s claims of sovereignty in the process. For
China, a secondary goal was to deter US intervention into South China Sea disputes and to gain
legitimacy for its authority in the South China Sea.
Military Balance: The United States had mild superiority in conventional variety in the area.
China had more troops stationed nearby, but the United States had a similar number of combat
aircraft that could reach the area. China held a quantitative advantage in surface combatants, but
the US made up for this with a qualitative naval advantage. The US also had superiority transport
aircraft. Overall, this gave the US slight superiority.
Outcome: In mid-May, a US submarine stopped in Subic Bay to underscore US-Philippine
military ties.909 On June 15, the coming of monsoon season spurred both countries to agree to a
US-backed agreement to pull their naval forces and fishing boats back from Scarborough
Shoal.910 This left the main issue of sovereignty unresolved. However, in July, China placed a
rope across the shoal’s water, effectively blocking Philippine access to it. By 2014, China was
placing military vessels to reinforce the denial of access to outside powers. Though China has no
internationally recognized claim to sovereignty of the island, it has been able to establish de facto
control over it. This achieved China’s primary goals of taking control of the shoal and extending
authority further into the South China Sea. China could not deter intervention by the United
States into South China Sea disputes or gain legitimacy for its claims of authority, constituting a
failure to achieve its secondary goals. The United States kept the South China Sea an open
waterway and had the international community brand China’s claims to the South China Sea as
illegitimate, constituting successful accomplishment of its secondary goals. However, it failed to
achieve its primary goal of preventing Chinese authority over the Shoal. China accomplished a
primary goal at the expense of a secondary goal, while the United States accomplished its
secondary goals at the expense of its primary goal. I count this as a win for China and a loss for
the United States.
North Korean Nuclear Test, 2013
Issue in dispute: This refers to a crisis between February and August 2013 triggered by a North
Korean nuclear test on February 12 (which followed a long-range rocket test in December
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2012).911 The United States moved to impose a fresh round of economic sanctions on North
Korea via the UN. The goal of these sanctions was to bring North Korea to the negotiating table
in the short-term and pressure it to give up its nuclear program in the long-term. North Korea
sought to avoid negotiations over its nuclear program, maintain its nuclear program, and gain
international recognition as a nuclear power.912 For the United States, this was a peripheral issue,
as it pertained to a country on another continent that was mainly threatening its influence in the
international system, though with a potential territorial threat to South Korea. For North Korea,
this represented a core issue, as it related to a nuclear weapons program that could deter a
conventional invasion from a much stronger power.
Primary goals: For the United States, the primary objective was to get North Korea to the
bargaining table and pressure it to give up its nuclear arsenal. For North Korea, the objective was
to avoid negotiations and gain acceptance as a nuclear power.
Secondary goals: For the United States, a secondary goal could be the halting of nuclear and
missile tests by North Korea. For the DPRK, secondary objectives could be the continuation of
missile and nuclear tests and the lifting of some economic sanctions.
Military balance: The US held an advantage in conventional variety if one counts South Korean
forces as being on the American side in the crisis. North Korea held a quantitative advantage in
troops, tanks, and submarines, while the US and South Korea held a quantitative advantage in
transport aircraft, tactical combat aircraft, and surface combatants. The US and South Korea also
held a qualitative advantage in all categories due to the obsolete technology in many North
Korean weapons platforms. This gave the US and South Korea more conventional options for
escalation in the crisis.
Outcome: North Korea defied pressure from the sanctions in the short-term, escalating the
conflict by verbally revoking the 1953 Armistice to end the Korean War. The US and South
Korea flew bombers over the Korean Peninsula two weeks later in a show of force against North
Korea. North Korea withdrew its workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), its joint
venture with South Korea and advised countries to evacuate their embassies in Pyongyang in
April. On June 6, China pushed North Korea into negotiations with South Korea, and on August
14, the two sides agreed to reopen the KIC and ratchet down the recent hostility. Economic
sanctions eventually brought North Korea to the negotiating table and helped ease tensions on
the peninsula, but it failed to bring about any concessions from North Korea on its nuclear
program. The sanctions remained in place and the larger issue of nuclear proliferation remained
unresolved. Both the United States and North Korea partially accomplished their main
objectives, with North Korea agreeing to talks but not taking steps to give up its nuclear arsenal.
I code this outcome as a draw for both sides.
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Crimea-Donbas War, 2014
Issue in dispute: This refers to the war between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea and the Donbas
region that was triggered by the success of the Euromaidan protests in ousting pro-Russian
president Viktor Yanukovych on February 22, 2014. Russia wanted to protect the Russianspeaking majorities in these two regions. It also feared that Ukraine would forge greater ties to
the European Union, NATO, and the United States in the wake of the protests, moving away
from Russia’s orbit. Annexing Crimea and the Donbas regions would accomplish both of those
long-term goals. The United States sought to prevent Russia from adding the two regions and
wanted to convince Russia to withdraw its military forces from Ukraine and stop supporting proRussian separatists in the Donbas after Crimea was formally annexed.913 For Russia, the political
status of Ukraine, a large former Soviet republic right on its border, was important. However, the
continued possession of Crimea and the Donbas by Ukraine would be unlikely to harm its
territorial integrity or survival, meaning it does not quite rise to the level of a core interest
Russia. For the United States, this was peripheral, as it related to the condition of a non-ally.
Primary goals: For the United States, the main objective was to prevent the annexation of Crimea
and the Donbas, help the Ukrainian military expel Russian soldiers from Ukraine, and quell
Russian separatist movements. For Russia, the main goal was to annex territory in Crimea and
the Donbas.
Secondary goals: For the United States, the secondary goal was to show Ukraine and other
Eastern European countries that they could on the US and the West for assistance. For Russia,
the secondary objective was to undermine the value of partnering with US and its allies, which
would weaken NATO and the EU’s ability to expand.
Military balance: Russia held an advantage in the amount of conventional variety in the area
immediately around Ukraine, though NATO and the US had an advantage at the all-European
level. I use the former as a guide to the military balance. This gives Russia an advantage in
number of troops, tanks, and combat aircraft. The naval balance is roughly even, with the US
having a qualitative advantage. The balance in transport aircraft is also even, with the US having
a qualitative edge as well. This translates overall to Russian superiority, though to a degree that
is not overwhelming. Even still, Russia had more options for conventional escalation in the
crisis.
Outcome: Russia moved in special operations forces without identifying marks, known as “little
green men,” into Crimea and the Donbas to support pro-Russian separatist forces. It successfully
annexed Crimea in March 2014. Fighting in the Donbas ran into a stalemate by early 2015. In
February 2015, the Russia and Ukraine, with mediation by France and Germany, signed the
Minsk II Agreement, agreeing to a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian
control in the Donbas.914 However, it is not clear that this accord is being followed, as proPifer, Steven. “Ukraine, Russia, and the US Policy Response.” Brookings Institute. June 5, 2014.
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/ukraine-russia-and-the-u-s-policy-response/.
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Russian forces, supported by Russia, continue to fight in the Donbas. Russia accomplished a
main objective in taking Crimea and a secondary one in preventing Ukraine from integrating
more fully with the West. The United States partially achieved a primary outcome in that the
Donbas is not yet in firm Russian control. It failed to achieve a secondary goal. Overall, I label
this outcome a win for Russia, as it was able to annex Crimea and creating a simmering conflict
in the Donbas. This has prevented Ukraine from integrating more fully with the West. This is a
loss for the United States, since it has been unable to change Russian policy with regards to
support for pro-Russian separatists.
Turkey-Russia Jet Incident, 2015
Issue in dispute: On November 24, 2015, Turkish F-16 jets shot down a Russian Su-24 near the
Turkey-Syria border that Turkey said violated its airspace. This incident was part of a larger
dispute between Russia and Turkey over whether Russia would continue attacking Syrian
Turkmen rebels fighting against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that were stationed near the
Turkey-Syria border.915 The entry here refers to a dispute between United States and Russia over
whether the latter would violate Turkish airspace in the future.916 For the United States, this was
a peripheral issue. For Russia, this was closer to a peripheral issue. It involved a dispute with a
state in its regional neighborhood and the freedom of action for its military forces in an
intervention in Syria, but a threat to its survival or territorial integrity could not arise through
control over airspace in Syria and Turkey.
Primary goals: For the United States, the primary goal was to prevent further incursions by
Russian into Turkey’s airspace near the Syrian border. For Russia, the primary goal was to
prevent the use of force by Turkey against its forces acting in Syria.
Secondary goal: Neither side linked other issues to this dispute, making this category not
applicable.
Military balance: The conventional balance was about even between NATO and Russian forces
in the area. Russia had a slight superiority in troops, but it had a marked superiority in combat
aircraft and tanks. NATO offset this with a large naval advantage. Both sides were close to even
in transport aircraft. This balanced out to a rough draw in conventional variety, though the US
and NATO are counted as “superior” in the indicator balance due to having an advantage of 0.52
to 0.48.
Outcome: Russia violated Turkish airspace only once until June 2016, when Russia and Turkey
agreed to improve bilateral ties. By the metrics of dispute, this is a success for US and loss for
Russia, as the Americans achieved their short-term goal. However, in the long-term, the thaw in
Turkish-Russian relations that happened as a resolution to this crisis ended up harming US
foreign policy and being a success for Russia. The United States achieved its primary goal, but
Perlez, Jane “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Military Jet.” Wall Street Journal. November 24, 2015.
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closer Russian-Turkish ties meant that Russia also accomplished its primary objective of
preventing conflict between its forces and Turkey in Syria. Due to the mutual accomplishment of
primary goals, I label this outcome a draw for both sides.
Kerch Strait Bridge Incident, 2018
Issue in dispute: On November 25, 2018, three Ukrainian vessels, a tugboat and two gunboats,
were rammed and fired upon by Russian air and naval forces. The Ukrainian vessels were
passing through the Kerch Strait, which separates Russia from Crimea, in order to reinforce a
Ukrainian naval base on the Sea of Azov at Berdyansk.917 This triggered a dispute over whether
Ukrainian naval vessels could travel into the Sea of Azov from the Black Sea and vice versa,
who would control the Kerch Strait, and whether the detained ships and sailors would be turned
over to Ukraine. The United States wanted freedom of travel for Ukrainian ships, less Russian
control over the Kerch Strait, and the return of the sailors and ships. Russia wanted the opposite.
This was a peripheral issue for the US and Russia, as keeping the Kerch Strait as an open
waterway would not undermine Russia’s territorial integrity or survival.
Primary goals: For the United States, the primary objective was to keep Ukrainian travel access
throughout the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea and prevent Russia from controlling the Kerch
Strait. For Russia, the primary objective was to obtain control over the Kerch Strait and prevent
Ukrainian naval vessels from traveling between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.
Secondary goals: For the United States, the secondary goal was to secure the release of
Ukrainian sailors from Russian detention.
Military balance: Russia held a slight conventional advantage during the dispute. It had more
troops, combat aircraft, and tanks in the area. However, it had a disadvantage in naval strength,
which was important due to the nature of this dispute. Overall, this translated into a small
advantage in the variety of conventional capabilities.
Outcome: Russia returned the sailors to Ukraine in September 2019 and the detained vessels
back to it in November.918 Ukrainian ships can travel to Berdyansk. However, Russia still
controls access through the Kerch Strait, increasing its influence in the Black Sea and its
influence over Ukraine. This represents the accomplishment of a primary goal for Russia in the
dispute, while the United States failed to accomplish its main objective of preventing further
Russian control in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. This is why I label it a Russian victory and a
US loss.
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Appendix Tables
Table A1: Regression Results with Indicator Measure of Local Conventional Superiority
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Table A2: Land Power as Sole Components of Conventional Power
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Table A3: Air Power as Sole Component of Conventional Power
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Table A4: Sea Power as Sole Component of Conventional Power

F-Test Results
Linear hypothesis test
Hypothesis:
Land Power = 0
Air Power = 0
Sea Power = 0
Model 1: restricted model
Model 2: Outcome ~ Land Power + Air Power + Sea Power

Model 1
Model 2

Residual Df’s Df’s
30
27
3

Chi-squared Pr(>Chi-squared)
18.9

0.0002868 ***
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Table A5: Results with GDP Substituting for Local Conventional Balance
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Table A6: GDP per capita as Substitute for Local Conventional Balance

366

Table A7: CINC Superiority as Substitute for Local Conventional Balance
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Table A8: Results with Softer Technological Superiority Adjustment
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Table A9: Berlin Crisis Re-Coded as Soviet Victory
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Table A10: Results with Clustered Robust Standard Errors at Country Level
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Qualitative/Technological Superiority Coding
Coding Rules
•

•

•

Technological sophistication – Any time a country’s weapons systems in a given
platform were, on average, 10 years or more newer than its adversary’s, I labelled this a
technological advantage that warranted a coding of qualitative superiority for the country.
Extra capability possession – Any time a country had a capability in a certain domain that
its adversary did not, I code this as qualitative superiority for that country. The categories
that were amenable to this were tanker/transport aircraft, surface combatants, and
submarines. The extra capabilities are described below for each category:
o Troops – none (qualitative/technological superiority not coded for this category)
o Tanks – none (only technological basis used for qualitative superiority coding)
o Tactical combat aircraft – none (only technological basis used for qualitative
superiority coding)
o Tanker/transport aircraft – the possession of heavy cargo aircraft by one side and
not by another OR the possession of much more heavy cargo aircraft as a
percentage of its transport force compared to the adversary; the possession of
tanker aircraft for in-flight refueling when the adversary did not possess that
o Surface combatants – the possession of an aircraft carrier while its adversary did
not possess one in the area of a dispute
o Submarines – the possession of nuclear-powered submarines while its adversary
did not possess any OR the possession of a many more nuclear submarines as a
percentage of the undersea force than the adversary; the possession of an
“acoustic advantage” as noted by maritime historians
Finally, all data on equipment comes from the The Military Balance.

Berlin Crisis, 1961
•

Tactical air quality – The United States primarily deployed fighters from the “Century
Series” of planes to Europe, in particular the F-100 Super Sabre and the F-105
Thunderchief, which came online in 1954 and 1958, respectively. The French used the F84 and F-86, which came into service in the late 1940’s and the Mirage III, which came
into service in 1961. The UK primarily used the Javelin fighter, which came into service
in the early 1950’s, and West Germany used the F-84 and F-86. The majority of the
Soviet tactical fighter force was made up of the MiG-17 fighter, which first came into
service in 1950. The USSR also deployed the MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighters as well as the
all-weather Yak-25 aircraft. The Century Series planes had greater range, speed, and
payload than the MiG-17, -19, and -21, but not the other planes in NATO’s arsenal. Plus,
US military leaders at the time did not see a decisive qualitative advantage in the air.919
This is why I put the qualitative balance as even, with 0.5 for both sides.

“National Security Action Memorandum 109.” October 23, 1961. This document describes opposing strengths as
“roughly comparable” in the air between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.
919
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•

•

•

•

Tank quality – Most US units in Europe were equipped with the M48 tank, introduced in
1952. West German forces also used the M48 tanks. The British deployed the Centurion
and Conqueror tanks, introduced in 1945 and 1955 respectively. French forces used the
AMX-13 tank, introduced in 1952. The Soviets used the T54/55 tanks and T10, with the
former being introduced in 1945 but having design modifications introduced throughout
the 1950’s and the latter introduced in 1953. Neither of these tanks was decisively better
or newer than the others, making the tank quality even, or 0.5 for both sides.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States used the KC-135 tanker for in-flight
refueling and the C-124 Globemaster II and C-130 Hercules for military transport (both
heavy cargo craft). The Soviets primarily used light and medium transports in the form of
the CAB, COACH, CRATE, CAMP, and CUB aircraft (Li-2, Il-12, Il-14, An-8, An-12).
The BEAR heavy bomber could be refitted into tankers. The greater range, carrying
capacity, and in-flight refueling capability of the US transport force makes it qualitatively
superior to the Soviet force. The US receives a value of 1 and the Soviets 0 here.
Surface combatant quality – The US fielded a majority of destroyers, frigates, and
cruisers built during WWII in the Atlantic fleet, but it included 17 newer guided-missile
destroyers, the nuclear-powered Enterprise attack carrier, and attack carriers from the
post-war Forrestal class. The Soviet navy also fielded some modern guided-missile
destroyers, but it had no aircraft carriers in the European theater. This gives the US a
qualitative edge over the Soviet force. I code it as 1 for the US and 0 for the Soviets here.
Submarine quality – The US deployed 21 modern nuclear submarines in its naval forces
overall, but the Soviets had introduced the H-class long-range nuclear submarine by this
time. I code this as qualitative parity, with 0.5 for both sides.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
•

•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States fielded the Century Series fighter planes in its
tactical air forces, while the Soviet Union deployed MiG-21’s and Il-28 light bombers.
While the MiG-21 was a modern fighter plane, the Il-28’s were obsolete by 1962, and
they made up half of the fighter contingent. I thus code the United States as being
superior in this area, with a value of 1 for it and a value of 0 for the USSR.
Tank quality – The Soviets deployed a mechanized infantry division to Cuba, consisting
of four regiments, each with its own tank battalion. These battalions likely would have
been equipped with T54/55 tanks. The United States STRAC forces were equipped with
the M48 tanks and some M60’s. I count this as rough equality in the quality of the tank
forces. This is coded 0.5 for both sides.
Tanker/transport air quality – Similar to the Berlin Crisis entry, the United States had
several KC-135 tanker aircraft and most of its transport aircraft were of the “heavy
cargo” variety and could travel over long range. The Soviets had heavy bombers that
could be refitted to serve as tankers and its transport fleet consisted of mostly light and
medium aircraft that could not travel as far. I code this as 1 for the US and 0 for the
USSR.
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•
•

Surface combatant quality – The Soviet Union did not deploy surface combatants to Cuba
in 1962, which automatically gives them a 0 in the quality category and the US a 1.
Submarine quality – The Soviets deployed 4 diesel-powered submarines of the Foxtrot
class. These submarines needed to surface in order to recharge their batteries and receive
radio communications from Moscow. They were also noisier than the American
submarines in the Atlantic and Caribbean, giving the US an “acoustic advantage.” In
addition, the US had some quieter nuclear-powered subs in the Atlantic that could be
used in the crisis. For this reason, I code submarine quality as 0 for the Soviet Union and
1 for the United States.

Congo Crisis, 1964
•

•
•

•

•

Tactical air quality – Neither the US nor the USSR had tactical air forces in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or the area around it. I code this technological
superiority variable as 0.5 for both by default.
Tank quality – Similar to tactical air quality, neither side possessed tanks in the DRC or
the area near it. I code this as 0.5 for both.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed dedicated tanker aircraft for
in-flight refueling and most of its transport aircraft were of the “heavy” variety. At this
time, the Soviet Union still did not have a dedicated tanker aircraft, giving it limited inflight refueling capability and most of its transport aircraft were “light” or “medium,”
constraining its power projection capability. I code this as a qualitative advantage, or 1,
for the US and 0 for the USSR.
Surface combatant quality – I count the US Second Fleet as potentially being in the area
near Congo and able to get to it quickly during the Congo Crisis. The Soviets had no such
naval force near the Congo. By default, this is qualitative superiority for the US and
inferiority for the Soviets.
Submarine quality – There is no evidence that the Soviets had deployed their nuclearpowered submarines near the African west coast during the crisis. Plus, US submarines
had an “acoustic advantage” over their Soviet counterparts during this time. I count this
enough to give the US a qualitative advantage in the undersea balance in the crisis.

Sino-Soviet War, 1969
•

•

Tactical air quality – The Soviet Union’s tactical air forces consisted primarily of MiG17’s, MiG-19’s, and MiG-21’s, the latter of which being its primary high-performance
aircraft. It had some high-performing Su-7’s for ground attack and the Yak-28 light
bomber. China’s tactical air forces mostly consisted of older model MiG-15 and -17’s
with a few MiG-19’s and -21’s. The Soviet Union’s planes, while not state of the art,
were on average more technologically sophisticated and recently made than Chinese
aircraft. I thus code the USSR as being qualitatively superior in terms of tactical air
quality and China as inferior.
Tank quality – The Soviet Red Army primarily used the T-62 and T-54/55 medium tanks
and the T-10 heavy tank. The Chinese used the JS-2 heavy tank and the T-34 and T-54
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•

•

•

medium tank. By this time, the JS-2 and T-34 tanks were obsolete tanks made in WWII.
The Soviet Army’s tanks were, on average, more recently made and technologically
advanced than the Chinese Army’s tanks. I code this as qualitative superiority for the
Soviet Union in the armor balance and qualitative inferiority for China.
Transport air quality – The USSR’s air transport fleet included around 1500 aircraft,
mostly of the short- and medium-range variety. The primary aircraft were the twin-engine
I1-14 and An-24 and the four-engine An-12 and Il-18. They also had some heavy bomber
aircraft (Bear and Bison) that could serve as a tanker with in-flight refueling capability.
The Chinese air transport fleet included An-2, Il-14, and Il-18 craft. On average, the
Soviet fleet was newer and could carry more troops and cargo. I therefore code
qualitative superiority for the Soviet Union in this area.
Surface combatant quality – The Soviet surface fleet consisted mostly of Sverdlov-class
cruisers, Krupny-class, Kashin-class destroyers, and Kotlin-class destroyers. The former
were made primarily in the early 1950’s, the latter in the mid-1950’s, and the middle two
in the early 1960’s. It is not clear what type of destroyers and destroyer escorts the PLAN
possessed at this time. For this reason, I do not code qualitative superiority for the Soviet
Union despite it being likely. I put 0.5 for both in this category.
Submarine quality – The Soviet Union had 320 conventional and 60 nuclear-powered
submarines in 1969, with the latter being evenly split between the Arctic and Far East
fleets. This means that Soviets had 30 or so nuclear-powered submarines in the Far East
during the Sino-Soviet War. The PLAN possessed 33 submarines, none of them nuclearpowered. For this reason, I code the Soviets as being qualitatively superior in the
undersea balance and the Chinese qualitatively inferior.

Cienfuegos, 1970
•
•

•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States was the only side in this dispute that had tactical
aircraft in the area, giving it qualitative superiority by default.
Tank quality – The United States was the only state in the dispute with tanks in the area
of the dispute. The Soviet Union had no armored divisions stationed in the Caribbean.
This gives the US qualitative superiority by default.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed 500 KC-135 tankers for inflight refueling along with 315 heavy, long-range transport aircraft in the form of the C133 and C-141. The Soviet Union had 50 heavy bombers that could serve as tanker
aircraft. It also had many light and medium transport aircraft in the form of the twinengined Il-14 and An-24 and the four-engined An-12 and Il-18. The US had a much
greater ability for in-flight refueling and contained more heavy, long-range transport
aircraft as a percentage of its transport force. I code this as qualitative superiority for the
United States and inferiority for the Soviet Union.
Surface combatant quality – The Soviet Union did not have any surface combatants in
the Western Atlantic during the dispute while the United States did. This gives the US
qualitative superiority by default.
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Submarine quality – It is unclear if the Soviet Union had submarines near Cuba during
the dispute. It is possible, but I have not found evidence of it. Regardless, the United
States still held an acoustic advantage over Soviet submarines in this era. Both the
probable lack of submarines in the area and the acoustic advantage gives the United
States qualitative superiority in the submarine balance in this dispute.

War of Attrition, 1970
•

•
•

•

•

Tactical air quality – The Soviet Union deployed its MiG-21 tactical fighter plane to help
Egypt shore up its air defense. This was one of the high-performing aircraft in the Soviet
air force. The A-4E Skyhawk and Mirage IIIC made up the majority of Israel’s tactical air
force. Israel possessed a number of F-4E Phantoms, Mystére, and Ouragan aircraft.
Neither the Israeli nor the Soviet planes were significantly newer, and none were clearly
superior in quality. I code this as approximate in quality, or 0.5 for both sides.
Tank quality – Soviet Union did not deploy tanks to the Middle East during the War of
Attrition, giving Israel qualitative superiority by default.
Tanker/transport air quality – The USSR possessed mostly light and medium transports in
the form of the twin-engined Il-14 and An-24 and the four-engined An-12 and Il-18.
Israel also possessed mostly medium transports in the form of the C-47, Noratlas, and
Stratocruiser, with the latter being on the heavier side. I code this as approximate quality
for both sides.
Surface combatant quality – Most of the Soviet navy consisted of older Skory-class
destroyers and 1950’s era Kotlin-class destroyers with old Sverdlov cruisers. The Soviets
had deployed 9 modern Kresta- and Kynda-class, but this deployment was not in large
enough numbers to make the Soviet Navy technologically advanced. It is unclear from
The Military Balance what type of destroyer and frigate Israel deployed. Without this
information and knowing that most of the Soviet surface combatants were more than 10
years old, I code the surface combatants for both sides as qualitative parity for both sides.
Submarine quality – About a quarter of the Soviet submarine force was nuclear-powered
in 1970, and I assume that this is the percentage of nuclear-powered submarines in the
Black Sea Fleet in 1970. Israel possessed 4 submarines, none of which were nuclearpowered. I code this as qualitative superiority for the Soviet Union and qualitative
inferiority for Israel.

Yom Kippur War, 1973
•

Tactical air quality – The United States tactical air force in the area consisted of the naval
combat aircraft stationed with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In these attack
squadrons were some fourth generation F-14A planes, but most were of the third- or
second-generation F-4, F-8, A-4, A-6, and A-7 type. The Soviet Union in its deployment
to Egypt, of which 1973 was the final year, contained third-generation MiG-21E planes.
Because the American planes were not significantly newer on average, I code this as
qualitative parity.
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Tank quality – Neither side had tanks in the area of the dispute, making this qualitative
parity by default.
Tanker/transport air quality – The US tanker force consisted of KC-135’s for in-flight
refueling, and the transport air force consisted of mostly heavy transport craft in the form
of the C-5A and C-141. The former was introduced in 1970. The Soviet Union possessed
50 Bison long-range bombers converted into tankers and its transport force was
predominantly medium transports in the form of the I1-14, An-8, An-24, An-12, and Il18. The US transport force was made up of far more heavy transports as a percentage of
its total force and was newer on average. I code as qualitative superiority for the United
States and qualitative inferiority for the Soviet Union.
Surface combatant quality – The United States had 2 aircraft carriers in its Sixth Fleet
along with 17 other surface combatants, though it is unclear of what type these
combatants were. The Soviet Union had 0 aircraft carriers in its Black Sea Fleet, and it is
not clear the exact composition of its 63 other surface combatants. Nevertheless, because
the US had an aircraft carrier and the USSR did not, I code the US as having qualitative
superiority in the naval surface balance.
Submarine quality – Over 70% of the American attack submarine force was nuclearpowered in 1973, and I assume this ratio in its attack submarine force in the
Mediterranean during the dispute. The Soviet attack submarine force consisted of around
15% nuclear subs, which I also assume to be the ratio in the attack submarine force the
Soviets had during the crisis. Because of this discrepancy and the advantage the US had
in ASW operations during this period of the Cold War, I code the US as having
qualitative superiority and the USSR as having qualitative inferiority.

War in Angola
•
•
•

•

Tactical air quality – Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States possessed tactical
aircraft in Angola or southern Africa. This is qualitative parity by default.
Tank quality – Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States possessed tanks in Angola
or southern Africa. I code this as qualitative parity by default.
Transport air quality – The United States possessed the KC-135 tanker aircraft for inflight refueling and the C-5A and C-141 heavy transports for moving forces abroad. The
Soviet Union possessed as a tanker some Bison aircraft that were converted from being
long-range bombers. For transport aircraft, they possessed light Il-14, An-8, and An-24
aircraft as well as medium Il-18 and An-12 aircraft. The Soviets had some An-22 heavy
transports, but this was a tiny portion of the air transport force (40 out of 1500 aircraft). I
code this as qualitative superiority for the United States and inferiority for the Soviet
Union.
Surface combatant quality – I count the US Second Fleet as potentially being in the area
near Congo and able to get to it quickly during the Congo Crisis. The Soviets had no such
naval force near the Congo. By default, this is qualitative superiority for the US and
inferiority for the Soviets.
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Submarine quality – The submarine force attached to the Second Fleet may have been
able to get to the southwest African coast quickly during the crisis, while the Soviets had
no such undersea force in the Atlantic Ocean. I code this as American qualitative
superiority by default.

Afghanistan, 1979
•

•

•

•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States did not possess any tactical fighter aircraft in
Afghanistan, in SW Asia, or South Asia. The Soviet Union did possess fighters in Central
Asia, giving the Soviets qualitative superiority by default.
Tank quality – The Soviets possessed tanks on its border with Afghanistan, while the
United States did not possess any tanks in Southwest or South Asia. This gives the
Soviets qualitative superiority by default.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed KC-135 tankers for aerial
refueling and the heavy C-5A and C-141 aircraft for transport. The Soviet possessed
converted Badger and Bison bombers as tanker aircraft with most of its transport craft
being An-12’s, Il-14’s, and An-24’s. There were some modern Il-76 and An-22 craft, but
not in large numbers. I code this as qualitative superiority for the United States due to the
relative newness of American planes and more of the force being of the heavy transport
type.
Surface combatant quality – The Soviet Union possessed naval forces as part of its
Caspian Sea flotilla. The United States had no naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Arabian
Sea, or Indian Ocean. I code this qualitative superiority for the Soviets by default.
Submarine quality – Neither sider possessed submarines in the Indian Ocean, Persian
Gulf, or Arabian Sea, giving each qualitative parity by default.

Able Archer Incident, 1983
•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States possessed the F-111E, the A-10, the fourthgeneration F-16, the F-4E, and F-4G aircraft in its air forces in Europe. Its NATO allies
possessed the fourth-generation Tornado (UK) and Alpha Jet aircraft (FRG) along with
the third-generation Jaguar, Buccaneer, Mirage IIIE, F-104G, and F-4F. Meanwhile, the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies possessed mostly second- and third-generation
aircraft, which included the second-gen MiG-21, the MiG-23, MiG-27, Su-7, Su-17, and
Su-24. Due to the presence of fourth-generation fighters in the NATO air forces and their
absence in the Warsaw Pact forces, I code qualitative superiority for the US and
qualitative inferiority for the USSR.
Tank quality – The United States forces in Europe were equipped with M-48A5, M60A1 and -A3, and some M-1 Abrams tanks. Its NATO allies possessed the Chieftain
(UK), AMX-30 (France), M-48A2 (FRG), and Leopard 1 (FRG) tanks. The Soviet
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies possessed the T-54/55/62 generation of tanks in the
greatest number along with several newer T-64 and T-72/80 tanks. Neither the Warsaw
Pact nor the NATO forces had significantly newer tanks in sufficient numbers to give
one side a technological edge. I code this as qualitative parity in the armor balance.
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Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed the C-5A and C-141B planes
for transport and the KC-135 tanker for in-flight refueling. The Soviet Union possess the
An-12, Il-76, and An-22 as its primary transport aircraft, the latter of which were of the
heavy type. They also possessed converted Bison and Badger aircraft for in-flight
refueling. Due to the updating of the Soviet transport force to include the more modern
Il-76 and to be more of the heavy type, I code qualitative parity in the tanker/transport
force in 1983.
Surface combatant quality – The United States possessed 5 aircraft carriers in its Atlantic
Fleet and 1-2 carriers in the Mediterranean, with about a third of these being nuclearpowered. It had some nuclear-powered cruisers along with several guided-missile
destroyers. The Soviet Union possessed 3 conventionally-powered aircraft carriers by
this time with two of them in the Black Sea Fleet facing NATO. It also had one nuclearpowered cruiser and several guided-missile destroyers. Due to the inclusion of aircraft
carriers in its naval forces as well as the capability to deploy nuclear-powered surface
combatants, I code qualitative parity between the US and the USSR during this time.
This is a conservative estimate, as one could argue that the US still had a naval edge at
this time.
Submarine quality – The United States’ submarine force in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean was nuclear-powered by 1983. The Soviet Union’s attack and cruisemissile submarine force was about half nuclear-powered. Because both sides had
nuclear-powered submarines in large numbers, I code this as qualitative parity.

Kashmir Crisis, 1990
•

•

•

•

Tactical air quality – The Indian Air Force contained the MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, and
the Jaguar IS in the bulk of its tactical air force, most of these planes being introduced in
the 1960’s or the early 1970’s. The Pakistani Air Force possessed mostly Q-5, J-6,
Mirage 5 and IIIE, J-7, and F-16 aircraft in its tactical fighter force. This does include a
4th-generation aircraft in the F-16, but every other aircraft was introduced in the 1960’s
or late 1950’s. I code this as neither side having a technological advantage and therefore
qualitative parity.
Tank quality – The Indian Army possessed the T-55, T-72, and Vijayanta tank in the
greatest numbers. The Pakistani Army possessed the M-47/-48 and Type-59 tanks in the
greatest quantity. The tanks in the Indian Army were newer on average but not so much
so to give the Indian military a technological advantage. Because of this, I code
qualitative parity in the armor balance.
Tanker/transport air quality – India possessed mostly four-engine An-12 aircraft for
medium transport and the twin-engine An-32 aircraft, introduced in the 1970’s, for light
transport. The Pakistani transport force consisted of four-engine C-130E’s for medium
transport. The Indian force was newer, but most of it was of the twin-engine light
transport variety. I decided to code this as qualitative parity between the two sides.
Surface combatant quality – India possessed 2 aircraft carriers in its naval force along
with a few destroyers and several frigates. All of these craft were conventionally
powered. Pakistan possessed no carriers, a few destroyers, and several frigates, all of
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which were conventionally powered. Due to the presence of aircraft carriers in the Indian
Navy, I coded this as qualitative superiority for India.
Submarine quality – India’s submarine force mostly included diesel electric Kilo and
Foxtrot class attack submarines with one cruise-missile, nuclear-powered Charlie I class
submarines. Pakistan possessed all attack submarines of the French-made, diesel electric
Daphne and Agosta class. The latter of which were the newest of the entire group, being
made in the 1970’s. Pakistan’s submarine force was newer, but India possessed one
nuclear-powered submarine. I code this as no technological advantage for either side and
therefore qualitative parity.

Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1995
•

•

•

•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States possessed mostly 4th-generation F-15 and F-16
aircraft in its tactical fighter forces in East Asia. China mostly possessed the Q-5, J-5/-6/7 aircraft in its tactical air force, all of which were made in the 1950’s and 1960’s. This
makes the US force significantly newer than the Chinese air force. I code this as
qualitative superiority for the United States.
Tank quality – The United States’ infantry divisions in South Korea were likely outfitted
with the M-60 and M-1 Abrams tanks, the latter of which was introduced in the 1980’s.
The PLA mostly possessed the Type 59 in its tank forces, which were introduced in the
1950’s. This makes the US forces much newer, which I code as qualitative superiority for
the United States.
Tanker/transport quality – The United States possessed KC-10A and KC-135 tankers for
in-flight refueling. Its transport force mostly consisted of C-5, C-141, and C-17 heavy
transports as well as C-130 for tactical airlift. The C-17 was introduced in 1991. The
Chinese transport force primarily consisted of Li-2, Y-5, and Il-14 planes for light
transport. The Chinese did have some Y-8 aircraft introduced in the 1980’s for medium
transport, and they did use some of these as tankers. Nevertheless, the US
tanker/transport force was by far more modern, giving the US qualitative superiority.
Surface combatant quality – The United States possessed 1 aircraft carrier as well as
some nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers as well as modern Arleigh-Burke class
destroyers in its Seventh Fleet. This was backed up by nuclear-powered carriers and other
nuclear-powered surface combatants in the Pacific Fleet. The PLAN had Luda guidedmissile destroyers and Jianghu frigates that were introduced in the 1970’s. However,
these were all conventionally-powered, and the PLAN had no aircraft carrier. I code this
as qualitative superiority for the US.
Submarine quality – All of the attack and cruise-missile submarines in the Seventh and
Third fleets were nuclear-powered. China’s attack submarines were mostly
conventionally-powered with a few nuclear-powered Han-class submarines. Because of
the disparity in the percentage of attack submarines being nuclear-powered in favor of the
United States, I code American qualitative superiority here.

India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests, 1998
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Tactical air quality – The Indian Air Force possessed the MiG-21, -23, -27, and -29 in its
tactical combat force, the latter of which was a 4th generation craft. From the French, the
Indian Air Force had also purchased Jaguar S and Mirage 2000 aircraft, the latter of
which was also a 4th generation plane. Both it and the MiG-29 represented a fraction of
the tactical combat force in the IAF. The Pakistani Air Force possessed the Mirage IIIE
and 5, the Q-5, J-6 and -7, and the F-16 in its tactical combat arsenal. The latter of which
was also a 4th-generation plane that represented a fraction of the overall tactical aircraft
force. I code this as qualitative parity between the Indians and Pakistanis, as neither
tactical air force was substantially newer or more technologically advanced than the
other.
Tank quality – The Indian Army possessed the T-55, T-72, and Vijayanta tank in the
greatest numbers. The Pakistani Army possessed the M-48A5 and Type-59 tanks in the
greatest quantity. This means that the tanks in the Indian Army were newer on average
but not so much so to give the Indian military a technological advantage. Because of this,
I code qualitative parity in the armor balance.
Tanker/transport air quality – The Indian Air Force possessed the twin-engine An-32 and
Do-228 for light transport, some old BAe-748 and newer Il-76 aircraft for medium
transport. Against this, Pakistan had C-130B and E variants for medium transport as over
half of its small transport force. It possessed Boeing 707 and 737 aircraft as well as a
couple jetliners for light transport. India possessed 6 Il-78 tankers for in-flight refueling,
and Pakistan did not possess this capability. Because of this, I code qualitative superiority
for India.
Surface combatant quality – India possessed a number of surface combatants first
introduced in the late 1950’s and 1960’s, including an old Hermes class carrier and
Leander frigates from the UK. They also had Kashin destroyers and Petya frigates from
the Soviet Union. These were the ships they had in the greatest numbers. The Pakistani
Navy was mostly made up of US Gearing class destroyers from the 1940’s along with
UK Amazon class frigates from the 1970’s. On average, the age of the ships was similar,
but the Indian Navy included an aircraft carrier, a capability the Pakistani Navy did not
possess. I code this as qualitative superiority for India.
Submarine quality – Both countries’ submarine force remained close to the same as what
they had in 1990. India’s submarine force mostly included diesel electric Kilo and
Foxtrot class attack submarines but it had retired its nuclear-powered Charlie I. Pakistan
possessed all attack submarines of the French-made, diesel electric Daphne and Agosta
class. The latter of which were the newest of the entire group, being made in the 1970’s.
Pakistan’s submarine force was newer, but India possessed one nuclear-powered
submarine. I code this as no technological advantage for either side and therefore
qualitative parity.

Kargil War, 1999
•

Tactical air quality – India’s tactical air force had the same composition of planes as it
did in 1998. Pakistan had roughly the same composition of tactical combat aircraft, but
with less J-6 and the introduction of more modern Mirage IIIO in its place. This was not
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enough to give Pakistan a technological advantage, so I continue to code this as
qualitative parity.
Tank quality – Both India and Pakistan possessed the same composition of tanks in 1999
as they did in 1998. I continue to code this as qualitative parity.
Tanker/transport air quality – Both India and Pakistan possessed the same composition
of transport aircraft in 1999 as they did in 1998. I continue to code this as qualitative
superiority in India’s favor.
Surface combatant quality – Compared to 1998, Pakistan had replaced its obsolete
Gearing-class destroyers with two Amazon-class frigates from the UK. However, India
had also modernized its fleet to some extent by having more Godavari-class frigates,
introduced in the 1980’s, and less Petya-class frigates from the Soviet Union. I continue
to code qualitative superiority for the Indian Navy here.
Submarine quality – Compared to 1998, the Indian Navy had a couple more Kilo-class
submarines (introduced in the 1980’s) to replace two Foxtrot-class submarines
(introduced in the 1960’s), representing an upgrade. Pakistan continued to have the
Agosta and Daphne submarines from France, but they introduced the Agosta 90B
variant, made in the 1990’s. Due to a similar increase in quality from each side, I
continue to code qualitative parity in the undersea balance between India and Pakistan.

Indian Parliament Terrorist Attacks, 2001
•

•
•

•

•

Tactical air quality – India possessed a similar tactical combat air force to 1998/99, but it
had replaced some MiG-21’s with Su-30K aircraft, representing an upgrade. Pakistan
also possessed a similar force to what it had in 1998/99. It had retired some J-6 aircraft
and put F-16’s in their place, also representing an upgrade. Due to the similar scale of
upgrades for both sides, I continue to code qualitative parity here.
Tank quality – Both sides possessed the same tank forces that they had in 1998 and
1999. I continue to code qualitative parity here.
Tanker/transport air quality – Both sides had the same tanker and transport aircraft that
they possessed in 1998 and 1999. I continue to code this as qualitative superiority for
India.
Surface combatant quality – India possessed a similar fleet of surface combatants as it
did in 1999 but with one less Petya frigate and two more Delhi-class destroyers, which
were introduced in the 1990’s. This represents a large upgrade. Pakistan possessed the
same fleet that it did in 1999. Due to the larger upgrade for India, I continue to code this
as qualitative superiority.
Submarine quality – India possessed a similar submarine fleet as it did in 1999 but with
one less Foxtrot class submarine and one more Kilo class, representing an upgrade.
Pakistan possessed the same fleet as it did in 1999. The Indian upgrade was not enough
to give it a decisive technological advantage or new capability that Pakistan did not have.
As a result, I continue to code this as qualitative parity.

Russia-Georgia War, 2008
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Tactical air quality – The United States possessed a naval air wing with the Sixth Fleet
outfitted with the F/A-18C as well as a naval wing at Incirlik with F-16 and F-15E
aircraft that may have been available for combat during the Russo-Georgian War. The
Russians had in their North Caucasus Military District a tactical combat force that mainly
consisted of Su-25, MiG-29, and Su-27 aircraft with some Su-24 light bombers, but the
latter were being disbanded at the time of the war. Because both sides were deploying
fourth-generation aircraft in the conflict, I code this as qualitative parity. I could include
the forces the United States had in Iraq, but I choose not to do this because those forces
were occupied in a conflict and would not be likely to be redirected to fight in the
Caucasus.
Tank quality – The United States had no tanks or ground troops deployed in Eastern
Europe, Turkey, Iran, or the Caucasus at this time. This gives Russia qualitative
superiority by default.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed the C-17 as the bulk of its
strategic transport force with some C-5, the former of which being introduced in the
1990’s. For tactical transport, the United States possessed the C-130 Hercules as well as
its updated Super Hercules variant, which had been introduced in 1999. It possessed the
KC-135 and KC-10A as tanker aircraft. Russia possessed the Il-76 as the bulk of its
transport force with some An-124 and An-22’s. It possessed some Il-78 tanker aircraft for
in-flight refueling. These transport aircraft were on average introduced in the 1970’s
compared to the 1990’s for the American aircraft. As a result, I code qualitative
superiority for the United States here.
Surface combatant quality – The United States possessed in its Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean 1 aircraft carrier as well as 6 guided-missile destroyers. The Russian
Black Sea Fleet contained 2 cruisers (conventionally powered), 3 guided-missile
destroyers, and 7 frigates. Because the US had an aircraft carrier and Russia did not in
these forces, I code qualitative superiority for the US
Submarine quality – The United States possessed 3 nuclear-powered attack submarines of
the Los Angeles class in its Sixth Fleet. Russia possessed 1 attack submarine of the Kilo
class in the Black Sea Fleet. These submarines were of similar age, but because the US
subs are nuclear-powered, this represents a technology not featured on the opposing
Russian sub. I code this as qualitative superiority for the United States.

Scarborough Shoal, 2012
•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States possessed the F/A-18 (C, E, and F variants) in the
Seventh Fleet. Its air forces in Korea and Japan were outfitted with F-16C/D and A-10C
aircraft. Opposing these forces, China possessed the J-7E and G, J-10, J-11, J-8H, and
Su-30MKK aircraft. Both sides possessed fourth-generation fighters introduced in the
1980’s and 1990’s. It is arguable that American planes were of better quality, but no
country had substantially newer planes. According to my coding rules, this is qualitative
parity.
Tank quality – The United States possessed the M1A1 and M1A2 tanks in its ground
forces in South Korea, both of which were third-generation tanks. They were introduced
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in the 1980’s and 1990’s, respectively. The majority of China’s tank force was composed
of Cold War-era Type 59 tanks with the rest being Type 79, 88, 96, 96G, 98, and some
99/99A2. On average, the American tanks were much newer than the Chinese tanks. I
code qualitative superiority for the United States here.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed the KC-10A and KC-135R/T
aircraft for aerial refueling. It possessed the C-5, C-17A, and C-130E/-H/-J for transport,
all of which being medium or heavy types. China possessed one regiment of H-6U
aircraft for aerial refueling. It possessed one regiment of Il-76 for heavy transport, three
regiments of Y-7 for light transport, and three regiments of Y-8 aircraft for medium
transport. Because a greater percentage of the American force was capable of medium
and heavy transport than the Chinese force, I code this as qualitative superiority for the
United States.
Surface combatant quality – The United States Seventh Fleet had a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier, guided-missile cruisers with helicopter hangar facilities, and guidedmissile destroyers, some with helicopter hangar facilities. In its South and East Sea
Fleets, China possessed guided-missile destroyers with hangar facilities and guidedmissile frigates, about half of them with hangar facilities. Because the United States had
an aircraft carrier and China did not, this extra capability gives the US qualitative
superiority.
Submarine quality – The United States Seventh Fleet likely possessed Los Angeles-class
attack submarines with perhaps some Virginia or modified Ohio class submarines, all of
which were nuclear-powered. China possessed 36 attack submarines in its East and South
Sea Fleets, only two of which were nuclear-powered. Because a much greater percentage
of American submarines were nuclear-powered, I code this as qualitative superiority for
the United States.

North Korea Nuclear Testing, 2013
•

•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States possessed the F/A-18D in its naval air forces with
the Seventh Fleet along with the F-16 C/D and A-10C in the air forces in South Korea.
The South Korean tactical air forces were made up of F-4E, F-5E/F, F-15K, and F-16C/D
aircraft. North Korea contained mostly 1960’s ear J-5/-6/-7 aircraft from China with a
few regiments having more modern Su-25 and MiG-29 aircraft. Because the US and
ROK forces were much newer, I code this as qualitative superiority for the United States.
Tank quality – The United States deployed the M1 Abrams in its ground forces in Korea,
and most of the Korean tank forces possessed the Korean variant of the M1 and M1A1
tanks. The North Korean forces possessed the WWII era T-34 tanks along with Cold
War-era T-54/-55/-62 and Type 59 tanks. Because the US and South Korean forces were
much newer, I code this as qualitative superiority for the United States.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States and South Korea possessed the C-5, C17, and C-130 aircraft (both the Hercules and Super Hercules versions) for medium and
heavy transport. The United States possessed the KC-10A and KC-135 R/T tanker
aircraft for in-flight refueling. North Korea possessed Cold War-era An-24, Il-18, Il-62,
Tu-134, and Tu-154 transport aircraft from the 1950’s and 60’s. Because the US and
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South Korean aircraft were much newer and North Korea did not have any tanker
aircraft, I code this as qualitative superiority for the United States.
Surface combatant quality – The United States Seventh Fleet had 1 nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier, 2 guided-missile cruisers with hangar facilities, and 7 guided-missile
destroyers. South Korea added to this 2 cruisers, 6 guided-missile destroyers, and 12
frigates. North Korea possessed 3 frigates. Because the US and South Korea had several
naval platforms that North Korea did not possess, I code this as qualitative superiority for
the United States.
Submarine quality – The United States possessed nuclear attack submarines of the Los
Angeles class in the Seventh Fleet, and South Korea added some conventionally powered
attack submarines mostly of the Chang Bogo type (introduced in the 1990’s). North
Korea possessed conventionally-powered submarines of the Golf class that were
introduced in the late 1950’s. Because the United States had nuclear-powered subs while
North Korea did not and US/ROK subs were much newer, I code qualitative superiority
in the undersea balance for the United States.

Russia-Ukraine War, 2014
•

•

•

•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States possessed the F-15C/D, F-15E, F-16C/D, and A10C aircraft in its Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). Russia possessed the MiG-29, MiG-31,
Su-27, and Su-24M aircraft in the air forces in its Western Military District. All of these
are fourth-generation planes, with neither being substantially newer. I code this as
qualitative parity.
Tank quality – The United States ground forces in Europe had the M1A1 and M1A2
tanks, which were introduced in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Russian ground forces possessed
the T-72B, T-80BV/-U, and T-90/T-90A tanks, which were introduced in the 1980’s and
1990’s as well. Because of this, I code qualitative parity here despite the presence of an
older original design in the T-72B.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed the C-5, C-17A, and C-130 (E,
H, and J variants) for strategic airlift, with the C-17’s and C-130J’s being introduced in
the 1990’s. The United States also had the KC-10A and KC-135R/T aircraft for aerial
refueling. Russia had the Il-78 aircraft for aerial refueling. Most of its transport was
composed of Il-76 aircraft, introduced in the 1970’s. Russia also possessed a number of
other aircraft, including the An-124 (introduced in the 1980’s), An-12/-24 (introduced in
the 1950’s and 60’s), and Tu-134/-154 (introduced in the 1960’s). Because US aircraft
were much newer on average, I code this as qualitative superiority for the United States.
Surface combatant quality – The United States possessed 1 aircraft carrier, 2 guidedmissile cruisers with helicopter hangar facilities, and 2 guided-missile destroyers with
helicopter hangar facilities in its Mediterranean Sixth Fleet. Russia possessed an aircraft
carrier, guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers (some with helicopter hangar
facilities), and guided-missile frigates in its Black Sea and Baltic Fleets. With both sides
having aircraft carriers, I code this as qualitative parity.
Submarine quality – The United States possessed three attack submarines in the Sixth
Fleet, most likely of the Los Angeles or Virginia class and all of them nuclear-powered.
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Russia possessed four diesel-powered attack submarines across its Baltic and Black Sea
Fleets. Because the United States’ submarines were nuclear-powered while Russia’s were
not, I code this as qualitative superiority for the United States.
Turkey-Russia Jet Shootdown Incident, 2015
•

•

•

•
•

Tactical air quality – The United States forces in the Middle East and eastern
Mediterranean possessed the F-22A (one squadron), F-15C (one sqn), and F-15E (one
sqn) aircraft. In the 5th and 6th fleets, the Navy possessed F-A18 aircraft of the C, E, and F
variants. Russia, in its Southern, Western, and Central Military Districts, possessed the
MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-24M/2, Su-27, Su-30, and Su-34 aircraft. The United States
possessed a fifth-generation aircraft, but it is such a small fraction of the total air forces in
the area (six out of 102 aircraft) that I do not count it as a significant new capability for
US forces yet. For this reason, I continue to code qualitative parity.
Tank quality – The United States armored brigade combat team in Kuwait possessed the
M1A1 and M1A2 tanks. Russian ground forces in the south possessed the T-72BA, T72B3, T-80BV/U, T-90, and T-90A tanks. The T-80 and T-90 tanks were thirdgeneration tanks comparable to the M1 Abrams and M1A1/A2. The American tanks were
not significantly newer than the Russian tanks overall, despite the presence of older T-72
in the Russian ground forces. Because of this, I code qualitative parity here.
Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed a similar tanker/transport air
force as it did in 2014, but they retired some C-130E and C-5A and replaced them with
newer C-5M Super Galaxy. Russia possessed the same force as it did in 2014. Because
the United States force modernized somewhat compared to the Russian force from 2014,
I continue to code qualitative superiority for the United States.
Surface combatant quality – Both Russia and the United States possessed the same type
of naval forces that they possessed in 2014. I continue to code qualitative parity here.
Submarine quality – Both Russia and the United States possessed the same type of
submarine forces in the Mediterranean Seas in the 2014 that they did in 2015. Because of
this, I continue to code qualitative superiority for the United States.

Kerch Strait Incident, 2018
•

•

Tactical air quality – The United States possessed a squadron of A-10C’s in Turkey and
the F-16C/D aircraft in Italy and Germany. This is similar to what the US had in 2014.
The Russian air forces in the western and southern portions of the country possessed a
similar force to what they had in 2015, but they replaced their Su-24M aircraft with
newer Su-35S. These were not introduced in large enough numbers to make the Russian
forces substantially newer than the American tactical aircraft forces. I code qualitative
parity here.
Tank quality – The United States ground forces in Germany still possessed the
M1A1/A2 tanks. Russian forces continued to have a majority of the T-72B/BA and T72B3 tanks in its armored forces. It also had a good number of T-80BV/U and T-90/90A
tanks in its ground forces. Because this composition of tanks is similar to what each side
in 2014 and 2015, I continue to code qualitative parity here.
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•

•

•

Tanker/transport air quality – The United States possessed a similar tanker/transport
force that it did in 2015, but it continued to replace the C-130H’s with C-130J’s and had
completely replaced its C-5A’s with C-5M’s. Russia possessed the same composition of
tanker/transport forces as it did in 2015. Because the United States continued to
modernize its forces while Russia’s remained the same, I continue to code qualitative
superiority for the United States.
Surface combatant quality – The United States possessed a guided-missile cruiser with
hangar facilities and guided-missile destroyers in its Sixth Fleet. Russia possessed a
guided-missile cruiser with hangar facilities, a guided-missile destroyer, and four
guided-missile frigates, half of them with hangar facilities. Because neither side
possessed aircraft carriers and had similar guided-missile and helicopter hangar
capabilities, I code qualitative parity here.
Submarine quality – The United States possessed nuclear-powered attack submarines in
its Sixth Fleet, while Russia possessed diesel electric-powered attack submarines.
Because the US subs were nuclear-powered ones for Russia were not, I code this as
qualitative superiority for the United States.
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